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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis sought to advance understanding of the politics of workplace reform, 
explaining the respective roles of management and employees and how they relate. 
 
The literature on workplace reform usually argues that reform is predicated on greater 
workforce participation in managerial decisions.  More specifically, different 
approaches to workplace reform can be aligned to different forms of participation.  
Thus quality management can be associated with direct forms of participation, 
institutional workplace reform may depend on representative forms, and best practice 
may require a combination of both. 
 
This thesis uses empirical evidence to explore this alignment between the different 
approaches to workplace reform and forms of participation. 
 
The period chosen for empirical study is approximately 1985-1992 – an era of rapid 
innovation in workplace reform for Australian manufacturing.  Three workplaces were 
chosen for intensive study from automotive component manufacturers because that 
industry was itself a laboratory for workplace reform and also because these firms 
exemplified different approaches to competitiveness and reform.   
 
Three approaches to workplace reform – quality management, institutional workplace 
reform, and best practice – were distinguished to capture the range of Australian 
practice at that time.  Similarly two approaches to workplace participation were 
distinguished – direct and representative – to reflect the range of observable practices 
at that time and to represent competing philosophies.  Direct participation illustrated 
an approach founded in managerial context of the political status quo, whilst 
representative forms were considered to permit a pluralist shift of power to enable 
employees to manage in place of management. 
 
The three case studies depict companies sharing the competitive crisis of their 
industry.  From this stems the impetus for workplace reform.  At this point the firms 
diverged in their choice of competitive strategies for workplace reform. 
 
The case studies reveal, at the superficial level, a match between the chosen 
approaches to workplace reform and forms of participation.  Basically, quality 
management is associated with direct employee participation, institutional workplace 
reform with collective bargaining and representative consultative committees, and 
best practice with both.  However when the implementation of reform and 
participation are examined this match becomes less significant.  One firm, Auto Air, 
achieved highly effective outcomes in both reform and participation.  Another firm, 
Auto Electrical, failed in both. 
 
The thesis concluded that the relationship between forms of participation and reform 
is less significant than the effective implementation of policy.  Unitarist or pluralist 
approaches to power distribution count less than managerial capacity to integrate 
successive reform initiatives and their commitment to workforce participation in 
change.   
 iv  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
 
TITLE          i 
 
CANDIDATE DECLARATION        ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS        iii 
 
ABSTRACT          iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS        v 
 
LIST OF FIGURES         x
     
LIST OF TABLES         xiv 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS       xxii 
 
CHAPTER ONE         
  
Introduction          1 
Introduction         1 
Research Design        8 
Summary and Thesis Plan       12 
 
CHAPTER TWO         14 
Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation      
Introduction         14 
 Workplace Reform         14 
 Quality Management        16 
 Institutional Workplace Reform       26 
 Best Practice         34 
 Workforce Participation       41 
 Representative Workforce Participation     42 
 Direct Workforce Participation      45 
 The Problem         48 
 Conclusion         49 
 
CHAPTER THREE         52 
The Australian Automotive Industry     
 Introduction         52 
 v  
       PAGE 
  
Australian Manufacturing         53 
 Developments in the Australian Automotive Industry    55 
 Australian Automotive Industry – The Product Market   59 
Performance Measures       65 
Performance Outcomes: The 1991 Crisis     72 
 Workplace Reform in the Australian Automotive Industry   73 
 Postscript         80 
Conclusion         81 
 
CHAPTER FOUR  
Auto Electrical (I)         83 
Engineering Competitiveness Through Advanced Technology  
 Introduction         83 
 Auto Electrical: Ownership and Corporate Role    84 
 Product         84 
 Market          86 
 Costs          86 
 Organisational Structure       87 
 Corporate Plan        90 
 Work Organisation        90 
 Management                    99 
 Human Resource Management                101 
 Wages and Industrial Relations                104 
 Pressures for Change                  107 
 Summary                   110 
 
CHAPTER FIVE         113 
Auto Electrical (II)         
Management Controlled Reform  
 Introduction         113 
 Quality Management Reform       114 
  Management Related Change      116 
  Employee Related Change – Production    119 
  Employee Related Change – Specialist    121 
 Institutional Workplace Reform      122 
  Two Tier        123 
  Award Restructuring       124 
  Enterprise Agreements      125 
 Best Practice Reform        127 
 Workforce Participation       129 
  Direct Workforce Participation      129 
  Representative Workforce Participation    133 
   Central Consultative Committee 1989-1991   134 
   Central Consultative Committee A&B 1992   138 
   Central Consultative Committee 1993   143 
 Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation    145 
 Conclusion         146 
 vi  
 
       PAGE 
CHAPTER SIX 
Auto Mechanical (I)         148 
Survival Through Global Rationalisation  
 Introduction         148 
 Auto Mechanical: Ownership and Corporate Role    148 
 Product         150 
Market          152 
 Costs          152 
 Organisational Structure       153 
 Corporate Plan        155 
 Work Organisation        156 
 Management         163 
 Human Resource Management      165 
 Wages and Industrial Relations      167 
 Pressures for Change        167 
 Summary         169 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN         173 
Auto Mechanical (II)  
Workplace Reform through Consultation        
 Introduction         173 
 Quality Management Reform       174 
  Management Related Change      176 
  Joint Management and Employee Related Change    177 
 Institutional Workplace Reform      181 
Two Tier        183 
Award Restructuring       183 
Enterprise Agreements      186 
  Management Commitment      187 
  Employee Commitment      188 
 Best Practice Reform                                        191 
 Workforce Participation       197 
  Direct Workforce Participation      198 
  Representative Workforce Participation    201 
   Joint Consultative Committee 1989-1992   201 
   Joint Consultative Committee 1992-1993   208 
 Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation    214 
 Conclusion         215 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT         217 
Auto Air (I)  
Competing Through Growth 
Introduction         217 
 Auto Air: Ownership and Corporate Role     218 
 Product         218 
 Market          219 
 Costs          220 
 vii  
 PAGE 
 
Organisational Structure       220 
Corporate Plan        222 
 Work Organisation        223 
Management         228 
 Human Resource Management      232 
 Wages and Industrial Relations      233 
 Pressures for Change        234 
 Summary         237 
        
CHAPTER NINE 
Auto Air (II)          239 
 Integrating Reform and Participation 
 Introduction         239 
 Quality Management Reform       241 
  Management Related Change      243 
  Employee Related Change – Production    245 
  Employee Related Change – Specialists    245 
 Institutional Workplace Reform      247 
  Two Tier        247 
  Award Restructuring       248 
  Enterprise Agreement       249 
  Productivity Agreement      250 
 Best Practice Reform        252 
  Strategy         254 
  Operational Practice       256 
   Stage One       256 
   Stage Two       259 
   Stage Three       260 
   Stage Four       262 
 Workforce Participation       267 
 Direct Workforce Participation       268 
  Process Improvement Groups      268 
  Semi-Autonomous Work Groups     270 
 Representative Workforce Participation     272 
  Employee Participation Group     274 
  Auto Air Group Award Restructuring Steering Committee  276 
  Award Restructuring Working Party Committee   278 
  Training Sub-Committee      281 
 Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation    283 
 Conclusion         284 
 
CHAPTER TEN          286 
Conclusion - Aligning Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation  
 Introduction         286 
 The Companies        298 
 Pressure for Reform        290 
 Workplace Reform        292 
 viii  
  PAGE 
 
Quality Management Reform       294 
Institutional Workplace Reform      295 
 Best Practice Reform        297 
 Workforce Participation       299 
 Conclusion          302 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY         308 
 
COMPANY REFERENCES       331 
 
APPENDICES         340 
 
 ix  
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
PAGE 
 
Chapter Two  
         
Figure 2.1  Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program   37 
   Principles of Best Practice 
 
Figure 2.2  Elements of Best Practice     38 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Figure 3.1   PMV Assemblers, Gross Investment Expenditure  67 
 by Type 1988-1991 (1991 $A) 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Figure 4.1  Auto Electrical       87 
   Analysis of Cost Distribution 1992  
    
Figure 4.2  Auto Electrical                  88 
   Organisational Chart - Divisions and Departments 1992 
 
Figure 4.3  Auto Electrical       89 
   Employment Distribution by Department 1992   
 
Figure 4.4  Production Flow Chart 1992     91 
    
Figure 4.5  Auto Electrical       95 
   Classification of Plant Workforce 1992  
   
Figure 4.6  Auto Electrical       96 
   Expenditure on Training 1992   
    
Figure 4.7  Auto Electrical ER&D Division    97 
   Classification of Workforce 1992 
 
Figure 4.8  Auto Electrical        98 
   Classification of Workforce 1992 
     
 
PAGE  
 x  
 
Figure 4.9  Auto Electrical       100 
   Organisational Chart Management 1992 
    
Figure 4.10  Auto Electrical       106 
   Union Membership Distribution 1992  
    
Figure 4.11  Auto Electrical       109 
   Employment 1988-1993      
 
        
Chapter Five 
 
Figure 5.1  Auto Electrical       117 
   Quality Council Communication Process 1989-1993  
  
Figure 5.2  Auto Electrical       140 
   Consultative Committee A  
   Meetings 1989-1993   
   
Figure 5.3  Auto Electrical       141 
   Central Consultative Committees 
Sub-Committees 1992 & 1993     
 
Chapter Six 
 
Figure 6.1  Auto Mechanical       153 
   Analysis of Cost Distribution 1992  
    
Figure 6.2  Auto Mechanical       154 
   Organisational Chart - Departments 1992  
   
Figure 6.3  Auto Mechanical       155 
   Employment Distribution by Department 1992 
   
Figure 6.4  Auto Mechanical       159 
   Classification of Production Workforce 1992  
   
Figure 6.5  Auto Mechanical       160 
   Employee Training Program - Hours per annum  
   1989-1991       
  
Figure 6.6  Auto Mechanical       163 
   Classification of Workforce 1992    
  
Figure 6.7  Auto Mechanical       164 
   Organisational Chart Management 1992  
 
PAGE  
 xi  
 
Figure 6.8  Auto Mechanical       169 
   Employment 1987-1992      
 
Chapter Seven 
 
Figure 7.1  International Corporation Credo    191 
 
Figure 7.2  Auto Mechanical       203 
   Consultative Committee Meetings 1989-1993  
 
Figure 7.3  Auto Mechanical       204 
Consultative Committee Sub-Committees 1989-1992  
 
Chapter Eight 
 
Figure 8.1  Auto Air        220 
Analysis of Cost Distribution 1990  
 
Figure 8.2  Auto Air        221 
   Organisational Chart - Departments 1990  
   
Figure 8.3  Auto Air        222 
   Employment Distribution by Department 1990   
 
Figure 8.4  Auto Air        225 
   Classification of Manufacturing Workforce 1990  
  
Figure 8.5  Auto Air        228 
   Classification of Workforce 1990    
  
Figure 8.6  Auto Air        229 
   Organisational Chart Management 1991   
  
Figure 8.7  Auto Air        237 
   Employment 1988-1993      
 
Chapter Nine 
 
Figure 9.1  Auto Air        257 
   Organisational Chart - Manufacturing 1992  
   
Figure 9.2  Auto Air        260 
   Organisational Chart - Business Units 1992  
   
Figure 9.3   Auto Air        262 
   Organisational Chart – Management 1992 
 
PAGE  
 xii  
 
Figure 9.4  Auto Air and Auto Air Group    273 
   Consultative Committee 
   Meetings 1989-1993  
 
Chapter Ten 
 
Figure 10.1  Cross Company Comparisons  
   Total Company sales 1988-1993 ($M)   291 
 
Figure 10.2  Cross Company Comparisons - Employment 1988-1993 291 
 
 xiii  
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
                 PAGE 
 
Chapter Two  
 
Table 2.1  Incidence of Quality Initiatives in Australian Workplaces  23 
1990 - 1995  
 
Table 2.2  Management Objectives for Quality Circles 1995  25 
 
Table 2.3  Issues Covered by Enterprise Agreements 1995  31 
 
Table 2.4  Work Organisation Provisions    31 
 in Enterprise Agreements 1995 
 
Table 2.5 Incidence of Joint Consultative Committees   32 
 in Australian Workplaces 1990 and 1995 
 
Table 2.6  Management Objectives for      33 
Joint Consultative Committees  
 
Table 2.7   Teams and Employee Empowerment    39 
 
Table 2.8  Incidence of Semi-Autonomous Work Groups  40 
   in Australian Workplaces 1995 
 
Table 2.9 Issues with which Consultative Committees   45 
have Authority to Deal 1995  
 
Table 2.10  Impact of Joint Consultative Committees 1995  45 
 
Table 2.11  Impact of Quality Circles and     
 47 
Semi-Autonomous Work Groups on  
Workforce Participation 
   Management View 1995  
 
Table 2.12  Impact of Semi-Autonomous Work Groups   48 
   and Quality Circles on Workforce Participation 
   Workplace Representatives View 1995    
 
Table 2.13  Four Elements of Workforce Participation   49 
 xiv  
PAGE 
 
Table 2.14   Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation  50 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Table 3.1   Domestic Sales of new PMVs 1985-1991   60 
 
Table 3.2  Market Share - Vehicles by Size 1985-1991   60 
 
Table 3.3  Annual Price Increases      61 
   Locally Produced and Imported Cars 
   Consumer Price Index & Average Weekly Earnings  
   1985-1991        
 
Table 3.4  New PMV Sales by Type of Purchaser 1985-1991 $A 62 
 
Table 3.5  Australian Automotive Exports 1985-1991    63 
 
Table 3.6  Production of Locally Produced PMVs   65 
 
Table 3.7  Working Days Lost per Thousand Employees:   70 
   Automotive Industry and Total Manufacturing 1987-1991 
 
Table 3.8  Australian Automotive Industry     71 
Mass Production Work Organisation  
 
Table 3.9  Profit Performance of PMV      72 
Manufacturing Operations ($M) 1985-1991    
 
Table 3.10  Employment in the Australian Automotive Industry  72 
1985-1993       
 
Table 3.11  Ford Q101 Systems Evidence Requirements, 1988  75 
 
Table 3.12  Automotive firms in the ABPDP    78 
Changes Introduced 
 
Table 3.13   Automotive firms involved in the ABPDP   79
   Workforce Participation 
 
Table 3.14  Australian Automotive Industry    81 
Production, Exports and Employment 
1992-1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 xv  
PAGE 
Chapter Four 
 
Table 4.1   Auto Electrical       107 
   Key Performance Data 1988-1993     
 
 
Table 4.2  Auto Electrical       111 
   Work Organisation - Mass Production Model   
 
Chapter Five 
 
Table 5.1  Auto Electrical       114 
Workplace Reform    
Table 5.2  Auto Electrical       116 
   Quality Management Reform Process 1989-1993   
 
Table 5.3  Auto Electrical       122 
   Workforce Participation and Quality Management Reform  
 
Table 5.4  Auto Electrical       123 
   Institutional Workplace Reform, 1987-1992    
 
Table 5.5  Auto Electrical       126 
   Workforce Participation and Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
Table 5.6  Auto Electrical       128 
   Workforce Participation and Best Practice Reform   
 
Table 5.7  Auto Electrical       133 
   Direct Workforce Participation  
 
Table 5.8  Auto Electrical       135 
   Structure for Representative Participation 
 
Table 5.9  Auto Electrical       136 
   Central Consultative Committee 1989 
Management Presentations 
 
Table 5.10  Auto Electrical       137 
   Central Consultative Committee 1989 
Sub-Committees    
 
Table 5.11  Auto Electrical       141 
   Central Consultative Committee (A) 1992  
Issues Presented by Management    
 
 
 
 xvi  
PAGE 
 
Table 5.12  Auto Electrical       142 
   Consultative Committee Sub-Committee Recommendations 
 
Table 5.13  Auto Electrical       143 
   Central Consultative Committee 1993  
Issues Discussed   
 
Table 5.14  Auto Electrical       145 
Representative Workforce Participation 1987-1993 
 
Table 5.15  Auto Electrical       146 
   Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation   
 
Chapter Six  
 
Table 6.1  Auto Mechanical       168 
   Key Performance Data 1988-1993     
 
Table 6.2  Auto Mechanical       171 
   Work Organisation - Mass Production Model   
 
Chapter Seven 
 
Table 7.1   Auto Mechanical - Workplace Reform   174 
 
Table 7.2  Auto Mechanical       176 
   Quality Management Reform Process 1989-1993   
 
Table 7.3  Auto Mechanical       177 
   Quality Operating System Strategy     
    
 
Table 7.4  Auto Mechanical       179 
   Quality Improvement Schedule     
 
Table 7.5  Auto Mechanical       181 
   Workforce Participation and Quality Management Reform  
 
Table 7.6  Auto Mechanical       182 
   Institutional Workplace Reform 1987-1993    
 
Table 7.7  Auto Mechanical       189 
   Employee Productivity Improvement     
 
Table 7.8  Auto Mechanical       191 
   Workforce Participation and Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
 xvii  
PAGE 
 
Table 7.9  Auto Mechanical       193 
   Best Practice Reform       
 
Table 7.10.  Auto Mechanical       194 
   Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program 
Project Proposal      
 
Table 7.11  Auto Mechanical       195 
   Policies 1992      
 
Table 7.12  Auto Mechanical       196 
   Key Performance Indicators 1993     
 
Table 7.13  Auto Mechanical       197 
   Workforce Participation and Best Practice Reform   
 
Table 7.14  Auto Mechanical       200 
   Direct Workforce Participation  
 
Table 7.15  Auto Mechanical       203 
   Structure for Representative Participation  
 
Table 7.16  Auto Mechanical       206 
   Consultative Committee 1989 Issues Discussed  
 
Table 7.17  Auto Mechanical       206 
   Consultative Committee 1990-91 
   Issues Discussed 
 
Table 7.18  Auto Mechanical       209 
   Consultative Committee 1992 
Issues Discussed       
 
Table 7.19  Auto Mechanical       212 
   Consultative Committee 1993 
Issues Discussed       
 
Table 7.20  Auto Mechanical       213 
   Representative Workforce Participation and Workplace Reform 
 
Table 7.21  Auto Mechanical       214 
   Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation  
 
 
 
 
 
 xviii  
PAGE  
 
Chapter Eight 
 
Table 8.1  Auto Air        233 
   Safety Record 1986-1991      
 
Table 8.2  Auto Air        235 
   Key Performance Data 1988-1993     
 
Table 8.3  Auto Air        238 
   Work Organisation Mass Production Model   
 
Chapter Nine 
 
Table 9.1  Auto Air Workplace Reform     241 
 
Table 9.2  Auto Air        242 
   Quality Management Reform Process 1989-1993   
 
Table 9.3  Auto Air        247 
   Workforce Participation and Quality Management Reform  
 
Table 9.4   Auto Air        248 
   Institutional Workplace Reform 1987-1993    
 
Table 9.5  Auto Air        252 
   Workforce Participation and Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
Table 9.6   Auto Air        253 
   Best Practice Reform 
 
Table 9.7   Auto Air        264 
   Work Organisation – Pre and Post 1992 
 
Table 9.8  Auto Air        265 
   Performance Targets Status-September 1993   
 
Table 9.9  Auto Air        266 
   Workforce Participation and Best Practice Reform   
 
Table 9.10  Auto Air        269 
   Process Improvement Group Projects 1990-1991   
 
Table 9.11  Auto Air        270 
   Workforce Participation and Best Practice Reform   
 
Table 9.12  Auto Air        271 
   Direct Workforce Participation 
 xix  
PAGE  
 
Table 9.13  Auto Air        275 
   EPG 1988-1992 
Issues   
 
 Table 9.14  Auto Air Group      276 
   Award Restructuring Steering Committee 
   Issues Discussed       
 
Table 9.15  Auto Air        279 
   Award Restructuring Working Party Committee 
1990-1991 
   Restructuring Timetable      
 
Table 9.16  Auto Air        280 
   Award Restructuring Working Party Committee 
1990-1991 -  
   Issues Discussed        
 
Table 9.17  Auto Air        282 
   Extent of Representative Workforce Participation  
   1987-1993 
 
Table 9.18  Auto Air        283 
   Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation   
 
Chapter Ten 
 
Table 10.1  Cross Company Comparisons - Characteristics  288 
 
Table 10.2  Cross Company Comparisons - Internal Structures  289 
 
Table 10.3  Cross Company Comparisons     290 
   Production Processes and Workplace Culture   
 
Table 10.4  Cross Company Comparisons    293 
   Integrating Workplace Reform      
 
Table 10.5  Cross Company Comparisons     294 
   Quality Reform Process      
 
Table 10.6  Cross Company Comparisons     295 
   Quality Reform Outcomes      
 
Table 10.7  Cross Company Comparisons    296 
   Institutional Workplace Reform Process 
 
 
 xx  
PAGE  
 
Table 10.8   Cross Company Comparison     296 
   Institutional Workplace Reform Outcomes 
 
Table 10.9  Cross Company Comparisons    297 
   Best Practice Reform Process 
 
Table 10.10  Cross Company Comparisons    298 
   Best Practice Reform Outcome 
 
Table 10.11  Cross Company Comparisons    299 
Workforce Participation  
 
Table 10.12  Cross Company Comparisons    300 
Direct Workforce Participation Process 
 
Table 10.13  Cross Company Comparisons     301 
   Representative Workforce Participation  
 
Table 10.14  Cross Company Comparisons     301 
   Outcomes of Workforce Participation under  
   Workplace Reform 
 
Table 10.15  The Processes of Workplace Reform    303 
   and Workforce Participation   
 
Table 10.16  Workplace Reform Outcomes and     305 
Implementation of Workforce Participation   
 Processes 
 
 
 
 xxi  
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
8D    Eight Discipline 
AAG     Auto Air Group 
AA     Auto Air  
ABPDP   Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program 
ABS    Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS    Automotive Body System 
ACAC    Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
ACAS    Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
ACM    Australian Chamber of Manufacturers 
ACTU    Australian Council of Trade Unions 
ADSTE   Association of Draughting, Supervisory and Technical 
    Employees 
AIA    Automotive Industry Authority 
AIC    Automotive Industry Council 
AIRC    Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
ALP    Australian Labor Party 
AM    after-market 
AMC    Australian Manufacturing Council 
AMWU   Amalgamated Metal Workers Union 
ARSC    Award Restructuring Steering Committee 
ARWPC   Award Restructuring Working Party Committee 
ASE    Australian Society of Engineers 
AWE    Average Weekly Earnings 
AWIRS90   Australian Workforce Industrial Relations Survey 1990 
AWIRS95   Australian Workforce Industrial Relations Survey 1995 
AWU    Australian Workers Union 
BCS    Body Chassis System 
BMC    British Motor Company 
BP    Best Practice 
CAD    Computer Aided Drafting 
CAI    Confederation of Australian Industry 
CAM    Computer Aided Manufacture 
CAR    Corrective Action Request 
CBU    Completely-Built-Up 
CC    Consultative Committee 
CCC1989   Central Consultative Committee 1989 
CCC1993   Central Consultative Committee 1993 
CCCA1992   Central Consultative Committee A 1992 
CCCB1992   Central Consultative Committee B 1992 
CKU    Completely-Knocked-Down 
 xxii  
Cl.     Clause 
CNC    Computer Numerical Control 
CPI    Consumer Price Index 
Cpk    Controlled Process Capacity 
CQI    Continuous Quality Improvement 
CSD    Corporate Services Department 
DIR    Department of Industrial Relations 
EB    Enterprise Bargaining 
EBA     Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 
EDI    Electronic Data Information 
EEO    Equal Employment Opportunity 
EFT    Electronic Funds Transfer 
EI    Employee Involvement 
EPAC    Economic Planning Advisory Committee 
EPC    Engineering Production Certificate 
ER&D    Engineering Research and Development 
FAPM    Federation of Automotive Products Manufacturers 
FCAI    Federated Chamber of Automotive Industries 
FCU    Federated Clerks Union 
FIMEE    Federation of Industrial Manufacturing and 
Engineering     Employees 
FMEA    Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
FMWU   Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union 
FORD Q1   Ford Motor Company Quality Supplier Assessment 
FORD Q101   Ford Motor Company Quality Supplier Assessment 
FVIU    Federated Vehicle Industry Union 
GM    General Motors 
GMH    General Motors Holden 
GMH QSA   General Motors Holden Quality Supplier Assessment 
HR    Human Resources 
HRM    Human Resource Management 
IC     Industry Commission 
IMVP    International Motor Vehicle Project 
IR    Industrial Relations 
IRC    Industrial Relations Commission 
JCC    Joint Consultative Committee 
JIT    Just In Time 
JUSE    Japanese Union of Scientific Engineers 
KPI    Key Performance Indicators 
MIS    Management Information System 
MIT    Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MPS    Materials Purchasing and Supply 
MRPII    Materials Research Planning II 
MTFU    Metal Trade Federation of Unions 
MTIA    Metal Trades Industry Association 
NATA    National Association of Testing Authority 
NC    Numerical Control 
NKCIR   National Key Centre for Industrial Relations 
NUW    National Union of Workers 
 xxiii  
NWG    Natural Work Groups 
OE    Original Equipment 
OECD    Organisation for Economic Development 
OH&S    Occupational Health and Safety 
OTS    Off-tool-sample 
P&A    Parts and Accessories 
PDO    Periodic Day Off 
PEP    Productivity Enhancement Process 
PIG    Process Improvement Groups 
PMV    Passenger Motor Vehicles 
Ppk    Preliminary Process Capacity 
PPM    Parts Per Million 
QC    Quality Circle 
QMSC    Quality Management Steering Committee 
QOSS    Quality Operations System Strategy 
QPT    Quality Planning Team 
QWL    Quality of Work Life 
RDO    Rostered Day Off 
SA    South Australia 
SAWG   Semi-Autonomous-Work-Groups 
SCP    Specialist Component Producers 
SEP    Structural Efficiency Principles 
SPC    Statistical Process Control 
SQA    Supplier Quality Assurance 
TAFE    Technical and Further Education 
TDC    Trade Development Corporation 
TPS    Toyota Production System 
TQC    Total Quality Control 
TQM    Total Quality Management 
TUTA    Trade Union Training Authority 
TWU    Transport Workers Union 
UK    United Kingdom 
USA    United States of America 
VBU    Vehicle Builders Union 
Vic.    Victoria 
WCM    World Competitive Manufacturing 
WPS    Workplaces 
WWII    World War Two 
 
 
 xxiv  
  
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This thesis seeks to advance understanding of the politics of workplace reform.  
Specifically, what are the tasks of management, what is the role of workers, and how 
do they relate? 
 
Workplace reform is a common term in Australia but it relates to a set of poorly 
understood and perhaps contradictory activities found in workplaces that are seeking 
to induce productivity growth.  It is commonplace for workplace reform to be 
predicated on greater workforce participation.  However the nature of this relationship 
is complex.  Workforce participation is also open to many interpretations, although its 
meaning has been explored more rigorously in the research literature.  The question of 
interest is – does workplace reform require a power shift to enable workers to remedy 
mismanagement, or does it require limited suggestions and consent manufactured 
within the political status quo?  Accordingly the question posed for this thesis is – 
what is the nature of the relationship between workplace reform and workforce 
participation? 
 
Let us begin, then, by establishing the purpose of the thesis through a brief discussion 
of the question set out above linked to a preliminary attempt to clarify the key 
concepts of workplace reform and workforce participation.  Having thus set the 
objectives of the thesis, the remainder of this chapter will go on to describe research 
methods, and to outline the issues dealt with in each chapter of the thesis.  
  
 
3 
Workplace reform – as it is understood now – has its origin in the efforts of business 
organisations to become more competitive and productive in a climate of intense 
product market competition.  Since the mid 1980s much has been said in Australia 
and in other developed countries about the need for industry to reform in order to 
remain competitive in international markets and to improve living standards.  “To live 
well, a nation must produce well”, claimed one influential North American study 
(Dertouzos, Lester & Solow 1989:1).  Australian policy makers and producers have 
heeded this message. 
 
The reform of production is a complex phenomena and may be made up of many 
ingredients.  Central to most analyses of workplace reform is the notion of more 
exacting customer demands – a consequence of product market saturation and relaxed 
market controls that cause intensified competition.  The challenge this creates for 
producers is a formidable one.  Producers in competitive markets must provide more 
exacting quality at lower prices at the very time that costs of materials, energy, and 
labour are increasing sharply (Imai 1986).  This in turn forces a re-appraisal of 
traditional methods of work organisation.  Work processes that emphasise quantity 
rather than quality, mechanisation rather than humanisation, and managerial control 
rather than employee commitment, have been indicted as unsustainable in a 
competitive market (Wilkinson et al. 1993).  Such traditional work processes are said 
to be associated with inferior products and inefficient factories – a poor basis for long-
term commercial survival (Dertouzos Lester & Solow 1989:1).  
 
Such discussions of productivity improvement inevitably lead to a reconsideration of 
the human factor in work processes.  It has been said “the people element is the final 
piece of the (productivity) jigsaw” (Wilkinson et al. 1993:22).  How business uses 
human resources is often analysed critically.  Thus one influential Australian 
government report condemned the past practice of Australian manufacturers by 
arguing that production can no longer depend on an indifferent and ill-trained 
workforce who retaliates with high labour turnover and absenteeism (Australian 
Manufacturing Council [AMC] 1990).  More generally, the correct use of labour is 
deemed essential to competitiveness; it is “more than merely a variable factor of 
production” (Peters & Waterman 1982; Kanter 1984; Turnbull 1988a; Drucker 1989; 
  
 
4 
Peters 1987, 1992).  Indeed it is sometimes argued that the key strategic resource in 
economic activity has changed from capital to human capital as new technology 
moves economic activity from an industrial era to an information era (Naisbitt & 
Aburdene 1986).  However a more balanced view is likely to depict human resource 
change as just one of a set of equally necessary changes to establish competitive 
production systems.  Thus some writers project future methods of work organisation 
will comprise: 
new ways of thinking about human resources, new ways of organising their systems of 
production, and new approaches to the management of technology (Dertouzos, Lester & Solow 
1989:129). 
 
Real productivity improvement, it is claimed, depends upon simultaneous and 
integrated improvement in all aspects of an organisation’s operations – strategy, 
technology, marketing, operations, information systems, and organisational structure, 
as well as human resources.   
 
In Australia such integrated reform of business and production systems is commonly 
referred to as ‘workplace reform’.  Chapter Two will explore what this means at 
greater length.  For the moment it is sufficient to note three points.  First, the term is 
imprecise because it is used to capture several processes or activities that are 
themselves complex, ill defined, and perhaps contradictory.  Second, these processes 
or activities have been alluded to by a number of subsidiary labels or terms including 
‘new production practices’, ‘teamwork’, ‘semi-autonomous work-groups’, ‘total 
quality management’, ‘lean manufacturing’, ‘high performance work organisation’, 
‘best practice’, ‘award restructuring’, ‘enterprise bargaining’, and many others.  Some 
of these terms refer only to a part (perhaps a small part) of what is meant by the larger 
term ‘workplace reform’.  Third, for the purposes of this thesis the focus will be upon 
three such processes - quality management, institutional workplace reform, and best 
practice.  Quality management is defined as the development of a new quality 
consciousness focussed on continuous quality improvement.  Institutional workplace 
reform is defined as collective bargaining with unions for productivity improvements 
in exchange for wage gains.  Best practice (a common abbreviation of ‘International 
Best Practice’ or ‘World’s Best Practice’) is defined as a “comprehensive and 
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integrated approach to continuous improvement in all facets of an organisation’s 
operations” (AMC 1994:iv).  
 
Why select and focus on these three approaches to workplace reform?  The answer to 
this question lies largely in the observation that they appear most relevant to the 
Australian automotive industry in the early 1990s when research fieldwork for this 
thesis was undertaken.  The automotive industry – in Australia as elsewhere in the 
world – has appeared to be the pacesetter and archetypal case of a transformation of 
production systems from a ‘Fordist’ to a ‘Post-Fordist’ approach.  The empirical 
studies that inform this thesis report workplace reform in three Australian automotive 
parts manufacturers.  In all three cases, the substance of workplace reform 
corresponded to the three types of reform selected here for particular attention.  More 
generally, from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, Australian manufacturing workplaces 
as a whole have sought to apply these three approaches to workplace reform.  This 
thesis contends that the specific practices and terminology used in Australian 
workplaces at this time related mainly to quality management, award restructuring and 
enterprise bargaining (which have been consolidated as institutional workplace 
reform), and best practice.   
 
There is a further reason to focus on these three types of workplace reform in that they 
appear to exhibit significant differences.  These differences will be discussed in 
Chapter Two.  They relate to the substantive agendas (what is to be reformed) and to 
the ownership or control of the process (by whom will reform be driven).  Such 
differences in the substance and process of workplace reform are likely to have 
important implications for the research question posed by this thesis.  Thus it can be 
suggested that the form of workforce participation necessary for workplace reform 
may depend upon the type of workplace reform – quality management, institutional 
workplace reform, or best practice.   
 
The objective of workplace reform is to improve productivity performance.  There 
exists a body of research literature which shows that performance by firms is affected 
by a set (or bundle) of human resource variables (Cooke 1989; Arthur 1994; Huselid 
1995; McDuffie 1995; Becker & Gerhart 1996).  These include the intensity of 
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collaboration – the co-operative or adversarial nature of labour-management relations.  
For the purpose of this thesis the term workforce participation shall be used to refer to 
this variable of the intensity of collaboration – the many ways in which employees 
may assist production.  This leads to the second key concept of the thesis – workforce 
participation. 
 
Much of the literature on workplace reform recommends increased employee 
(workforce) participation.  It has been claimed that “without the participation of both 
parties to the employment relationship, the firm will not be a viable concern and 
neither profit nor wages will be earned” (Kaufman 1992:37).  Researchers on best 
practice in the USA found that successful companies were characterised by a 
significant level of participation by the workforce on a wide range of matters 
(Dertouzos, Lester & Solow 1989:99).  In the UK one recent government report 
concluded “effective employee involvement is not just a matter of good employer 
practice...it is, above all, a prerequisite for business growth in a modern economy” 
(Employment Department, Research Report 1994, cited in Fernie & Metcalf 
1995:379).  Likewise in Australia a major report into the future of Australian 
manufacturing concluded that there was need for: 
a comprehensive and integrated approach to organisational change and the pursuit of 
continuous improvement in the performance of an enterprise [and] a fundamental change in 
corporate culture and the way management and employees work....a key element of which was 
the increase in employee involvement in decision making (AMC 1990:71). 
 
Consistent with these general claims, the three different approaches to workplace 
reform distinguished above (quality management, institutional workplace reform, and 
best practice) each incorporate increased workforce participation as a key part of the 
reform of the management-employee relationship.  However there is no agreement as 
to the form that it should take.  This ambiguity or lack of clarity is characteristic of the 
literature on workforce participation.  It has been stated that “participation is not a 
single coherent entity....rather it is a vague and shifting terminology covering a 
complex range of techniques and contexts” (Ackers et al. 1992:281).  Similarly it has 
been noted “industrial democracy means different things to different people” (Davis & 
Lansbury [ed] 1986:1).  This looseness in terminology is further shown in the 
workplace reform literature by the undiscriminating use of terms as varied as 
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industrial democracy, workforce participation, empowerment, and employee 
involvement.  Despite their interchangeable use in the workplace reform literature, 
these terms may actually relate to rather different practices and policies.  The key 
dimensions of difference are explored below. 
 
Categorisations of different types of workforce participation may be based upon many 
criteria.  They may relate, for example, to the: 
• level at which participation occurs (from board level to production line) 
• subject matter of participation (which may be unlimited or restricted to a 
specific issue) 
• authority of the participative machinery (executive or advisory) 
• participation of the wider labour movement (which may be excluded or 
involved), or to the model of democracy (representative/pluralist or direct).  
 
This thesis is concerned with the politics of workplace reform.  Thus the particular 
interest in workforce participation relates primarily to the types of political 
mechanisms in workplaces which may mediate conflicting interests in decision-
making.  A useful starting point in categorising different types of workforce 
participation is to distinguish between representative/pluralist forms (in which 
independent and legitimate power blocs mediate conflicting views upon management 
decision making), from direct forms (in which management devolves responsibility 
for production to accountable individuals or teams).   
 
The representative/pluralist type arises because there are claimed to be differences of 
interest underpinned by the unequal distribution of power between employers and 
employees (Fox 1967, 1974, 1975).  It has been argued that, from an employee’s view, 
workforce participation serves to reduce the contested terrain between management 
and labour caused by the unequal distribution of power and control.  Increasingly 
equality of influence through participation is required before more collaborative 
industrial relations can be assured (Edwards 1979; Kochan, Katz & McKersie 1986).  
Thus Poole argued that “workers’ participation is…..the principal means of obtaining 
greater control by workers over several aspects of their working lives and in so doing 
augmenting their power vis a vis that of management”(Poole 1975:24).  This motive 
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for workforce participation leads towards specific institutional forms by which 
employee power can be mobilised – usually forms that involve employee 
representation by independent trade unions or by elected representatives with ‘shop 
floor’ electorate support.  These institutional forms may be referred to as industrial 
democracy or workforce participation but not as empowerment or employee 
involvement.  They entail: 
greater economic and political pluralism....an equality of bargaining power between labor and 
management, industrial democracy, through the independent representation of the workers by 
trade unions and a moderation of the adversarial relationship between managers and workers 
through institutionalized methods of conflict resolution (Kaufman 1992:189). 
 
Conversely, the direct/unitarist approach sometimes described as empowerment or 
employee involvement is often founded in a rather different view of optimal power 
relations.  This is a form of participation employers may favour to enhance workforce 
collaboration with managerial decision-making as it is not premised on the mediation 
of conflicting interests.  Rather, there is an assumption of shared or common interest, 
usually in collective economic welfare.  The institutional forms of empowerment or 
employee involvement will favour individual or work group employee involvement 
rather than collective representation.  Paradoxically, perhaps, this participative model 
will also introduce direct decision-making about customer satisfaction or production 
issues rather than influence upon managerial decision-making.  Implicit in this, of 
course, is a rather different approach to organisational structure than that found in a 
‘Fordist’ organisation – a flatter, less hierarchical structure with decision-making 
authority devolved to work teams (Rimmer et al. 1996).   
 
There is considerable room for debate about the relation between the two forms of 
workforce participation suggested above.  For example, one view advanced by Keller 
is a developmental position that sees the second form of participation supplanting or 
supplementing the first.  He argues: 
old forms of employee representation were and are indirect representative, collective, and 
institutionalized; new models of participation tend to be more direct, individual, and more or 
less informal (Keller 1995:323). 
 
On the other hand Kelly and Kelly argue that “although workers often welcome these 
new industrial relations techniques, there is little evidence of any impact on ‘them and 
us’ attitudes” (Kelly & Kelly 1991:25). 
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The differences between these approaches to workforce participation will be expanded 
upon in Chapter Two.  It is sufficient here to note that the literature on workplace 
reform and workforce participation is problematic in terms of linking concrete forms 
of workforce participation to specific types of workplace reform. 
 
From the studies cited above, there seems to be a widespread claim that workplace 
reform requires workforce participation of some kind.  What is problematic is the 
nature of the relationship between the two.  This thesis first asks whether particular 
types of workplace reform are associated with particular forms of workforce 
participation.  Two preliminary definitional questions need to be answered before this 
question can be handled. 
 
• First, what is meant by workplace reform?  Three approaches to workplace reform, 
quality management, institutional workplace reform, and best practice, will be 
further explored in Chapter Two. 
• Second, what is meant by workforce participation?  Two forms of workforce 
participation, direct and representative, will be distinguished and discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
 
The thesis then goes on to explore whether the hypothesised relationships between 
workplace reform and workforce participation are supported by empirical data devised 
from detailed case studies. 
 
Research Design 
 
Analysis of the relation between workplace reform and workforce participation in this 
thesis is supported by empirical research drawn from three workplace case studies.  
Case study research was considered appropriate for a number of reasons.  First, it is 
appropriate to the complexity of the research subject.  Marchington et al. claim that a 
case study approach to workplaces is useful when studying the “often intricate and 
subtle nature of the questions....why different forms of…Employee Involvement…were 
introduced, how they impacted upon the organisation concerned, and how they varied 
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between different case study sites” (Marchington et al. 1992:3).  This view is echoed 
by Lansbury and Macdonald who claim that case studies provide “the opportunity to 
gain an in-depth knowledge of the dynamics and texture of workplace industrial 
relations” (Lansbury & Macdonald 1992:20).  Both workplace reform and workforce 
participation are complex phenomena, well suited to study through case studies which 
can open up complex patterns of social meaning, power relations and causality.  
Second, the relation between workplace reform and workforce participation is a 
dynamic one, involving changes over time.  These changes are best captured by case 
study research which lends itself to recording and analysing chronological events over 
a lengthy period of time (Lansbury & Macdonald 1992).  While recognising that 
caution needs to be taken with any findings based on a small number of case studies it 
is believed the findings will make a valuable contribution, “throwing light on complex 
and dynamic phenomena” (Kaufman 1992:180). 
 
The case studies describe firms in the Australian automotive industry.  This industry 
was chosen because it has experienced extensive experimentation in workplace 
reform.  Underpinning this reform during the 1980s and 1990s was severe economic 
pressure that forced automotive companies throughout the world into more 
competitive changes such as frequent model renewals.  Recognition of environmental 
hazards and concerns regarding scarcity of fuel contributed.  More generally there was 
a climate of greater consumer demand for price reductions and quality improvements 
(Turnbull 1991; Volpato 1992).  These pressures coincided with product market 
saturation and more intense global competition between producers.  By the late 1980s 
such competitive pressures in Australia forced domestic producers to seek improved 
labour productivity through workplace reform.  This was associated in 1990 with a 
major research report into the future of manufacturing industry.  This report claimed 
the car industry and its associated suppliers represented one of the most important 
industries to the country (AMC 1990).  However, between 1987 and 1993 it became 
an industry under threat as sales of imported vehicle increased from around 15% of 
the market to almost 40% (Automotive Industry Authority [AIA] 1988, 1991, 1993).  
In response to these market problems the government encouraged automotive 
companies to undertake workplace reform.   
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It will be shown that successive experimentation in workplace reform placed emphasis 
upon quality improvement, institutional reform of the management-workforce 
relationship, and integrated ‘best practice’ processes.  Thus the automotive industry, 
both assemblers and component manufacturers, came to exemplify the types of 
workplace reform of interest in this thesis.  Much has been written on reform in the 
automotive assembly section of the industry (Krafcik & McDonald 1989; Lever-Tracy 
1990; Lansbury & Davis [ed] 1991; Mathews 1991; Lansbury & Mcdonald 1992; 
Levine, McLennan & Reece 1993; Menere 1993; Lansbury 1994; Shadur et al. 1994; 
Simmons 1994; Lansbury & Bamber 1995; Davis & Lansbury 1996; Simmons & 
Lansbury 1996; Bamber & Lansbury 1997; Greenwood & Langfield-Smith 1997).  
Accordingly, the less familiar components sector was chosen as a focus for this thesis 
to complement this existing research. 
 
The three case study companies were chosen for several reasons.  First all three 
companies shared a common set of characteristics.  These were; 
 
• All are defined as significant within the Specialist Component Producers (SCPs) 
sector of the automotive industry 
• All are directly linked through the sale of components and the provision of tooling 
to their automotive assembly customers 
• Each suffered from economic downturn in the 1980s and early 1990s 
• All were affected by the reform process introduced by the Australian Federal 
Government in 1984 (Button 1984) 
• Employees in each company are highly unionised, belonging to active and 
powerful unions 
 
Second, all three met a necessary test for inclusion in this thesis.  Each had attempted 
to implement an extensive workplace reform agenda that included some or all of the 
three types of workplace reform under consideration in this thesis.  Similarly these 
experiments in workplace reform were accompanied by workforce participation 
initiatives.  The three companies are therefore appropriate research sites to explore the 
question posed in this thesis. 
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Data collected for the thesis included both primary data sourced from company 
records, focus groups, interviews and surveys, secondary data sourced from published 
case study research, government reports, and a survey of other relevant literature.  
Four principal data collection methods were employed in the case study research: 
• Semi-structured interviews (interview questions are given in Appendix 1). 
• Focus Groups (schedules and questions for each case study are provided in 
Appendix 2). 
• Research into company records.  (This included questions from a ‘Climate 
Survey’ carried out in Auto Mechanical provided in Appendix 3, and 
questions for a ‘Forepersons Survey’ carried out in Auto Air provided in 
Appendix 4). 
• Personal observation. 
 
The data collected was principally qualitative, although quantitative data was gathered 
where possible.  Data collection through observation was made possible by agreement 
with management, unions, and employees in the three workplaces.  This made it 
possible to undertake observation as a non-participant.  Over time this allowed 
observation of both formal and informal consultative activities.  Some observation 
visits were brief, simply for the collection of specific information; others were longer, 
involving small group discussions and attendance at formal meetings.  Included 
amongst the latter were meetings of consultative committees.  Trust was built up with 
managers, the workforce, and the unions representing the workforce, which accounts 
for their willingness to allow viewing of company documents and other information 
without restriction and to use any information collected during these visits as part of 
the empirical data for this thesis.  It also allowed access to the case study sites over an 
extended period from 1989 to 1993 to gain understanding of the dynamics of 
workplace change.  It was a condition of research that anonymity be preserved for all 
three workplaces. 
Focus Groups were used as a data source in all three case studies.  In all companies 
Focus Groups were conducted with both management and workforce representatives 
present.  In some cases additional Focus Groups were held consisting solely of 
managers or employees and their representatives.  The questions posed for the Focus 
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Groups differed to a small degree as shown in the Appendices.  These differences 
were intended to minimise confusion.  They did not noticeably affect results from the 
Focus Groups.  Focus Groups were conducted early in the research in order to enable 
the researcher to stimulate discussion of opinions, reactions, and feelings about 
workplace reform.  Each Focus Group received a written copy of the recorded 
outcomes for validation.  From the information collected the researcher was able to 
develop questions then used in interviews with managers and union officials. 
 
Summary and Thesis Plan 
 
This Chapter has introduced some issues about the tasks and roles of management and 
workers under workplace reform.  Specifically it has explored the question of the 
nature of the relationship between workplace reform and workforce participation.  The 
issues discussed may be summarised as follows.  Workplace reform is a complex 
concept encompassing a range of more specific activities intended to make workplaces 
more productive.  These include, but are not limited to, quality management, 
institutional workplace reform, and best practice.  Under economic pressure since the 
early 1980s, Australian automotive assemblers and parts manufacturers have 
spearheaded reform initiatives under these three headings.  It is usually accepted that 
workforce participation is an integral ingredient in such reform.  Workforce 
participation too is a complex concept capable of application to a range of diverse 
practices.  For the purpose of this thesis two main approaches to workforce 
participation were distinguished – representative and direct.  The relationship between 
workforce participation and workplace reform is unclear, deserves attention, and may 
vary depending on the specific approach taken to reform. 
Ultimately this thesis is concerned with the politics of workplace reform – what kind 
of participation underpins what kind of reform?  The research setting chosen to 
explore this question is the Australian automotive industry.  Case studies were 
undertaken upon three specialist component producers selected primarily because they 
exemplified the range of workplace reforms distinguished above (quality 
management, institutional workplace reform, and best practice), whilst also attempting 
to establish workforce participation.   
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The remainder of this thesis falls into four parts.  First, Chapter Two explores in 
greater depth the key concepts introduced above.  Workplace reform and workforce 
participation are discussed through an extended review of the relevant literature.  
Second, Chapter Three describes economic, corporate, and policy developments in the 
Australian automotive industry with a special focus on the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
This account provides a necessary backdrop to the case studies that follow of the three 
automotive parts manufacturers.  The third part of the thesis comprises six chapters 
containing the case studies themselves.  The account of each firm is broken into two 
chapters: the first describes economic, corporate, technological and other changes, 
whilst the second recounts specific developments in workplace reform and workforce 
participation.  Finally, the tenth and concluding chapter compares similarities and 
differences observed in the three case study firms and draws out lessons about the 
relationship between workplace reform and workforce participation.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
WORKPLACE REFORM AND WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION 
Theory and Practice 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapter the question was asked - what is the relationship between 
workplace reform and workforce participation?  An initial distinction was drawn 
between three types of workplace reform (quality management, institutional 
workplace reform, and best practice) and between two types of participation 
(representative and direct).  The principal objective of this chapter is to review the 
literature on workplace reform and workforce participation to clarify the principal 
types distinguished above.  
 
Workplace Reform  
 
Mathews describes workplace reform as the “watchword of change in Australia” 
(Mathews 1994:19).  He may be correct in suggesting that the expression workplace 
reform is employed extensively in Australia, but what does the expression mean?   
 
In general, workplace reform can be said to possess three defining characteristics.  
First, is a common purpose - to improve competitiveness or productivity.  Workplace 
reform may have other objectives such as improving job security, workforce equity, or 
environmental standards.  But this thesis will treat these as contingent objectives 
whereas improved competitiveness or productivity is a necessary goal.  Second, is a 
common locale or point of action - the workplace.  Workplace reform may depend 
upon support from sources outside the workplace - corporate head offices, 
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governments, trade unions, and so on.  However, the activities and productivity gains 
to which those supports are directed occur essentially within workplaces.  Third, is a 
common ingredient - varying the human input into production.  Workplace reform 
may well entail other aspects of business activity – strategy, new technology, 
marketing, and the like.  However, by themselves changes to such business activities 
do not constitute workplace reform as this term will be used here.  Rather it is 
necessary that workplace reform requires human resource change, albeit frequently 
under the influence of changes in other business functions or activities.  
 
In Chapter One it was noted that workplace reform denotes several distinct and 
sometimes conflicting phenomena.  Three particular approaches were distinguished 
for further analysis in this thesis – quality management, institutional workplace 
reform, and best practice.  These were selected as the approaches most relevant to the 
Australian automotive industry in the period under research – the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  It will be shown that these three are also different in important ways.  It will 
also be claimed that this typology, whilst not exhaustive (encompassing all significant 
approaches to workplace reform), does cover other significant claimants for attention 
such as lean production (which can be treated as a variant of best practice).  Many 
phenomena given different titles in management writing overlap significantly in 
substance.  It is not possible to show here what all the titles for workplace reform are; 
indeed this would be superfluous as many relate to practices adequately described by 
other titles.  This thesis is founded on the claim that the three variants selected 
adequately cover the field – at least for the automotive industry at the time of the 
study. 
 
The order in which Australian managers, especially those in the automotive industry, 
came to experiment with these three forms of workplace reform is roughly as follows.  
Quality management was the first to come in vogue.  Quality circles became popular 
in the early 1980s, followed by ‘just-in-time’ (JIT) systems and strict quality 
accreditation in the late 1980s.  Institutional workplace reform was next to follow 
beginning with the ‘two tier’ wage system of March 1987 and continuing through 
award restructuring (1988-90) and enterprise bargaining (1991 onwards).  The theory 
and application of best practice coincides initially with the operation of the Australian 
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Best Practice Demonstration Program (1991-1996) although it has antecedents which 
can be traced back to the Organisational Development (OD) Movement of the 1970s.  
The sequence for discussion of these three types of workplace reform will follow the 
rough chronological order of their application in Australian industry.  The thesis will 
now examine in detail each of these three types of workplace reform.   
 
Quality Management 
 
The first type of workplace reform is quality management.  It was defined briefly in 
Chapter One as the development of a new quality consciousness focussed on 
continuous quality improvement.  It has been a popular approach to workplace reform 
in Western societies, including Australia, since the early 1980s.  As discussed by 
many writers, amongst others Dore (1973), Harber and Samson (1987), and 
Schonberger (1992), quality management is based on Japanese experience in the post 
war period.  However the principal theorists are American.  The next section explores 
what these writers mean by quality management and how their ideas were applied in 
Australia.   
 
Taking the definitional question first, quality has been defined simply as “fitness for 
use” (Juran 1989:15) or “conformance to requirements” (Crosby 1979:9).  Despite the 
simplicity of these definitions there has been considerable debate upon how 
companies can achieve quality, and in particular the degree of emphasis to be placed 
on technical as compared to people-oriented quality improvements.  The advocates of 
technical quality improvement have generally been associated with Statistical Process 
Control (SPC) and Total Quality Control (TQC), (Shewart 1931; Page 1954, 1964; 
Montgomery 1980; Sprouster 1984).  Advocates of people-oriented quality, on the 
other hand, have been associated with Total Quality Management (TQM), (Crosby 
1979, 1984; Deming 1982, 1986; Juran 1989).  This debate between technical and 
people centred approaches continues.  However it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
enter into the debate since this has been done in other studies (Schonberger 1982; 
Feigenbaum 1983, 1986; Imai 1986).  In any event, modern thinking leans towards 
defining quality management as a synthesis of its technical and people oriented 
aspects.  For example Dawson and Palmer define quality management as: 
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computerised data collection and statistical experimentation with a focus on teamwork, group 
participation and a culture of continuous improvement in operating systems (Dawson & 
Palmer 1994:40). 
 
This definition is consistent with the one employed for this thesis (see Chapter One).   
 
Since the late 1970s many writers have sought to describe quality management.  Four 
chosen for discussion in this thesis are Deming (1982, 1986), (considered by many to 
be the founder of the quality movement), Crosby (1979, 1984), Juran (1989), and 
Feigenbaum (1983, 1986).  All have worked mainly in the USA, although their 
influence is much broader spreading to many countries, including Japan, which was 
the source for much of their inspiration.   
 
Deming (1982) states that in order for quality to improve, companies have to broaden 
their focus from final product inspection to the production process itself.  He 
maintains that 85% of product quality problems are caused by the system of 
production (common cause variations), with the much smaller 15% caused by 
employees (specific cause variations).  Accordingly he suggests that what is needed is 
the adoption by companies of a zero defect target to be achieved through continuous 
quality improvement (CQI).  This requires companies to make both internal and 
external change towards improved customer relations and to replace the just-in-case 
philosophy that had dominated production resulting in costly stockpiling, with a just-
in-time delivery system such that inputs are delivered: 
just in time to be sold,...just in time to be assembled to finished goods,...just in time to go on to 
sub-assemblies and, ...just in time to be transformed into fabricated parts (Schonberger 
1982:16). 
 
Deming’s first five Principles of Good Management are summarised as: 
i)   create constancy of purpose towards improvement of product and service. 
ii)  adopt a new philosophy based on zero defects. 
iii) cease dependence on mass inspection. 
iv) award business on quality, along with price. 
v)  seek constant improvement (Deming 1986). 
 
He argues that such a CQI philosophy cannot simply be engineered in but rather 
requires a supportive enterprise culture.  To this end he states that internal barriers 
within the company have to be reduced, managers have to become leaders rather than 
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controllers, and employees have to be encouraged to regain a pride in workmanship.  
This he summarises into a further four Principles of Good Management: 
vi)   institute leadership. 
vii)  drive out fear so that everyone may work effectively. 
viii) break down barriers between departments. 
ix)   reintroduce pride of workmanship (Deming 1986). 
 
Finally, to achieve employee commitment to CQI, Deming advocates a new 
management-employee relationship.  First, management has to accept some 
responsibility for quality problems.  He maintains that although this will be resisted by 
management because “it is a new and incomprehensible thought to a man in an 
executive position that management could be at fault in the production end” (Deming 
1986:47), quality cannot be improved until systems designed by management are 
changed.  Second, management has to reduce its reliance upon targets and quotas.  
This reliance, Deming claims, has resulted in an increase in the quantity of goods 
produced, but at the expense of quality.  Instead managers have to develop long term 
policies aimed at genuine change rather than quick fix solutions.  “People who expect 
quick results, are doomed to be disappointed”, he argues (Deming 1986:x).  Hence 
two further Principles of Management are added: 
x)   eliminate slogans, exhortations and targets for the workforce. 
xi)  eliminate numerical work standards (quotas) (Deming 1986). 
 
Third, the workforce needs to be trained in quality techniques.  These problem-solving 
tools are used to collect and analyse accurate information on quality problems.  Gabor 
quotes Deming as arguing that “decisions made by management or workers must be 
based on data and on the theoretical knowledge needed to know how to use it, not on 
instinct” (Gabor 1990:32).  Employees also need to understand their role in the whole 
process.  As Hall explains, Deming had the view that employees needed to “visualise 
the physical operations of the company from raw material to customer delivery” (Hall 
1983:10-11).  Finally, employees need to be encouraged to be innovative rather than 
being “handicapped by the system...that…belongs to management” (Deming 1982:68).  
Wright (1984) argues this requires employees to be recognised for their technical 
expertise rather than them being seen as simply extensions of technology.  Deming 
gives examples from Japan in which employees regularly participate in operating 
decisions, are encouraged to make suggestions, and accept a high degree of 
  
 
20 
responsibility for overall performance.  Thus Demings’ final three Principles of Good 
Management are: 
xii)  institute training on the job. 
xiii)  institute a vigorous program of education and self improvement. 
xiv)  create a structure in top management that will push every day on the above 13 points 
(Deming 1986). 
 
His proposals for change focus on the way production occurs rather than the way 
decisions are made.  He does not suggest any change in managerial decision making 
structures.  Nor does he reject pluralist institutions such as trade unions, although 
ideally they are to be excluded from managerial prerogative.  Rather he assumes that 
employees, led by unions, will adopt the interests of management since “it is clearly 
understood that the interests of the union are tied to the success of the company” 
(Deming 1986:47).  Consequently, the quality model developed by Deming does not 
recognise an independent union view on quality issues. 
 
Other important quality theorists reinforce this focus on the production process rather 
than on the decision-making process.  First, Crosby states the importance of 
establishing quality measurements for each activity within production in order to 
calculate the cost of non-conformance.  He defines quality management as: 
a sophisticated way of guaranteeing that organised activities happen the way they are planned.  
It is a management discipline concerned with preventing problems from occurring by creating 
the attitudes and controls that prevent defects from happening in the company’s performance 
cycle (Crosby 1979:94).   
 
By this definition Crosby recognises the important responsibility of management in 
“establishing the purpose of an operation, determining measurable objectives, and 
taking the actions necessary to accomplish these objectives” (Crosby 1979:25).  The 
role of the employee is to assist managers by advising them of suggestions for change.   
 
Second, Juran states work organisation influenced by mass production techniques has 
restricted employees ability to improve product and hampers their efforts to “eliminate 
the causes of defective product” (Juran 1989:6).  He argues that despite the need for 
increased workforce involvement in producing quality products, senior managers (the 
vital few) need to direct more closely lower levels of management and the workforce 
(the useful many).  This is because: 
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the bulk of the workforce lacks, in varying degrees, the special skills that make possible a self 
sufficiency in product design, process design, and quality control….This lack of special skills 
imposes limits on the ability of managers to delegate responsibility to the workforce (Juran 
1989:44-52). 
 
This requires managers to retain control of projects to ensure priorities are effective 
and to counter “the risk that the workforce will be deciding which projects the 
managers should tackle” (Juran 1989:52). 
 
Finally, Feigenbaum provides a more inclusive definition.  He describes quality 
management as: 
an effective system for integrating the quality development, quality maintenance, and quality 
improvement efforts of the various groups in an organisation so as to enable marketing, 
engineering, production, and service to occur...at the most economical levels....which allows 
for full customer satisfaction.  It is much more than merely a grouping of technical projects and 
motivational activities, without any clearly defined managerial focus.  Quality is, in essence, a 
way of managing the organisation (Feigenbaum 1983:xxi-xxii). 
 
He states that total quality management is “the single most important force leading to 
organisational success and company growth in national and international markets” 
(Feigenbaum 1986:xxi).  Once again management is seen as the principal decision 
maker within a company, although he argues that management must learn to delegate 
responsibility saying that “management must find the means of delegating 
responsibility and authority for a management activity, while retaining the means of 
assuring satisfactory results” (Feigenbaum 1983:xxi).  For delegation to be successful, 
he argues, communication must be improved to ensure that the workforce has “a good 
understanding of what management is trying to do” (Feigenbaum 1983:208-9).   
 
A common feature of all these theories is the need for employees to adopt a 
philosophy of continuous quality improvement.  Mathews describes this as dispensing 
with the idea that “quality can be achieved through inspection”, and replacing it with 
the idea that “quality can be achieved at source by entrusting workers with the goals 
and performance measurement of their work system” (Mathews 1994:12).  This is said 
to require management adoption of a coaching leadership style to encourage 
employees to commit themselves to performance goals set by management.  Change 
also needs to be made to the production process to discourage poor quality production.  
Such changes include first, a new method of delivery such that parts, sub-components, 
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and finished product are delivered just-in-time.  This removes the luxury of just-in-
case delivery, which, it is claimed, encourages the production of sub-standard quality 
items (Wantuck 1982).  Second, quality theorists advocate the establishment of groups 
of employees trained in the techniques of Statistical Process Control who meet 
regularly to discuss solutions to quality problems.  Thus the quality management 
reformers advocate increased workforce involvement in quality improvement through 
a change in the way tasks are performed, the technical monitoring of processes and 
products, and employee involvement in temporary problem solving groups.  Thus 
workforce participation is an essential element in the quality management process.   
 
What then has been the Australian experience of quality management?  First, there 
appears to have been a lengthy time lag between pioneering developments in Japan 
and the follow-on applications in Australia.  Quality circles were claimed to originate 
as early as 1962 in Japan (Dore 1973; Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers 
[JUSE] 1980; Schonberger 1982; Harber & Samson 1987).  They only became 
widespread in Western countries in the 1970s and early 1980s, the first UK example 
being Rolls Royce in 1978 (Dale & Haywood 1984).  In 1990 the British Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey found that 28% of British businesses had quality circles 
(Milward et al 1992).  In the USA, quality circles followed on from experiments in 
suggestion systems introduced by companies such as Honeywell in 1980 and Phillips 
Petroleum in 1981, (Appelbaum & Batt 1994:75).  A 1982 survey of over 6000 firms 
with 100 or more employees found that 44% had quality circles (New York Stock 
Exchange Survey 1982, reprinted in Appelbaum & Batt 1994:173).  A 1990 survey of 
Fortune 1000 firms found that 66% of firms had quality circles, an increase from 39% 
in 1987 (Appelbaum & Batt 1994:180).   
 
Similarly in Australia the initial impetus for quality initiatives came in the early 
1980s.  It began as an employer initiative supported by state and federal governments.  
This resulted in 1984 in an Australia for Quality campaign.  Second, a triparite 
Council (Technology Transfer Council [TTC]) was established with representatives 
from the Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce (DITAC), the Metal 
Trade Industry Association (MTIA), and Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI), 
(Jureidini 1991; Sohal 1991).  The aim of these initiatives was to develop the 
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efficiency and effectiveness of enterprises through training in statistical process 
control, the introduction of just-in-time (JIT) inventory, and the introduction of quality 
circles (QCs), (Sprouster 1984; TTC 1984; Ramsay, Samson & Sohal 1991; Zappala 
1988).  Following these initiatives an Australian Quality Council was established and 
Australian Quality Awards were introduced.  The first documented example of a 
quality circle was at the Repco Bearing Company in Tasmania (Wells 1982, 1985).   
 
By 1989-90 the first Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS 90) 
found 13% of all workplaces had QCs or productivity improvement groups, the 
proportion rising as high as 23% in manufacturing (Callus et al. 1991).  Similarly JIT 
methods of production, based on the Toyota Production System (Ohno 1988; Monden 
1993) were introduced into Australia in the 1980s, initially by Japanese vehicle 
manufacturers in Australia (Kriegler & Wooden 1985; Ramsay, Sohal & Samson 
1990; Sohal 1991; Sohal, Ramsay & Samson 1993).  Clearly the evidence shows 
significant usage of quality initiatives in Australia, but they occurred perhaps later and 
were less widespread that in the UK (Turnbull 1988b) or the USA.  
 
Second, QCs in Australia, as in some other western countries, have shown a shorter 
operational time span than the Japanese experience.  Dale and Hayward (1984) claim 
that within three years of being established in the UK 50% of QCs had failed.  A 1991 
survey conducted by the UK Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service found that 
25% of QCs that had been introduced in the previous year had been discontinued 
(ACAS 1991:14).  In Australia, the second Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in 
1995 (AWIRS 95) found that between 1990 and 1995 although at the macro level the 
general incidence of QCs remained static across workplaces (wps) the incidence of 
QCs varied between industries.  In manufacturing the incidence of QCs fell from 23% 
to 19% between 1990 and 1995.  However, as shown in Table 2.1, by 1995 other tools 
of TQM had been introduced in 37% of all workplaces, especially larger workplaces 
(Morehead et al. 1997:506-507).  
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Table 2.1 
Incidence of Quality Initiatives in Australian Workplaces 
1990-1995 
 
Workplace 1990-QCs 
% workplaces (wps) 
1995-QCs 
%wps 
1995-TQM 
%wps 
All workplaces 13 13 37 
Sector 
      Private 
      Public 
 
13 
12 
 
13 
12 
 
37 
36 
Number of Employees 
      20-49 
      50-99  
      100-199 
      200-499 
     +500 
 
  9 
13 
19 
19 
23 
 
11 
14 
17 
16 
23 
 
30 
37 
44 
63 
69 
Industry 
      Manufacturing 
      Communication services 
      Electricity, gas and water supply 
      Accommodation, cafes and 
restaurants 
      Retail trade 
      Government Administration 
       Personnel and other services 
 
23 
22 
13 
 4 
 4 
 3 
 3 
 
19 
22 
25 
  6 
  9 
  8 
16 
 
39 
62 
66 
26 
36 
29 
29 
Source: Morehead et al. 1997:506-507 
 
This suggests that like other Western economies, Australian firms exhibited 
considerable interest in various approaches to quality management, however the 
longevity of any single quality initiative is uncertain.  
 
Third, QCs in Australia, as in other Western countries, have functioned differently.  
Evidence suggests that despite similarity in the structure of QCs in Japan and Western 
companies, differences have been observed in the way QCs function to encourage 
employee involvement in the decision-making structures (Dore 1973; Bradley & Hill 
1983).  This is partly explained by differences in approach to decision-making 
between the two cultures.  Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars describe the Japanese 
approach to decision making as ‘appositional’ in that: 
the direction of initiation is upward,....junior suppliers of particulars bringing their information 
to more senior harmonizers...who weave this information into coherent visions and 
configurations.  Relationships between hierarchical levels are close and intimate, emotionally 
as well as conceptually, since the parts must fit the whole to create effective harmonies 
(Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars 1994:98). 
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In this context QCs have an important role within the decision making process.  In 
contrast they describe decision making in Western companies as ‘propositional’ or 
upward initiated through a hierarchical system in which: 
orders are not vague and holistic, requiring interpretation from below, but are analytical, 
precise and specific and come from the top to the bottom (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars 
1994:98). 
 
In this alternate context QCs have only a marginal role in decision making.  Lawler 
and Mohram note that “generally (QCs) are restricted to recommend solutions for 
quality and productivity problems which management then may apply” (Lawler & 
Mohram 1985:66).  Palmer claims QCs gave employees “a right to be heard, but with 
managerial prerogative still having the ultimate decision” (Palmer 1994:12).  
Evidence for this contention is provided in a 1990 survey of companies in the UK, 
which found issues discussed within QCs were primarily related directly to technical 
production decisions.  Thus, quality issues were discussed in 95%, production costs in 
72%, and output concerns in 66%, of QCs, while basic employee concerns were rarely 
featured, (ACAS 1991).  Such findings led Hill to claim that there was little evidence 
of any change in the power relationship between management and the workforce (Hill 
1991).  Meanwhile there is little evidence of union involvement in QCs despite 
evidence from the USA that where unions are involved QCs are more successful 
(Cohen-Rosenthal & Burton 1993).  In 1986 a survey of UK companies found only 
11% of QCs had union representatives overseeing their joint steering committees 
(Industrial Society 1986).  This has led unions to define QCs as: 
part of a strategy by managers to bypass trade unions and create an individualistic relationship 
with employees, in order to increase the legitimacy of management in employees eyes 
(Batstone & Gourlay 1986, cited in Hill 1991:543). 
 
Managerial control of QCs also contributed to negative responses to QCs.  Guthrie 
blamed the 1970 failure of QCs in the UK based Ford Motor Company on the 
autocratic management of the company (Guthrie 1987).  In a 1992 survey 
Marchington quoted employee complaints that QCs were merely “a device initiated by 
management to strengthen their control by appropriating employee ideas under the 
guise of greater workplace democracy” (Marchington 1992a:82).   
In Australia a survey of 55 Australian manufacturers in 1991 found that 86% of 
companies considered quality initiatives to be an integral part of company business 
strategy (Ramsay, Samson & Sohal 1991).  However it was found quality initiatives 
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were focussed on technical rather than people issues.  This is illustrated by the 
findings of a 1990 study into JIT manufacturing in Victoria.  This study found the 
introduction of JIT associated with training in the techniques of problem identification 
and solution, with little or no training in group dynamics:  
in many companies management education about just-in-time stops at this technical level of 
understanding…..of equal importance….should be…..managements’ appreciation of the high 
level of communication and co-operation required (Ramsay, Sohal & Samson 1990:41). 
 
Similarly, the AWIRS 95 survey found management view quality circles as a means to 
improve productivity, efficiency, and quality, rather than as a means to assist 
employees.  Table 2.2 presents management objectives for quality circles.   
Table 2.2  
Management Objectives for Quality Circles 
1995 
 
Objective QCs  
%wps 
Increase productivity, efficiency, performance 65 
Improving quality of product or service 50 
Increase customer or client satisfaction 43 
Improve communications 38 
Increase employee responsibility or autonomy 33 
Enhance skill levels 31 
Increase employee motivation or commitment 27 
Increase job satisfaction 26 
Team building 22 
Other objectives 19 
Source: Morehead et al. 1997:192 
 
Increased productivity, efficiency, and performance was identified in 65% of 
workplaces, improved quality in 50% workplaces, and improved customer or client 
satisfaction in 43% of workplaces, whilst only 33% identified increased employee 
responsibility or autonomy (Morehead et al. 1997:192). 
 
Qualitative evidence also suggests low employee involvement in quality.  In the 
earliest documented case study of quality circles at the Repco Bearing Company in 
Tasmania, it was found management had total control of the process (Wells 1982; 
McGraw & Dunford 1987a).  Similar results were found in a study 10 years later of 
quality management experience at the Western Port Works of the Coated Products 
Division of BHP.  This study found despite management claims that employees 
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participated in the quality reform process, employees complained of limited 
management commitment to the underlying principles of TQM.  Indeed the study 
found no fundamental structural change associated with the process, and a dearth of 
tangible rewards for employees (Harber 1991:10-11).   
 
This review of literature and evidence suggests that quality management fits the test 
for inclusion as a type of workplace reform.  It is concerned with business 
competitiveness, its locale or focus of operation is the workplace, and it usually 
operates (in part) by reconfiguring human input into work.  It is also clear it requires 
an increased participative role for employees, although the form this takes and its 
impact upon management decision-making processes suggests such workforce 
participation may be limited.  The evidence in Australia shows widespread use of 
quality principles, although the extent of influence afforded to employees as part of 
the quality reform process varies, and effective implementation and training may be 
less common. 
 
Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
The second approach to workplace reform is institutional workplace reform.  In 
Chapter One this was defined as - collective bargaining with unions for productivity 
improvements in exchange for wage gains.  It was also observed that Australia had 
experienced three distinct waves of institutional workplace reform beginning with the 
‘two tier wage system (1987-88), award restructuring (1988-90), and enterprise 
bargaining (1991 onwards).  Inherent in all three waves was the requirement for 
improved productivity or efficiency and changes to be negotiated and implemented at 
the workplace.  It did not follow, however, that all bargaining be conducted at the 
workplace level.  Indeed this was emphatically not the case with many two tier and 
award restructuring negotiations which were conducted or co-ordinated at industry 
level.  However, the level of productivity bargaining has progressively shifted towards 
the workplace, especially following the enactment of the enterprise bargaining 
principle by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC – the 
Commission) in late 1991. 
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Institutional workplace reform has resulted in decentralisation of the collective 
bargaining process in many countries over the last 10 to 20 years (Turnbull 1988b; 
Archer 1992; Bray 1992; Bamber & Snape 1993; Wheeler 1993).  For some countries, 
for example Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, this decentralisation of collective 
bargaining has been from the industry to the plant and enterprise level (Archer 1992; 
Bamber & Snape 1993; Hammarstrom 1993).  For other countries, such as Sweden, 
the change has been from national central authority to industry level (Windmuller 
1987).  Finally, for other countries, it has merely confirmed workplace based 
negotiations (Kuwahar 1993; Wheeler 1993).  However what appears common to all 
countries is that the accompanying decentralisation has been employer driven for 
strategic purposes rather than union driven, in Beans words, “as an expression of 
enhanced workplace power” (Bean 1996:90).  This decentralisation has been 
accompanied by a change in the role of the State (Edwards 1994; Edwards, Belanger 
& Haiven 1994).  In some countries the State has provided new procedural rules and 
regulations to enable decentralised bargaining within a legal framework.  In other 
countries, decentralisation has been accompanied by deregulation of the labour 
market.  This has been claimed to satisfy employer demands for greater flexibility and 
to reduce wages in the belief that “employment will be created if real wages and 
employers’ labour costs are allowed to fall without impediment” (Bean 1996:127-
128).  In these cases the role of the State has been to provide procedural rules and 
regulations which permit greater flexibility for managerial decision-makers and 
greater individualisation of employment relations (Keller 1991).  As a result 
deregulation has been associated with a decline in collective bargaining in favour of 
individual workforce participation.   
 
In Australia, during the late 1980s and early 1990s institutionalised workplace reform 
was designed as a union collective bargaining activity rather than at individual 
employees.  The next section explains how this collective form of institutional 
workplace reform developed and its salient features. 
 
Collective bargaining in Australia had traditionally taken place within a compulsory 
arbitration system provided by the State.  Decisions of the Commission provided the 
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legal base for industry level awards.  This was described by Walker as a system that 
“granted the unions demands for collective bargaining, but at the same time placed a 
check upon their power by restricting strikes” (Walker 1970:15).  Change to this 
system began in 1983 with the Price and Incomes Accord between the Australian 
Labor Party (ALP) and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), (ALP & 
ACTU, 1983).  This has been described as a social contract that initially led to an 
increase in the degree to which wage determination was centralised (Carey 1988; 
Ewer, Higgins & Stevens 1987; Ewer et al. 1991; Curtain & Mathews 1991).  
Decisions of the Commission in the late 1980s reversed this trend towards 
centralisation.  The first Decision in 1987 sought to encourage workplace based wage 
negotiations by offering a two-tier wage system (ACAC 1987).  The first-tier granted 
an automatic cost-of-living adjustments of $10 a week for all awards.  The second tier 
increase of up to 4% was conditional upon proof of agreement between the unions and 
management at the enterprise to remove restrictive work practices to enable 
demonstrable productivity improvements.  Rimmer termed this a process of ‘managed 
decentralisation’ (Rimmer 1991:6).  Outcomes from this round of bargaining were 
limited.  Most agreements were still dominated by broad changes agreed at the 
industry level and many enterprise changes were confined to “internal numerical 
flexibility and functional flexibility” (Rimmer & Zappala 1988:31).  It was, however, 
argued that this was an important first step in “the evolution of the wages system 
towards establishing a productivity culture and providing the move towards workplace 
bargaining” (Curtain, Gough & Rimmer 1992:22).   
 
The second Decision of the Commission was handed down in August 1988.  This 
decision provided for an immediate wage increase of 3% to all employees covered by 
awards with a further increase of $10 payable within six months.  In return the parties 
had to agree to a fundamental review of all awards aimed at producing long-term 
benefits rather than short term cost savings.  To this end the Commission specified 
several ‘Structural Efficiency Principles’ (SEPs) that had to be incorporated in the 
review (AIRC 1988).  The SEPs included - the introduction of more flexibility in 
work patterns, the introduction of multi-skilling, a commitment to developing career 
paths for employees, agreement for work to be reorganised, and finally a commitment 
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to equal opportunity.  Thus the agenda for collective bargaining was broadened from 
employment issues to production issues.  In the words of the Commission: 
It is not intended that this principle (award restructuring) will be applied in a narrow cost-
cutting manner or to formalise illusory, short term benefits.  Its purpose is to facilitate the type 
of fundamental review essential to ensure that existing award structures are relevant to modern 
competitive requirements of industry and are in the best interests of both management and 
workers (AIRC 1988:3). 
 
The role of the Commission was reduced to ensuring agreements conformed to the 
SEPs, with responsibility for implementation assigned to joint consultative processes 
at the workplace (Curtain 1987; Curtain & Mathews 1990; Curtain & Mathews 1991). 
 
Again outcomes were mixed.  The 1990 Report into the future of Australian 
manufacturing claimed substantial gains in terms of developing a more co-operative 
culture: 
Australia's traditionally antagonistic industrial relations climate, with its high incidence of 
industrial disputation, is giving way to a much more constructive approach between 
management and the trade union movement, reflected in the current program of award 
restructuring (AMC 1990:3). 
 
However a later study in 1992 found gains had been limited to an increase in 
flexibility as demarcations were reduced and training plans to increase skills 
developed (Curtain, Gough & Rimmer 1992).  Such limitations led to employer calls 
for deregulation of workplace bargaining and limited roles for unions (Hilmer et al. 
1989).  Unions responded by negotiating an agreement with the Federal Labor 
Government guaranteeing them a role in enterprise-based agreements, until the 1993 
Industrial Relations Reform Act enabled the Commission to ratify agreements 
negotiated in non-union workplaces (Commonwealth Government 1993)1.   
 
The third important Decision of the Commission was made in October 1991.  This 
Decision reversed an earlier rejection of decentralised bargaining by the Commission 
in April 1991.  This rejection was made on the basis that the parties to industrial 
relations have still to develop the maturity necessary for the further shift of emphasis 
now proposed (AIRC 1991a).  However, under the October Decision, the Commission 
would ratify Enterprise Agreements negotiated at the workplace between management 
                                                 
1 Given that these EFA's had only been in effect for a year before the AWIRS 95 was undertaken and the data 
collection showed little penetration of EFAs, the statistics presented focus on Enterprise Agreements 
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and the unions (AIRC 1991b).  These Agreements were not to be restricted by any 
central wage principles except that they were to consider a broad agenda and to adhere 
to the existing SEPs.  There was also to be no change to existing standard hours of 
work, or annual leave and long service leave conditions.  The Decision was confirmed 
by an amendment to the Industrial Relations Act, 1988 that made it possible for the 
Commission to register Certified Agreements (Commonwealth Government 1992).  
Once again this decision led to calls by employer associations for deregulation 
(Angwin 1992).  This was countered by calls from the unions for no further change 
(TUTA 1993). 
 
Some positive outcomes were recorded from this decision.  Within 12 months more 
than 470 Enterprise Agreements, covering approximately 15% of all employees under 
Federal awards, had been ratified.  Over 70% of these came from manufacturing (DIR 
1992a).  By 1995 it was estimated that 48% of workplaces had some type of 
workplace agreement (DIR 1995:23).  The AWIRS 95 found that in 69% of all 
workplaces management claimed that the negotiation of a workplace or enterprise 
agreement was important in achieving the organisation's goals (Morehead et al. 1997).  
Commitment to extensive change is shown by the fact that within a year it was 
claimed the agreements committed the parties to a diverse and innovative range of 
productivity indicators measuring both quantitative and qualitative factors (DIR 
1992b).  By 1993 a diverse range of production issues had been negotiated as well as 
basic employee issues of wages and working conditions (DIR 1993a).  By 1995 there 
was an assorted range of issues included in Agreements as shown in Table 2.3 and 
Table 2.4.  Although pay rates were still the major issue included in agreements, 
working hours, training, work practices and work organisation, were included in over 
60% of agreements.  Moreover, quality assurance and flexible labour organisation 
were amongst the most frequent work organisation changes (DIR 1995:106 & 109). 
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Table 2.3 
Issues covered by Enterprise Agreements 
1995 
 
Issues covered by Agreements Enterprise Agreement (Certified)  
%wps 
Pay rates 94 
Work hours 81 
Training 68 
Work practices or work organisation 65 
Leave arrangements 63 
Consultation or negotiation agreements 63 
Grievance handling procedures 60 
Occupational health and safety 52 
Penalty rates 50 
Discipline and dismissal 48 
Child care or family leave 47 
Performance appraisal, pay 45 
Retrenchment and redeployment 44 
Superannuation 25 
Other 4 
Source: DIR 1995:106 
 
Table 2.4 
Work Organisation Provisions in Enterprise Agreements 
1995 
 
Objective Proportion of Enterprise Agreements % 
Quality Assurance, etc 28 
Flexible labour organisation 23 
New classification structure 17 
Teamwork 15 
Best Practice 11 
Organisational restructuring 4 
At least one of the above  53 
Source: DIR 1995:109 
 
Turning now to the implementation of these agreements.  In its 1988 Decision, the 
Commission required management and unions in each workplace to establish a 
suitable consultative process to ensure that implementation of the restructured award 
fitted within the SEPs.  By this Decision, the Commission hoped to extend to the 
workplace the co-operative consultative processes that had begun at the macro 
industry level between the union movement and government with the Prices and 
Incomes Accord (ACTU & ALP 1993).  Such consultation had resulted in effective 
tripartite co-operation through the Economic Planning Advisory Committee, and the 
Australian Manufacturing Council, and an agreed blueprint for industry development 
(ACTU & TDC 1987).  Management and employees were encouraged to embrace 
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joint consultation by the publication of an historic Joint Statement on Participative 
Practices, between the union movement and a major employer association (ACTU & 
CAI 1988).  Union members were assisted in development of effective consultative 
mechanisms at the workplace through the publication by the ACTU of a Blueprint for 
Changing Awards and Agreements (ACTU 1988).  In the metal industry the MTFU 
published a members guide entitled Implementing Metal Industry 4.5% Agreements 
(MTFU 1991).  Further support for consultation within the industry came from the 
publication of several joint agreements on the new Metal Industry Award (MTIA & 
MTFU 1989; MTIA, ACM & MTFU 1991).  While in the automotive industry jointly 
agreed consultative processes were part of the Agreed principles for a new Automotive 
Industry Award (FCAI & FVIU 1989).  Finally, further union initiatives for reform 
towards ‘best practice unionism’ were suggested in the early 1990s (Ogden 1993a, 
1993b). 
Although it is difficult to accurately state what influence these reforms had on the 
establishment of workplace based Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs), a 
comparison of the findings of AWIRS 90 and AWIRS 95, summarised below in Table 
2.5, gives some indication of change between these years (Morehead et al. 1997:506-
507).  
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Table 2.5 
Incidence of Joint Consultative Committees in Australian Workplaces 
1990 and 1995 
 
Workplace JCCs-1990 - %wps JCCs-1995 - %wps 
All workplaces 14 33 
Sector 
      Private 
      Public 
 
  9 
28 
 
27 
50 
Number of Employees 
      20-49 
      50-99  
      100-199 
      200-499 
      +500 
 
  8 
15 
21 
25 
48 
 
23 
36 
44 
68 
74 
Industry 
      Manufacturing 
      Education 
      Government administration 
      Electricity, gas and water supply 
      Construction 
      Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 
      Retail trade 
 
14 
45 
25 
23 
  5 
  3 
3 
 
41 
55 
60 
58 
37 
  6 
8 
Source: Morehead et al. 1997:506-507 
By 1995, as shown in Table 2.6, managers regarded JCCs as important for improving 
communication, workplace efficiency, and productivity  
Table 2.6 
Management Objectives for Joint Consultative Committees  
1995 
 
Objective JCCs %wps 
Improve communication 63 
Improve workplace productivity, efficiency 52 
Increase satisfaction, employee morale 36 
Assist in implementing change 35 
Improve quality of product, service 32 
Reduce level of disputation 23 
Help with the introduction of new technology 17 
Reduce labour turnover and absenteeism 12 
Improve safety, occupational health and safety 6 
Other objectives 14 
Source: Morehead et al. 1997:192 
 
In 35% of workplaces management identified the JCC as having a role in assisting 
change and improving quality (Morehead et al. 1997:192).  
Thus institutional workplace reform in Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s led 
to decentralisation of collective bargaining to the enterprise.  It also resulted in a 
broadening of issues subject to negotiation between management and unions into 
production related, and strategic issues, rather than purely wages and working 
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conditions.  Finally it led to an increased proliferation of company level joint 
consultative committees.  However, the role of these committees in workplace 
decision making appears to have been limited by management to immediate 
production matters.  
 
From this discussion of institutional workplace reform, it is clear it fits the test for 
workplace reform.  It is concerned with business competitiveness, its locale or level of 
operation is the workplace, and it operates by reconfiguring the role of the employee 
in the workplace.  It is also clear enterprise bargaining frequently provided for 
increased workforce participation. 
 
Best Practice 
 
The third type of workplace reform is best practice.  In Chapter One this was defined 
as “a comprehensive and integrated approach to continuous improvement in all facets 
of an organisation’s operations” (AMC 1994:iv).  More specifically Rimmer et al. 
describe best practice as: 
a complex idea capturing concrete ways of doing better in all aspects of a business's-strategy, 
marketing, design, production, finance, accounting, supply, human resources and 
organisational decision making (Rimmer et al. 1996:7).  
 
The theoretical base for best practice grew during the late 1980s from various studies 
on why Japanese manufacturers were performing better than those in Western 
economies.  A team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) conducted 
one of these studies between 1986 and 1988 (Dertouzos, Lester & Solow 1989).  The 
MIT study compared practices of American and Japanese manufacturers and 
concluded that there were six deficiencies in American practice.  These were: 
!"Outdated production strategies (mass production and parochialism) 
!"Short time horizons 
!"Technological weakness 
!"Neglect of human resources 
!"Failure of co-operation 
!"Government and industry at cross-purposes. 
 
The MIT study also observed business practices of several ‘leading edge’ 
manufacturing firms in the USA and concluded there were six key similarities 
between these firms.  These were: 
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!"Simultaneous improvement in quality, cost and delivery;  
!"Close customer relationships 
!"Close supplier relationships 
!"Effective use of technology for strategic advantage 
!"Less hierarchical and less compartmentalised organisations 
!"Human resources policies that promoted continuous learning, teamwork, participation and 
flexibility  
 
This built upon earlier claims by researchers such as Kochan, Katz, and McKersie that 
business strategies should include an integration of functions, tasks, customers, 
suppliers, and people.  Such integration, they claimed, could only occur “when 
innovation at all three levels….(shop-floor, collective bargaining and strategic 
management)… are linked together in an integrated fashion” (Kochan, Katz & 
McKersie 1986:204). 
On the basis of these findings the MIT study concluded there was need for companies 
which sought to be ‘best practice’ to develop an integrated change process focussed on 
five key imperatives.  These were identified as: 
!"Α focus on the fundamentals of manufacturing  
!"A new economic citizenship in the workforce 
!"A blend of co-operation and individualism within the enterprise  
!"Learning to live in the world economy 
!"Providing for the future 
 
These principles require companies to decrease dependence upon government 
protection and replace it with new business strategies recognising the global market.  
Such an approach was consistent with earlier calls for traditional short-term financial 
controls, corporate portfolio management, and technology-driven production planning, 
to be replaced by long-term, integrative socio-technology strategies (Hayes & 
Abernathy 1983).  The MIT Study specifically argued companies need a new approach 
to manufacturing.  This conclusion was supported by the findings of a major 
international study in 1989 of the automotive industry (Womack, Jones & Roos 1990).  
This study found mass production principles resulted in poor quality product and 
uncommitted employees.  The study recommended new ‘lean production principles’.  
Lean production describes a system of production using less of everything, as 
described by Jones: 
half the time and effort to design the product and half the human effort and tooling to make it, 
with half the defects and less than half the inventories (Jones 1992:191). 
 
In this way Jones claimed lean production would replace mass production while 
preserving the best features of both craft and mass production and produce for 
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customers “twice the number of products for half the normal volume per model” 
(Jones 1992:191).  There were five main elements to lean production - devolution of 
responsibility to employees; workteams; continuous improvement through employee 
involvement (kaizen); JIT delivery processes (kanban) to eliminate waste; and visual 
factory controls.  Thus lean production was described as: 
teams of multiskilled workers at all levels of the organisation,....highly flexible increasingly 
automated machines, ...careers structured to reward strong team players rather than those 
displaying genius in a single area (Womack, Jones & Roos 1990:63).  
 
Such a production system, it was claimed, would replace ‘batch production’ with 
‘flow processes’ as continuous improvement replaced ‘buffer stocks’. The Toyota 
Production System (1960) emphasised this approach at the Saturn Udevella plant, 
showing the successful transplantation of this production process into the West 
(Rehder 1994).  In Australia such transplants began in the early 1980s with Mitsubishi 
(Kriegler & Wooden 1985), followed by Ford (Lansbury 1994), and were then 
translated into several component manufacturers (Lansbury & Hammarstrom 1991).  
Although there has been debate on the merits of lean production (Gahan 1991; 
Tolliday & Zeitlin 1992; Berggren 1993; Wood 1993; Appelbaum & Batt 1994; 
Mathews 1994), it is sufficient to recognise that it is seen as a variant of best practice 
reform.   
 
Best practice has a new role for employees.  All accounts of best practice and lean 
production emphasise human resources as an essential element.  The MIT study 
argued for a system whereby employees actively collaborate rather than passively 
perform.  Similarly Kochan and Dyer state workers need to be recognised for their 
value to the workplace, arguing “best practice is a term used to describe firms that 
seek to use human resources as a source of competitive advantage” (Kochan & Dyer 
1992:72).  It is argued lean production will release workers from being seen as 
“unskilled or semi-skilled workers tending expensive single purpose machines” 
(Womack, Jones & Roos 1990:53).  This will occur as workers are given greater 
autonomy and flexibility and allowed to participate in the actual production process.  
In order to induce workers to accept this increased responsibility it is recognised that 
financial returns such as bonuses, profit sharing, and workforce ownership of the 
firm’s stock, should be offered so that mutual gains result (Cohen-Rosenthal & Burton 
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1993).  Management also needs to change, as Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton state 
“success does not come from dictating compliance but from seeking to achieve 
common goals with all employees” (Cohen-Rosenthal & Burton 1993:vi).  In return, 
unions are exhorted to develop more co-operative strategies, thus Cohen-Rosenthal 
and Burton claim: 
the clock cannot be turned back to the days when unions got their way, the way forward is to 
challenge employers to manage better in ways that lead to greater employment security and 
higher incomes (Cohen-Rosenthal & Burton 1993:vi).  
 
However, strategies developed for mutual gains are less easy to identify.  Many 
researchers state there is no one best way for improving performance although they all 
agree some form of worker involvement is essential (Appelbaum & Batt 1994; AMC 
1995).  One influential model is that of teams which locate the source of competitive 
advantage and continuous improvement in the front-line, or production level, 
workforce (Appelbaum & Batt 1994).   
 
Indeed in Australia best practice came to be broadly defined by the principles laid 
down by the Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program (ABPDP), (1991-96).  
The Program was conceived by the Australian Federal Labor Government as the 
means to “raise the efficiency of Australian enterprises to world standards” (Hawke, 
Keating & Button 1991:1.21).  The program had two stated purposes.  First, it aimed 
to identify the most effective methods and approaches to best practice reform.  
Second, it aimed to promote an understanding of preferred practices in order to 
stimulate other Australian enterprises in their adoption (AMC & DIR 1991).  Under 
the ABPDP the Federal Government provided financial support for showpiece 
companies committed to the best practice principles set out below in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 
Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program 
Principles of Best Practice 
 
♦ A shared vision for world class performance, supported by a comprehensive, integrated and co-
operative change strategy that brings about continuous improvement in cost, quality and 
timeliness. 
♦A strategic plan developed in consultation with the workforce 
♦A commitment to change driven by the Chief Executive Officer 
♦Flatter organisational structures 
♦A co-operative and participative industrial relations culture 
♦A commitment to continuous improvement and learning, with a highly skilled and flexible workforce 
♦Innovative human-resource policies which include a commitment to occupational health and safety 
and equal employment opportunity 
♦A focus on customers, both internal and external 
♦Closer relationship with suppliers 
♦The pursuit of innovation in technology, products and processes 
♦The use of performance measurement systems and benchmarking 
♦The integration of environmental management into all operations 
♦Involvement in external relationships (networks) which enhance the competitive capability of the firm 
Source: AMC & DIR 1991. 
 
In return for funding, participating companies agreed to act as demonstration 
companies for others contemplating such reform (Hawke, Keating & Button 1991; 
AMC & DIR 1994a; ATC 1992).  The program operated from 1991 to 1996 during 
which time over 100 firms became involved and a variety of changes were introduced. 
Companies selected for the Program were significantly influenced by the 
government’s objectives.  First, 80% of participating companies came from the 
manufacturing sector given the government objective of encouraging the 
manufacturing sector to become world’s best practice.  Second, almost half of all 
companies were large to medium-sized business employing more than 500 persons, 
with around 40% being foreign owned.  Finally, over 60% of companies were located 
in the manufacturing hub of the Eastern Australian states of New South Wales and 
Victoria.  Most projects were confined to a single site that belonged to a larger 
business (Rimmer et al. 1996).  Second, the government sought to develop 
management and union co-operation upon best practice.  Accordingly, all company 
proposals required union endorsement. 
 
Several evaluative studies of best practice experiences were undertaken during the life 
of the program (AMC & DIR 1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; AMC [McKinsey] 
1993, 1994; AMC [NKCIR] 1994; AMC [Jones] 1995).  In 1996 a comprehensive 
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study of the outcomes of the first 42 companies participating in this Program was 
undertaken (Rimmer et al. 1996).  As set out in Figure 2.2, nine key elements of best 
practice were included in an evaluative framework.   
Figure 2.2 
Elements of Best Practice 
GOALS CHANGE 
Strategy  
 
integrated strategy that projects how best practice changes will benefit all 
organisational stakeholders, including customers, shareholders and 
employees 
OPERATIONAL  PRACTICES 
Organisational 
Structures  
responsibility to employees with the necessary skills, often through flatter 
hierarchies and semi-autonomous work teams 
Technology innovation and organisational improvement 
Customer-Supplier 
relationships 
closer internal and external relations with industry, educational, regional, 
government and other stakeholders  
Process Improvement 
techniques 
 
customer focus and provide continuous improvement in cost, quality and 
delivery 
People Management 
 
need to develop human resources (including skills, teamwork and flexibility) 
and to cooperage with employees and their unions 
INFORMATION  ENABLERS 
Measurement and 
control systems - 
benchmarking 
monitor performance on key indicators and provide timely and effective 
feedback 
CULTURAL  ENABLERS 
Change leadership stable change leadership at all levels of the organisation 
Empowerment employees to exercise control over daily work and are  involved in strategic 
decision making 
Source: Rimmer et al. 1996. 
 
These elements included the six key similarities of leading edge companies outlined 
by the MIT study - an integrated strategy, new operational practices (teams), 
technology, closer customer and supplier relations, process improvement techniques 
and improved people management.  To this were added what were termed enablers for 
change.  These included information enablers – measurement and control systems and 
benchmarking to monitor performance which impact directly on cost, quality, and 
delivery outcomes.  Also cultural enablers - change leadership and empowerment of 
employees - were identified. 
 
Using this framework the Study found the experience of best practice varied between 
companies.  More than 80% of the 42 companies had a formal strategy aimed at 
process improvement.  All companies had adopted mechanisms for process 
improvement and over 80% had developed processes to measure outcomes.  Over 
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70% of companies had invested significantly in technology in the previous five years.  
Over 60% of companies professed a commitment to greater employee participation in 
day to day activities through teams, however, as shown in Table 2.7, only in 33% of 
companies had direct employees been empowered with substantial power over their 
daily work.  Further in only two companies had this been extended to direct 
employees being involved in strategic decision-making.   
Table 2.7 
Teams and Employee Empowerment 
 
Change  Number of firms. 
TEAM STRUCTURES  
no active encouragement of team ethos  5 
no permanent teams, but team ethos actively encouraged 10 
permanent teams for direct employees only 24 
permanent teams for direct and indirect employees   3 
EMPLOYEE EMPOWERMENT  
direct employees have limited control over daily work 27 
direct employees have substantial control over daily work 12 
direct employees control own work, and are involved in strategic decision 
making 
  2 
Source: Rimmer et al. 1996:55- 59 
 
In Australia teams are a relatively new phenomena.  The 1990 AWIRS found little 
evidence of teams in Australian workplaces although by 1995 the incidence of semi or 
fully autonomous work groups (SAWGs) had increased significantly as shown in 
Table 2.8 (Morehead et al. 1997:507). 
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Table 2.8 
Incidence of Semi-Autonomous-Work-Groups in Australian Workplaces 
 1995 
 
Workplace SAWGs-1995 
%wps 
All workplaces 43 
Sector 
      Private 
      Public 
 
39 
53 
Number of Employees 
      20-49 
      50-99  
      100-199 
      200-499 
      +500 
 
42 
45 
41 
47 
48 
Industry 
      Manufacturing 
      Education 
      Government administration 
      Electricity, gas and water supply 
      Construction 
      Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 
       Retail trade 
 
48 
65 
49 
45 
45 
29 
26 
Source: Morehead et al. 1997:507 
 
However, there is little in depth study of their operation.  This requires further 
exploration. 
 
From the discussion of best practice it is clear it fits the test for workplace reform.  It 
is concerned with business competitiveness, its locale is the workplace, and it operates 
through reconfiguring the human input into work.  It is also clear the role of the 
employee changes as the reform process develops, and workforce participation is an 
essential element of this type of workplace reform, although its exact form varies.  
 
In summary, the literature on change associated with all three reforms chosen for 
analysis in this thesis show each fit the test for workplace reform.  They are all 
concerned with business competitiveness, the level of change is located at the 
workplace, and each operates through varying the human input into work.  It is also 
clear each reform process relies on a new role for the employee, which requires greater 
commitment to company performance through increased workforce participation.  
However workforce participation is not a singular term but indeed may be variously 
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described.  Accordingly, the next section of this chapter explores the literature upon 
workforce participation. 
 
Workforce Participation 
 
Pateman (1970) described participation as the degree to which employees participate 
in final decision-making.  From a study of participation at the shop floor and company 
level she identified two forms - partial and full - participation.  Partial participation 
she described as occurring in joint consultative committees in which elected 
workforce representatives influence decisions but management has final decision 
making power.  Full participation occurs in shop-floor work groups in which each 
member had equal power over the outcome.  A third form was added later to explain 
circumstances in which employee influence on decision-making is more apparent than 
real (termed pseudo participation).   
 
Wang (1974) defined workforce participation in terms of degree of worker influence 
over decisions.  He designed a matrix of workforce participation that enabled 
participation initiatives to be identified by type (information sharing, consultation, 
joint decision-making, and self-management), by level (shop-floor, departmental, 
organisational, and corporate), and by form (executive and administrative).  Typical 
examples of types of participation identified in this matrix are: 
!"shop floor level - consultation between individual managers and employees or between co-
workers within work teams. 
!"departmental level - suggestion schemes for information sharing between individuals, or 
committees to assist consultation between representative managers and employees.   
!"Company and corporate level consultation –  
either joint decision-making if worker-directors are appointed 
or 
co-determination or self-management -depending on the degree of worker control and 
profit sharing Wang (1974) 
 
Walker (1975) defined worker participation in terms of the degree of worker 
involvement in decision making.  He described this as “the extent to which workers, 
while remaining in workers’ positions, may take part (directly or through 
representatives) in certain functions defined as managerial” (Walker 1975:435).  He 
  
 
44 
claimed that in order to understand participation it is necessary to assess the practice 
through empirical study of the: 
!"Scope of participation – the range of managerial functions in which employees take part 
!"Degree of participation – how far employees influence managerial functions 
!"Extent of participation – the proportion of workers who participate. 
!"Areas of authority and managerial functions in which workers take part 
!"Extent to which employees participate through profit sharing or other schemes in the 
results of the enterprise. 
!"Form of participation (Walker 1975:438). 
 
Although many other writers have defined workforce participation, many are 
variations around these themes.  Accordingly for the purpose of this thesis these 
definitions are sufficient.  There are two common features of these definitions.  First is 
the notion of power distribution between managers and employees.  Second is the 
identification of two principle forms of participation.  First there is individual 
participation by employees at the work area or shop floor (direct participation).  
Lansbury (1980) gave the example of SAWGs at the departmental or work level, or 
self-management at corporate or enterprise level.  Second there is representative 
participation by elected employee delegates to departmental or organisation level 
JCCs.  Lansbury (1980) gave the example of JCCs at departmental or work level, or 
co-determination at the corporate or enterprise level.  Given the division into 
representative and direct participation this requires further discussion. 
 
Representative Participation 
 
Representation of workers in industrial relations has traditionally been through unions.  
Early literature upon unions claimed that workers are best represented by trade unions 
organised as representative democracies.  Industrial democracy, it was argued, can 
only be achieved by union outside the organisation engaging in collective bargaining 
with managers inside the organisation (Webb & Webb 1897).  This argument was 
questioned in the 1960s by writers such as Flanders (1968) who argued that collective 
bargaining from outside the organisation may confine worker representation to 
economic, or labour market matters, rather than to enable an extension into power and 
control, or labour process matters.  Clegg (1961) stated that although collective 
bargaining should be the prime focus of union activity it was possible for workers to 
be involved at lower levels of management where they have specialist knowledge.  
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This argument was reiterated in the 1970s and 1980s as unions began to explore ways 
to counter managerial power and reduce the frontiers of control between managers and 
workers (Edwards 1979; Brown 1981; Batstone 1984, 1988; Millward & Stevens 
1986; Sisson 1987).  Indeed Poole argued that participation within organisations had 
the potential to give workers more control over their working lives (Poole 1975).   
 
In more recent times arguments for greater workforce participation have come from 
managers rather than unions.  This has originated from arguments that greater 
workforce commitment is needed if companies are going to become more competitive. 
Writers such as Ramsay (1977) argue that this management support for greater 
workforce participation has come merely to counter any apparent or threatened 
redistribution of power towards the workforce.  His study of management support for 
workforce participation in Britain in the 1900s led him to term such periods ‘Cycles of 
Management Control’.  During these periods, he argued, managers sought to “combat 
labour organisation, improve labour productivity, and overcome resistance to 
change….to encourage the workforce to adopt an enterprise consciousness” (Ramsay 
1977:485).  As a result he cautioned against too easy an acceptance of managerial 
initiated participative practices.  Similarly Kelly and Kelly (1991) argue management 
is willing to support workforce participation “only as long as they yield profitable 
results and do not impinge on their own power” (Kelly & Kelly 1991:41).  This, they 
claim, has resulted in little change to ‘them and us’ attitudes as “workers often lacked 
choice over participation…[while there is]…a lack of institutional support for the 
schemes by senior management” (Kelly & Kelly 1991:25).  
 
Discussion continues in the industrial relations literature as to how best to use 
workforce participation to share power more evenly between managers and 
employees.  In Europe during the 1970s legislation was passed to ensure election of 
worker representatives to Boards of Directors and works councils.  For example 
Sweden passed the Board Representative Act in 1972 followed in 1976 by the 
Codetermination at Work Act.  Germany passed similar legislation in 1972 (Works  
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Constitution Act) and 1975 (Codetermination Act).  However in more recent years 
legislative support for workforce participation has declined.  As Clarke states: 
the movement to enhance workers’ participation by statutory means has ‘run out of 
steam’…..Instead it has been replaced by employer initiated enterprise based schemes aimed to 
elicit higher levels of employee commitment (Clarke 1993:259).  
 
In Australia the union movement did not develop a policy on industrial democracy 
until 1975 (ACTU 1975, 1977).  Even then implementation of the policy was confined 
to the establishment of JCCs on specific issues such as new technology and 
occupational health and safety matters (Pritchard 1979; Lansbury 1980; Lansbury & 
Prideaux 1980; Vaughan 1984; Davis & Lansbury 1986; Teicher 1992).  Even the 
signing of the Accord between the ALP in government and the ACTU (ACTU & ALP 
1983) had little impact on enterprise level representative participation apart from the 
legislative requirement that each government department develop industrial 
democracy plans (Public Service Reform Act 1984).  Vigorous debate upon the issue 
of industrial democracy and workforce participation between the union movement 
(who favoured industrial democracy supported by legislation) and employers (who 
favoured voluntary workforce participation) led to the release in 1986 of a major 
government Policy Discussion paper on industrial democracy (DEIR 1986).  However 
the Paper did not seek to resolve the debate but simply defined industrial democracy 
as the goal, and workforce participation as the means to achieve this goal.  Thus an 
active campaign by the union movement to introduce representative participation was 
not evident until the Commission Decisions on institutional workplace reform in the 
late 1980s as explained earlier.  
 
Even when JCCs were established in the early 1990s, their operational effectiveness in 
changing the power balance between workers and managers is disputable.  AWIRS 95 
data shows that by 1995 around 90% of JCCs were meeting at least once a quarter 
(Morehead et al. 1997:194).  However, as shown in Table 2.9, issues before the 
committees were principally confined to basic employee and production related 
matters, rather than company strategy.  Industrial relations concerns of wages and 
working conditions were discussed in only 38% of committees.  This suggests that  
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collective bargaining by unions from outside the organisation remained the most 
important pay determinant.  The least frequently discussed issues were financial and 
investment decisions.  This suggests that management retained control over company 
strategic decisions. 
Table 2.9 
Issues with which Consultative Committees have Authority to Deal  
1995 
 
Issue % Committees 
Work organisation 81 
Occupational Health and Safety 59 
Introduction of new technology 52 
New products or service lines 40 
Pay and conditions 38 
Equal Employment Opportunity Affirmative Action 38 
Individual grievances 36 
Discipline of employees 27 
Financial, investment decisions 20 
Other 10 
Source: Morehead et al. 1997:194 
 
The outcome was that effectiveness of JCCs was confined to improving 
communication rather than significant improvement in product or service quality as 
shown in Table 2.10.  
Table 2.10 
Impact of Joint Consultative Committees  
1995 
 
Issue Improved 
%wps 
No change  
% wps 
Deteriorated 
%wps 
Communication between management and employees 82 16 2 
Ease with which change can be introduced 72 25 2 
Workplace performance 66 32 1 
Product or service quality 59 39 2 
Source: Morehead et al. 1997:195 
 
Direct Participation 
 
That employees require a supportive social environment in order to find work 
satisfying emerged in literature early in the 1900s.  The Hawthorne studies and 
Lewin’s work on teamwork gave support for this concept (Mayo 1933; Roethlisberger 
& Dickson 1939; Lewin 1947).  However, in keeping with a unitarist approach to 
management, the emphasis was upon benevolent managers providing a work 
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environment in which employees can satisfy their hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1954).  
During the 1960s discussion began to focus on participative leadership (Herzberg, 
Mausner & Synderman 1959; Herzberg 1966; McGregor 1960).  This led to 
discussion about job and work redesign.  On the one hand there were calls for jobs to 
be redesigned to enrich and enhance the quality of working life through job rotation 
and job enlargement (Davis & Taylor 1972; Kanter 1978; Buchanan 1979; Gustaven 
1992).  On the other hand there were calls for work redesign based on socio-technical 
systems in which work tasks are devolved to SAWGs (Emery 1959, 1991; Emery & 
Thorsud 1977; Cummings 1978; Dunphy 1981; Trist 1981; Dunphy & Stace 1992; 
Gustaven 1992; Trist & Murray 1993).  Both approaches led to increased emphasis on 
employee participation in work teams, although these were differences as to the scope 
of work teams responsibility. 
By the late 1980s a major study into the international automotive industry extolled the 
competitive advantages resulting from lean production processes which rely upon “the 
maximisation of the number of tasks and responsibilities to those workers actually 
adding value” (Womack Jones & Roos 1990:99).  Lean production had developed in 
Japan, influenced particularly by the experiences of Toyota (Ohno 1988).  By the mid 
1990s experimentation in an increased role for workers resulted in a variety of 
suggestions.  First, there were temporary teams, for example QCs, bought together for 
a limited life for a specific purpose (Keller 1995).  Second, there was a range of 
permanent teams, including self-managing teams (Bryant, Farhey & Griffiths 1994; 
Katzenbach & Smith 1994), self-leading teams (Manz 1990), self-directed teams (Ray 
& Bronstein 1995), empowered teams (Wellins, Byham & Wilson 1991), high 
performing teams (Rayner 1993), and superior teams (Kinlaw 1991).   
Several features characterise all these teams.  First, they are management inspired.  In 
1995 Keller claimed that work teams are: 
more and more key elements of management demands, motivated by purely economic 
objectives with employees and their representatives pursuing partially differing ideas (Keller 
1995:323). 
Second, management and employee team members embark upon a mutual exchange.  
This is described by Mahoney & Watson, as a “reciprocal extension of trust and 
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discretion…(which)…creates a social exchange of obligations extending beyond those 
in the economic exchange of the employment contract” (Mahoney & Watson, cited in 
Fernie & Metcalf 1995:381).  In 1995 an influential report into managerial practice in 
Australia exhorted management to adopt a less control and more leadership style and 
“use the local knowledge of all employees” (Karpin 1995:21).  Third, individual team 
members contribute their technical expertise on issues related to their immediate work 
area through permanent SAWGs.   
 
These suggestions are designed to increase employee satisfaction as a means to 
improving performance rather than to change the power relationship between 
managers and employees.  Marchington et al state that teams “by their nature are not 
designed to alter substantially the established structure of governance in 
organisations” (Marchington et al. 1993:557).  Rather they are designed to increase 
employee commitment through direct employee involvement (Marchington 1992; 
Marchington et al. 1992; Marchington et al 1993; Capelli & Rodgovsky 1994).  
Indeed some writers claim teams increase management surveillance and control, 
diminish employee discretion, increase stress through increased pacing, and create 
new peer group control pressures (Babson 1993, 1996; Graham 1995; Stewart & 
Garrahan 1995; Delbridge 1998; Parker & Slaughter 1998a, 1998b).  However other 
writers argue teams at least suggest new management attitudes towards worker control 
in which “management’s perception of the legitimate boundary of autonomy have 
been widened” (Buchanan 1989:259).  While Kitay and Lansbury claim teams lead to 
the replacement of supervisors by team leaders as the first step towards teams 
“ultimately…managing themselves” (Kitay & Lansbury 1995:45).  
 
Evidence in Australia as to the impact of various forms of direct participation on 
productivity improvement and the role of workers is inconclusive.  AWIRS 95 found 
managers considered QCs and SAWGs to have positive impact on all issues related to 
performance, introduction of change, product or service quality and communication,  
as shown in Table 2.11.   
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Table 2.11 
Impact of Quality Circles and Semi-Autonomous Work Groups on the Workplace  
Management View 
1995 
 
Issue Improved 
%wps 
No change  
% wps 
Deteriorated 
%wps 
Communication between management and 
employees 
82 16 2 
Ease with which change can be introduced 80 18 2 
Workplace performance 87 12 1 
Product or service quality 82 16 1 
Source: Morehead et al. 1997:191 
 
Workplace delegates also believed these initiatives led to employees having an 
increased say at the workplace, as shown in Table 2.12, although there was less 
conviction this led to increased efficiency. 
Table 2.12 
Impact of Semi Autonomous Work Groups and Quality Circles on Workplace Delegate Views 
1995 
 
Achievements of Quality Circles and Autonomous Work Groups  
 
% wps 
Allow employees to have their say 79 
Improve  quality 69 
Allow employees to make decisions 65 
Increase job satisfaction 58 
Improve customer satisfaction 52 
Save money and increase efficiency 47 
Get employees to work harder 27 
Other achievements   5 
Source: Morehead et al. 1997:191 
Thus, although there is evidence direct participation does increase the ability of 
employees to have their say, this appears to be on issues directly related to the 
immediate work area, rather than broader company issues.  
The Problem 
It has been shown in this chapter that the three forms of workplace reform – quality 
management, institutional workplace reform, and best practice – have been associated 
with workforce participation.  This thesis seeks to advance understanding of the 
precise relationship between the various forms of workplace reform and workforce 
participation.  The literature on workforce participation suggests that representative 
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participation has greater potential to change the power relationship between 
employees and managers, while direct participation has greater potential to increase 
employee commitment to the enterprise.  However this is inconclusive.  Accordingly, 
in order to assist empirical analysis, a framework of participative practices devised by 
Marchington will be used (Marchington 1990).  This is presented in Table 2.13.  
Table 2.13 
Four Elements of Employee Participation 
 
type of participation information sharing 
the extent to which the 
employee or, employee  
communication 
representative can influence 
the final decision 
consultation 
 codetermination 
 control 
form of the participation direct – face-to-face between management and their subordinate 
 indirect – worker represented in the process of management decision 
making 
level at which the 
participation takes place 
task/work-area 
 department 
 establishment 
 division/region 
 corporate/national 
subject matter  
issues under discussion 
basic employee - wages, terms and conditions of employment, health and 
safety, grievance procedure, absence, staffing/manpower, appraisal, 
welfare and redundancy 
 production - quality, output, work method, costs, job evaluation and 
communication 
 strategic - company financial position, investment, training, new 
technology and staffing levels 
Source: Marchington 1990 
 
This framework enables workforce participation to be classified according to four 
elements: 
!"type of participation - the extent to which the employee or employee representative can 
influence final decisions 
!"form of participation - whether it is direct face to face between management and 
employees or indirect between worker representatives and management 
!"level of participation - whether it is work area specific, departmental or whole enterprise 
!"subject matter - whether issues discussed fall within basic employee, production, or 
strategic matter.  
 
Conclusion 
 
A brief resume of the literature review shows that each of the three selected workplace 
reform processes chosen for detailed analysis in this thesis.  It was found that each of 
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the reform processes fit the test for workplace reform.  They are all concerned with 
business competitiveness, for each change is located at the workplace, and each 
operates through reconfiguring the human input into work.  The difference between 
the processes rests principally on the focus of the reform.  Quality management reform 
seeks to introduce continuous quality improvement to the production process and thus 
operates primarily in the immediate work area.  Institutional workplace reform seeks 
to decentralise the bargaining process to relate wages and working conditions more 
closely to enterprise productivity and efficiency and thus operates at the company 
level, with some consequences for the work area.  Best practice reform seeks an 
integrated change process within a strategic plan for the future.   
 
Workforce participation was found to be more difficult to define given the various 
theories guiding its practice.  However two principle forms of participation – 
representative and direct – were distinguished.  Representative participation is more 
closely associated with questions of power distribution and thus is preferred by 
unions, while direct participation has greater potential to increase employee 
commitment to the enterprise and is thus preferred by managers.   
 
The link between these two bodies of literature can be explained through a 
hypothesised relationship as shown in Table 2.14.  This suggests that there is a link, 
on the one hand, between quality management and best practice reform and direct 
workforce participation.  On the other hand there is a link between institutional 
workplace reform and best practice and representative participation.   
Table 2.14 
Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation 
 
Workplace Reform Direct Participation Representative 
Participation 
Quality Management QCs  
Institutional Workplace Reform  JCCs 
Best Practice SAWGs JCCs 
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The relationship shown is premised on two competing views of the parties of 
workforce commitment.  A union/pluralist views sees power sharing through 
representative institutions as a necessary condition for employee willingness to 
participate in reform.  A managerial/unitarist view sees the need for no more than 
direct engagement of employees in direct decision-making upon continuous 
improvement within a framework of managerial dominance.  Best practice, it would 
seem, combines elements of the two. 
 
The following chapter turns to the Australian automotive industry in which case 
studies were conducted to investigate this proposed relationship.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to describe economic and industrial changes in the Australian 
automotive industry primarily between 1985 when the Vehicle Industry Plan was 
introduced (Button 1984), and 1991 when government policy through to the year 2000 
was announced (Hawke, Keating & Button 1991).  This time period encompasses the 
introduction of all three reform processes under analysis in this thesis.  Reference to 
events outside this time period is made for clarification where necessary.  However, at 
the end of this Chapter a postscript has been added to summarise output, export, and 
employment trends to the mid 1990s to provide a time frame in which to see the 
results of reforms.  This description of the industry is undertaken in order to explain 
why workplace reform was adopted.  For this reason, it is primarily concerned to show 
a developing crisis in the years up to 1991.  Information for this Chapter came 
principally from Government Reports.  These include periodic reports into the state of 
the automotive industry, annual reports by the Automotive Industry Council (AIC) and 
the Automotive Industry Authority (AIA), and two recent reports by the Industry 
Commission (IC).  Reference is also made to an international study of the automotive 
industry (MIT).  The chapter begins with some observations on manufacturing in 
general.  It then looks at the Australian automotive industry, analysing trends in 
performance indicators associated with the market, production, and employment.  The 
chapter concludes with an examination of the broad pattern of workplace reform in the 
industry. 
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Australian Manufacturing 
 
Australia, it has been argued, has never had a natural competitive advantage in 
manufacturing.  Manufacturing industry grew substantially only after the Federal 
Government introduced a protective ‘infant industry’ manufacturing policy after 
World War Two.  This policy aimed to reduce Australian reliance on manufactured 
imports (Bell 1993).  The protection afforded manufacturing by these policies resulted 
in a doubling of the contribution of manufacturing to gross domestic product from the 
beginning of the century to reach almost 28% in 1963 (Jackson Committee Report 
1975).  However, during the early 1970s the sector came under scrutiny concerning 
the appropriate form and level of government support.  The government was 
persuaded to reduce tariffs to increase general economic welfare while commissioning 
studies into long term adjustments.  These studies included the Green Paper produced 
by the Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry (Jackson 
Committee Report 1975), the White Paper on Manufacturing Industry 
(Commonwealth Government 1977), and the Study Group on Structural Adjustment 
(Crawford Report 1979).  Each of these identified similar problems - manufacturing 
firms operated on a small scale with relatively poor productivity, outdated or 
inappropriate technologies, inadequate management techniques, and poor labour 
relations.  Each report concluded that restructuring was crucial before tariff protection 
could be removed without fundamental damage to the industry.   
 
A critical part of this restructuring was to introduce change to improve management-
employee relationships to reduce “mutual suspicion [and] distrust” (Jackson 
Committee 1975:104-105,108).  An important element of this change was to increase 
employee participation in decision making.  The Jackson Committee recommended 
decision-making procedures “to accept the practical usefulness of allowing interest 
groups real involvement and participation” (Jackson Committee 1975:16).  The 
Crawford Report argued “employee participation in the development of plans 
affecting them increases the scope for producing solutions which minimise 
disruptions” (Crawford Report 1979:44).  However little was done by government, 
employers, or unions to increase workforce participation in management decision-
making.  
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The Federal Labor Government elected in 1983 took a more interventionist approach 
to industry through the Prices and Incomes Accord (ACTU/ALP 1983).  
Manufacturing industry policy was still premised on the need to reduce protection, but 
it was recognised this had to be done in a way to provide for the growth of 
manufacturing industry as the international importance of primary and mineral 
industries declined.  In the government’s words “the days of our being able to hitch a 
free ride in a world clamouring, and prepared to pay high prices, for our rural and 
mineral products, are behind us” (Hawke, Keating & Button 1991:1.1).  Accordingly, 
the Australian Manufacturing Council (AMC) released several plans for 
manufacturing industry growth, offering financial assistance to companies 
demonstrating strategic growth plans.  A further condition was that Plans had to be 
discussed and endorsed by both management and unions (Curtain 1987).  Industries 
targeted for such assistance were automotive, heavy engineering, steel, and textile, 
clothing and footwear industries (BIE 1986).  In addition in 1988 the government 
introduced a new tariff reduction program.  This set the target of a maximum tariff 
level of 15% by 1992 for all industries except passenger motor vehicle (PMV) and 
textile, clothing and footwear industries.  
 
At the same time the government demonstrated support for workplace reform.  
Specific proposals spanned all three types of workplace reform distinguished in 
Chapter Two.  The government in 1981 endorsed quality management through the 
Australia for Quality Campaign (Sprouster 1984).  Institutional workplace reform was 
affirmed between 1987 and 1991 through government-union agreements in Accords 
Mark III-VI.  Best Practice reform also gained government support in 1991 through 
the program for competitive workplace reform (AMC & DIR 1991). 
 
While workplace reform was widely recommended for manufacturing as a whole, the 
automotive industry was given high priority because of the economic pressures on it 
and fears this industry was under threat. 
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Developments in the Australian Automotive Industry 
 
This section first describes the structure of the Australian automotive industry 
including, passenger motor vehicle assembly (PMV) and component production as 
represented by the 33 major specialist component producers (SCP).  It then outlines 
economic pressures on the industry after 1985 showing trends in market indicators 
such as sales, price, and quality, and in performance indicators, such as production and 
productivity.  Particular attention is afforded to both technical (capacity, scale, and 
investment) and personnel (labour productivity, industrial relations, and management 
practices) influences upon productivity.  Finally industry profitability and employment 
performance are described. 
 
The Australian automotive industry has a number of sub-sections including, sale of 
new and used vehicles, replacement parts and accessories, vehicle repair, component 
and vehicle manufacturing, design and engineering services, and other services such 
as freight, finance and insurance.  This thesis is concerned with the twin sectors of 
passenger motor vehicle manufacturing and specialist component production2.  The 
automotive industry has been a prominent special case in Australian manufacturing 
industry policy.  It is protected, along with textile, clothing, and footwear industries, 
by the highest tariffs (in 1990 more than three times greater than the manufacturing 
sector as a whole).  A few large, overseas-owned firms dominate it.  Finally, it is 
especially close to government in the application of industry plans (Beruldsen 1989; 
IC 1990a:1). 
 
During the 1980s the automotive industry share of manufacturing stood at around 7% 
of turnover and 5% of value added.  Over this time the value added by the industry 
represented around 1% of Australia’s total gross domestic product (IC 1990a:23).  The 
industry contributed nearly 6% of manufacturing employment, supporting a 60/40 
ratio of male to female employees.  Although the industry (including component 
manufacturers) accounted for only 1% of purchases from the rest of the economy, for 
some manufacturing industries, including basic metals, fabricated metal products, and 
                                                 
2 This does not include light commercial vehicles and other commercial vehicles 
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leather, rubber, glass and fabrics, it is an important customer.  Furthermore, the 
industry has strong technological links with a range of other manufacturing and 
service industries (IC 1990a). 
 
Despite special government tariff protection from 1907 aimed to encourage 
manufacture of vehicle bodies and components, the industry did not develop to a 
viable size until after significant additional government tariffs and import licensing 
restrictions were introduced in the 1940s and 1950s.  This assistance was aimed at 
attracting investment and production skills from American and British manufacturers.  
Uhlenbruch claims the Australia’s automotive industry is fundamentally different 
from the three world leaders, “the main difference lies in the simple fact that Australia 
has no indigenous automotive industry” (Uhlenbruch 1986:15).  The Australian 
automotive industry has been built upon foreign design, technology, and capital.  
Although the assembly of motor vehicles commenced in Australia in 1925, not until 
November 1948 was the first Australian built car, General Motors (GM) Holden, 
released.  The British Motor Corporation (BMC), Ford, and finally Chrysler followed 
in the next 14 years.  These companies were attracted by incentives from federal and 
state governments as well as profitable growth in the Australian domestic market.  By 
1960 the Australian automotive industry as a whole consisted of nearly 300 companies 
employing over 30,000 people (IC 1997:K1).   
 
The level and complexity of government assistance was increased significantly in 
1965 with the introduction of the first 10-year Motor Vehicle Plan.  This Plan aimed 
to increase local content used in vehicle production by establishing minimum levels of 
local content, 95% being the highest level.  If PMV assemblers used more than the 
minimum local content they could import components free of duty (IC 1997:K9).  A 
Car Component Manufacturing Program complemented this strategy.  Specified 
components (excluding raw materials) were deemed to have 100% local content.  The 
result of these initiatives was to increase the number of component manufacturers in 
Australia, many being foreign owned subsidiaries.  The Plan was renewed in 1975 but 
at reduced levels of protection.  In 1979 an Export Facilitation Scheme for vehicle 
producers was introduced.  In 1981 this was extended to component producer and 
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replaced the Car Component Manufacturing Programs (Beruldsen 1975).  Finally in 
1984 the governments ‘Button’ superseded all previous plans (Button 1984).   
 
The Button Plan reversed the previous protection policy and replaced it with strategies 
to encourage greater industry efficiency and quality at lower prices.  Tariffs and local 
content requirements were to be reduced and import quotas abolished in order to 
expose companies to international competition.  This was to be done gradually, a 2.5% 
tariff reduction to occur annually over 10 years, to reduce the average to 35% by 
January 1992.  At the same time the industry was encouraged to restructure to take 
advantage of economies of scale by reducing both the number of companies and 
number of models produced.  A target of no more than three assembly companies was 
established, and companies were encouraged to reduce production to no more than six 
models.  Penalties were imposed for low volume production and access to export 
facilitation opportunities was increased (Button Plan 1984; IC 1997:359). 
 
In 1984 there were five PMV assemblers, reduced from a high of ten in 1960 (some 
quite small such as Australian Motor Industries).  These PMV assemblers produced 13 
vehicle models with annual production volumes averaging only 28,000 per model and 
46,000 per plant.  This compared unfavourably with the internationally accepted 
efficiency level of 200,000 per plant (IC 1990a:31).  To assist the restructuring 
process a national tripartite Automotive Industry Authority (AIA) was established, 
Labour Adjustment Training Schemes were introduced, and a Component 
Development Grants Scheme was established to encourage technological 
advancement and greater consultation between management and the workforce.  In 
1988, following a mid-term review, quantitative import restrictions on PMVs were 
removed.  This left tariffs the sole form of protection against vehicle imports. 
 
Outcomes from implementation of these Plans varied (AIC 1986a; 1986b).  Between 
1985 and 1990 the nominal rate of assistance3 for the automotive industry decreased 
from 85% to 36%, with a projected further decline to 30% by 1992.  This was 
                                                 
3 estimate of the price raising effects of taxation 
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estimated as the equivalent to a decline in the effective rate of assistance4 from over 
250% to 127% (IC 1990b:14).  By 1992 the number of PMV assemblers was reduced 
to four following the withdrawal from local production in 1991 of the Nissan Motor 
Company.  The PMV assemblers are - the Ford Motor Company of Australia, (Ford), 
General Motors Holden’s Automotive Limited (GMH), Mitsubishi Motors Australia 
Limited (Mitsubishi), and the Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (Toyota).  By 1992 
there were only ten operating plants following closure of the GMH Woodville plant 
(IC 1997:359).  The geographic dispersal of plants throughout Australia had also been 
reduced to only two States, Victoria, and South Australia, following plant closures in 
Queensland and New South Wales.  This led the government in 1991 to extend the 
scheduled tariff reductions of 2.5% per year to the year 2000, at which time tariffs 
were to be reduced to around 15% on average.  Meanwhile, the 15% duty-free 
entitlement was continued, and the export facilitation scheme expanded to make it 
more flexible and market oriented (Hawke, Keating & Button 1991). 
 
Turning to components, it is difficult to determine the exact size of the sector.  It is 
made up of both first tier suppliers providing components to PMV assemblers, and 
second tier suppliers supplying first tier suppliers with components for subassemblies, 
although the PMV assemblers themselves also undertake component production.  Of 
the estimated 500 firms supplying components to vehicle producers, 200 are 
considered large, with the largest 35 firms producing about 80% of sales for the 
sector5.  These 35 firms are referred to as Specialist Component Producers (SCPs).  
This thesis is mainly concerned with this group (AIA 1988, 1991, 1993; IC 1990a, 
1997).  Components supplied to the PMV assemblers are either original equipment 
(OE), components used in the assembly or manufacture of PMVs, or replacement 
parts and after-market components (AM) capable of being fitted to vehicles at any 
time after final production.  In 1991 around 63% of locally manufactured components 
were supplied as original equipment to the five assembly companies (AIA 1991: 45). 
 
                                                 
4 estimate of assistance to the industry’s value added after allowing for both assistance to output and the tax effect 
of assistance on inputs. 
5 All three case studies used for research for this thesis are SCPs 
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All PMV assemblers and many SCPs are either subsidiaries of overseas parents, are 
wholly or partly owned by overseas car companies, or produce under licence to 
international component manufacturers6.  These subsidiaries draw most of their 
capital, product design, and production methods, from their foreign parents.  This has 
implications for the way they function, particularly with regard to export markets.  To 
quote Uhlenbruch  
the vehicle builders in Australia are part of overseas-based multinationals, and the same is true 
of the majority of the larger parts makers..  [which] ..set up operations in Australia to service 
the domestic market, and not to use Australia as a base for exports (Uhlenbruch 1986:15).  
 
Thus the automotive industry in Australia shares the general characteristic of the 
Australian manufacturing industry of being established under extensive government 
assistance to protect it against external competition.  It was estimated that by 1991 the 
assistance to the industry would be equivalent to a direct subsidy of $4000 for each 
vehicle produced (IC 1990a:1).  This type and level of assistance resulted in a largely 
foreign-owned industry located here to access the Australian market.  However, by the 
1970s and 1980s, greater competition within the international automotive market was 
causing successive governments to seek alternate plans to make the Australian 
industry more internationally cost competitive.  The success of these Plans and the 
need for future action can only be gauged by a detailed exploration of the pressures on 
industry.  This is the task of the next section. 
 
Australian Automotive Industry: The Product Market  
 
Pressure for change arises partly from market problems.  The local industry market 
performance can be identified by a study of sales data.  This reveals the market for 
Australian-made PMVs was both maturing and volatile, reaching a peak of vehicle 
sales of just over 500,000 units in 1985 (IC 1990a:26).  Table 3.1 presents sales data 
for domestic sales from 1985 to 1991.  This showes that after 1985 domestic vehicle 
sales fluctuated.  Sales reached 360,000 units in 1987 and 470,0000 units in 1990, 
then declined to 393,000 units in 1991 (AIA 1988, 1991).  Over the same period the 
contribution from locally produced PMVs decreased from almost 80% of these sales 
in 1985 to around 70% of sales in 1991. 
                                                 
6 Multi national companies bought two of the case study companies in this thesis from their Australian owners. 
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Table 3.1 
Domestic Sales of new PMVs 
1985-1991 
 
Year Domestic Sales  
Volume - Units 
Local PMV Sales  
% volume 
1985 509,589 77 
1986 398,739 81 
1987 363,964 84 
1988 410,473 80 
1989 448,514 76 
1990 467,493 75 
1991 393,161 69 
Source: AIA 1988:77; AIA 1991:83 
 
The increased demand for imported vehicles was due to a number of factors (AIA 
1988, 1991).  First, customer demand changed from medium-upper and luxury sized 
vehicles to small and micro sized vehicles.  These smaller vehicles are mainly 
imported and are not built in Australia.  Second, was price competition from imported 
vehicles.  Third, the private market for PMVs was approaching maturity.   
 
Turning first to customer demand.  Change in demand from medium-luxury to small-
micro sized cars vehicles was influenced by removal in 1988 of import quotas, 
coupled with lower costs associated with overseas competitors higher economies of 
scale.  Between 1985 and 1991 the market share of PMVs (mainly Australian made) 
held by the medium-upper-luxury vehicle decreased from a peak of 73% in 1988 to 
63% in 1991.  Imported small vehicles, as shown in Table 3.2, filled the gap.  
Table 3.2 
Local Market Share - Vehicles by Size 
1985-1991 
 
Year Imported -% 
Micro-light 
Local - % 
Micro-light 
Imported - % 
medium-luxury 
Local - % 
Medium-luxury 
1985 9.7 20.5 13.5 56.3 
1986 8.8 21.9 10.5 58.8 
1987 9.2 19.8 9.2 64.6 
1988 9.2 20.3 13.1 60.2 
1989 8.2 19.6 16.2 56 
1990 11.3 22.2 13.9 52.6 
1991 16.9 19.7 14.2 49.2 
Source: AIA 1988:79; AIA 1991:85 
 
This reveals between 1985 and 1991 market share for imported micro-light vehicles 
increased from around 10% to almost 17%, while market share for imported medium-
  
 
63 
luxury vehicles remained static at around 13%.  Simultaneously local market share of 
micro-light vehicles remained static while the market share of locally produced 
medium-luxury vehicles decreased.  Around this time Australian producers withdrew 
from local production of small cars.  Ford ceased local manufacture of the Laser and 
Nissan the Pulsar in the early 1990s leaving Toyota the sole Australian assembly of 
small PMVs.  This resulted in an overall increase in market share for imported 
vehicles from just over 20% in 1985 to over 30% in 1991.  
 
Second, locally produced PMVs came under increased price competition from 
imports, as shown in Table 3.3 (AIA 1991). 
Table 3.3 
Annual Price Increases 1985-1991 
Locally Produced and Imported Cars  
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  
Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) 
 
Year 
 
Local Imported CPI AWEs 
1985 14.3 16.3 8.0 6.2 
1986 19.1 24.8 9.5 7.4 
1987 10.9 13.2 7.0 5.4 
1988 5.7 6.9 6.7 8.1 
1989 5.9 2.8 8.2 6.3 
1990 5.2 2.5 6.7 6.5 
1991 4.4 2.5 1.4 3.5 
Source: AIA 1991:92 
 
Annual price increase of locally produced PMVs reduced gradually after 1986 from a 
high of almost 20% in 1986 to a low of just over 4% in 1991.  By 1988 the annual 
price increase of locally produced PMVs was lower than the annual CPI increase.  
Despite this price pressure from cheaper imported vehicles increased after 1988 as 
import quotas were removed.  The price increase for imported vehicles decreased from 
a high of almost 25% in 1986 to a low of 2.5% in 1990.  Although in 1988 the annual 
price increase of 7% for imported vehicles was about 1% higher than the local price 
increase, in 1989 the annual price increase for imported vehicles was just under 3% 
compared to just under 6% for locally built vehicles.  The data also suggests price 
competition from imports held the price movements for local manufacturers below 
comparable movements in consumer prices and earnings.  This suggests a difficult 
market climate for PMV producers in Australia. 
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Third, the market for PMVs is affected by market maturity.  It appears the private 
market for PMVs in Australia was reaching saturation by 1991.  This was 
accompanied by change in vehicle buyer type, which may have made the market more 
difficult.  Table 3.4 shows sales of PMVs to private buyers decreased from a high of 
300,000 in 1985 to 200,000 in 1991 (AIA 1988, 1991).  
Table 3.4 
New PMV Sales by Type of Purchaser 
1985-1991 $A 
 
Year 
 
Private Business Government 
1985 303,087 176,367 30,135 
1986 216,543 148,351 33,845 
1987 168,849 157,537 37,578 
1988 196,925 178,615 34,933 
1989 212990 186,046 49,478 
1990 253,424 170,770 43,299 
1991 205,308 146,316 41,537 
Source: AIA 1988:78; AIA 1991:84. 
 
At the same time demand by business declined marginally from a high of 170,000 in 
1985 to 146,000 in 1991.  The decline in private and business demand was partly 
offset by a gradual increase in government purchases from 30,000 in 1985 to 41,000 
in 1991.  This represented a decrease in importance of private purchasers from almost 
60% of the market in 1985 to 52% in 1991.  Purchases by the government increased to 
the point at which their share of the market almost doubled from 6% in 1985 to 11% 
in 1991.  As a sidelight corporate and government sales are likely to be less profitable 
because of buyer power forcing margins down.  This created further economic 
pressure on the industry. 
 
The declining market for locally produced vehicles was offset to a small extent after 
1990 by an increase in exports.  Given the subordinate role foreign parents assign to 
Australian subsidiaries, the amount of product exported is not great.  Exports were 
relatively insignificant throughout the 1980s, although they showed some 
improvement after 1990 as shown in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 
Australian Automotive Exports 1985-1991 
 
Year Value of Exports 
$M 
Production Exported 
(%) 
Average Annual 
Growth (%) 
1985 442.3 0.6 15.4 
1986 463.2 1.4 9.9 
1987 754.9 3.2 25.3 
1988 613.4 0.57 12.5 
1989 649.1 1.69 11.1 
1990 1,013.8 7.1 17.6 
1991 1,157.3 9.5 17.1 
Source: AIA 1991:90; AIA, 1993:86; DIST 1998:90 
 
Less than 2% of annual automotive production was exported until 1990 when an 
increase to around 7% of production was recorded, and stayed steady at around 9% in 
1991 (AIA 1987, 1989, 1991; DIST 1998).  This represented an increase of between 
1985 and 1991 in the value of exports of over 200%, with average annual growth 
fluctuating between around 10% in 1986 and over 17% in 1990 and 1991.  For 
individual producers the value of exports ranged from 1% to 20% of sales.  The 
experience of SCPs was similar.  In 1991 exports averaged around only 9% of total 
sales.  This was concentrated in only a few firms.  Nine firms did not export, 20 firms 
exported less than 10% of sales, and only three firms exported more than 20% of their 
total sales (IC 1990). 
 
These problems for locally produced PMVs led to simultaneous pressures to both 
reduce prices and increase product quality.  Taking prices first, further price 
reductions could only be achieved by reducing costs.  Costs of PMVs include the cost 
of components and cost of the factors of production.  In 1990 component inputs were 
estimated to contribute around 78% of total costs of locally produced PMVs (IC 
1990a:30).  This led PMV assemblers to seek price reductions of around 5% per 
annum from component suppliers as a condition for longer-term supply contracts.  
The pressure was thus passed from the PMV assembler to the SCP supplier.  Turning 
to labour costs.  In its 1990 Report the Industry Commission claimed labour costs 
accounted for around 20-25% of total passenger vehicle manufacturing costs.  
Although the Australian automotive industry has a wage advantage over Japan, West 
Germany, and the USA, this is reduced once on-costs are added.  The Report claimed 
that the average wage of a production worker in Australia was $20,000 compared with 
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$50,000 in Japan.  However the direct cost advantage is partly offset by other factors 
such as penalty rates, rostered days off, payroll tax, holiday loading and workers’ 
compensation which are generally higher than overseas countries.  It was further 
claimed that labour costs per unit of output are relatively high in Australia because of 
lower levels of labour productivity and fewer days worked (IC 1990a:209-210).  
However change to these wage conditions required a restructuring of awards 
governing the employment relationship.   
 
In the late 1980s PMV buyers placed further quality demands on component suppliers.  
Australian vehicle models had not developed a good reputation for quality compared 
with Japanese makers.  Sample survey data taken between 1984 and 1991 showed new 
owners detecting more faults in locally produced Australian vehicles in the first few 
months of ownership than imported vehicles.  This led the Automotive Industry 
Association to claim “only one model, locally produced during 1988, showed a 
statistically significant trend to improved quality over the four year period from mid 
1984-1988” (AIA 1988:62).  By 1991 some quality improvements had been achieved 
which led the AIA to claim “in the past four years the quality of Australian made cars 
has improved 27% and the quality gap between locally manufactured cars and 
comparable imports has narrowed considerably” (AIA 1991:59).  This Report referred 
to a survey that claimed all eight vehicle models had lower faults in 1991 than in 1985 
(ARMS data, reprinted in AIA 1991:59).  The rating of SCPs by PMV producers had 
also improved.  Ratings of ‘good’ had increased from 30% of SCPs in 1990 to 51% in 
1991, whilst ratings of ‘poor’ had decreased from 20% to 15% (AIA 1991:64).  This 
led Australian PMV assemblers to be favourably rated against overseas manufacturers 
in terms of quality improvements.  The AIA Report quoted an international survey as 
claiming the quality of Australian sourced cars had improved significantly since 1988.  
Between 26% and 33% improvement had been recorded, compared to 32% 
improvement in European-sourced cars sold into the USA market.  The AIA used 
these findings to conclude “compared with these car manufacturing countries, 
Australia is making progress in quality improvements” (AIA 1991:60).  PMV 
assemblers however accused SCP suppliers of showing little interest in quality 
improvements.  The AIA reported PMV assemblers as stating “an insufficient number 
of specialist component producers are involved in the type of quality program which 
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would enhance quality performance” (AIA 1988:65).  Assemblers complained of only 
36% of SCPs consistently satisfying quality requirements, while 12% were identified 
as poor performers (AIA 1988:64).  Thus in order for the industry to continually 
improve further reforms to quality processes were required. 
 
In summary by 1991 both the PMV and SCP sectors of the Australian automotive 
industry faced a declining market, increased import competition, and demands for 
both a decrease in price and an increase in quality.  Before assessing the response of 
industry to these challenges, it is necessary to explore the way performance is 
measured in the industry.  
 
Performance Measurement 
 
The main indicators used to measure performance in the automotive industry are gross 
production, production per automotive plant, and production per model.  Using any of 
these measures it is clear the local market focus of the Australian PMV industry 
resulted in low volume production and minimal economies of scale in an industry 
heavily reliant upon high economies of scale (IC 1990a:18).   
 
First, to explore gross production.  Between 1985 and 1989 gross production of PMVs 
in Australia averaged 380,000 units compared to eight million produced in Japan and 
seven million in the USA.  Production levels did not fluctuate significantly around this 
level until 1991 when they dropped below 300,000 as shown in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 
Production of Locally Produced PMVs  
 
Year 
 
Local Production 
1985 387,364 
1986 320,763 
1987 309,773 
1988 320,755 
1989 364,274 
1990 368,165 
1991 288,380 
Source: AIA 1988:79;1991:87 
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These production levels are low by world standards.  Even the relatively newly 
established Korean automotive industry averaging production of over 650,000 
vehicles in the same period.  The only country close to the Australian production 
levels was the newly industrialised economy of Mexico, which averaged 326,000 
vehicles in 1989 (IC 1990a:19).   
 
Second, to consider production per automotive plant.  An international study of the 
motor vehicle industry in 1989 claimed assembly volumes of 200,000 vehicles per 
automotive plant per annum are necessary for efficient production in the automotive 
industry.  In Australian no assembly plants operated at more than 100,000 vehicles per 
annum.  Indeed daily production rates in 1990 averaged only half those of the newly 
industrialised economies of Korea, Mexico and Brazil (Krafcik and MacDuffie, 
reprinted in IC 1990a:31). 
 
Third, production levels per model is used as a measure of performance.  Once again 
the international study into the motor vehicle industry found that in Australian no 
model achieved more than 100,000 units, with most models producing annual 
volumes of less than 40,000 units.  This compared with 300,000 units produced in the 
USA in 1988 by General Motors for the Chevrolet Corsica/Benetta and 700,000 for 
the Chevrolet Cavalier, and 350,000 produced in Japan by Toyota for the Corolla and 
for the Camry (IC 1990:18).  Thus the Australian automotive industry compared 
unfavourably on an international scale with volumes of production in most other 
vehicle producing countries. 
 
Productivity also showed a similarly poor performance.  Productivity within the 
industry is generally measured in three ways - plant capacity utilisation, levels of 
automation, and labour productivity.  First, to explore capacity utilisation.  In an 
international study of the automotive industry in 1989 it was found productivity of 
Australian plant lagged behind other countries in each of the main functional areas of 
welding, painting, and final assembly (Krafcik and MacDuffie, reprinted in IC 
1990a:212).  Higher levels of capacity utilisation were demonstrated within SCPs.  
Despite this the international study concluded Australian PMV plants operated 
substantially below capacity. 
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Australian vehicle assemblers were, on average, operating at only slightly more that 50% of 
their capacity.  This compares with plant utilisation levels in excess of 80% in virtually all 
other regions surveyed (Krafcik and MacDuffie 1989, reprinted in IC 1990a:203). 
 
This low capacity utilisation results from under-utilisation of the machinery used in 
production and peculiarities of labour utilisation in Australia, including single shifts 
and fewer days worked than comparable overseas plants (IC 1990a:204).  For capacity 
utilisation to increase, change to both technology and labour utilisation were needed. 
 
Second, automation in Australian assembly plants is low and there was little sign of 
plans to invest in new technology.  In the 1989 international study mentioned above, 
Australian assembly plants were found to have automated a weighted average of less 
than 11 production steps.  This compared unfavourably against almost 30 steps 
automated in Japanese plants in Japan.  Even companies within the newly 
industrialised economies had a weighted average of almost 12 steps (Krafcik & 
MacDuffie 1989, reprinted in IC 1990a:205).   
 
There was also little sign of plans to automate the production process.  The 1991 AIA 
Annual Report found total expenditure on investment by PMV producers between 
1988 and 1991 had decreased by around 12%, from around $1900 to $1600, with little 
sign of a reversal of this trend (AIA 1991).  These figures are more informative when 
they are disaggregated into investment in product, capacity, efficiency and capital 
maintenance, and administration as shown in Figure 3.1 (AIA 1991). 
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Figure 3.1 
PMV Assemblers Gross Investment Expenditure by Type 
1988 -1991 ($A1991) 
Source: AIA 1991 
 
The major form of expenditure on investment is in new product as models are 
updated.  This fluctuates depending on the stage of new model production, but it did 
not drop below 50% of overall expenditure between 1984 and 1991.  Investment 
expenditure aimed at improving efficiency is often associated with automation.  
Although this represented the second largest type of investment expenditure in the 
Australian industry, it contributed less than 20% of total expenditure over the period.  
In 1991 this increased to 20%, however this was a one-off as the Toyota plant was 
established in Victoria.  The remaining 30% of investment expenditure is used simply 
to maintain existing production facilities (Capital Maintenance and Administration) 
and to extend manufacturing capacity to increase output (Capacity).  Similar results 
were recorded for the SCP sector (AIA 1991).  Thus there was no evidence the 
industry aimed to significantly automate its production processes. 
 
Third, productivity of labour in the automotive industry is calculated in three ways.  
For the industry as a whole simple one factor input-output data is used.  For the PMV 
sector the number of labour hours required per employee is used.  For the SCP sector 
the value of sales by firms deflated by the CPI is used.  First, to explore the industry as 
a whole.  Simple one factor input-output approach is determined by dividing the 
average number of vehicles produced by the number of employees.  The AIA 
calculated an output for 1989 of almost six vehicles per employee (AIA 1991:16).  
This was only half the output recorded in the USA (11 vehicles per employee) and 
only one-third the Japanese output (17 vehicles per employee).  In 1989 the 
international study of the automotive industry calculated Australian assembly plants 
required over 44 hours to produce a ‘standard’ vehicle.  This compared unfavourably 
51%
10%
20%
19%
Product
Capacity
Efficiency
Maintenance
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not only with Japan (which required less than 17 hours) but also with plants in the 
newly industrialised countries (Krafcik and MacDuffie 1989, reprinted in IC 
1990a:217).  
 
In addition to direct measures of performance there are measurable factors thought to 
affect productivity.  Four of these are commonly examined - level of labour turnover, 
level of workforce skill, level of industrial disputation and finally, management 
practices.   
Labour turnover in the Australian automotive industry averaged a high of 35% in 
1987, with levels in individual companies of between 11% and 61% (AMC 1990).  
This compared unfavourably with the figures of 4% turnover in US plants in North 
America and 5% in Japanese company plants in Japan (Krafcik and MacDuffie 1989, 
reprinted in IC 1990a:208).  In 1989 such levels of turnover were estimated to add 
around $850 to the cost of each car produced in Australia (AMC 1990:63-69; AIA 
1990).  In 1991 labour turnover reduced to around 5.5% for the PMV sector and 8.5% 
for the SCP.  The decline was thought to be a result of the recession more than of any 
deliberate policy and thus cannot be considered as a measure of industry improvement 
(AIA 1991).   
 
A low skill base is said to limit labour productivity in Australia where almost 60% of 
the automotive industry workforce are semi-skilled process workers.  An Australian 
Industry Commission Report in 1990 found the level of training of both newly hired 
and experienced employees in the Australian automotive industry to be below levels 
achieved by many overseas competitors (IC 1990a:38-39).  By 1991 only 3% of PMV 
employees and only 2% of SCP employees were apprenticed (AIA 1988, 1991).  A 
survey of seven PMV assembly plants in 1991 in Victoria estimated around 60% of 
production and assembly line workers were from non-English-speaking backgrounds 
(Levine, McLennan & Pearce 1993).  The low levels of literacy and numeracy 
amongst many of the overseas born workforce exacerbated problems of poor skills 
(Bertone & Limbrick 1994; Jones 1995).  
 
Turning to industrial disputation.  Industrial relations in the Australian automotive 
industry has been described as adversarial, characterised by; 
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numerous industrial disputes...many over demarcation and manning issues.......local issues 
outweighed national stoppages as a major cause of lost time....workers sought to protect their 
positions by enforcing strict demarcation lines.....Delegates also claimed that there was a ‘them 
and us’ atmosphere in the plant caused by strong status differences between management and 
the workforce (Hammarstrom & Lansbury 1991:18). 
 
Table 3.7 summarises number of working days lost between 1987 and 1991. Between 
1987 and 1989 the number of working days lost per thousand employees in the 
automotive industry increased steadily to a peak of 555 days in 1989 (AIA 1991).  
This figure resulted from 20 disputes and involved almost 22,000 workers.  This level 
of disputation was typical of the manufacturing sector.  However by 1991 working 
days lost per thousand employees had decreased dramatically to only 88 days.  This 
comprised only 10 disputes involving only 5,000 workers.   
Table 3.7 
Working Days Lost Per Thousand Employees  
Automotive Industry and Total Manufacturing 
1987-1991 
 
Year 
 
Total Manufacturing Automotive Industry 
1987 374 389 
1988 405 289 
1989 357 555 
1990 642 114 
1991 882 88 
Source: AIA 1991 
 
Finally there is managerial practice.  The production process adopted in the Australian 
automotive industry has been traditionally based upon the model developed by Ford in 
the USA in the early 1900s (Taylor 1964; Katz 1985; Marsden et al. 1985; Tolliday & 
Zeitlin 1992).  This is represented in Table 3.8. Mass production methods have 
resulted in a centralised, hierarchical, many-layered, management decision-making 
process and separated departments in which employees are seen as either skilled 
thinkers or unskilled doers.  The result is standardised products and processes ruled by 
quantity considerations with output quality relegated to a post-production activity.  
There is little flexibility within the workforce, with workers assigned to rigid and 
closely defined tasks restricted by the technology employed.  The workforce response 
has been to join unions to engage in collective bargaining to protect jobs.  This has 
allegedly contributed to adversarial industrial relations  (Mathews 1989; 
Hammarstrom & Lansbury 1991).  
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Table 3.8 
Australian Automotive Industry  
Mass Production Work Organisation 
 
  
Management 
 
Centralised 
Hierarchical 
Process  Standardised by industrial engineers 
Technologically determined  
Short cycle time per job 
No schedule for preventative maintenance 
Product design Standardised products 
Cosmetic variations  
No design for manufacturability 
Market Segment mass consumption-local Australian market 
 
Departments Segmented, functional  
Product Quality  quality inspection post production 
no continuous quality improvement 
no employee involvement 
Job design narrow, individual, tasks based 
technologically determined 
limited job rotation and flexibility 
Skills and Depth 
of Knowledge 
semi-skilled workforce 
on-the-job training 
skilled technical and professional employees 
Human Resource 
Management 
reactive 
Industrial 
Relations 
adversarial – management anti-union 
unitary, based on philosophy of harmony of interest between management and 
worker 
Source: Batt and Appelbaum 1994 
 
The 1989 international automotive study characterised Australian management 
practices as on average the most controlled (robust/buffered) of all plants surveyed.  
This was compared to the Japanese management style, which was characterised as 
being highly dependent on labour force skills and motivation (fragile/lean).  
Australian plants were also described as having plant managers who were seen as least 
committed to human resource management policies (Krafcik & MacDuffie 1989, 
reprinted in IC 1990a:206).  
 
In summary, by the early 1990s productivity levels within the Australian automotive 
industry were lower than overseas competitors.  There was no sign companies were 
taking any effective measures to improve this by investing in technology, or changing 
methods, or improving skills to increase technical ability or improve communications, 
leadership, or problem solving.  The performance results of this scenario are discussed 
below. 
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Performance Outcomes: The 1991 Crisis 
 
Profitability of the Australian PMV assembly sector is shown in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9 
Profit Performance of PMV Manufacturing Operations ($M) 
1985-1991 
 
Year PMV 
 
SCP 
1985 55.9 Unknown 
1986 -192.3 Unknown 
1987 -80.5 Unknown 
1988 -12.1 105 
1989 126.7 163 
1990 -223.8 175 
1991 -501.7 69 
Source: AIA 1991 
 
Profits were recorded in only two years between 1985 ($56 million) and 1991 ($127 
million), (AIA 1991)7.  In 1991 the sector suffered a massive loss of $500 million.  
This produced a combined loss of $828 million for the period.  Although in the same 
period the SCP sector was profitable ($105 million in 1988 increased to $175 million 
in 1990), the level of profitability decreased after 1990 to $69 million in 1991. This 
led to a decrease in employment in 1991 as shown in Table 3.10.   
Table 3.10 
Employment in the Automotive Industry 
1985-1993 
 
Year PMV SCP Importers 
 
Automotive 
Industry 
1985 34,302 23729 2,750 60,781 
1986 31,675 26,417 2,263 60,355 
1987 30,919 25,331 1,931 58,181 
1988 30,476 25,697 1,888 58,061 
1989 33,558 25,729 2,190 61,477 
1990 35,128 25,817 2,210 63,155 
1991 29,008 20,916 1,827 51,751 
1992 24,036 17,707 1,777 48,431 
1993 23,067 17,681 2,247 47,134 
Source: AIA 1988:89; 1991:98; 1993:94; DIST 1998:94 
 
Total employment in the automotive industry fluctuated around 60,000 for much of 
the 1980s.  In 1991 employment levels decreased to a low of 51,751 employees and 
                                                 
7  This does not include sale of imported PMV’s, shared vehicles and bought-in PMV components as exports 
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continued to decline in the two years following (AIA 1988, 1991, 1993).  This 
decrease initially had a greater effect on the PMV sector, which employed over 50% 
of automotive industry employees, but was expected to affect to also affect the SCP 
sector. 
 
By 1990 the Australian automotive industry was under stress.  The focus on the local 
market had resulted in sales being too low to yield economies of scale.  Sales had 
peaked in 1985, fluctuating thereafter within a tight band, followed by a slump in 
1991 as the recession began.  There was little hope of an increase locally as the private 
customer market approached maturity and imports of cheaper vehicles increased.  
There was also little indication exports would grow in the short term.  It was clear the 
industry required substantial reform.  Negative profitability and declining employment 
demonstrated these problems.  Put simply, management faced a competitive crisis 
caused by pressures from imports, static prices and low productivity without 
significant investment or the prospects of technologically based solutions.  In this 
context the pressure for workplace reform became very strong.  The next section 
outlines changes introduced into the automotive industry through these reform 
processes.  
 
Workplace Reform in the Australian Automotive Industry 
 
By the late 1980s the Australian automotive industry was under growing competitive 
pressure.  The industry’s traditional response to such pressures was to seek more 
government protection.  By the 1980s, however, the Federal Government was no 
longer prepared to provide such protection.  The industry’s second response was to cut 
costs.  However demands for improved quality, coupled with successful union 
resistance to wage cuts, necessitated adoption of a different approach.  Over the space 
of several years, 1986-1991, the industry adopted three principal approaches to 
workplace reform – quality management, institutional workplace reform, and best 
practice. 
 
First, as noted in Chapter Two, Australian experience with quality management began at 
industry level in the mid-1980s through groups such as Enterprise Australia and the 
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Australian Quality Council.  Implementation of quality initiatives at enterprise level 
followed slowly.  Japanese subsidiaries in Australia such as Mitsubishi were amongst the 
first to experiment (Kriegler & Wooden 1985; Wilkinson 1989), while Repco Bearing in 
Tasmania in 1985 was one of the first automotive companies to introduce quality circles 
(Wells 1982, 1985; McGraw & Dunford 1987a; McGraw & Dunford 1987b; Wells 1985).  
 
By the late 1990 most assembly companies had developed internal quality systems which 
they extended to their suppliers through ‘preferred suppliers’ accreditation processes 
(Berggren 1992).  Toyota had extended their Toyota Production System (TPS) into a 
Supplier Assessment System (TSA) (Menere 1993; Toyota 1993; Greenwood & 
Langfield-Smith 1997; Langfield-Smith & Greenwood 1998), (later adopted as an 
industry standard by the Federation of Automotive Parts Manufacturers [FAPM] in 1994).  
Ford (Australia) had extended the Ford Worldwide Quality System Standard, Q101 to a 
Preferred Quality Award, QI, (Ford 1990).  Accreditation meant the component supplier 
had achieved a level of quality excellence and had in place processes and systems for 
continuous improvement in meeting and exceeding the customer's needs and expectations 
(Ford 1990).  This enabled the assembler to “plan its sourcing of goods and services in 
detail ...[and]... to reduce uncertainty” (Shadur et al. 1994:624, 628).  These Supplier 
Assessment Systems are important for several reasons.  First, they illustrate the kind of 
mechanisms by which quality methods spread from PMVs to SCPs.  Second, they each 
require greater workforce participation.  The TPS requires functional work teams, shop 
floor reporting, suggestion schemes, and quality circles.  The Ford Supplier Quality 
Standards (SQS) requires companies to demonstrate improved information sharing, the 
establishment of cross-functional project teams, and employees trained in problem 
solving (Ford 1990).  For example Table 3.11 sets out the Ford SQS requirements. 
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Table 3.11 
Ford Q101 Systems Evidence Requirements, 1988 
 
PROCESS and PRODUCT 
QUALITY  
PLANNING 
 
DOCUMENTING 
 
CRITICAL 
CHARACTER’S 
evaluate process capability  flow charts written quality 
procedures 
key quality 
disciplines for control 
items.  
select appropriate methods to 
control all product 
characteristics  
feasibility assessments  quality systems and 
performance records 
document control 
items 
process control through 
gauges, measuring and test 
equipment  
failure mode and effect 
activities (FMEA) 
drawing and design 
change control methods 
 
conduct and document 
engineering specification 
tests and react appropriately 
control plans part/process 
modification control 
 
identify product and test 
status 
gauging, measuring 
and testing equipment 
process change control 
methods 
 
provide set-up instructions 
and new set-up verification 
preliminary process 
capability studies 
  
maintain reference samples written process 
monitoring and control 
instructions 
  
establish procedures for 
rework 
packaging to protect 
product 
  
analyse and document 
returned parts 
initial sample 
evaluation, 
documentation and 
certification 
  
provide eight-discipline 
reports (8D) 
data for prototype 
fabrication 
  
plan and implement 
preventative maintenance 
process to monitor and 
control sub-supplier 
quality 
  
control heat-treating 
operations per customer 
standards 
plans for maintaining 
ongoing quality 
  
provide lot traceability    
use of SPC to monitor 
processes and improve 
capability 
   
plans for continuous 
improvement 
   
Source: Ford Motor Company 1990  
 
However the extent to which these system requirements led to increased workforce 
participation in decision making within workplaces is unclear.  In a study of workplaces 
in 1991 Hammarstrom and Lansbury found a degree of employee discontent with the 
limited agenda in which they were asked to participate.  They quoted workers as 
complaining: 
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the agenda of the working parties [was] often restrictive, discussion was too narrowly focussed on 
improving productivity and supervisors were fearful of exposing themselves to possible criticism 
from workers (Hammarstrom & Lansbury 1991:19). 
 
Indeed QCs appear to have been the principal means by which employee contribution was 
sought.  There were other initiatives such as the Ford Employee Involvement Program 
(1983), and the GMH and Nissan Quality of Work Life programs (early1980s), that also 
sought employee views (Lever-Tracy 1990; Lansbury & Davis 1991; Lansbury & 
Macdonald 1992; Simmons 1994).  However, in both cases employees’ suggestions for 
change were passed to management.  Thus by 1990 the need for greater workforce 
participation to improve quality had been accepted in principle although the practice was 
less easily identifiable.  
 
Second, institutional workplace reform in the automotive industry in Australia paralleled 
the general experience recounted in Chapter Two (Lansbury & Hammarstrom 1991).  The 
first changes were at industry level where a number of broad initiatives set the 
environment for reform.  Bamber and Lansbury (1997) explain this industry focus as due 
to the small size of the Australian market which influenced companies to adopt industry 
patterns, as well as the traditional influence of national industrial regulation (Bamber & 
Lansbury 1997:14).  Not until the late 1980s was there any push to decentralise wage 
bargaining for the SCP sector.  Until then this industry tended to follow pace-setting 
negotiations in the Metal Industry Award (Carr 1992).  
As explained in Chapter Two, by 1989 both the Vehicle Industry Award (covering 
employees in assembly automotive assembly) and the Metal Industry Award (covering 
employees in component production) had been restructured with endorsement from 
the Commission.  Implementation of the new Awards to suit enterprise requirements 
was assisted by agreements between employers and unions.  In 1991 the Federated 
Vehicle Industry Unions (FVIU) undertook a Project to assess “the state of the 
industry from a union perspective and to recommend changes to union policy which 
would assist in improving the industry’s performance” (FVIU & NKCIR 1991:3).  By 
1992 all parties had agreed to a curriculum for upskilling of workers through the 
proposed Production Engineering and Vehicle Industry Certificates.   
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Some enterprise specific variation was introduced as part of the implementation of the 
new Awards (Rimmer 1992), although more enterprise variation was to occur later 
under enterprise bargaining.  The PMV producers and their unions had regulated 
employment conditions by company awards for many years.  However, not until 1991 
did they experiment greatly with the freedoms created by government and the 
Commissions’ enterprise bargaining policies.  In the PMV sector, the Ford Australia 
Enterprise Agreement of 1991 changed the character of employee involvement.  The 
Agreement developed the voluntary Employee Involvement Program into permanent 
SAWGs, termed Natural Work Groups.  They were described as the most basic unit of 
work (Simmons & Lansbury 1996), and were designed to reduce demarcations 
between workers.  The aim was to produce a “single status workforce with every 
employee having unrestricted access to the issue of tools and equipment...limited only 
by recognised and accredited skills, knowledge and experience” (DIR 1993a:45; 
Simmons & Lansbury 1996).  Similarly, the Toyota Enterprise Agreement committed 
the workforce to continuous improvement through QCs.  It also committed parties to 
“standardised work, production improvements, elimination of waste, a suggestion 
scheme, team meetings, multiskilling and employee rotation” (DIR 1993a:10).  
Bendix-Mintex in the SCP sector developed an Enterprise Agreement that committed 
the workforce to another form of SAWGs, termed Cellular Work Teams, through “a 
technical redesign of production facilities to develop cellular manufacturing 
techniques” (DIR 1993b:16).  All these SAWGs were designed in accordance with 
lean production principles.  Other enterprise agreements committed workers to less 
ambitious changes such as “the best use of skills, with tasks shared between work 
groups on the basis of skills” (DIR 1993b:54).   
 
Workforce participation under these reforms varied from direct participation in 
SAWGs to representative participation in JCCs.  Ford Australia introduced a multi-
tiered consultative process that included both internal and external (full-time union 
official) participation (Curtain, Gough & Rimmer 1992; Lansbury 1994; Simmons & 
Lansbury 1996; Bamber & Lansbury 1997).  In the SCP there were examples of 
commitment of the parties to “regular plant and section meetings” (DIR 1993a:11).  
However there is little detail on the success of these consultative processes.   
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Third, best practice principles took hold in the automotive industry as early as 1991.  
To begin, five companies from the automotive industry were formally included in the 
first round of the ABPDP.  The companies were drawn from both the PMV sector 
(Toyota Motor Corporation), and from the SCP sector (Air International, Bendix-
Mintex, Henderson’s Automotive, and South Pacific Tyres).  However, best practice 
extended much more widely to all PMV firms and most SCP suppliers. 
 
The experience of these ABPDP companies was documented by Rimmer et al. (1996)8.  
The findings are summarised in Table 3.12.  
Table 3.12 
Automotive firms involved in the ABPDP 
Changes Introduced 
 
 Air Int. Pty 
Ltd (Vic.) 
Bendix Mintex Henderson’s 
Automotive 
Toyota  
Motor Corp. 
South Pacific 
Tyres 
Strategy formal, 
integrated 
formal, 
integrated 
formal, 
integrated 
formal, 
integrated 
formal, 
integrated 
Technology significant 
investment  
Significant 
investment 
significant 
investment 
significant 
investment 
significant 
investment 
Customer-
Supplier 
external – 
driven by 
competition 
external – 
driven by 
competition 
external - 
driven by 
competition 
external - 
driven by 
competition 
external - 
driven by 
competition 
Process 
Improvement 
guided by 
concepts and 
people 
framework, 
concept driven 
guided by 
concepts and 
people 
guided by 
concepts and 
people 
framework, 
concept driven 
Change 
Leadership 
established established established established established 
Measurement 
and Control 
macro data 
supplemented 
by measures 
for specific 
purposes 
but no 
benchmarking 
macro-
accounting and 
financial but no 
benchmarking. 
integrated and 
comprehensive 
but no 
benchmarking. 
integrated and 
comprehensive 
but no 
benchmarking. 
integrated and 
comprehensive 
but no 
benchmarking. 
 
Each participating automotive company had progressed as far as developing a formal and 
evolutionary strategy driven by competitive considerations.  Two companies, Air 
International and the Toyota Motor Company, developed this into an integrated strategy.  
All companies had included in their existing strategies significant investment in 
technology.  All companies had adopted steady change leadership to achieve reform.  
                                                 
8 Detailed case studies are provided in accompanying volumes [Toyota Motor Corporation, (Greenwood 
& Langfield-Smith, 1997)] [Air International (Macneil, 1997)], [Bendix Mintex (McWilliams, 
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However there were variations in the development of improved measurement and control 
systems and process improvement.  Bendix-Mintex and Hendersons’ Automotive 
(Shacklock 1997) had limited conceptual improvements, while the three other companies 
had developed beyond concepts to people-related improvements.  Measurement and 
control systems in Bendix-Mintex were still principally limited to macro accounting and 
financial data.  In Air International macro data was supplemented by measures for 
specific purposes.  The other three companies had developed integrated and 
comprehensive measurement systems.  However, none of the companies had developed 
benchmarking beyond the preparation stage. 
 
Workforce participation associated with best practice workplace reform also varied as 
shown in Table 3.13.   
Table 3.13 
Automotive firms involved in the ABPDP 
Workforce Participation 
 
 Teams People Management Empowerment - direct 
employees 
Air International 
Pty Ltd (Vic.) 
direct and indirect 
employees 
human resources & 
industrial relations 
substantial or full control 
over daily work 
Bendix Mintex direct employees industrial relations limited control over daily 
work 
Henderson’s 
Automotive 
direct and indirect 
employees 
industrial relations substantial or full control 
over daily work 
Toyota Motor 
Corp.  
direct employees human resources & 
industrial relations 
not relevant 
South Pacific 
Tyres 
direct employees human resources & 
industrial relations 
substantial or full control 
over daily work 
Source: Rimmer et al. 1996 
 
All companies had introduced SAWGs for production employees.  In two companies, Air 
International and Bendix Mintex, employees in support departments also participated in 
SAWGs.  In most companies this allowed direct employees substantial control over their 
daily work, but in none were employees involved in strategic decision making.  Thus 
progress on employee empowerment was less advanced.  In all companies people 
management was negotiated through unions, with three companies developing an 
integrated approach between industrial relations and broader employee welfare issues.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
1997)], [Henderson’s Automotive, Shacklock, 1997)], and [South Pacific Tyres (Terziovski & 
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Thus there is evidence companies within the automotive industry in Australia had 
implemented changes associated with best practice reform.  Furthermore, workforce 
participation was associated with these changes.  However, managers in several 
companies claimed workforce resistance to change had to be overcome before change 
could be effective.  For example, the Managing Director of Bendix Mintex stated “any 
attempt to introduce workplace reform without establishing the foundations of good 
employee relations and union co-operation will have a limited chance of success” (ATC 
1992:7).  Managers at Henderson’s Automotive stated “these people-changes were the 
foundation for the push for product quality improvement and they were regarded as a 
legitimate part of the quality programme” (Blewett 1994:99).  Finally, management at 
South Pacific Tyres observed more effort was required into the people aspects of reform: 
technology alone cannot provide increases in productivity and competitiveness without the 
commitment and skill of the people that operate the machines,...  the main challenge for SPT in the 
future is to integrate the new technology into the workplace culture so that best practice attitudes 
and values are changed and sustained throughout the organisation (ATC 1992:121-123). 
 
Further, when the reform process did not have sufficient scope for employees it had to be 
changed.  For example the Toyota project had to be adjusted to increase the amount of 
employee involvement and to change authoritative management to a more participative 
approach in order to overcome operator resistance (Greenwood and Langfield-Smith 
1997:433-464). 
 
Thus a study of the literature on the introduction of change associated with best 
practice reform within the automotive industry in Australia shows significant variety.  
Workforce participation was a part of this reform process, principally through 
SAWGs.  However there was little experience of truly empowered employees in 
strategic company matters.  Accordingly workforce participation associated with best 
practice reform requires further examination.  This sets the task for the case study 
research for this thesis. 
                                                                                                                                            
Samson, 1997)]. 
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Postscript 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the period 1988-1992.  However a postscript 
of industry development since then is instructive.  Table 3.14 provides a summary of 
the major changes since 1991. 
Table 3.14 
Australian Automotive Industry 
Production, Exports and Employment  
1992-1996 
 
 Production Value of Exports 
$M 
Production 
Exported % 
Employment 
1992 277,725 1248 9.0 48,431 
1993 294,070 1474 8.0 47,134 
1994 322,893 1537 7.2 44,539 
1995 312,384 1775 7.4 45,324 
1996 325,631 2173 13.5 44,001 
Source, IC 1997:C6, DIST 1998:88, 90 &94 
 
Production has recovered somewhat from the low of 1992 to return to the higher 
volumes of the 1980s.  This has been accompanied by an increase in exports, with the 
percentage of production exported remaining at the higher levels achieved since 1990.  
These changes resulted in improved financial performance with profits being recorded 
for the first time in 1993 and continuing to grow to a high of $510 million in 1996.  
These improvements have been achieved despite a steady decline in employment to an 
industry low of 44,000 in 1996.  There is evidence the industry improved after the 
recession of the early 1990s.  However to what extent the workplace reforms 
contributed to this recovery is uncertain.  Some of the workplace change initiatives 
introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s have become permanent features of work 
organisation in the industry.  In a 1997 study Park, Erwin and Kapp found 61% of the 
largest firms in the industry had introduced SAWGs.  These had been given increased 
responsibility, with 72% being responsible for quality, 53% being responsible for 
organising job rotation within the group, 45% having responsibility for setting daily 
production tasks, and 42% being responsible for managing unplanned absences.  The 
SAWGs had replaced less permanent QCs, with only 14% of the largest passenger 
vehicle manufacturing companies continuing with QCs (Park, Erwin,& Knapp 1997). 
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Conclusion 
 
The automotive industry typifies the experience of the manufacturing sector in Australia.  
It owes its origins to government protection designed to establish an automotive 
manufacturing industry in Australia.  This was achieved under protective tariffs, import 
quotas, and other restrictions.  However, it resulted in an industry largely subordinate to 
overseas parent companies.  Pressures for reform in the 1970s resulted in little change.  
This eventually led to a 1985 reversal of government protective policy in an attempt to 
encourage the industry to become internationally competitive.  However, this had little 
effect and by 1991 the industry was poorly placed to compete in the global market.  The 
local market was close to maturity, with imports advancing into the already diminished 
local market.  Exports, although growing, were restricted by the subordinate status 
afforded Australian subsidiaries of overseas parent companies.  The declining market 
meant there was little hope of reducing prices by developing economies of scale.  Quality, 
although showing signs of improvement, was still uncompetitive in world terms, while 
productivity was below overseas standards.  This resulted in an unprofitable industry with 
little incentive to invest.  It resulted in the industry in 1990 shedding a significant 
proportion of its labour force.   
 
These outcomes led to acceptance of the need for wide ranging workplace reform.  
Changes associated with all three reform processes under analysis in this thesis were 
trialed in the late 1980s and early 1990s with varying degrees of success.  In each 
instance workplace reform was underpinned by workforce participation.  This took the 
form of both direct participation by individual employees and workforce elected 
representative participation.   
 
What this overview has been unable to ascertain is the dynamics of the relationship 
between workplace reform and workforce participation.  What is required is greater 
detail of company specific changes.  The next six chapters provides detail of three 
automotive component companies’ responses to these pressures.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
AUTO ELECTRICAL (I) 1  
Engineering Competitiveness Through Advanced Technology 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The next six chapters set out research findings from three case study companies.  
These companies were chosen for reasons set out in Chapter One.  Principally, all are 
SCPs with close relationships to all four of the PMV companies.  All introduced 
changes between 1988 and 1993 resembling each of the types of workplace reform - 
quality management, institutional workplace reform and best practice.  Finally, all 
sought to change management-workforce and union relationships through workforce 
participation. 
 
The findings from the case studies are presented as follows.  Each case study is 
divided into two chapters.  Thus, Chapter Four presents a review of the first case study 
Company describing its operations and the pressures on the company in the late 
1980s.  A similar review is provided for the other two case studies in Chapters Six and 
Eight.  Chapter Five describes in detail workplace reform in its three different variants 
for the first case study firm and then explores the methods of workforce participation 
associated with each reform process.  Chapters Seven and Nine provide similar detail 
for the other two case study companies.  Appendix 1 sets out details of the various 
data collection techniques. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Note: Pseudonyms are used for all the case studies. 
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Auto Electrical: Ownership and Corporate Role 
 
Auto Electrical is unusual - amongst the three case study firms - its ownership, 
operation, and work organisation remained, in 1993, much as they had been five or so 
years earlier when the processes of workplace reform began.  Such stability is often 
absent among medium sized manufacturers (Rimmer et al. 1996).  
 
Auto Electrical is a privately owned subsidiary of a German parent.  The company 
was established in Australia in 1961 as part of the Auto Electrical International Group 
which operates 20 factories in Europe, North and Central America, Africa, Australia 
and the East Asia region including New Zealand and the Philippines (AEG 1990a & 
1990b).  In 19902 the Australian contribution by Auto Electrical and the after-market 
trading and holding company, Auto Electrical Australia, to Group turnover was almost 
6%, making it the second biggest contributor to Group turnover outside Germany (AE 
1991a).  The value of the company to the parent lies in its access to the protected 
Australian market.  A further potential advantage lies in its strategic position close to 
the South Pacific market, although this had not been utilised during the period under 
review.  Further, when discussing the development of a growth strategy for the 
company, managers voiced concern at the potential competition for the Asian market 
from plants owned by the parent company in the Philippines and New Zealand (AE, 
Board of Directors November 22, 1991).  The four member Australian Board of 
Directors, (all of whom are German expatriates, as is one of the four Associate 
Directors), is directly responsible to the German Board of Directors (AE 1990b). 
 
Product 
 
The Materials Purchasing and Supply Director (MP&S), stated Auto Electrical 
annually produces and supplies approximately 7.5 million parts, with a product range 
of several thousand different items comprising automotive headlamps, auxiliary 
lamps, signal and sundry lamps (Director MP&S December 8 1992).  The company 
also manufactures many of its own tools and fixtures.  This product range was 
                                                          
2 Dates refer to Financial Year  
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expanded following a merger in 1984 with a major UK owned competitor.  The 
merger enabled Auto Electrical to supply the whole Australian market for headlamps 
rather than the previous 25% of the market.  This also resulted in design and 
production of a broader range of electrical equipment for vehicles based upon newly 
developed (dough-moulding) lighting technology (Managing Director August 1 1992).  
Auto Electrical is able to apply leading edge technology through access to the German 
parent company and through the parent’s associated Technical Co-operation 
Agreements with Japanese component manufacturers.  This has enabled the company 
to establish mutual technical and research relationships for the design of new vehicle 
models with the PMV producers (Managing Director August 1 1992).  However the 
Plant Director expressed concern at the degree of improvisation required to adapt 
local technology to company requirements because low production volumes make it 
impossible to utilise much of the sophisticated technology used by the parent (Plant 
Director December 8 1992). 
 
The Sales and Customer Liaison Director (Sales), stated 60% of output in dollar terms 
is original equipment (OE), with the rest being parts and accessories (P&A).  
Component parts are supplied directly to the Australian automotive assembly 
companies (Ford, GMH, Nissan, Mitsubishi, and Toyota) with a small amount 
provided to Auto Electrical Australia for the after-sales market (Sales Director 
December 8 1992) 3.  The Engineering, Research and Development Manager (ER&D) 
explained pressure from customers in the late 1980s led the company to increase its 
research and development into production of an integrated Vehicle Lighting Systems 
Unit (Manager ER&D July 30 1993).  This had not proceeded to production stage 
during the period of this research but had resulted in increased resources being 
devoted to research and development.  Finally, because of its subordinate status as an 
overseas subsidiary, Auto Electrical can, and has, confined itself to an Australian 
customer base, exports making up only about 1% of total output in 1991 (Director 
Corporate Services [CSD] August 1 1992). 
 
                                                          
3 Auto Electrical Australia is responsible for the import of finished components for sale on the Australian market 
from the parent company.  In 1993 Auto Electrical and Auto Electrical Australia were amalgamated into one 
company. 
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Market 
 
The Plant Director stated the geographical isolation of Australia from the major 
European and American markets has contributed to a unique technical and research 
relationship between the company and its local customers that extends beyond the 
traditional commercial relationship in other parts of the world.  For example 
Australian PMV customers generally provide more costly model specific tooling in 
return for a commitment by Auto Electrical to supply spare parts for the life of the 
vehicle model plus seven years.  However the development of competitors in the 
Asian Pacific region during the second half of the 1980s changed this exclusive and 
long-term relationship to a more conventional commercial one.  Company products 
compete for market share against local suppliers - chiefly the Ford owned Plastics 
Plant, which also produces signal lamps.  Competition also comes from imported 
headlamps and accessories as well as interior and exterior accessory lamps from the 
parent company plus a growing number of small competitors in Japan and Korea 
(Director Plant December 8 1992).   
 
Costs 
 
The Director MP&S explained Auto Electrical company purchases around 3000 
different items per annum, of which about 1/3 are imported.  Imported items include 
major sub-components such as motors for moving headlamps and cruise controls, 
glass lenses and bulbs, and raw material acrylics used in production.  In total about 
50% of material input volume is imported.  Remaining inputs, mainly raw materials or 
relatively simple components such as acrylics, rubber parts, fasteners, cables, paints 
and foils, are provided by Australian suppliers.  Additional cost pressure is placed 
upon the company by the heavy dependence on overseas inputs, which creates a need 
for high inventory.  Many directors complained the frequent unscheduled delivery 
changes by customers, coupled with their demand for JIT delivery, also adds to the 
cost of inventory (AE Board of Directors November 22 1991).  
 
The company divides its costs into three major areas - materials, overheads, and 
labour.  Capital costs are not separately identified (this is interesting given the 
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importance the company attaches to having leading-edge technology).  This is partly 
explained by the fact that payment for access to international agreements on 
technology is repatriated to the parent company and thus is separately costed in the 
company’s annual returns.  Figure 4.1 provides an analysis of cost distribution 
between materials, labour, and overheads.  
Figure 4.1 
Auto Electrical 
Analysis of Cost Distribution 1992 
Materials
51%
Direct Labour
5%
Overheads 
16%
Indirect Labour
28%
 
Source: AE Finance 1992 
 
In 1992 material costs made up 50% of total costs, with inventory valued at over $6 
million, or 10% of annual turnover.  Labour contributed a much smaller 33% of costs, 
with process workers (direct labour) contributing only 5% of total costs (AE Finance 
1992)4.  Overheads contributed the remaining 16% of costs.  This cost distribution has 
important implications for any company future strategy.  Reducing direct labour 
(process workers) would have only minor effects on costs, with greater cost impact to 
be gained by reducing indirect labour (specialists).  However the company needs these 
professionally and technically trained skilled specialists to retain its technical 
competitive advantage.  Thus the company was forced to consider other productivity 
improvements to try to decrease material costs.  
 
Organisational Structure 
The organisational structure of the company is represented in Figure 4.2 (AE CSD 
1992a). 
                                                          
4 Note: The company did not provide a further breakdown of its costs. 
  
Figure 4.2 
Auto Electrical 
Organisational Chart-Divisions and Departments 1992 
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The company is separated into six autonomous Divisions: 
1. Plant 
2. Engineering, Research and Development 
3. Materials Purchasing and Supply 
4. Finance 
5. Corporate Services 
6. Sales 
 
Each Division is responsible for a separate function and is administered as a separate 
cost centre calculating efficiency and productivity on a weekly and monthly basis by 
measuring actual expenditure against budgeted expenditure (Director Finance April 29 
1993).  Each Division is further separated into a total of 18 Departments and five sub-
Departments.  Divisions are connected through the computer based Materials 
Resource Planning (MRPII) system augmented, to a limited extent, by formal, 
interdepartmental planning meetings.  Employment is unevenly distribution between 
departments as shown in Figure 4.3 (AE CSD 1992). 
Figure 4.3 
Auto Electrical 
Employment Distribution by Department 1992 
 Source: AE CSD 1992b 
 
In 1992 the Plant employed 68% of the 549 employees.  The second largest 
department, ER&D, employed 16% of the workforce, while MP&S employed 11%, 
and CSD, Finance, and Sales together contributed around 8% of total employment. 
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Corporate Plan 
 
The Finance Director explained the Corporate Plan for Auto Engineering is based on a 
traditional short-term financial performance model of a comprehensive annual budget 
plan (Director Finance April 29 1993).  Budget plans incorporate expected future 
needs, activity levels, and changes from the previous year.  Plans are limited to one 
year as management considers anything longer would not be constructive given the 
number of variables to be controlled (AE Board of Directors November 22 1991).  
Overall efficiency is determined by measuring total costs against total recovery.  
Activity based production planning had not been developed but was under 
consideration at the time of this research.  Despite the emphasis on financial 
performance, it was claimed the corporate plan is engineering rather than accounting 
driven as the company considers its strategic market advantage is in its research and 
development (Director Finance April 29 1993).  
 
Work Organisation 
 
Work is organised within Auto Electrical on a functional, task basis into numerous 
divisions, departments, and sub-departments.  Tasks are technologically determined. 
 
Production is carried out within the Plant Division which is divided into two 
Departments - Plant Support and Plant Production.  The Plant Support department is 
separated into three functional sub-departments - Production Planning, Quality 
Assurance, and Production Engineering.  The Plant Production Department also 
separates into two functional sub-departments - Primary Production and Final 
Assembly.  Primary Production includes various separate task related sections - 
moulding, dough moulding, welding, stamping, coiling, studding, and decorating.  
This department provides around 50% of inputs to Final Assembly.  Final Assembly 
divides into two separate task sections - small lamps and headlamps, plus a mobile 
shrink-pack servicing both sections.  A workflow chart for the Plant is reproduced in 
Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 
Production Flow Chart 
    Planner             Check customer order requirements 
 
 
 
      N  Raw material, packing material, tooling  
Check due date       availability  
for delivery,  
advise supply department and toolroom      Y 
 
          Issue order on production department 
 
 
           Manufacture goods to order requirement 
 
 
        Goods manufactured          N 
     N    to specifications 
 
           Y 
 
     N       Any further operations  
         to complete goods 
        Y 
         
 
         Finish all operations 
 
Goods booked out 
     Y       N  Quality OK (Audit Inspection) 
 
Source: AE Production Planning 1992 
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The following section first explains the role of the production support departments 
before turning to a detailed description of the actual production process.  The section 
is completed by a description of the role of specialist departments. 
 
The Manager, Production Engineering explained the production process is designed in 
accordance with the German parent company.  Professionally qualified engineers in 
Production Engineering, together with the Plant Managers, make adjustments for local 
circumstances after which the design is passed to both Planning and Quality 
Assurance departments (Manager Production Engineering December 8 1992). 
 
The Manager Production Planning explained the production planning process relies 
upon a computerised Materials Resource Planning (MRPII) system installed in its 
original form in 1982.  Professionally qualified Production Planners operate the 
MRPII system to produce a Cumulative Plan (covering eight months) which 
establishes monthly schedules produced as weekly and daily plans.  Planners check 
customer order requirements, availability of raw material, packing material, and 
tooling, and issue orders on the production department (Manager Production Planning 
December 8 1992). 
 
The Manager Quality Assurance explained the department is responsible for product 
quality.  Quality of supplier inputs is the responsibility of a separate department, 
Quality Assurance, within MP&S Division.  Production Quality Assurance is under 
control of the Plant Director although it is functionally separated to ensure quality is 
not compromised by the quantity demands of customers.  Professionally and 
technically qualified engineers and technical officers set targets, issue charts and audit 
the production process through computer data analysis (Manager Quality Assurance 
July 20 1993).  Feedback on quality is made to the production workforce in monthly 
reports on costs of failure and attribute charts and through daily product audits.  There 
is no requirement, nor encouragement, for feedback from process workers considered 
lacking the necessary expertise to provide useful information (Manager Quality 
Assurance July 20 1993).   
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Targets are set according to a ‘made-to-measure’ process with data from the previous 
production run used to determine control levels for the next run.  Testing is carried out 
against standards set by the company’s Quality Systems Manual.  The Department 
relies upon control charts (attribute, variable and individual) to monitor the production 
process.  Reliability of finished product is formally monitored and analysed both 
internally and externally through customer feedback (which accounts for 90% of 
monitoring) and field data.  Technologically sophisticated testing equipment such as 
technical sensor checking devices, 3D measuring equipment, programmable logic 
control and, electronic leak testing devices measures reliability.  Data is analysed by a 
computer software program developed by the Department in 1988.  Customer 
feedback and analysis of warranty data is relied upon to check reliability of finished 
product.  Final measurement of quality performance is performed by traditional 
aggregate economic indicators of rate of return, turnover, profit on turnover, 
profitability and cost-benefit analysis.  Between 1987 and 1993 these measures 
showed variable performance, with actual performance meetings targets between 1987 
and 1991 but declining below target in 1992 and 1993 as costs increased associated 
with new product development.   
 
Production occurs on a two-shift basis, chiefly because the machines require 24-hour 
operation.  The Plant is split into two functional sub-departments.  First is Primary 
Production.  The Manager Primary Production, described the production process as 
capital intensive, operating as a flow-line process.  Work is organised around 26 
different machines, moulding, welding, stamping, coiling, studding, painting, and 
decorating, product.  Some of these machines are mechanically controlled, some are 
automated, and some, like the dough-moulding machine, are computerised.  
Production occurs in 20 possible lines, seven for original equipment, and 13 for spare 
parts, with an average of five lines running daily and seven monthly.  Work is 
organised according to machine capacity, with a skeleton staff running the night shift 
to keep the machinery functioning (Manager Primary Production December 8 1992).   
 
In the moulding section process workers feed raw materials into processing machines 
and remove moulds from the machines.  These moulds are then placed into cutting 
and shaping machines or stacked ready for delivery to the coating section.  Machines 
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are set, process problems are addressed, and die changes performed, by setters.  
Process workers are expected to check machine gauges in order to detect process 
problems but they are not expected to make any adjustments.  Any problems are 
notified to supervisors who decide on the action to be taken.  In the coating section, 
general hands sort components and feed product into the machines to be stamped, 
studded and welded.  They are also responsible for ensuring the area is dust free.  
Skilled welders use hand-held tools to perform welds inaccessible to the machines.  
Skilled spray painters operate hand-held paint spray guns or machines to decorate 
product as moulds pass along a moving conveyor.  The dough-moulding process is 
computerised and operated by a crew of semi-skilled general hands who feed raw 
material into the machines and then withdraw and stack finished moulds for final 
treatment.  The fitters who set the machines used in this process are highly skilled in 
computer technology since any mistake in this process is costly given the non-
recyclable nature of imperfect product.  Finally, skilled spray painters operate the 
dough-moulding treatment process. 
 
In 1992 semi-skilled process workers and general hands (several trained as die-setters) 
contributed 70% of the 152 persons employed in this sub-department.  There were 
also 37 skilled tradespersons, spray painters and fitters, to perform more skilled work 
(AE CSD 1992b). 
 
The second functional sub-department is Final Assembly.  The Manager, Final 
Assembly explained work is organised into two sub-sections - lamp and headlamp.  
Seven lines operate on a flow basis, and up to three lines operate on a batch basis to 
produce parts for superseded models and other spare-parts.  Work in this Department 
is more labour intensive with lamps assembled using hand-tools to fasten, drill and 
screw parts.  The department has some technologically sophisticated machines to 
stamp and hole-punch and a glue-robot for final adhesion.  Finally, a mobile 
‘instapack’ process operated by process workers services both sub-departments, while 
materials movement within production is undertaken by semi-skilled storespersons 
and licensed fork-lift truck drivers (Manager Final Assembly December 8 1992). 
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In 1992 over 90% of the 130 persons employed in this sub-department were semi-
skilled process workers, general hands, storespersons and fork-lift truck drivers, with 
a small number trained to set machines and operate the robot (AE CSD 1992b).   
 
The technological sophistication of the machinery used in production is not reflected 
in the skills of the Plant workforce.  Figure 4.5 shows the classification distribution of 
the Plant workforce (AE CSD 1992b).  
Figure 4.5 
Auto Electrical: Plant 
Classification of Workforce 1992 
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Other
10%
 
Source: AE CSD 1992b 
 
Around 75% of the production workforce are classified at the lower levels of skills as 
process workers and general hands.  Only 10% are skilled tradespersons and only 5% 
are technically or professionally qualified.  The remaining 10% are in administrative 
or managerial positions. 
 
Expenditure by the company on upgrading production workforce skills further reflects 
the company’s technological focus.  Training expenditure increased from 1.5% of 
total annual salary in 1990 to almost 3% in 1991 and 1992.  However the Plant 
contributes only about 1/3 of total training expenditure despite much larger workforce, 
compared to around 50% contribution by ER&D Division.  Estimates of relative 
expenditure on training between Division are given in Table 4.6 (AE CSD 1992c).  
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Figure 4.6 
Auto Electrical 
Expenditure on Training 1992 
 
Source AE CSD 1992c 
 
Expenditure on training in 1992 shows a Plant average of around $147 per employee, 
compared to an average of $581 per employee in ER&D Division.   
 
Productive efficiency is measured in a number of ways - ‘departmental efficiency’ 
‘operating efficiency’ and stock turnover.  Departmental efficiency is measured by 
hours spent in the department minus lost time due to such things as breakdowns, shift 
changes, and line stoppages.  Operational efficiency is measured by productive hours 
recorded against standard hours allowed to produce a given item (standard set by 
Production Engineering).  The company was loath to release these figures however the 
Plant Director stated that time taken for die-change was being targeted as a necessary 
improvement.  In order to achieve a shorter turnaround the plan was to increase 
automation, use less people with greater levels of skills.  Increasing the level of 
quality consciousness among the workforce was also a target area (Director Plant 
April 29 1993).  Stock turnover has been steadily improving since 1987 from 63 days 
in 1987 to 55 in 1992.  However this needed further improvement to be internationally 
competitive. 
 
Apart for production there are five specialist divisions separated into 16 departments.  
The second largest division in employment terms is Engineering, Research and 
Development.  ER&D is responsible for all planning, research, design, and testing of 
product, and all maintenance (AE CSD 1992c).  These functions are undertaken 
within four functionally separate departments - Design Engineering, Process 
ER&D
38%
Plant
37%
CSD
10%
MP&S
6%
Finance
3%Sales
6%
 99 
Engineering, Central Laboratory, and Toolroom and Maintenance.  Work performed 
in this division is varied and requires professional qualifications and skills associated 
with problem identification and solution.  In 1992, as shown in Figure 4.7, employees 
in ER&D were more highly skill classified than in the Plant.  
Figure 4.7 
Auto Electrical: ER&D Division 
Classification of Workforce 1992 
Prof./Tech.
52%
Trade
32%
Other
16%
 
Source: AE CSD 1992b 
 
More than half the employees in this Division were professionally qualified engineers, 
technicians, planners or scientists and a further 32% were trade qualified.  These 
highly skilled employees use state-of-the-art technology.  This technology includes a 
laboratory that is National Association of Testing Authorities (NATA) rate, optical 
and photometry devices that meet NATA standards for on-road testing, environmental 
testing equipment, metrological equipment, equipment that is Computer Numerically 
Controlled (CNC linked to Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) to form a Computer 
Aided Manufacturing (CAM) process.  Efficient scheduling of maintenance is 
achieved through a computerised preventive maintenance plan operated by the 
toolroom. 
 
Materials Planning & Supply is the next largest Division (AE CSD 1992b).  The 
Division has six functionally separate Departments - Purchasing, Quality Assurance 
(supplies), Inward Goods, Warehousing, Packaging and Printing, and Shipping and 
Packaging.  All these are once again assisted by technology.  Purchasing is based upon 
a computerised MRPII system.  Supplier Quality Assurance department monitors 
quality of inputs using computerised testing equipment.  An incoming audit of 
supplies is carried out by random inspection with surveys of supplier sites carried out 
periodically.  Inward goods and finished product are stored in the warehouse with 
stock control undertaken using computerised label printing and bar coding.  Internal 
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materials management is assisted by mechanised forklifts and automated vacuum-
lifting machines.  Finally, professionally qualified technicians and planners in the 
Shipping and Packaging Department and the Packaging and Printing Department, 
assure that product is despatched (Director MP&S December 8 1992).   
 
Three smaller divisions assist these processes.  First is Finance in which professional 
accountants perform all managerial and financial accounting functions.  Second is 
CSD within which professionally qualified and experienced employees monitor all 
personnel and industrial relations issues and perform data processing.  Finally is Sales 
and Customer Relations in which professionally qualified and experienced planners 
and technicians are responsible for all customer contact including sales planning, and 
sales engineering.  These last three departments contribute around 8% to overall 
employment.  All are assisted by state-of-the-art computer hardware and software 
packages (AE CSD 1992b).  
 
Thus work organisation within Auto Electrical is capital intensive, technologically 
driven process and based on a rigid division of labour.  This has resulted in the 
workforce being fairly evenly divided between semi-skilled process workers and 
technically and professionally qualified specialists as shown in Figure 4.8 (AE CSD 
1992b).  
Figure 4.8 
Auto Electrical 
Classification of Workforce 1992 
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Source: AE CSD 1992b 
 
Employees have, however, different degrees of variety and autonomy in their work.  
For semi-skilled workers tasks are repetitious and tightly controlled, while 
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professional, technical and trade skilled workers have both more autonomy and more 
variety in their work.  This has led to a marked division and separation between 
process workers in the Plant and specialists, that restricts communication, reduces 
integration, and reduces ability to seek cross-departmental and cross division 
improvements.  
 
Management 
 
This separation between divisions and departments and between process workers and 
specialists is reproduced in the management structure.  Management is organised into 
a multi-tiered hierarchy as represented in Figure 4.9 (AE CSD 1992a).  There are six 
Divisional Directors, with 19 departmental managers reporting to them and 22 second 
level Managers, Supervisors and Co-ordinators reporting to the departmental 
managers.  Management, including Supervisors, accounts for about 10% of total 
employment within the company.  Although Supervisors from the Plant are not 
considered to be part of management by other more senior managers, they do have 
responsibility for many employment-related issues.  Supervisor responsibilities 
include organising the workforce (overtime rosters, rest breaks, industrial and 
counselling issues) as well as quality and scheduling of production. 
 
The Board of Directors is the chief decision making body for the company.  The 
Board meets weekly with the six Divisional Directors to discuss broad company 
matters.  There are no formal meetings of departmental managers except those 
associated with the Quality Council and the Health and Safety Committee (AE Board 
of Directors November 22 1991).  Management makes all decisions within the 
company. 
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Figure 4.9 
Auto Electrical 
Organisational Chart - Management, 1992 
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Employee input into decision-making is limited to production meetings of 
management appointed employee representatives when production schedules permit.  
Common employee responses to questions related to their input into decisions indicate 
resentment of their lack of opportunity to become involved.  The following responses 
were given to the question: 
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If consultation is to work what changes need to be made to the way managers act? 
!"increase trust, objectivity and commitment 
!"eliminate ‘them and us’ attitudes 
!"remove rule by fear 
!"reduce departmental barriers 
!"recognise everyone works for the same company, not departments 
!"management needs to communicate the company’s long term plan 
!"more direct contact is needed between management and the workforce  
!"workforce should be trained in communication skills 
!"management should practice what they preach (Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 
1991). 
 
These responses confirm the experience of low-level consultation between 
management and employees requiring management to take a more proactive approach 
before employees can actively participate. 
 
Human Resource Management 
 
The CSD Director and the Personnel and Industrial Relations Manager stated the 
personnel function at Auto Electrical is limited in scope, fragmented by departments, 
and reactive.  Departments are responsible for their own employment and perform all 
recruitment, promotion, and training, with only limited support from the Personnel 
and Industrial Relations Department.  The personnel role is confined principally to 
managing the payroll, co-ordinating training needs, providing health and safety 
support, performing general personnel functions and collecting staff statistics 
(Manager Personnel & Industrial Relations September 15 1992).  This limited role 
suggests the company has a low priority for human resource issues with policies 
evolving largely in response to government legislation.  This is demonstrated by the 
company’s approach to Equal Employment Opportunity, Training and Occupational 
Health and Safety. 
 
First, to take Equal Employment Opportunity.  In 1988 the company developed an 
Equal Employment Opportunity Policy.  The Policy sought to ensure “regardless of 
sex or nationality, all present employees will be considered on their qualifications, 
skills, abilities and aptitudes for all future job opportunities” (AE CSD 1988a).  The 
Policy was extended in 1991 to an Affirmative Action Policy (AE CSD 1991a).  
However little changed in practice.  Although the workforce is made up of 
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approximately equal number of males and females, males dominate in the higher 
skilled classification in all divisions.  Women are employed mainly in clerical and 
semi-skilled light-assembly work.  There are no females employed in trade positions 
or as plant or machinery operators/drivers or in sales positions.  Only 17% of 
professionals and para-professionals are female.  There are no female Board members.  
There is only one female with a managerial title, however this position is not included 
as a management position on the organisational chart nor is it remunerated as other 
managerial positions.  Finally, there are only six female supervisors, three in Accounts 
and Administration, and three (of 13) plant supervisors (AE CSD 1992b).  The limited 
application of the EEO policy is further demonstrated by typical employee responses 
to the question –  
What changes have occurred in equal employment opportunity in the last 5 years and what 
further changes are needed? 
 
!"need to change the performance appraisal system to remove the possibility of personality 
conflict, misunderstandings and departmental differences on points scored 
!"need to make people more aware of the legislation on Equal Employment Opportunity and 
Affirmative Action 
!"treat everyone’s ideas equally 
!"develop common health and safety standards 
!"increase individual confidence (Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 1991). 
 
These responses suggest that despite company policies on equal employment 
opportunity, employees considered that there was little demonstrated equality of 
opportunity. 
 
Second, what of the company experience with training?  Although the company 
expended around 3% of payroll on training in 1991 and 1992, this training was not 
centrally co-ordinated to ensure fairness and equity but rather was initiated by 
individual departmental managers (Manager Training and Development July 20 
1993).  This resulted in a differential approach to training in which the less skilled 
production workforce were afforded less access to training compared to the already 
skilled professional and technical workforce.  This is illustrated by the wide-range and 
number of typical responses by employees to the question: 
What training would you like to do if you had the opportunity? 
!"clerical 
!"language 
!"graphic design 
!"tool-setting 
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!"mechanical 
!"computer 
!"marketing 
!"technical 
!"statistics 
!"manual handling  
!"NC programming 
!"ergonomics (Focus Groups August 19 & September 5 1991).  
These responses suggest wide ranging interest amongst employees in improving skills.  
When questioned further, employees showed a clear understanding of what assistance 
they required in order to participate in further training.  Employees gave the following 
typical responses to the question –  
How could training be improved?: 
!"need to encourage and praise participants 
!"train  internal employees as trainers 
!"improve English language skills 
!"make more use of downtime 
!"bridge the gap between engineering and production 
!"form a training committee 
!"check for understanding 
!"more consultation with the shop floor 
!"need to train everybody not just the same people all the time (Focus Groups August 28 & 
September 12 1991). 
 
These responses indicate many employees wanted to be trained but were critical of 
company support for training.  On the other hand management believed that 
employees were not prepared to sacrifice their own time for training.  An example 
given during one of the focus groups is set out below: 
Management in one of the focus groups complained that the company provided two paid hours 
of government assisted English-language training per week.  When this was changed to 1 hour 
paid time and one hour unpaid time at the end of a shift employee interest reduced.  In response 
to this accusation employees (many of whom were women) stated that if the training had been 
later at night (say 7pm) they would have been happy to participate.  But the training was only 
offered at the end of the shift and this was when they had family responsibilities (Focus Group 
September 5 1991).   
 
This example was a clear indication of the lack of communication and consultation 
between managers who were making decisions and workers affected by these 
decisions, which led to mistrust, and frustration between the management and 
employees.  
 
Third, to take company experience of Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S).  
OH&S was more progressive in Auto Electrical following the introduction in 1982 of 
a new company based Industrial Health, Welfare and Safety Policy (AE CSD 1982).  
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This Policy attempted to change the emphasis of health and safety away from 
compensation towards prevention.  In 1988 a Rehabilitation Policy was added which 
emphasised “the speedy and complete rehabilitation of employees suffering from 
work related injuries or illness” (AE CSD 1988b).  However this was abandoned in 
1990 in response to management complaints that they could not find suitable light 
duties for injured workers (Manager Health and Safety July 20 1993).   
 
These initiatives did result in a reduction in health and safety claims from 55 between 
1986 to 33 in 1992, with working-days lost over the same period being reduced from 
an average of 65 to less than 20 days (AE CSD 1991b).  However the Manager Health 
and Safety stated that joint health and safety committee did not function truly as a 
joint body, making use of employee ideas.  Rather they still operated under a 
philosophy of managers and specialists engineered-out problems rather than 
employees helping to assist in more safe processes (Manager Health and Safety July 
20 1993).  The lack of participation by employees in the resolution of health and 
safety problems was demonstrated by typical responses of employees to the question: 
How could health and safety be improved?:  
!"listen to people on the workshop floor 
!"more feedback from the safety committee 
!"establish small groups in each department to interact with the safety committee 
!"everyone become involved 
!"more training (Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 1991). 
 
These responses demonstrate employee frustration that their ideas for improving 
health and safety were not respected or attended to by management. 
 
Wages and Industrial Relations 
 
The Metal Industry Award sets wages and working conditions for the majority of 
employees.  A small number of employees are covered by the Federal Transport 
Workers Award, while clerical employees and the Occupational Nurse were paid 
according to the State Commercial Clerks Award and the Registered Nurses Award 
until these awards were terminated by the Employee Relations Act, Victoria (Victoria 
Parliament 1992).  During the time under review the company continued to adhere to 
the wages and conditions in these Awards.  The company has traditionally paid over 
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award allowances for skills.  On average six percent over award is paid to process 
workers trained as on-line quality control inspectors, and 20% over-award is paid to 
the tradesman/tool setter classification (Manager Personnel and Industrial Relations 
September 15 1992).  An individual Employee Appraisal System offering eight 
percent wage increase subject to supervisor and manager assessment of performance 
existed until it was terminated in mid 1992.  The system was abandoned because of 
concerns expressed by employees about the subjectivity of managerial appraisal.  
Around 80 employees (specialists and managers) are award free.  They are paid under 
individual contracts negotiated according to market rates.  
 
The Manager Personnel and Industrial Relations stated the workforce is substantially 
unionised with around 80% of the workforce being union members.  The Plant is the 
most highly unionised.  In 1992 there were five separate unions on site (reduced from 
six in 1991 with the amalgamation of the Association of Draughting, Supervisory and 
Technical Employees (ADSTE) and the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union 
(AMWU) into the Metal and Engineering Workers Union (MEWU), (Manager, 
Personnel and Industrial Relations September 15 1992) 5.  The Director CSD 
explained this large number of unions resulted from a number of factors peculiar to 
the company.  First, the functional and task related work organisation had produced 
strongly defended demarcations between jobs to assist employment security.  Second, 
the company merger in 1984 resulted in members of two rival unions being employed 
by the merged company.  Third, the Federated Clerks Unions maintain a more 
significant membership than usual in manufacturing companies.  Fourth, supervisors 
are not required to resign from the union on promotion and most have chosen to retain 
their union membership (ADSTE).  Finally, the largest union on site is a union not 
normally represented in manufacturing - the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union 
(FMWU), (Director CSD September 15 1992).  The distribution of union membership 
presented in Figure 4.106 (AE CSD 1992b).  
                                                          
5 Given the frequent changes in name of this union, in this thesis the abbreviations AMWU are used throughout. 
6 Due to a number of amalgamations involving unions during the period under research names were changed 
(sometimes several times).  For the sake of clarity I will continue to use the union names as identified here.   
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Figure 4.10 
Auto Electrical 
Union Membership Distribution 1992 
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Source: AE CSD 1992b (note TWU membership of 1% not shown on diagram) 
 
Around 50% of company employees are members of the FMWU.  This is much higher 
than any other union, with the AMWU being the next largest with only 17% of 
company employees.  Each of the other unions cover only 5% of company employees 
each, while the Transport Workers Union of Australia has only 1% of employees.   
 
The Director CSD described union involvement in the company as taking place at two 
levels.  First, most bargaining on wages and working conditions is conducted at the 
industry level.  Second, shop stewards, assisted by full-time paid officials, negotiate 
company specific problems (Director CSD September 15 1992).  The presence of full-
time officials on site is substantial, with shop stewards relying on officials to negotiate 
demarcation disputes (Ormsby December 9 1992).  There were no regular meetings 
between shop stewards and management until 1985 when the new Director of 
Corporate Affairs (who had been the general manager of the company with which 
Auto Electrical merged in 1984) established regular, formal meetings with 
representatives from each union.  However separate meetings were held with each 
union and thus had little effect on reducing the potential for demarcation disputes, 
while occupying a great deal of time for both management and union representatives.  
Finally, the many layered and hierarchical management structure, and adherence to a 
traditional collective bargaining model of industrial relations, resulted in little, if any, 
participation by the workforce in the day to day activities of the company. 
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Pressures for Change 
 
It is possible to distinguish internal from external pressures – the former stemming 
from new policies, the latter stemming from market, government, union and other 
environmental factors.  For Auto Electrical, despite evidence that internal 
communication problems existed this did not lead to significant change to policies.  
Rather pressure on the company for change came chiefly from external agencies. 
 
The first environmental pressure for change was the product market.  Given the local 
PMV producers are the principle customers for the original equipment produced by 
Auto Electrical, the market for this equipment is largely dependent on the market 
facing these producers.  As indicated in Chapter Three, by the late 1980s the market 
for new PMVs was under pressure from government policy, exchange rate 
fluctuations, near-saturation of demand and increasing competition from imports.  In 
this environment the market for Auto Electrical products was similarly pressured.  
This is shown in movements in key performance data as summarised in Table 4.1 (AE 
Finance 1993).  
Table 4.1 
Auto Electrical 
Key Performance Data 1988-1993 
 
Year Sales $M Net Profits (Pre 
Tax) 
Return On Paid Up 
Capital 
1987 61382 <1% <1% 
1988 70207 13% 47% 
1989 78183 17% 74% 
1990 80216 13% 50% 
1991 61237 6% 17% 
1992 56387 12% 31% 
1993 60000 6% 16% 
Source: AE Finance 1993 
 
Sales turnover for the company peaked in 1990 at $80 million, following a steady 
increase since the merger with a major product competitor in 1984.  After 1990, sales 
declined, causing a fall in net profit before tax from around 13% in 1990 to around 
6% in 1991.  Fluctuations continued with net profit return increasing from this 6% in 
1991 to 12% in 1992 and then restructuring down to 12% in 1992.  Similarly, return 
on paid up capital reached a high of 74% in 1989 after which it declined significantly 
to a low of 16% in 1993 despite a small upsurge in 1992. 
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The Managing Director explained some of the decline resulted from the recession and 
other changes in the PMV sector.  The decision by Ford in August 1991 to halve the 
production of the Capri resulted in a loss to Auto Electrical of 1200 pairs of 
headlamps per month and some courtesy lamps.  A further six to seven percent of 
sales was lost by the closure in October 1992 of the Nissan manufacturing plant.  
However a much larger loss of market was due to price competition from overseas 
and local companies.  Despite the retention of its Ford market, the company lost one 
GMH contract in 1992 to a Korean company and a second GMH contract in 1993, 
worth between 15% and 20% of sales, to a small niche company operating in New 
South Wales (Managing Director August 1 1992).  These contracts were not regained 
during the period under review although these losses were partly offset by a new 
contract with Toyota.  
 
The company was not able to take advantage of the expansion of the automotive 
market in Asia as it lacked an export capability because of its traditional confinement 
to the local Australian market7.  The Managing Director complained the reduction in 
Australian federal government protection for the industry in the 1980s caused many of 
its problems, especially as it occurred at the same time as governments in Asia were 
supporting the development of their own fledgling industries.  For example the loss of 
the GMH contract to the Korean based company was blamed on the provision of 
costly tooling by the Korean government which substantially reduced the price of 
components to PMV customers (Managing Director August 1 1992).  
 
The fall in sales had a negative effect upon employment within the company.  The 
company had been downsizing its workforce gradually since the mid 1980s – a 
phenomenon apparently widespread in manufacturing - from a peak of 746 in 1985 
(the employment peak resulted from the transfer of 80 employees following the 
merger in 1984), to 549 in 1992.  The employment trend is shown in Figure 4.11 (AE 
CSD 1992b). 
                                                          
7 Although outside the time period under review, it is relevant to note that in 1994 the parent established a totally 
separate Auto Electrical Asia Pacific (with headquarters in Victoria) with the exclusive role of developing a 
strategy for the South Eastern and Pacific markets. 
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Figure 4.11 
Auto Electrical 
Employment - 1988-1993. 
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Source: AE CSD 1992b 
 
High labour turnover (36% in 1988) assisted the downsizing, although this had 
reduced to 12% by 1992 (probably a result of the recession).  When combined with a 
further decline in the market, the company was forced in 1993 to offer a round of 
retrenchments.  This resulted in the loss of 76 employees, mainly from the Plant, 
which meant by 1993 company employment was less than two-thirds of the peak in 
1985. 
 
The second environmental pressure came from customer quality demands.  In the late 
1980s PMV companies increased their demand for quality improvements from their 
suppliers.  The improvements were to be in finished product and delivery as well as 
process improvements.  Management at Auto Electrical was relatively unconcerned 
about these requirements as they maintained they produced a superior quality product 
(AE Board of Directors November 22 1991).  Instead they criticised customers for 
their frequent delivery rescheduling as these made planning, process changes and just-
in-time delivery difficult.  They also criticised customers for having apparently 
inconsistent priorities in their demands that local producers supply high quality 
product but then award overseas contracts on price alone.  This managerial attitude 
within Auto Electrical suggests the company was unprepared to make significant 
change to accommodate customer quality demands.   
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The third and final environmental pressure came from industrial relations 
developments.  In the late 1980s the federal government supported demands for 
decentralising bargaining to the enterprise level.  The new bargaining structure 
required significant change for Auto Electrical given the number of unions on site and 
the lack of a single department with responsibility for all employment related issues.   
 
Summary 
 
In summary, Auto Electrical is a subsidiary of a German company established in 
Australia in the 1960s to take advantage of the Federal Government’s incentives for 
the local automotive industry.  The company’s subsidiary status means its decision-
making process is strongly influenced by the parent.  It also means the company’s 
scope for development is limited by decisions to confine sales to Australia.   
 
The company relies upon a work organisation modelled on ‘Fordist’ principles as 
summarised in Table 4.2.  Departments are segmented on a functional basis into 
numerous divisions, departments and sub-departments.  The Plant is the largest 
employing division with almost 70% of employees.  The production process is 
technologically determined and standardised by industrial engineers into short cycle 
times.  Production is defined by narrow, repetitive tasks with limited job rotation, 
flexibility, and limited autonomy for the workforce.  In contrast, work in the service 
departments is more skilled, allowing employees more autonomy, variety and 
flexibility.  
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Table 4.2 
Auto Electrical  
Work Organisation-Mass Production Model 
 
Departments segmented, functional- numerous divisions, departments, and sub-
departments 
plant is the major employing division 
Process  standardised by industrial engineers 
technologically determined – state-of-art 
short cycle time per job  
routine, computer-driven maintenance schedule 
Job design technologically determined  
plant - narrow, individual, tasks based with limited job rotation and 
flexibility 
support – more autonomy, flexibility and variety 
Skills and Depth of 
Knowledge 
more than half are semi-skilled, but over 30%  
technical, professional or trade 
Product design superior performance 
model specific style options 
no design for manufacturability 
Human Resource 
Management 
lacks formality, reactive 
Industrial Relations adversarial – multitude of strong union 
Product Quality  quality inspection post production 
no continuous quality improvement 
no employee involvement 
Market Segment local Australian market 
Management centralised, segmented hierarchical  
dominated by managerial prerogative 
 
This has resulted in little integration of activities and poor communication between 
departments and divisions.  It has also produced a semi-skilled production workforce 
separated from the highly skilled specialists in support departments.  Specialists 
design product with no input from the Plant and thus no ‘design for 
manufacturability’.  The technological focus of the company has resulted in little 
attention being given to human resource management and there is a reactive and 
reactionary approach to the unions.  In response a strongly unionised, multi-union 
structure has developed in the Plant.  This has resulted in a lack of employee concern 
for, or involvement in, quality improvement and the continuation of quality 
improvement driven by technological change.  Finally, management is structured as a 
separated hierarchy with all decisions made by management.  This has resulted in 
resentment and lack of trust between employees and managers. 
 
By the late 1980s Auto Electrical was a company under stress.  Its local market was 
adversely affected by economic developments, with little export activity to provide a 
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buffer for the company.  The company could no longer rely on its superior quality and 
technology to maintain market dominance given increased pressure on prices.  It was 
not competitive with either overseas competitors or local niche market companies. 
The company was poorly structured to accommodate change with divisional and 
departmental separations and rivalries supported by multiple levels of management 
wishing to preserve the status quo.  Employment suffered from these economic 
pressures with employees unable to cope with changes due to low skills.  The 
company was restricted in its responses to these pressures by a rigid cost structure and 
a capital-intensive focus.  Human resource management issues were ill considered and 
an adversarial industrial relationship characterised management-workforce 
interactions.  In this commercial and industrial relations context the company’s intent 
in workplace reform is easy to explain.  The next chapter explores the nature of 
workplace reforms and of workforce participation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
AUTO ELECTRICAL (II)  
Management Controlled Reform 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out in detail how Auto Electrical implemented the three workplace 
reform processes - quality management, institutional workplace reform and best 
practice – introduced in response to external pressures described in Chapter Four.  The 
chapter is organised as follows.  The first section presents the major changes 
introduced under each of the reform processes.  These are summarised in Table 5.1.  
The second section explores the operation of these changes in terms of workforce 
participation.  The conclusion is twofold.  First, change under the reforms lacked a 
strategic, integrated focus.  Second, the form of workforce participation introduced 
was principally representative through Consultative Committees, which although 
structurally supported, lacked commitment from either management or the workforce.  
This resulted in little realisation of the opportunity to improve productivity through 
workforce change, and instead maintained a continued reliance upon costly 
technological improvements. 
 116 
Table 5.1 
Auto Electrical 
Workplace Reform 
 
DATE Quality Management 
Reform 
Institutional Workplace 
Reform 
Best Practice Reform 
1987  two tier agreement  
1988 strategy adopted   
 Ford Q101 achieved   
1989 Quality Council translation classifications in 
Metal Industry Award 
Managing Director on an 
automotive industry study tour 
USA 
1990 training of eight process 
workers as Process Quality 
Controllers 
  
 process workers to initial work 
for traceability 
  
 training in Statistical Process 
Control techniques for Plant 
employees by Quality 
professional 
  
1991 GMHB+   
 Mitsubishi Motors ‘A’ Enterprise Agreement (1) 
 
 
1992 Ford Q1   
 Nissan Quality teams   
  
first Kaizen team - Plant 
  
 management Kaizen team   
 Supplier Quality Assurance   
 8D and Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis training –
Project Teams 
Enterprise Agreement (2) 
 
WCM Workshop and 
management teams 
 
1993 Kaizen team training – entire 
company 
  
 
Quality Management Reform 
 
The Manager Quality Assurance claimed the company had a good history of product 
quality rating with its PMV assembly customers.  This led to timely awarding of the 
new quality assessment ratings by its customers.  In 1988 it was awarded Ford Q101 
preferred supplier status, with an upgrade to Ford Q1 in 1992.  In 1991 it was awarded 
GMHB+ quality rating and Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd 'A' category rating 
(Manager Quality Assurance July 20 1993).  This meant initially there was little 
pressure on the company to change its quality process. 
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Auto Electrical relied upon a traditional approach to quality, in which engineering 
experts confined assessment to final product checking from the Quality Department.  
The Quality department, in consultation with the ER&D department, and the parent 
company, set quality standards and strategies for quality improvement.  Plant 
supervisors were responsible for ensuring adherence to quality standards.  
Management considered quality was principally dependent upon employees 
performing their tasks correctly.  Quality problems, in their view, arose because 
employees did not follow procedures “quality needs a technical judgement and the 
problem is people do not stick to procedures” (Manager Quality Assurance July 20 
1993).  Employees, on the other hand, adopted the view similar to Deming’s (Deming 
1982) quality problems were system related.  This difference in view as to the root 
cause of quality problems is demonstrated by a sample of common responses as set 
out below from employees and management to the question: 
‘Would you buy the products made by the company?’  
!"quality is good but variable 
!"quality of finished product depends on quality of raw materials 
!"quality depends on whether quantity or quality of output is emphasised. 
 
While management representatives stated that: 
!    quality depends on whether workers identify problems (Focus Groups August 19 & 
September 5 1991)." 
 
This resulted in a concentration on final product rejects and customer complaints as a 
measure of quality performance rather than process quality measurement through 
quality problem documentation and measures of scrap and rework.  
 
In 1988, as part of its response to the new customer rating system introduced by its 
assembly customers, Auto Electrical did introduce some changes to process and 
product quality, chiefly with regard to planning, documentation, and identification of 
critical characteristics.  Table 5.2 summarises these changes in terms of the Ford 
Quality System Standard (Ford 1990), (Ford being one of the company’s major 
customers).  However, as will be demonstrated, these changes did not reduce reliance 
upon technical monitoring of quality through technology and by technical experts. 
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Table 5.2 
Auto Electrical 
Quality Management Reform Processes 
1989-93 
 
Ford Quality System Requirements AE Change Process 
 
PROCESS and PRODUCT QUALITY   
evaluate process capability  Senior management quality council assisted by 
management quality report meetings 
product control  on-line process control 
 Technology upgraded 
process control computer package developed 
8D reports 8D teams established  
Statistical Process Control to monitor processes and 
improve capability 
process workers trained in Statistical Process 
Control techniques 
 Nissan training 
 Kaizen teams 
provide lot traceability Employees to initial all work 
plans for continuous improvement quality department  
PLANNING   
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis Specialists trained 
control plans Quality department through computer based software assessment 
monitor and control sub-supplier quality Supplier quality assurance policy  
DOCUMENTING  Company quality manual 
CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS   
key quality disciplines for control items Quality department through computer based 
software assessment 
 
Management Related Change 
 
First, in 1989 a Senior Management Quality Council was established with 
responsibility for developing company policy on all quality matters.  The continuing 
focus on technical aspects of quality, and on managerial control, was demonstrated by 
membership of the Council.  All company Directors plus the managers of the three 
manufacturing related departments - Plant, ER and Development, and MP&S - were 
represented.  However there was no representation from the Personnel or Finance 
departments.  Similarly, there was no workforce or union representation on the 
Council.   
 
The Council had no formal terms of reference, rather it was simply established to meet 
monthly to consider advice from departmental managers.  In turn the departmental 
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managers were to hold monthly Quality Report Meetings to determine suggestions for 
the Quality Council.   
 
It was planned that communication of quality issues within the company would be 
improved by a multi-layered one-way information sharing process as shown in Figure 
5.1.  
Figure 5.1 
Auto Electrical 
Quality Council Communication Process 
1989-1993 
 
The Council would communicate its decisions to the Quality Report Meetings, which 
would then report to cross-departmental Quality Control Project Teams of Managers.  
These latter Teams would prepare material for Supervisors to inform employees.  
Thus the first focus of the company was upon improved communication of managerial 
decisions rather than any change to the decision-making process.   
 
However this had limited impact on employee attitudes to quality, with employees 
continuing to see quality changes being dominated by technology improvements into 
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which they had little input.  In 1991 the following inclusive responses from employees 
were recorded in answer to the question: 
What changes have occurred in quality in the past five years?’ 
!"New technology – barcoding, instapack machine, glue robots, computers and compressor 
for planning and testing, dough-moulding machine, NC milling machine, goniometer 
system in optical laboratory, vibrator in coating department, electronic clocking system, 
dust-free spray booths, washing plant, foolproof jigs, modification of tools 
!"Process Changes – SPC, workers authority to reject components, time to discuss quality 
problems, Made-to-Measure, identification of rejects (Focus Groups August 28 & 
September 12 1991). 
 
This suggests employees saw some increase in their role in quality improvement, but 
more attention being placed on technological measurements.  This led, in their view, 
to limited quality improvements as broader structural and cultural change is needed.  
This was demonstrated by the plethora of responses recorded in answer to the 
question: 
‘What changes need to be made in your work area to enable you to produce a better quality 
product without waste?’  
"
!"Process Improvement 
Closer attention to detail 
Increase size of orders 
Ensure on-time production 
Better planning 
Sufficient time to complete the process 
Careful handling of components between stations 
Easier manufacturing procedures 
Preventative maintenance 
!"Better Materials 
Insist on better quality supply 
!"Employee relations 
Better communication 
Train the trainer 
Better relations between management and workforce 
More feedback 
Co-ordinate teams 
Better work environment 
Reduce language barrier 
Remove double handling 
Regular maintenance of tools 
Comfortable working conditions 
Better co-operation 
Better knowledge of products 
Better communication between shifts (Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 1991). 
 
These responses suggest employees at Auto Electrical believed their role in improving 
product quality was undervalued.  Indeed some managers professed similar views, 
with one Production Managers stating workers should be consulted, as they are the 
‘experts’ (Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 1991). 
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Second, in August 1992 a management workshop on ‘World Competitive 
Manufacturing’ (WCM) was held.  Arising out of this three Project Teams of 
managers were established to collect information on issues determined crucial to the 
company future - organisational culture, Kaizen and customer processes.  The Kaizen 
team was assigned the task of exploring quality improvement by focussing on 
purchasing, continuous improvement, waste reduction, and performance 
measurement.  However the team had made little progress by the end of 1993 and was 
criticised by workforce representatives on the joint Consultative Committee for the 
secrecy surrounding their operation.  
 
Finally, in late 1992 management developed an Auto Electrical Supplier Quality 
Assurance Policy for all suppliers not already covered by the PMV ‘supplier quality 
assurance programs’.  In this way the company hoped to improve the quality of inputs.  
However such improvements were limited given the minimal local sourcing of raw 
materials and components.   
 
Employee Related Change – Production 
 
The establishment of the Quality Council was followed by several changes affecting 
employees.  However, as will be shown, these changes did not fundamentally change 
employee roles. 
 
First, in 1990 eight process workers were trained and reclassified to process quality 
control positions in the Plant.  Their role was to continually inspect the process and 
report directly to the Production Manager.  However the outcome from this initiative 
was limited because it was so narrowly focussed.  By 1992 it was recognised that 
further action to involve employees was needed.  
 
Second, again in 1990 process workers were instructed to initial all their work to 
assist lot traceability in order to source quality problems.  This initiative was not well 
received by employees who saw it as means for managers to place the blame for 
quality problems on employees without changing employee ability to reject poor 
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inputs.  An example of this problem was given by employees during a Focus Group as 
summarised below: 
Workers in the gluing section maintained they could tell from the colour of a lamp delivered to 
them whether it is likely to crack during the gluing process.  However supervisors ignore their 
concerns and they are told to just complete the task.  When the lamp subsequently breaks 
during the gluing process workers are blamed.  Workers claimed that initialling the product 
would only make them more vulnerable (Focus Group September 12 1991). 
 
Third, the Quality-Engineering Department trained Plant employees in Statistical 
Process Control techniques (SPC).  The training was computer-based using laser 
medium technology.  This enabled groups of 20 operators to watch a supervisor 
interact with the computer on a scheduled one-hour per fortnight.  However this style 
of training meant workers did not get the opportunity to interact directly with the 
computer which resulted in the fact a year later few employees could even remember 
having participated in the training (Focus Group August 28 & September 12 1991).  
 
Fourth, despite discussions in October 1991 between managers from Auto Electrical 
and Nissan to establish ‘Nissan Quality Teams’ within the company to explore Nissan 
specific quality problems, this was not proceeded with after Nissan decided to cease 
local production.  However in October 1992 a ‘Kaizen’ team was established in the 
Plant under the leadership of a supervisor trained in the Nissan process.  The team met 
weekly for one hour over nine weeks to obtain suggestions “for improvement on the 
floor by people actually working there” (AE CSD 1993).  Recommendations from the 
team were made to a meeting of Directors in December 1992 followed by a 
presentation to the whole workforce in February 1993.  This quality improvement 
team process was considered successful by management and in 1993 it was extended 
to a training program in Kaizen techniques for the entire workforce (Long 1993).  
However, within a few weeks of the training there was growing resentment to these 
Groups among employees as any suggestions for change were taken by management 
without any formal process to recognise worker input (Workforce Representatives 
July 20 1993).  
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Employee Related Change – Specialists 
 
Between 1992 and 1993 63 specialists were trained in Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) and Eight-Discipline problem solving techniques (8D) by the 
Federation of Automotive Products Manufacturers (FAPM) (AE CSD 1992d).  
Following this training several 8D Cross Functional teams of Engineering and Sales 
staff were formed to “make overall preparations for the manufacture of products 
needed to satisfy specific customer contracts” (Director Corporate Services June 15 
1993).  
 
In summary by 1993 Auto Electrical had introduced a number of changes under its 
Quality Management reform process.  The outcomes of these changes, however, are 
subject to interpretation.  The Manager Quality Assurance claimed the changes had 
resulted in significant reductions in rework, stocks, lead-time, machine down-time, 
scrap, absenteeism, and warranty payments and customer complaints (Manager 
Quality Assurance July 20 1993).  He also claimed improvements in delivery 
performance and in after-sales service.  However, apart from traditional measures of 
customer complaints, there was no established means to measure quality 
improvements and thus to support this statement.  On the other hand employees 
claimed improvements were more technical than process related.  
 
In terms of the issue of interest to this thesis, workforce participation associated with 
quality management reform was introduced, albeit in a limited form.  Table 5.3 
presents a summary of workforce participation introduced under quality management 
reform. 
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Table 5.3 
Auto Electrical 
Workforce Participation and Quality Management Reform 
 
Participant Form of Workforce Participation Details 
Management 1989 Quality Council management  
Production 
workers 
information sharing  
 training 8 trained as quality controllers 
workers trained in statistical process 
control techniques and Kaizen 
 direct participation Kaizen team 
Specialists training Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and 
Kaizen 
 direct participation 8D teams established 
 
It is clear there was an attempt to involve workers in change associated with quality 
management reform.  However such involvement was limited, confined principally to 
improving communication and training.  Given this limited worker role the question 
becomes - how effective was this form of participation in assisting workplace reform?  
This will be pursued following discussion upon changes associated with the other two 
reform processes.  
 
Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
Auto Electrical was characterised in Chapter Four as having an adversarial industrial 
relations culture associated with high union membership, multiple unions protecting 
strictly demarcated jobs and strong representation from full-time union officials.  In 
response, management had established a strong relationship with the Metal Trades 
Industry Association (MTIA) through the representation of its Managing Director on 
the Board of Directors of the MTIA (Managing Director August 1 1992).  This 
resulted in a traditional collective bargaining process.  This industrial relations culture 
restricted acceptance by either management or unions of productivity bargaining and 
resulted in limited gains from the institutional reform process as shown in Table 5.4.  
Several wage agreements were made between 1987 and 1992 but none of these 
agreements were presented to the Industrial Relations Commission for ratification.  
The following section summarises the principal changes negotiated as part of the 
institutional workplace reform process.  
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Table 5.4 
Auto Electrical 
Institutional Workplace Reforms 
1987-1992 
 
ISSUES TWO TIER 
1987 
AWARD 
RESTRUCTURE 
1989 
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENT (1) 
1991  
Not ratified by AIRC 
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENT (2) 
1992 
Not ratified by AIRC 
Basic 
Employee 
wage increase - $10 
plus 4% 
wage increase – 3% 
plus $10 
wage increase –4.5% 
plus 4.5% 
wage increase – 4% 
 payment by 
Electronic Funds 
Transfer  
no reclassification Rostered-day-off  
restructure 
reconfirm general 
commitment 
 protective clothing  crib break flexibility  
 Rostered-day-off 
flexibility 
 core hours  
 dispute avoidance    
 stand-downs  
 
pay cycles  
 
Production minor task changes no change no change no change 
 
Two Tier 
 
The first agreement was negotiated in 1987 separately for each union.  Negotiations 
took place between the Corporate Director, the Manager Personnel and Industrial 
Relations, and full-time union officials from each of the major unions (Director 
Corporate Services September 15 1992).  The agreement included monthly wage 
payments to be made by Electronics Funds Transfer (EFT) and a commitment to 
commence discussions on a procedure for dispute avoidance, both of which were 
common to other such agreements within the industry.  Company specific agreed 
changes were limited as itemised below:  
!"increased flexibility in the scheduling of Rostered-Days-Off (RDOs) 
!"a reduction in the provision of protective clothing to essential or agreed situations 
!"minor changes to the tasks undertaken by process workers to enable measurement against 
quality standards 
!"elimination of wash up time for most employees 
!"agreement to work the production lines as required in case of stands down (AE & FMWU, 
AMWU, ADSTE, ASE 1987). 
 
None of these changes were aimed at significant productivity and efficiency 
improvement.  The Director Corporate Services claimed, however, the experience of 
these negotiations influenced the decision in 1989 to establish a joint Consultative 
Committee of management and union representatives (Director Corporate Services 
September 15 1992).  The principal management aim for this Committee was to 
develop greater employee commitment to the company.   
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Award Restructuring 
 
The second change introduced skill base reclassifications arising from restructuring of 
the Metal Industry Award.  Auto Electrical treated the implementation of this change 
simply as an administrative name change with no skills audit undertaken to identify 
skills held and/or used by employees in excess of those related to existing tasks.  
Employees, on the other hand, believed they did have other skills that could have been 
used for reclassifications.  This is demonstrated by a sample of employee responses to 
the question: 
‘What skills do you have you do not use at work at present but feel you could use?’ 
 
design, drawing, computer, language, teaching, communication, process analysis, problem 
solving, mathematics, machining, moulding, mechanical, market research, driving, forklift 
driving, planning, accounts, fitting and turning, electronic assembly, robot programming, time 
management, negotiation, conflict resolution (Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 
1991). 
 
This suggests a broad spectrum of unrecognised and untapped skill potential within 
the company.  The lack of managerial interest in the opportunity for reclassification 
caused worker resentment in that it reduced their opportunity for career advance.  That 
workers were interested in promotion is demonstrated by typical positive responses as 
set out below to the question: 
‘Is promotion desirable, and if so, why is it desirable?’ 
!" more interesting work with greater variety 
!"challenge which allowed you to prove yourself and gain self satisfaction 
!"greater responsibility 
!"more money 
!" worker knows best 
!" power (Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 1991). 
 
This suggests employees saw promotion as the means to a more enjoyable worklife 
with greater financial rewards.  Employees showed their frustration to management’s 
limited application of the new skill based classifications by their participation in two 
nation-wide stoppages in June 1989 and February 1990.  Although these stoppages 
were part of an industry wide campaign, the resentment of employees was shown by 
the typical employee response as shown below to the question: 
 
‘What training-career prospects exist in the company?’: 
!" there is little or no career prospects for process workers and only limited promotion prospects 
to leading hand positions 
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!"most process workers are still doing the same job for which they had been originally employed 
(Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 1991). 
By these responses employees demonstrated their disillusionment at the lack of 
company attention to developing career opportunities for process workers.   
 
Thus implementation of the new Metal Industry Award AT Auto Electrical resulted in 
little immediate change for workers.  The only real change was the decision by 
management to restructure the existing Consultative Committee to include more 
employee representatives to try to increase its effectiveness in identifying 
opportunities for future productivity improvements (Director Corporate Services 
September 15 1992).   
 
Enterprise Agreement 
  
In 1991 an Enterprise Agreement was negotiated for the company (AE & FMWU, 
NUW, MEWU, FIMEE 1991).  The Director, Corporate Services explained these 
negotiations were carried out through a Single Bargaining Unit (SBU) consisting of 
himself, the Manager P&IR, and seven union representatives.  Three full-time union 
officials assisted four shop stewards on the SBU.  He admitted little in the way of 
productivity improvements was negotiated in exchange for the wage increase of 2.5% 
from December 1991 (Director Corporate Services September 15 1992)  .  The 
Agreement included the following:  
!"morning and afternoon tea breaks to be held within designated crib areas 
!"extension of core hours of work to all employees 
!"change to fortnightly pay cycles 
!"restructuring of RDOs to accommodate a total plant closure on the tenth day in order to try to 
reduce the stockpiles of unsold finished goods.  This required all employees to work additional 
time each day (AE & FMWU, NUW, MEWU, FIMEE 1991). 
 
He claimed this was not due to union recalcitrance but rather to lack of management 
suggestions for change.  He further stated following the agreement poor management 
planning in the implementation of these changes reduced, indeed in some cases 
removed, productivity improvements.  He cited the example of poor production 
scheduling which removed cost saving opportunities from the proposed scheduling of 
a nine-day-month: 
Departmental managers scheduled work on the tenth (RDO) day.  This meant not only were 
the expected cost reductions from a total plant close-down reduced, but labour costs were 
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actually increased by the necessity of paying overtime to workers rostered to work on their 
RDO (Director Corporate Services September 15 1992). 
The final change negotiated under the institutional workplace reform process was the 
Enterprise Agreement reached in 1993.  Again negotiations for this Agreement 
followed the model of earlier bargaining with both full-time union representatives and 
shop stewards negotiating with the Corporate Affairs Director and Personnel and 
Industrial Relations Manager.  There were no formal links between the SBU and the 
joint Consultative Committee and no suggestions for productivity improvements from 
the committee, although informal links existed through joint membership of the shop 
stewards on both committees.  The Agreement again resulted in limited productivity 
and efficiency improvements.  Indeed the agreement merely restated the joint 
commitment to consider further changes to specified items including:  
!"reorganisation of some departments to achieve better ways of working and improved 
efficiencies  
!"rationalisation of departments for improved efficiencies 
!"relocation of departments with employees performing different work or working in different 
departments 
!"introduction of work cells and associated multi-skilling of employees (AE & FMWU, 
NUW, MEWU, FIMEE 1993). 
 
A vague commitment by the unions on behalf of employees to continuous 
improvement, consultation, a stable industrial relations climate, skills and training, 
and further productivity improvement within the company, was also included (AE & 
FMWU, NUW, MEWU, FIMEE, FCU 1993). 
 
Thus, despite a verbal commitment to productivity improvements by both parties as 
part of institutional workplace reform, little practical change was realised.  What then 
can be said of workforce participation associated with institutional workplace reform?  
Table 5.5 provides a summary of such workforce participation. 
Table 5.5 
Auto Electrical 
Workforce Participation and Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
ISSUES TWO TIER 
1987 
AWARD RESTRUCTURE 
1989 
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENTS  
1991 and 1993 
Not ratified by AIRC 
Basic 
Employee 
 
collective bargaining – each 
separate union  
Consultative Committee 
Consultative Committee 
 
collective bargaining through 
a Single Bargaining Unit 
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The negotiation of enterprise based agreements relied upon traditional collective 
bargaining by local shop stewards supported by full-time union officials.  There was, 
however, an agreement to establish a company wide joint Consultative Committee, 
and thus to increase the extent of enterprise representative workforce participation.  
The question therefore becomes – how effective was this Consultative Committee in 
assisting workplace change?  Before exploring this question implementation of 
change under the third workplace change process will be explored. 
 
Best Practice Reform 
 
Auto Electrical showed interest in the principles associated with best practice reform 
in 1989 when the Managing Director of the company participated in an automotive 
industry study tour of lean production principles in the USA (Managing Director 
August 1 1992).  However there is no indication of any change for the company 
resulting from this tour.  This is interesting given employees and managers during 
Focus Group sessions easily identified a broad span of suggestions normally 
associated with conventional content of best practice.  Thus the following responses 
were typical of answer given to the question:  
‘What should be included in a plan to make the company a world competitive export company?’: 
!"improve quality 
!"reduce cost 
!"improve efficiency 
!"find markets overseas 
!"diversify domestic lighting, consoles, wheel trims) 
!"improve planning 
!"better interaction between workers and capital 
!"supply on time 
!"update technology 
!"improve skills 
!"better interaction between department 
!"teamwork 
!"design for manufacturability 
!"reduce inventory 
!"no rejects, reduce waste 
!"improve morale 
!"better transport of finished products 
!"improve quality of inputs 
!"improve communication 
!"better management-workforce relations (Focus Groups August 19 & September 5 1991). 
 
However, it was not until 1992 company management developed a best practice 
mission: 
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We design, manufacture, and trade the Auto Electrical range of automotive products and high 
value added plastic mouldings for the Australian-Pacific region (Consultant Report 1992). 
 
The mission was further clarified by an aim for the business: 
to be a reliable long term vendor to the automotive industry producing profitable, best 
products of world best quality, timely delivery and at competitive prices (Consultant Report 
1992). 
 
However the mission had little impact and it was not even communicated to 
employees.  Instead, in keeping with the managerial decision making process, three 
Project Teams of managers were established to explore issues relevant to best 
practice.  The teams had no formal aims or objectives, and no formal reporting 
mechanisms (Director Corporate Services June 15 1993).  Indeed requests by 
workforce representatives on the Consultative committee for information on the 
Mission and the findings of these Teams was first ignored and then responded to in a 
perfunctory manner (Workforce Representatives July 20 1993).  
 
Thus, as shown in Table 5.6, there was limited company activity in terms of the best 
practice framework identified by Rimmer et al (1996) directed towards best practice 
during the time under review.   
Table 5.6 
Auto Electrical 
Workforce Participation and Best Practice Reform 
 
GOALS CHANGE WORKFORCE 
PARTICIPATION 
strategy  limited strategy, driven by single (cost) 
factor 
none  
OPERATIONAL PRACTICES   
organisational structures no active encouragement of a team ethos none 
technology significant investment in last five to ten 
years – ongoing 
none 
external relations driven by competitive considerations none 
process improvement techniques primarily framework or concept-driven training and Kaizen 
groups 
people management  ad hoc approach with no guiding 
philosophy 
collective bargaining 
through unions 
INFORMATION ENABLERS   
measurement and control systems limited mainly to macro accounting and 
financial data 
none 
CULTURAL ENABLERS   
change leadership no obvious change leadership none 
empowerment direct employees have no control over 
daily work 
none 
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There was no corporate strategy until 1993.  Even when a corporate strategy was 
determined it was driven by a single cost reduction factor.  There was no change to 
operation structures and no active encouragement of teams.  There was little attempt 
to use the ‘expertise’ of workers, with work remaining narrowly task-based.  Process 
improvement was primarily framework driven, with principal emphasis being on 
technology-led improvements.  People management was ad hoc, with no defined 
human resource strategy and industrial relations defined by the traditional collective 
bargaining process.  Measurement and control systems were confined to traditional 
macro-accounting and financial data.  Finally there was no obvious change leadership, 
and employees had no control over their daily work.  In these circumstances 
workforce participation remained limited to collective bargaining by full-time union 
officials. 
 
Workforce Participation 
 
The discussion of workplace reform processes has already introduced the fact 
workforce participation was associated with both quality management and 
institutional workplace reform.  In this section a closer look is taken at the substance 
of workforce participation.  Workforce participation introduced as part of workplace 
reform in Auto Electrical can be divided into direct and representative participation.  
However in both cases it remained an addition to, rather than a replacement for, 
traditional managerial decision making and collective bargaining processes. 
 
Direct Workforce Participation: 
 
Direct workforce participation by individual employees at Auto Electrical was limited 
to increasing one-way information from management to employees, training 
employees in quality improvement techniques, increasing individual employee 
responsibility for quality, and establishment of some work area quality improvement 
teams.  The question thus becomes, how effective was this form of participation in 
introducing change? 
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Employees were willing to be more directly involved in quality issues as indicated by 
typical employee responses to the question: 
‘How could the quality of product be improved?’: 
!"more group discussions 
!"involve employees from the start 
!"more feedback 
!"reduce language barriers 
!"more teamwork 
!"more individual responsibility 
!"greater management appreciation of employee input 
!"more training (Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 1991). 
 
By these responses employees identified the need for improved communication and 
training before they could participate in quality improvement.  However, opportunities 
for employees to increase their involvement were limited.  First the newly established 
Quality Council retained its managerial hierarchy (Manager Quality Assurance July 20 
1993).  Indeed employees complained managers were unable to “develop consensus 
among themselves”, much less to communicate effectively with the workforce (Focus 
Group August 19 1991). 
 
Despite training of all Plant employees in quality problem identification and solution 
there was no accompanying change to the production process to enable employees to 
use these techniques.  Employees continued to perform task-specific jobs (Focus 
Group August 28 & September 12 1991).  Indeed employees complained when they 
made suggestions for change management took little notice “management refers to us 
as experts then ignores our expertise” (Focus Group August 19 1991).  This led to 
problems not being identified until customers complained.  An example given in a 
Focus Group is summarised below: 
The customer, Ford, notified the Sales & Customer Service Division of a product quality 
problem.  Despite meetings between Ford engineers and engineers from Auto Electrical the 
problem could not be resolved.  By chance it came to the notice of a Plant employee who had, 
two weeks previously, told the supervisor of the problem during the assembly of the product 
(Focus Group September 5 1991). 
 
One process worker summarised the management attitude as “management is 
concerned with making a quality product, but do not concern themselves sufficiently 
with treating the workers in a quality manner” (Focus Group September 5 1991).  
Indeed employees feared management retribution if they contributed a contrary view 
to managements’.  This was evident in the following responses to the question: 
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‘If consultation is to work what changes will need to be made to the way managers and workers 
act and the skills they have?’ 
 
!"workers are scared of management because there is no climate of friendship developed  
!"workers fear their ideas will not be taken up 
!"workers fear mistakes 
!"workers need to be treated with respect by management 
!"workers need to overcome fear of job loss if people speak of problems 
!"managers need to remove do-as-I-say, not as-I-do 
!"managers need to remove secrets 
!"managers need to appreciate work well done  
!"if discussion is made with management, they should consider our view 
!"management needs to develop the ability to instruct rather than order 
!"management needs to speak to workers and not ignore them  
!"management needs to be more receptive to suggestions/problems 
!"management needs to understand workers know about problems from hands-on experience 
!"managers need to tell the workers the reasons for decisions 
!"managers need feedback from employees 
!"managers should stop yelling if people don’t understand 
!"management should talk with people not at them 
!"workers need to be more involved in the company and be informed of the long-term plan 
!"managers should not ridicule workers 
!"workers need truthful and consistent information 
!"workers need to improve their English language skills (Focus Groups August 28 & 
September 12 1991) 
 
Through these responses employees demonstrated both a fear of management 
response to their suggestions for change and a resentment that no attention was given 
to their knowledge of the production process and associated quality problems.  The 
Kaizen teams established in 1993 somewhat reversed this situation as several 
suggestions for change made by Plant employees were implemented.  This included: 
!"a reduction of the ‘Front Turn Signal Line’ from 15 metres to 4.3 metres 
!"Just-in-Time principles introduced by changing the configuration of workstations 
!"work-in-progress improved 100% 
!"stress on both the operators and the line flow removed 
!"housekeeping, improved by 100% 
!"productivity improved by 36% (AE Corporate Services 1993). 
 
Furthermore employee members of the team found management to be supportive of 
their efforts: 
We found management and supervisors are as concerned with problem-solving and improvements 
on line as we operators….We learned to work as a team, listen to each other and gained 
enormously in self-confidence when the time came to present our finished product (AE Corporate 
Services 1993). 
 
However, despite a training program for all employees in kaizen techniques, the lack 
of a formal process to extend this team concept throughout the plant led to employee 
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complaints that the Kaizen groups were too narrowly focussed.  For example 
workforce representatives stated: 
!" Kaizen has a narrow product related focus 
!" it is difficult to establish cross-departmental teams 
!" teams are ‘adhoc’ which makes communication of activities of the various teams difficult to 
convey 
!" teams lack any decision-making power as there is no formal reporting mechanism from the 
teams to any decision-making body other than their immediate managers (Workforce 
Representatives July 20 1993). 
 
These responses suggest that a more inclusive work reorganisation was needed.  Plant 
employee frustration was further increased by their exclusion from the ‘8D Cross 
Functional teams’ of specialists.  On the other hand, their exclusion from these teams 
meant that discussed of improvements was confined to technical quality problems 
rather than process problems.  This is demonstrated by a survey of typical issues 
discussed in 8D teams as follows: 
 
!"handling and storage of hazardous materials 
!"poor adhesion of metallizing process 
!"variations in weight of Hot-Melt-Glue dispensing by robots 
!"draft specifications of Self-Adhesive Decals for headlamps 
!"unpredictable reflectivity from Reflex Reflectors 
!"poor paint adhesion 
!"electrical failure of headlamp 
!"surface damage to lens 
!"handling of reflectors 
!"condensation on headlamps 
!"bulb fitting problems (AE Quality Assurance August 1992). 
 
There was no mention in these reports of how these technical problems may be 
reduced or removed by work reorganisation. 
 
In summary, as shown in Table 5.7 workforce participation introduced under quality 
management reform at Auto Electrical was limited.  
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Table 5.7 
Auto Electrical 
Direct Workforce Participation 
 
Methods of Workforce Participation Extent of Workforce Participation 
 
information sharing one way communication, management to 
workforce 
training  
 
quality specialists and workers immediately 
affected by quality problem, until 1993 
work reorganisation no supportive work organisational changes 
 participation limited to the eight newly promoted 
quality controllers 
 process workers limited to tasks 
 no work reorganisation to support training 
 
Quality improvement remained the responsibility of technical experts in the Quality 
Department with assistance from a few process workers upskilled to quality control 
functions.  Work remained task-based with no opportunity for workers to use their 
quality improvement techniques on a continuous basis.  Quality remained a post-
production control activity by ‘quality experts’ rather than a continuous improvement 
process by workers.  Management retained all decision-making power despite the 
implementation of shop-floor quality improvement teams. 
 
Representative Workforce Participation 
 
Representation participation had a much greater impact on Auto Electrical during the 
period under review than did direct participation.  Representative participation was 
introduced into Auto Electrical in the form of Consultative Committees established to 
assist institutional workplace reform.  The history of these committees in Auto 
Electrical demonstrates the many difficulties and decisions this process encountered in 
trying to work effectively in a company in which management was the traditional sole 
decision maker.  Difficulties arose from presumptions made by both managers and 
employees.  The Consultative Committees at Auto Electoral went through a number of 
developmental stages as these difficulties emerged.  The initial Consultative 
Committee was established in 1987 following negotiations over the second tier wage 
round.  It fell into disuse and was reformed in 1992 as part of company 
implementation of the restructured Metal Industry Award.  This produced two 
Committees - one on which union members of the workforce were represented and 
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one representing non-union employees.  These two committees were again 
restructured into one joint Consultative Committee in 1993.  The following section 
outlines the experience of these committees.  
"
Central Consultative Committee 1989 –1991 
 
In 1989 the Auto Electrical Central Consultative Committee (CCC 1989) was 
established. The committee was envisaged as a tool of management to increase 
communication and improve problem solving.  In a Discussion Paper the Corporate 
Director stated the company is: 
committed to the promotion of management led consultation with employees for the purpose of 
communication, joint problem solving and to keep all members of the company abreast with 
progress (AE Corporate Director 1988). 
 
In order to achieve these aims it was believed employees would work better if they 
understood the bigger picture: 
It is the company's view that employees will perform better when they understand that 
management will keep them informed on important issues and where their opinions and 
expertise are sought in resolving problems (AE Corporate Director 1988). 
 
Accordingly, the company aimed to: 
enlist the constructive involvement of employees, to promote a good working environment and 
to improve productivity, to achieve a high standard of competitiveness (AE Corporate Director 
1988). 
 
From the start it was clearly established the Committee would be advisory to 
management rather than a decision-making body: 
The Consultative Committee is neither a decision-making not a negotiating body in so far as 
matters normally considered to be those of an industrial relations.  It may be looked upon as an 
important advisory body….the final decision to proceed or not to proceed with the course of 
action will rest with the company (AE Corporate Director 1988). 
 
Employees were encouraged to support the committee with “understanding, 
knowledge, co-operation and enthusiasm”, as an aid to “managing the business and 
improving the quality of decisions and an overall commitment to the company” (AE 
Corporate Director 1988).  Thus it is clear that the purpose of the committee was a 
one-sided employee commitment to company goals.  Employee goals of improved 
working environment were seen as the means to ensure employee commitment to the 
company, not as an end in themselves.  There was no intent to increase employee 
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participation in managerial decision-making, but only to offer the opportunity for 
consultation. 
 
It was decided there should be an equal number of managers and employee 
representatives on the committee.  The first committee consisted of six managers 
(three Directors - Corporate Affairs, ER&D, and Plant, and three managers - Finance 
and two from MP&S), and seven shop stewards.  The terms of reference developed by 
management covered a broad spectrum of issues including:  
!"new systems 
!"technological change 
!"training and development 
!"affirmative action  
!"plant efficiency 
!"matters of significant importance to workers (AE CCC 1988).   
 
This suggests a broad range of issues for discussion including basic employee, 
production and strategy issues.  Table 5.8 summarises the form of employee 
representation proposed using the framework introduced in Chapter Two.  
 
Table 5.8 
Auto Electrical Structure for Representative Participation 
Form of involvement representative 
Level at which involvement takes place company 
Type of involvement consultation 
Subject matter new systems 
 technological change 
 training and development 
 affirmative action 
 plant efficiency 
 employee concerns 
 
However the experience of the committee is more confined.  The committee began 
enthusiastically, meeting bi-monthly throughout 1989.  However meetings declined to 
quarterly in 1990, with no further meetings after March 1991.  Issues discussed within 
the committee are summarised in Table 5.9. 
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Table 5.9 
Auto Electrical 
Central Consultative Committee 1989 
Management Presentations 
 
SUBJECT ISSUE  DATE 
 
Basic 
employee 
translation of Metal Industry Award - Manager Personnel 
and Industrial Relations 
May 1989-March 1991 
March 1991 
 superannuation – Director CSD June-December 1990, March 
1991 
 recycling and environment policy – Health and Safety 
Manager 
April 1989, December 1990 
 draft Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative 
Action Policies – Personnel Officer 
April-June 1989, June 1990 
 relocation of personnel – Director CSD August,  October 1989 
 in-house payroll system and new time-keeping system – 
Director CSD 
June, December 1990  
 vacancies internal applications- Manager Personnel and 
Industrial Relations 
March 1991 
Production Productivity improvement-Plant Director May 1991 
 bar coding – Manager MP& S October 1989 
Source: AE CCC 1989-1991 Minutes 
 
It is apparent management treated the committee primarily as an information 
exchange.  Various managers, principally the Corporate Services Director, informed 
the meeting of new policies and practice developed by department and of new 
technology being introduced.  However there was no expectation of a response from 
employee representatives, and little or no consultation on these changes.  There were 
several sub-committees established to collect information on specific issues and to 
make recommendations to the Consultative Committee as shown in Table 5.10.   
Table 5.10 
Auto Electrical 
Central Consultative Committee 1989 
Sub-Committees  
 
SUBJECT  ISSUE OUTCOME DATE 
 
Basic 
employee 
smoking policy  
 
report presented in august 1989 but 
issues left unresolved 
June 1989-1991 
 child care unresolved June 1989 
 
 
suggestion scheme 
 
scheme introduced in 1992 June 1989 –1991 
Source: AE CCC 1989-1991 Minutes  
 
However these sub-committees were confined to basic employee issues.  Of 14 issues 
discussed in the Consultative Committee between 1989 and 1991, 12 were confined to 
minor housekeeping, human resource, and industrial relations matters.  There was no 
reference to business strategy or financial direction.  In response workforce 
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representatives limited their requests for information to relatively minor housekeeping 
issues such as:  
!"the provision of a bus for transport to and from work 
!"security in the car park  
!"the possible replacement of ‘musak’ by radio broadcasts in the production area (AE CCC 
Minutes 1989). 
 
Further, the sub-committees were relatively ineffective, taking months to make any 
recommendations. 
 
A review of the committee in 1991 revealed a number of employee concerns.  First, 
employee representatives complained subject matter was too narrow, lacked real 
substance, and was a one-way information flow from management.  Employee 
representatives stated they had expected the Consultative Committee to be a:  
consultative group whereby they would have the opportunity of expressing opinions on and 
participating in decisions on company plans to introduce changes in its future organisation and 
operations.  In looking back over the work of the Committee, the topics raised by 
Management’ have been few and, in most cases, did not require debate or decisions because 
the latter had already been taken (AE CCCA Report 1991). 
 
Employees were thus openly frustrated at managements' limited interest in their views 
and at being informed of change only after management had taken decisions. 
 
Second, employees complained of poor communication between committee 
representatives and themselves.  Although Minutes were placed on several notice 
boards for employee perusal there were no formal report-back sessions to the 
workforce, and no canvassing of workforce opinion on issues.  This resulted in low 
levels of trust between employee representatives and employees as shown in typical 
responses as to the question: 
‘If consultation is to work within Auto Electrical what changes need to be made to the role of the 
Consultative Committee?’ 
 
!"workforce suggestions need to be more effectively canvassed 
!"workers ideas need to be acknowledged and respected even if they appear minor  
!"workforce representatives need to know what goes on in each department 
!"information back to the workforce needs to be both more frequent and more accurate 
!"information needs to be translated for the workforce in appropriate languages 
!"management needs to give reasons for its decisions  
!"workforce representative need to be assured they will not be victimised or ridiculed  
!"discussion needs to be followed by action (Focus Groups August 28 & September 12 1991). 
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Thus employees not only criticised management but also their representatives.  This 
negative response resulted in management deciding to restructure the Committee to 
have an effective consultative process by which to implement the newly restructured 
Metal Industry Award. 
 
The first step in this process was a management decision, endorsed by the union, to 
hold company-wide information sessions on the implications of the newly restructured 
award for management and employees.  A consultant recognised in the MTIA-MTFU 
Award Restructuring Implementation Agreement (Workplace Resource Centre Pty 
Ltd) was employed for this task.  It was agreed by management, unions and 
participants, that the training had been effective in communicating the importance of 
having a well-functioning Consultative Committee to explore workplace change 
proposals.  Indeed the training was so effective it resulted in a delay in establishment 
of the Consultative Committee due to non-union members in specialist departments 
wanting to be included.  This was opposed by union members who saw such 
employees as de-facto management representatives, with their inclusion in the 
committee making the balance between management and employee representative 
uneven (Workforce Representatives July 20 1993).  This matter was only resolved by 
establishing two committees – Central Consultative Committee A (CCCA 1992) 
which included union representatives and Central Consultative Committee B (CCCB 
1992) which included non-union representatives.   
 
This experience further illustrates the division between Plant employees and 
specialists that characterised the company culture and served to limit good 
communication.  It is of interest to this thesis that it is this problem that had led to the 
recognition of the need for an integrated best practice reform process.  This potential 
was not recognised by Auto Air during the time under review.   
 
Central Consultative Committee A (CCCA 1992)  
Central Consultative Committee B, (CCCB 1992) 
 
The CCCA 1992 was established in April 1992, followed by the CCCB 1992 in May 
that same year.  Each committee was made up of equal numbers of management and 
employee representatives.  Both committees functioned under similar Constitutions 
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and both discussed similar issues, accordingly the following focuses on the activities 
of one committee - the union-related Consultative Committee (CCCA). 
 
The first meeting of CCCA 1992 was designed as a two-day workshop facilitated by 
the same mutually agreed consultant who had run the information sessions.  A number 
of potential problems concerning the way the members of the committee viewed 
consultation became evident during this training (Workplace Resource Centre Pty Ltd 
1992).   
 
First, management representatives found the time taken to reach group consensus 
frustrating.  At one stage a Director resorted to a quantitative approach to resolve a 
group attempt at reaching consensus.  When employee representatives objected to this 
approach he refused to accept their complaints as legitimate.  Second, management 
representatives sought to exclude full-time union officials from the committee by not 
providing the opportunity for ‘observers’ into the draft Constitution of the Committee.  
This matter remained unresolved at the conclusion of the training.  Third, employee 
representatives did not feel they had power within the committee because of the senior 
status of management representatives.  Several worker representatives complained 
that they don’t talk like managers.  Finally, shop steward representatives on the 
committee were concerned at the election of lack of union training of non shop-
steward employees elected to the committee.  This led to a managerial response as the 
aim of the committee was to consult, there was no need for employee representatives 
to be influenced by the union (Workplace Resource Centre Pty Ltd 1992).  These 
examples demonstrate managers had no intention of sharing any power, while 
employee representatives were both fearful of their knowledge compared to managers 
and frustrated by managerial intent.  
 
The workshop did, however, produce a Draft Constitution to be discussed with 
employees and management before endorsement.  This showed the committee was 
trying to overcome its earlier communication problems with the broader workforce.  
The Terms of Reference in the draft constitution broadened the role of the committee 
from a one-sided benefit to the company, to mutual benefit for both the company and 
the workforce.  The proposed aim of the committee was: 
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To ensure the survival and future success of Auto Electrical and its employees by promoting- 
a) True consultative processes and close co-operation between management and employees 
b) The principles of, and commitment to, award restructuring and structural efficiency by 
covering such factors as: 
organisational structure, company policy and procedure changes, company future plans, 
improvements in efficiency and productivity, significant changes in technology, 
equipment and work organisation, quality, training, career paths and skills of all 
employees, communication, work environment (AE CCCA 1992 Draft Constitution). 
 
However the Constitution was silent on the question of the power of the committee, a 
factor that suggests mutual acceptance of the limited advisory power of the 
committee.  The experience of the committee was, however, not significantly different 
from the earlier committee as explained below.  As shown in Figure 5.2, once again 
the committee began enthusiastically meeting monthly in 1992.  
 
Figure 5.2 
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Source: AE CC 1989-1993 Minutes  
 
Less meetings of the whole committee were held in 1993, however the establishment 
of a number of sub-committees as shown in Figure 5.3 balanced this.  Issue specific 
sub-committees were established to explore issues of ‘good housekeeping’, 
‘acknowledgement of achievement’, improved communication, training, absenteeism, 
company library, and future holidays.  The establishment of these sub-committees 
suggests there was more two-way discussion in smaller joint groups than in the larger 
Consultative Committee.  
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Figure 5.3 
Auto Electrical 
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Subject matter discussed in the committee and in sub-committees was, however, still 
dominated by basic employee issues as shown by in Table 5.11.  
 
Table 5.11 
Auto Electrical 
Central Consultative Committee (A) 1992 
Issues Presented by Management 
 
SUBJECT  ISSUE DATE 
 
Basic 
Employee 
Single Bargaining Unit negotiations October 1992 
 plant shut-down May, October, December 
1992 
 confidentiality agreements April and May 1992 
 student employed December 1992 
 superannuation March 1991, May 1993 
 multi-cultural day ,company open day May 1992, September 1992 
 social club December 1992 
Production restructure of finance/administration April 1992 
Strategic future of company  March, October 1992 
Source: AE CCC A 1992 Minutes  
 
Typical basic employee issues mentioned for discussion included - wages and working 
conditions, confidentiality, employment of students, and superannuation, specific 
purpose days and the company social club.  Only once was a production related issue 
mentioned by management, and even then it was to inform the committee of a 
management decision to restructure the finance and administration department.  
Finally, the general manager did address the committee on the strategic future of the 
company on two separate occasions, but this was purely to provide information. 
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The outcomes of this committee were also limited.  First, sub-committee deliberations 
were lengthy with limited outcomes as shown in Table 5.12.  The Communications 
sub-committee took six months to recommend to the Committee two additional notice 
boards be installed.  The Good Housekeeping sub-committee took over a year to 
recommend the existing occupational health and safety procedure should remain 
unchanged.  The Acknowledgement of Achievement sub-committee took over a year 
to recommend introduction of a scheme to recognise especial performance and 
achievements of individuals and groups.  Three other sub-committees were still 
deliberating at the time this research was completed, while the recommendations from 
the final sub-committee (wages) was rejected by the workforce in November 1993 
(AE CCCA 1992-3). 
 
Table 5.12 
Auto Electrical 
Consultative Committee 1992 Sub Committee  
Recommendations 
 
SUBJECT ISSUE ACTION DATE 
 
Basic Employee acknowledgement of 
achievement 
report – suggestion schemes May 1992 -December 1992 
July 1993 
 absenteeism unresolved September 1992 
 skills audit unresolved 
AMWU withdrawal 
July 1992-July1993 
 good housekeeping 
communication 
decision – no change 
report – more notice boards 
April 1992 - September 1992 
June 1992 
Source: AE CCC 1992 Minutes  
 
By October it was obvious the Committee was not meeting expectations of employee 
representatives and many managers felt frustrated by committee proceedings.  In a 
review of the first six months activities the following problems were identified:  
!"Agenda’s of both Committees showed little progress.  Sub-committees deliberations are 
lengthy and require broader input  
!"Employee representatives are concerned at the narrow agenda of the Committees.  They 
cited various major changes decided by management without consultation with the 
Committee including:  
!"introduction of kaizen 
!"relocation of mirror welders 
!"extension of chanson 
!"employee transfers 
!"process worker appointments 
!"new work process  
!"changes to work flow  
!"removal of the evacuation alarms 
!"introduction of revised evacuation procedures (AE CSD 1992e)  
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Finally, union representative complained management are the only people with the 
knowledge of the current state and proposed future for the company of Auto 
Electrical.  They sighted the fact there was no information being provided to the 
Consultative Committee as to the activities of the management Kaizen Project Teams 
(AE CSD 1992e). 
 
In summary employee representative complained there was no real consultation.  To 
address these concerns the Review recommended: 
!"Broadening the agenda items to include discussion of company future plans  
!"Monthly Management reports to the Committee reviewing activities within department 
and divisions 
!"Formal links to be established between the Consultative Committees and the Kaizen 
Project Teams  
!"Reduction in the frequency of committee meetings to provide for more relevant dialogue 
!"Amalgamation of the two Committees (AE CSD 1992e). 
 
In response it was decided to amalgamate the two Consultative Committees. 
 
Central Consultative Committee 1993 (Combined) 
 
In February 1993 the two committees merged.  Management made some attempt to 
satisfy employee representative complaints by tabling Reports on a variety of issues as 
shown in Table 5.13.  However these Reports were still principally confined to basic 
employee issues. 
Table 5.13 
Auto Electrical 
Central Consultative Committee 1993 
Issues Discussed 
 
SUBJECT ACTION 1993 
 
Basic Employee superannuation March 
 future policies and procedures for training June  
 new medical/first aid procedure employee rehabilitation June 
 employee suggestion schemes June and July 
 employee survey October, November 
Production Kaizen June 
 diversification August 
 customer focus September 
Source: AE CCC 1993 Minutes 
 
Employees criticised the Reports for being delivered as a one-way information flow 
from management to the employee representatives without any attempt to consult 
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employees.  They were also criticised as being limited in content, historical, and 
superficial rather than strategic.  This was interpreted by employee representatives as 
indicative of reluctance by management to properly inform employees and thus to 
retain decision-making power (Workforce Representatives July 20 1993).  Employee 
dissatisfaction finally resulted in October in a letter from employee representatives to 
the Managing Director complaining of lack of managerial commitment to the 
consultative process.  The letter stated: 
Some management representatives, we believe, are not committed to consultation.  There is a 
lack of commitment and apathy.  The Consultative committee feels management is less 
responsive in informing us of the more important issues, which affect the whole company.  One 
of our concerns is Management not attending meetings and coming up with excuses and not 
replacing their absenteeism with alternatives (Employee Representatives AE CC 1993). 
 
Through this letter employees demonstrated that there had been no change in the 
decision-making process within the company and their participation had been totally 
undervalued.  Employee representatives stated although they accepted the 
Consultative Committee was not a decision-making body, it should be able to make 
recommendations.  Instead employees complained they feared managerial response to 
any suggestions for change “non management and employee delegates are scared of 
retribution and intimidation and so ideas, suggestions and opinions are not voiced” 
(Employee Representatives AE CC 1993). 
 
Further evidence the Consultative Committee was not meeting employee expectations 
was given late in 1993 when employee responses to a training audit undertaken by the 
committee were found to be unreliable because employees overstated their skills 
because they not trust management to use the results of the training audit properly.  
Rather they feared they would be used to target employees for redundancy.  
Consequently employees had exaggerated their skills.  Finally, this lack of trust led in 
November to employee rejection of a committee recommendation to timetable annual 
leave Periodic Days Off (PDOs) to accommodate production scheduling problems, 
and in December to the withdrawal of the principal union covering trade and 
supervisory employees, AMWU, from the committee.  This spelt the end of usefulness 
of the Consultative Committee. 
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In summary, representative participation was introduced through Consultative 
Committees established as part of institutional workplace reform.  However, as shown 
in Table 5.14 this form of participation was limited to structural form with little 
operational significance.  
Table 5.14 
Auto Electrical 
Representative Workforce Participation  
1987-1993 
 
Change Method of Participation Extent of Participation 
 
Institutional  
 
collective bargaining full-time union officials supported by shop 
stewards 
 Consultative Committee elected representatives 
  advisory, but limited recommendations 
  issues – basic employee, production 
(information from management) 
workforce rejected recommendations 
 
Traditional management control and decision-making led to a concentration upon one-
way information flows from management to employee representatives on issues of 
basic employee concern.  Managerial response to employee complaints that the 
consultative process was ineffective was superficial.  This eventually resulted in 
employee rejection of the committee.  In response full-time union officials continued 
to control negotiations over wages and working conditions.  
 
Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation 
 
It is clear Auto Electrical did undertake all three workplace reform processes - quality 
management, institutional workplace reform, and best practice, although the latter was 
hardly evident as more than a new idea.  However change introduced under these 
reform process lacked strategic purpose, was short-lived, limited, and non-cumulative 
and resulted in little productive improvement.  Workforce participation adopted both 
direct and representative forms as shown in Table 5.15.  
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Table 5.15 
Auto Electrical 
Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation 
Workplace Reform  Direct Participation Representative Participation 
Quality 
Management  
one-way communication from 
management to employee 
 
 employees trained but no work 
reorganisation 
 
 8 process workers trained as quality 
controllers 
 
Institutional 
Workplace 
 collective bargaining full time union 
officials 
  consultative committee  
Best Practice training in Kaizen techniques  
 
However this workforce participative lacked strategic purpose, had limited 
management commitment, and was more simply managerial response to external 
pressures from customers, government, and unions.  This meant that workforce 
participation at Auto Electrical was more rhetoric than reality.  Without management 
commitment it failed to provide employee commitment to an integrated platform for 
productivity improvements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Auto Electrical attempted change under each of the 
workplace reforms under analysis in this thesis.  A Quality Management Strategy was 
adopted in 1988 in response to customer requirements for new procedures to ensure 
ongoing supplier quality assurance.  Negotiations towards enterprise specific 
productivity improvements began in 1987 in response to decisions of the AIRC.  
Finally, in 1992 the company began to address the agenda to develop best practise.  
External pressure from markets, customers, and government largely induced these 
changes.  
 
What this Chapter has shown is these external pressures for reform failed to induce a 
corresponding internal commitment to change.  Although structures were established 
to introduce reforms they lacked translation into operation.  Managers remained 
separated into divisions and departments with changes given only cursory attention by 
any but the introducing division.  For example, quality initiatives remained the 
responsibility of the Quality Department; consultation was regarded as the 
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responsibility of Corporate Services; while Best Practice was to all intents and 
purposes an engineering activity.  There was no attempt to benefit from the 
cumulative effects of these reforms. 
 
Given this lack of integration between reform initiatives it is not surprising workforce 
participation was also limited to a structural form without substance.  Direct 
participation by individual employees was restricted to problem solving on quality 
issues in temporary teams with activities confined to the immediate work area.  
Representative participation in Consultative Committee was restricted principally to 
issues of basic employee concern, with production and strategic issues remaining 
solely the responsibility of management.  Finally, change associated with best practice 
reform remained principally a managerial activity.  In these circumstances minimal 
long-term improvements were recorded.  Experiments in both workplace reform and 
workforce participation came to be seen as marginal because of poor integration and 
operation causing management and employees to withdraw their respective 
commitment to reform.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
AUTO MECHANICAL (I) 
Survival Through Global Rationalisation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the second case study analysed in this thesis, Auto Mechanical 
(AM).  The format for this chapter is similar to the first case study with a review of 
the company describing its operations and the pressures upon it in the late 1980s.  
 
Auto Mechanical: Ownership and Corporate Role 
 
Auto Mechanical differs from the first case study outlined in this thesis for two 
principle reasons.  First, in 1990 it implemented a company restructure in accordance 
with a directive from the American-parent to conform to a global international 
business rationalisation strategy.  Second, market pressures caused the company to 
rethink its business strategy.  However, despite subsequent operational changes, the 
company remained fundamentally designed according to traditional mass production 
concepts.  
 
Auto Mechanical was originally established in 1953, as an Australian owned 
private company servicing the local automotive industry.  In the 1960s it was 
acquired by Wilmot-Breedon, a British company with outlets in many European 
countries, (Managing Director October 7 1994).  In 1979 an American-owned 
International corporation purchased it, along with the rest of the British owned 
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group (AMIC 1991).  This International Corporation has diverse interests in four 
core businesses – Automotive, Electronics, Aerospace, and Graphics, with total 
sales in 1991 totalling US$2.3 billion.  Auto Mechanical belongs within the 
Automotive Operations Group which, in 1991, contributed about 20% of total 
sales to the International Corporation.  This placed the Automotive Operations 
Group as equal to the Electronics Group in terms of its contribution to the 
International Corporation.  This was less than the Aerospace Group, which 
contributed 39% of sales, but was greater than the contribution from the Graphics 
Group which contributed 8% of sales.   
 
Automotive operations include truck, bus and off-highway vehicles.  The Wilmot-
Breedon purchase added passenger motor vehicles to these larger vehicles.  PMV 
suppliers are located within an Auto Mechanical Group producing various 
automotive body systems (ABS) such as window regulators, door systems, 
convertible roof systems.  In 1991 this Group contributed 30% of total sales of 
Automotive Operations.  Auto Mechanical in Australia is smallest of all 
companies within the Auto Mechanical Group, with larger sister plants located in 
the UK, France and Italy (AMIC 1992) 
 
The value of the company in Australia lies in its access to the protected Australian 
market and its strategic position close to the South Pacific market.  However the 
relatively small contribution of the company in Australia to the Group partly 
explains why until 1990 it was largely unaffected by its American acquisition.  
This was despite a major business rationalisation of European facilities after the 
American acquisition.  This rationalisation occurred as a result of a strategic plan 
for the International Group by which each Plant would develop a product for 
which it became the Centre of Expertise.  It would then service the rest of Europe 
with that product.  In this way the International Group planned to produce a Total 
System product, (AMIC 1991; Managing Director October 7 1994). 
Initially the only change to the Australian company from the American acquisition 
was the Australian Board of Directors reported directly to the International 
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Corporation’s American Board.  The company retained the name Wilmot Breedon, 
it remained focussed on the Australian market, and only 5% of company sales 
were exported (Managing Director October 7 1994).  This changed in 1990 when 
the company was instructed by its American owner to undertake a similar 
restructure to the European companies.  First, the International Corporation 
appointed a new Managing Director to replace the Australian Board of Directors.  
Second, the company name was changed to Auto Mechanical to identify it as 
belonging to the Auto Mechanical Group.  Third, the company was instructed to 
adopt the Credo of the International Corporation (AMIC 1988).  Finally, the 
company was required to narrow its product range to two products and become a 
Centre of Expertise in production of an electronically sophisticated motor (AM 
1991).   
 
Product 
 
The Managing Director explained that until 1990 Auto Mechanical had produced 
around 600 mechanical components, ‘anything that goes click clack’, for car 
bodies and chassis (Managing Director October 27 1992).  Such products included 
window regulators, door latches, door hinges, seat adjustments, suspension 
systems, sunroofs, bumper-bars, and chrome insignias’.  The company also 
produced many of the required sub-components.  These mechanical parts 
complemented the electrical parts produced by another British company, Lucas, for 
the English PMV producer, Morris (Beruldson 1989)1.  In the late 1970s the 
British owner, Wilmot-Breedon, acquired a French company producing electric 
motors for window regulators.  This led to the development of various Automotive 
Body Systems into Body Chassis Systems using the electric motors.  Thus the 
international company diversified into several integrated Total Systems Units 
(BCSs), (AMIC 1992).   
 
                                                 
1 In 1984 Lucas merged with Auto Electrical  
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After 1990 two major changes to product were planned for the company in 
Australia.  First, products supplied by Auto Mechanical were to be reduced to two 
new Total Systems Units – a Window Regulator System and a Convertible Roof 
System (both for Ford Australia).  The production of door latches (for Nissan) was 
divested and production of some of the sub-assemblies, for example plating, was 
outsourced.  Second, the company was nominated by the parent Corporation to 
become a Centre of Expertise in the production of a motor required for the new 
window-regulator Body Chassis Systems.  The motor was initially produced by a 
sister company in France and exported to Auto Mechanical in Australia.  This 
change would mean that the Australian production of the motor would initially 
complement, and eventually replace, the near full capacity production of the 
French sister company.  To assist this development the parent company provided 
access to the Corporation’s Science Centre in the USA and to other companies in 
the Corporation through Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) and Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI).  It also provided $2.5 million for the company to develop a 
computerised production line for window-regulators (AM Managing Director 
1992).  
 
The Manager Sales & Engineering explained these product changes had little 
effect on the distribution between original equipment (OE) and parts and 
accessories (P&A), with OE contributing 80% of output in dollar terms (Manager 
Sales & Engineering October 26, 1993).  This reflects the concentration of the 
market in Australian-based PMV assemblers.  Auto Mechanical supplies all of 
Ford Motor Company, Australia’s requirements for window regulators and door 
latches, and 50% of GMH requirements (the other 50% was lost to German 
imports in the 1980s).  In order to honor existing contracts the company continued 
to supply, on a batch basis, spare parts for International Trucks, Mitsubishi, and 
Nissan.  Before 1990 exports from Australia were negligible, however the planned 
growth of the company as a Centre of Expertise for motors provides the 
opportunity for future export growth.  
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Market 
 
The Manager Sales & Engineering explained the close physical proximity between 
Auto Mechanical and its Australian-based customers has contributed to joint research 
and design of product and to specialised technical after-sales service by Auto 
Mechanical.  In return for this, and for a commitment by the company to supply spare 
parts for the life of the vehicle plus seven years, PMV assemblers provide costly 
model specific tooling.  This gives Auto Mechanical a considerable cost advantage 
over its overseas competitors.  For example around $1million is required for the 
tooling of one set of window regulators.  The planned production of new Body 
Chassis Systems provided the potential to consolidate its close ties to its Australian 
customers, as well as opportunity for export (Manager Sales & Engineering October 
26 1993).  
 
Costs 
 
Auto Mechanical divides its cost into four major areas - materials, capital, labour and 
overheads.  The company imports around half of its raw materials (rubber and 
plastic).  It also imports the costly motors (at $40 each) from its French-based sister 
company.  Accordingly, inventory levels and material costs are high.  The 
implementation of the new product strategy had, by 1992, resulted in a significant 
reduction in inventory costs from around $3 million in 1989 to around $380,000 in 
1992, or nearly 3% of sales (Purchasing & Supply Manager December 15 1992; 
Financial Controller March 15 1993).  In 1992 the breakdown of costs was as shown 
in Figure 6.1 (AM Finance Department 1992). 
  155 
Figure 6.1 
Auto Mechanical 
Analysis of Cost Distribution 1992 
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Source: AM Finance Department 1992 
 
Material costs had been reduced to a relative contribution of 24% of total company 
costs.  It was expected this would be further reduced with local production of the 
motor (AM Finance Department 1992).  Capital costs had increased in relative terms 
to 45% of total company costs, as the new computerised window-regulator line was 
developed.  Capital costs were expected to keep increasing as the company developed 
its Centre of Expertise capacity.  This meant that in relative as well as absolute terms 
labour costs (especially direct labour costs) had been reduced.  In 1992 the direct 
labour costs of process workers contributed only 8% of overall costs, although total 
labour costs were increased when indirect labour costs of specialist support 
employees were added.  This added a further 18% to make the total labour 
contribution of 36% of total costs.  This relatively high indirect labour cost was 
explained by the needs for skilled staff as the company developed its technical 
expertise.  Given these high labour and capitals there was pressure on the company to 
improve its productivity. 
 
Organisational Structure 
 
The company’s organisational chart (AM Human Resource Department [HRD] 
1992a) is presented in Figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6.2 
Auto Mechanical 
Organisational Chart-Departments, 1992 
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Source: AM HRD 1992a 
 
A minor restructure in 1990 resulted in the creation of two new departments - 
Purchasing and Human Resources - and the amalgamation of the Engineering and 
Sales departments.  This meant the company was left with six functionally 
autonomous departments - Manufacturing, Engineering & Sales, Quality, Finance 
& Administration, Purchasing and Human Resources, with each department 
performing a number of diverse functions.  Each department was further divided 
into sub-functions.  Formal communication between departments was managed 
through a computerised management information system (MIS) and a MRPII 
system.  This did little to improve the already strained communication between the 
physically separated manufacturing and specialist departments (Manager 
Production December 15 1992). 
 
 
Employment was unevenly distributed between departments.  This is shown in Figure 
6.3 (AM HRD 1992b).  
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Figure 6.3 
Auto Mechanical 
Employment Distribution by Department 1992 
Source: AM HRD 1992b 
 
In 1992 Manufacturing employed over 70% of the 176 total employees.  The next 
largest department was Engineering & Sales with 18 employees.  There were 11 
employees in Quality, seven each in Finance and Purchasing, and only three in Human 
Resources.  The 40% decrease in overall employment in 1990 was fairly evenly 
distributed between departments.  
 
Corporate Plan 
 
Until 1990 the company relied upon a comprehensive annual budget plan based on 
traditional short-term financial considerations (Managing Director October 27 1992).  
The annual budget used traditional return-on-funds to measure financial performance.  
There was little emphasis on developing process measurement, although there were 
plans to introduce Activity Based Cost Accounting in 1995 for each separate activity. 
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Work Organisation 
 
Manufacturing was separated into two functional groups – Manufacturing Services, 
which included production engineering and maintenance, and Production, which 
included production and the toolroom.  Professionally qualified engineers in 
Manufacturing Services were responsible for production planning.  Planning was 
assisted by an MRPII system introduced in 1990, which linked directly to the 
Purchasing Department.  In 1990 the International Corporations’ MRPII system 
replaced all other methods of inventory management.   
 
Following the appointment in 1986 of a new Production Manager (now Managing 
Director) the company experimented with a Kanban process whereby materials 
movement was controlled by a pay-point system using ‘move-tickets’.  At the same 
time Just-in-Time was introduced to reduce inventory holdings.  However, these 
initiatives had failed by the late 1980s.  The Managing Director claimed that the 
initiatives failed because of insufficient workforce training and inadequate 
consultation with the workforce (Managing Director October 7 1994).  
 
Until 1990 a broad product range of assemblies and sub-assemblies for mechanical 
components were produced (Production Manager December 15 1992).  Production 
was divided into a Fabrication Shop, a Machine Shop, a Plating Shop, a Zinc and Die-
casting shop, a testing area, and customer-based assembly lines for single products.  
Production occurred on a daily one-shift flow-line basis, although batch assembly was 
used for parts for superseded vehicle models.  Process workers were responsible for 
production with machines set by trained setters.  Technology varied from large 
machines for cutting, pressing, forming, and welding, raw steel into sub-components 
such as door locks, window winders, roof rails, levers, brackets and other small part, 
to small machines for testing, assembling and welding sub-components.  The most 
advanced technology was the Numerically Controlled (NC) testing machines and a 
welding robot for larger welds.   
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This production process was described as unproductive for a number of reasons.  
First, Production was guided by an individual quantity based bonus system.  This has 
resulted in quantity valued over quality and production of stockpiles of poor quality 
product unable to be sold.  Second, the plant was poorly designed with cumbersome 
internal materials movement because of numerous assemblies and sub-assemblies.  
Third, there was little communication between largely English speaking managers and 
principally Macedonian-speaking production workers.  This had resulted in 
Macedonian supervisors, mostly male, having more power than the departmental 
manager.  To rectify these inefficiencies the Production Manager had, in 1988, tried to 
introduce change.  First he tried to remove the quantity based bonus system, but 
employees resisted this as it had significant wage implications.  Second he introduced 
a Kanban demand-led production process, however poor planning, and inadequate 
communication, had led to production bottlenecks.  Third he tried to reorganise 
production into cells, but again worker resistance, poor planning and insufficient 
communication and training had frustrated these changes.  Finally he replaced some 
of the supervisors to reduce the ‘Macedonian Mafia’ (his terminology) but this was 
resisted by workers.  Accordingly in 1990 the initiatives were abandoned (Managing 
Director October 7 1994).  
 
In the same year the company was told to introduce change to accord with the new 
international strategy (Managing Director 1990).  Between October 1989 and October 
1992 Auto Mechanical reduced from 600 to 100 its production of finished parts.  The 
product range was narrowed and sub-component production, such as plating and 
machining (screw and fastener production), fabrication, zinc and die-casting and 
painting and decorating, were outsourced (AM 1992a).  Despite these changes, the 
company continued to produce door latches and other components on a batch basis to 
meet existing contractual obligations to supply PMV customers with model-based 
spare parts for the life of the model plus seven years.   
 
As a result of the new product strategy two major changes were introduced in the 
early 1990s.  First, production scheduling was more precisely tied into the MRPII 
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system to ensure outsourced sub-components were ready when required (Director 
Purchasing December 15 1992).  Second, a new computer-operated window regulator 
line was introduced.   
 
The Manager Production explained that apart from the new computerised line the 
production process remained essentially unchanged.  Production was still separated 
into a number of functional areas- a blanking, pressing and welding shop (albeit 
smaller and less diverse), a testing area, and customer-based component production 
divided into Mechanisms Components Assembly process (continued as an interim 
measure), Convertible Roof Systems, and a Window Regulator Assembly Line.  A 
section of the factory left vacant by the outsourcing process was set aside for future 
location of the motor assembly lines (Manager Production December 15 1992).   
 
The Mechanisms Component Assembly produces three product types.  First, various 
components for truck, utility, and van spare parts, are batch assembled two to three 
days per month.  Second, GMH automatic gear change is produced on a flow basis 
through a six stage (station) assembly process.  Third, Ford door handles are produced 
on a flow-line assembly split into two parallel processes (required because the tooling 
for the front and back doors is not interchangeable) through 11 stations determined by 
the capability of the machinery.   
 
In Convertible Roof Assembly production occurs through a six-station process.  
Components are assembled, moved by robot slider to a welding robot, passed on to 
spot welding for more intricate welds and to add rails, returned to the welding robot, 
then passed to the grinding machine, before being sent outside the factory for further 
processing.  Outsourced sub-components are returned for assembly of handles, hooks 
and plastic and welding assembly of the convertible roof.   
In 1991 a computer operated Window Regulator Line was introduced.  The 
production of the automated line was funded by the parent company and designed in 
Australia with assistance from sister companies within the International Corporation.  
The continuous rolling conveyor moves assembly platens through 20 workstations 
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taking a total of eight minutes.  Six stations are fully automated with all fixtures easily 
and quickly changeable.  Production workers trained in all processes operate the other 
16 stations the skills for performing quality checks.  Program Controllers have 
responsibility for the operation for platens, combining interlocks, and any variation to 
workflow.  The process is able to handle a number of different models, with die 
changes performed by the operators (Production Manager December 15 1992).  A 
natural work team was created around this process with operators expected to accept 
greater responsibility for quality outcomes.  However, although the line is 
technologically sophisticated, it retains the mass production concept of moving sub-
components through task specific stations requiring only semi-skilled repetitive work.  
During the time this research was underway the natural work team had not 
demonstrated its ability to operate as a self-managing team.  
 
Thus the reorganisation of work arising from the implementation of the new 
international strategy was minimal.  Apart from the new computerised line and a 
welding robot, technology used in production is relatively unsophisticated.  Despite 
this technology still determines, and limits, the work processes to narrow and 
repetitive tasks.  As a consequence the production workforce has a low skills base as 
shown in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 
Auto Mechanical 
Classification of Production Workforce 1992 
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87%
Prof./Tech
3%
Trade
10%
 
Source: AM HRD 1992b 
Almost 90% of the production workforce are classified at the lower skill levels of 
process workers and machine setters (AM HRD 1992b).  Low levels of literacy 
amongst the largely non-native English speaking workforce (principally Macedonian) 
further exacerbate problems.  Despite this the company has tried to provide promotion 
opportunities by recognising skills acquired internally through experience rather than 
simply employing from outside based on qualifications (AE Human Resource 
Director October 27 1992).  Increased expenditure on training by the company in the 
early 1990s, as shown in Figure 6.5, reflects the adoption of a new Corporate strategy.    
Figure 6.5 
Auto Mechanical 
Employee Training Program-Hours per year 1989-1991 
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Source: AM HRD 1991c 
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Between 1989 and 1991 there was a six-fold increase in training hours per employees, 
from 6 hours in 1989 to 36 hours in 1991.  By 1992 training represented 15% of 
company payroll and 9% of total gross turnover.  A significant percentage of this was 
language training for overseas born manufacturing process workers in production, as 
the first step in skills upgrading (AM HRD 1992c).  This is discussed further in the 
next Chapter. 
 
The effects of these changes are not as easily determined.  Auto Mechanical measures 
productive efficiency in a number of ways (Financial Controller March 15 1993).  
First, labour/capital efficiency is measured by value added per employee.  Second, 
efficiency is measured by Standard-Yearly-Labour-Hours minus Clock Hours (actual 
hours clocked-on).  Finally, materials management is measured by the number of 
inventory turns per year.  Between 1987 and 1990 value-added per employee almost 
doubled, reaching a high in 1993 of $74,500.  However there was little change in 
clock hours, although overtime worked increased steadily.  During the same time 
inventory turns per year increased from 4.5 in 1987 to 7.1 in 1990, however a slight 
decrease to 6 turns per year was recorded after 1990.  
 
Five service departments support production.  The second largest employing 
department - Engineering and Sales - was created in 1990 by amalgamating two 
separate departments to assist development of a new export strategy.  A senior 
Engineer with experience in the overseas sister companies heads the department.  
Engineers and technical officers design and test products in co-operation with 
customers.  A NATA rated laboratory assists product design, while customer-linked 
CAD enables joint collaboration in product design with local PMV customers.  As a 
result of the new strategy several engineers from the department undertook study tours 
of the French sister plant in preparation for production of the motor (Director Human 
Resources May 4 1993).   
 
In 1989 the quality function was separated from Engineering and a new Quality 
department was established.  The Director Quality stated technically trained or 
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experienced employees upgraded from production carried out the quality function.  
The quality department sets targets, issued charts, and audited the production process.  
There have been attempts to have production employees monitor product quality, 
especially on the newly computerised window regulator line, but this has met with 
varied response.  Testing is performed against standards set in the company’s quality 
systems manual, itself produced by the Quality Department.  Reliability of finished 
product was formally monitored and analysed by the Quality Department from both 
internal and external information collected through customer feedback and field data.  
Measurement of quality performance uses traditional economic indicators of rates of 
return, turnover, and profitability.  Cost of quality is measured by expenditure on 
prevention of defects (target of 60% of quality expenditure), on post-production defect 
inspection and finally, on expenditure on scrap and rework (target of 20% each).  The 
company uses sampling inspection and variable control charts for process control 
purposes.  Quality inspection and testing is assisted by the laboratory and by two 
machines (one mechanised and the other computerised) testing for on-road rigour.  
Quality of inputs is defined through written specifications in the Auto Mechanical 
Quality Supply System.  The most common method of verifying correctness to 
specification of purchased material is statistically based acceptance sampling with a 
target of zero defects.  This function is shared between the Quality and Purchasing 
Departments (Director Quality December 15 1992).   
 
In summary, quality is performed in a traditional manner, separated from production 
by the skills required of a technologically driven, post production quality assurance 
process.  However there had been some attempt to promote process workers into 
quality to provide some link between the two departments. 
 
The final three support departments are Purchasing, Finance, and Human Resources.  
The Purchasing department orders, receives, and despatches goods, organises the 
outsourcing of sub-component production and delivery and undertakes internal 
materials management.  The department is responsible for the MRPII system.  The 
computerised Managing Information System is administered through the Finance 
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department, which also handles all accounts, bookkeeping, and general administration.  
Finally, the newly created Human Resource Department has responsibility for all 
personnel and industrial relations activities.  This Department is physically located 
within the manufacturing building to ensure close contact between the HR 
professionals and the workforce.   
 
This work organisation resulted in 1992 in almost 70% of the workforce being 
classified as semi-skilled as shown in Figure 6.6.   
 
Figure 6.6 
Auto Mechanical 
Classification of Workforce 1992 
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Source: AM HRD 1992b 
 
Only 9% of the workforce were professionally or technically qualified with a further 
8% trade qualified.  The remaining 15% of the workforce worked in service areas but 
had been promoted on the basis of experience rather than formal qualification.  This 
had resulted in some degree of interaction between process workers and specialists, 
however it was recognised that this required further change (Director Human 
Resource October 27 1992).   
 
Management 
 
Management was structured into departments in a multi-tiered hierarchy depending on 
Department size as represented in Figure 6.7 (AM HRD 1992a). 
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Figure 6.7 
Auto Mechanical 
Organisational Chart - Management 1992 
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Management accounted for around 10% of company employment (AM HRD 1992a).  
Management personnel changed in 1990 with adoption of the parent-Corporation 
strategy, with a new Managing Director appointed as well as new directors of 
purchasing, human resources, and quality.  This change did not, however, alter the 
managerial structure except to increase the importance of human resources and 
purchasing.  Further, the appointment of two female directors changed the character of 
the previously all male management group.   
 
To reduce separation between departments and improve communication managers 
met formally in cross-functional design and quality teams, or on an informal as 
needed basis.  This, plus the relatively small size of the facility, has resulted in 
relatively effective communication between managers.   
 
Although managers make all decisions informal communication between managers 
and workers occurs frequently as evidenced by the following cross section of 
responses to the question: 
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‘How would you describe the relationship between managers and employees in this company?’ 
!"management consults with the shopfloor 
!"communication meetings are used effectively 
!"workers have no fear concerning the ideas they propose 
!"the recent morning tea with the Managing Director was good 
!"the physical location of managers makes them easier to access (Focus Groups February 15 & 
16 1993). 
 
These responses suggest amicable informal consultation.  Confirmation of this 
observation was provided by the Climate Survey undertaken in 1993 (Task Force 
Consultants 1993).  Around 60% of respondents disagreed with the statement –‘ I find 
it difficult to talk freely with my supervisor.  Management is generally inaccessible and 
unapproachable’.  On the other hand, 72% of employees agreed with the statement – 
‘I’m satisfied with the job done by my manager.  My manager handles change within my 
company’.  While, 64% of respondents agreed and only 15% disagreed with the 
statement - ‘I am always treated fairly by management.  I rarely, if ever, think about leaving 
for another job somewhere else’.  
  
Human Resource Management 
 
The Director, Human Resources, stated that before her appointment to the position in 
1990 the company did not have a long term articulated and integrated employment 
relations strategy.  All personnel related issues were the responsibility of individual 
departments.  This resulted in significant variations in approach.  The Personnel 
Officer had simply been responsible for all payroll matters and dealing with personnel 
problems as required.  The language barrier between the largely Macedonian speaking 
manufacturing workforce and the personnel officer resulted in supervisors being 
largely responsible for all personnel issues.  She described the separation of Human 
Resources as a separate department in 1990 as a demonstration of a more positive 
commitment to employees.  This was confirmed by employee response to the 1993 
Climate survey.  In response to the question - ‘My company stresses the importance of 
workers.  Staff morale is important’ - almost 80% of employees had responded in the 
affirmative (Task Force Consultants 1993).  Following the appointment of the new 
Human Resource Manager initiatives were taken on a wide range of human resource 
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issues including Equal Employment Opportunity, Training, and Occupational Health 
and Safety.  These are described below. 
 
First, Equal Employment Opportunity was promoted.  In 1990 the company appointed 
two women into managerial positions, one as the Purchasing Director and one the 
Human Resources Director (Director Human Resources October 27, 1992).  In the 
same year Human Resource Department developed three new company Policies - 
Equal Employment Opportunity (AM HRD 1990a), Affirmative Action (AM HRD 
1990b), Sexual Harassment (AM HRD 1990c).  However it was recognised more 
action had to be taken as even as late as 1992 women accounted for only 35% of 
salaried employees and less than 5% of managers.  
 
Second, as mentioned earlier the company placed more emphasis on training.  Before 
1990 the company did not have a formal training policy and there were no structured 
career opportunities.  Although a structured training program had not been introduced, 
total company training hours had increased to 4000, double that of a year earlier.  This 
had resulted in average training hours per employee increasing from six to 14 hours 
(AM HRD 1992d). 
 
Third, the company had demonstrated long-term interest in the occupational health 
and safety of its employees.  A joint management-union Health and Safety Committee 
was established in 1986 (AM HRD 1986).  By 1990 the company had a 2% safety 
incident rate which had yielded a minimal workcare levy of 7%, lower that the 
industry average (AM Health and Safety Committee 1990).  In the 1993 Climate 
Survey, 67% of employees agreed with the statement – ‘My working area is a healthy and 
safe environment.  The company pays attention to providing good facilities for staff’ (Task 
Force Consultants 1993).   
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Wages and Industrial Relations 
 
The Metal Industry Award set wages and working conditions for the majority of 
employees.  The State Commercial Clerks Award had covered administrative 
employees until the award was terminated by the Employee Relations Act (Victoria, 
Parliament 1992).  The company continued to abide by these salaries and conditions 
during the time under review.  The company has traditionally paid over-award rates 
for skills.  Salaries of managers and specialist employees were set according to the 
Hay job evaluation method with annual Performance Reviews.  This different 
approach to remuneration led to some resentment between award and salaried 
employees as non-wage benefits, such as the provision of vehicles, only applied to 
salaried personnel (Director Human Resources October 27 1992) 
 
The manufacturing workforce was fully unionised.  The Amalgamated Metal Workers 
Union (AMWU) was the only union on site since the 1991 amalgamation with 
ADSTE.  The union dealt with the company on two levels.  At the operational level, 
the locally elected shop steward, and the Director, Human Resources negotiate 
workplace conditions.  At a broader level, a full-time union official assists the shop 
steward on award or enterprise agreement negotiations.  Both the Director Human 
Resources and the full-time union official, separately, defined the relationship as 
positive and constructive (Director Human Resources & AMWU Official May 4 
1993).  Company specific industrial action had not occurred, and agreements had been 
made with the workforce to accommodate nation-wide strikes.  However the 
existence of a high absentee rate, averaged at around 7% per annum (often considered 
as a measure of hidden unrest), was cause for concern. 
 
Pressure for Change 
 
In 1990 Auto Mechanical experienced considerable external pressures for change 
from the International Corporation, local PMV customers, government and unions. 
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The first environmental pressure came from the parent company.  Table 6.1 shows in 
1990 the company faced a positive market (AM Finance Department 1993).  
Table 6.1 
Auto Mechanical  
Key Performance Data 1988-1993 
 
Year Sales $M Profits (Pre Tax) Return On Assets 
(%) 
1987 15821 -562,465 -10 
1988 22168 -1,234,843 -29 
1989 31631 -1,580,487 -58 
1990 40475 1,233,154 17 
1991 31226 -673,192 -12 
1992 24051 24,684 1 
1993 20628 1,348,000 20 
Source: AM, Finance Department 1993 
 
In that year sales reached a high of $40,475 million, more than double the $15,821 
million in 1987.  Pre tax profits were positive at $1,233,154, with a 17% return on 
assets.  Given this, one would expect resistance from management, workers, and 
unions, to any proposal for change.  However a slump occurred in 1991.  Although he 
company quickly recovered its profitability a loss of $673,192 was recorded in 1991.  
By 1992 a positive return of $24,684 was recorded with an increase to $1,348,000 in 
1993.  Furthermore, although return on assets had declined to minus 12% in 1991, 
1993 recorded a 20% return.  The financial improvement occurred despite a reduction 
in sales to just over $20 million in 1993, or half the 1990 figure.  This appears to be 
partly due to improved productivity per employee, and partly to improved materials 
management.  However shedding unprofitable product lines (associated with the 
halving of revenue between 1990 and 1993) also boosted return on assets and 
profitability. 
 
These improvements in productivity were associated with reduced production, sales 
turnover and employment.  The decline of employment after 1989 is shown in Figure 
6.8 (AM HRD 1992b).   
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Figure 6.8 
Auto Mechanical 
Employment 1987-1992 
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Source: AM HRD, 1992b 
 
In 1989 a peak of 450 employees was achieved.  Two years later employment slumped 
by 255 to 155, a company low.  The biggest decrease occurred between 1989 and 1990 
when 160 persons left the company, followed by a further reduction of 65 persons 
between 1990 and 1991.  Employment did show some recovery after 1991, to reach 
167 persons employed in 1993 (AM HRD 1992b).  
 
To summarise, after 1990 change was forced on Auto Mechanical by the parent 
company.  This change revised local production and dropped some lines, whilst 
cutting jobs to increase profitability.  It should be noted 1992 also saw a decline in 
demand from assemblers.  This contributed to lower sales and jobs. 
 
The second environmental pressure came from customer quality demands.  The Ford 
Q101 and Q1 systems, as explained in Chapter Three, were especially relevant to 
Auto Mechanical given the importance of Ford as a customer for the new Systems 
Units.  This Ford preferred supplier quality system required a greater emphasis on 
process quality improvements.  In response Auto Mechanical developed a Total 
Quality Management program at significant extra expense to the company.   
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The third and final environmental pressure came from industrial relations 
developments.  The new bargaining structure introduced through the AIRC required a 
more sophisticated collective bargaining process at the enterprise.  
 
Summary 
 
In summary Auto Mechanical is an American owned company that in 1990 was 
pressured by the parent to introduce a new strategy in accordance with the 
International Group to which it belongs.  This strategy involved a rationalisation of 
the product range and an agreement to develop expertise in production of a motor 
required by various Unit systems.  The implementation of this strategy resulted in a 
reduction in manufacturing output as some sub-assemblies were outsourced, and a 
new computerised production line for window regulators was installation.   
 
However, production remained essentially task oriented with a production driven 
focus.  This was confirmed by a 1993 Climate Survey which found the company had a 
high standardised score of 4.46 (five being the maximum) in task oriented, rational 
climate dimension (Task Force Consultants 1993).  Work organisation, as 
summarised in Table 6.2 remained modelled on Fordist principles.  Departments 
remained segmented on a functional basis with production the main employing 
department.  The production process was technologically determined by relatively 
rigid and unsophisticated machinery except for the new computerised process.  
Production was standardised by industrial engineers into short cycle times.  Work in 
production was defined by narrow, repetitive tasks with limited job rotation, 
flexibility, and limited autonomy for the workforce.   
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Table 6.2 
Auto Mechanical  
Work Organisation Mass Production Model 
 
Departments 
 
segmented, functional departments, and sub-departments 
Process  standardised by industrial engineers 
technologically determined – unsophisticated machinery 
short cycle time per job 
no schedule for preventative maintenance 
Job design plant - narrow, individual, tasks based with limited job rotation 
and flexibility 
support – more autonomy, flexibility and variety limited job 
rotation and flexibility  
technologically determined 
Skills & Depth of Knowledge more than half are semi-skilled, less than 20%  
technical, professional or trade semi-skilled  
Product design superior automotive body system - body chassis system 
discussion of design for manufacturability 
Human Resource Management becoming proactive 
Industrial Relations strong union, but co-operative process 
Product Quality  quality inspection post production 
no continuous quality improvement 
no employee involvement 
Management 
 
centralised hierarchical 
Market Segment local Australian market 
opportunity to export to sister companies 
 
In contrast, work in service departments was more skilled, allowing employees more 
autonomy, variety, and flexibility.  This resulted in a largely semi-skilled production 
workforce separated from highly skilled specialists in support departments.  However 
company attempts to promote internally had resulted in less separation between 
departments as employees were promoted form one department to another.  Product 
was designed by specialists with no input from the plant and thus although there was 
discussion of ‘design for manufacturability’ this was not well developed.  After 1990 
Auto Mechanical gave more attention to human resource management and to 
developing co-operation with unions.  This resulted in limited employee involvement 
in quality improvement.  Finally, management remained organised in a hierarchical 
and segregated structure, with all decisions made by management.  
 
By the late 1980s Auto Mechanical was a company under stress.  To continue as a 
viable commercial entity in the new International market it had to develop strategies 
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to increase productivity and efficiency at reduced prices.  At the same time local 
Assemblers were placing increased and costly quality demands on the company.  
Furthermore, the company workforce was faced with the threat of redundancy as 
product range was rationalised and sub-component production was outsourced.  As 
this was happening demands were being made to develop a more sophisticated 
enterprise-based collective bargaining process.  In this context the decision by the 
company to implement further change associated with the three workplace reforms is 
understandable.  The next chapter discusses these changes.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
Auto Mechanical (II) 
Workplace Reform through Consultation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out in detail how Auto Mechanical used the workplace reform 
processes - quality management, institutional workplace reform and best practice - to 
implement the new international business strategy designed by the American parent 
Corporation.  This chapter is organised as follows.  The first section presents the 
major changes introduced under each reform process.  These are summarised in Table 
7.1.  The second section explores the operation of these changes in terms of workforce 
participation.  The conclusion is twofold.  First, integration of the reform processes 
made them mutually reinforcing.  Second, representative workforce participation 
through the Consultative Committee contributed to development of a new 
management-workforce relationship based upon co-operation and consultation.  
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Table 7.1 
Auto Mechanical 
Workplace Reform  
 
DATE Quality Management 
Reform 
Institutional Workplace 
Reform 
Best Practice Reform 
1987  Two Tier Agreement  
1989 Ford Q101 (140 points) Award Restructuring 
Consultative Agreement 
 
 
1990 Quality Management Strategy 
adopted 
 International Strategy-Credo 
 Ford Q101 (150 points) - SQR 
rating 50U (unsatisfactory) 
  
1991 Quality Council of Manager 
established. 
 World Competitive 
Manufacturing Workshop 
September Ford Q101 (160 points) – 
SQR rating 94U 
(unsatisfactory) 
 application for funding under 
Australian Best Practice 
Demonstration Program 
October GMHA and Toyota B+ rating 
309 points (restricted supplier) 
 new technology – 
computerised window 
regulator line 
November
 
Ford Q101 (168 points) - SQR 
rating 94E (excellent) 
 
 
 
 
1992 Ford Preferred Supplier listing Enterprise Agreement integrated policies developed 
 GMHA Toyota B+ rating, 348 
points (approved supplier 
status) 
  
 Supplier Quality Assurance   
 Kanban introduced with 
supplier regulator rails 
 
 
 
1993 Ford Q1 Enterprise Agreement World Competitive 
Manufacturing funded training 
–teamwork 
 
Quality Management Reform 
 
The Director Quality explained that traditionally Auto Mechanical had relied upon a 
technical approach to quality assessment with engineers in the Engineering 
Department and quality professionals in the Quality Department performing all tasks 
associated with quality assurance (Director Quality December 15 1992).  The 
company had gradually improved its quality rating with its PMV assembly customers.  
For example in 1989 it was awarded 140 points towards Ford Q101, this was 
increased to 150 points in 1990, 160 points in September 1991, 166 in October 1991 
and finally it was awarded Ford Q101 status in November 1991.  It took until 1993 for 
it to be awarded Ford Q1 preferred supplier quality status.  Similarly in 1991 the 
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company was only granted a restricted supplier status for GMHA and Toyota B+, 
upgraded in 1992 to a fully approved supplier status (AM 1992b).  
 
The Quality Department produced and interpreted the quality manual.  Quality 
professionals were responsible for compiling all data related to quality performance, 
however this was limited to post-production assessment.  There were no process 
control methods to evaluate process capability or to enable modification of process 
during production.  Process control relied solely upon gauges, measuring, and test 
equipment.  There was no established process for rework and no ability to analyse and 
document returned parts.  Finally, there was no long-term strategy for quality 
improvement.  These limitations had resulted in a number of problems for the 
company.  The Managing Director explained that when he was first employed in 1986 
as the Production Manager the production process was geared to a quantity-based 
rather than quality conscious output.  This resulted in various stockpiles around the 
plant of poor quality unsaleable components (Managing Director October 7 1994).  
By 1990 scrap levels of product were nearly 5000 parts per million (PPM), supplier 
rejects were over 5000PPM, and customer returns were as high as 4000PPM (AM 
Quality Department 1993a).   
 
In the late 1980s two further pressures were added to the company which forced it to 
reassess its approach to quality.  Firstly, as discussed in Chapter Three, PMV 
customers required evidence suppliers were updating their quality systems.  Secondly, 
the Parent Corporation required all companies within the Group to develop TQM 
objectives within a new quality management program (Director Quality December 
15).  In response to these pressures, in 1990 Auto Mechanical introduced a TQM 
program.  Table 7.2 summarises these changes in terms of the Ford Quality System 
Standards (1990), (Ford being a major customer for Auto Mechanical).  Both broad 
company structural and specific process changes were introduced.  
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Table 7.2 
Auto Mechanical 
Quality Management Reform Process 
1989-1993 
 
Strategy Required AM Change Process  
 
PROCESS and PRODUCT QUALITY   
evaluate process capability (post production only) Quality Management Steering Committee (QMSC) 
Quality Planning Team (QPT)  
Quality Operating System Strategy (QOSS) 
product control (traditional) QMSC, QPT  
process control  Computerised window regulator line 
8D reports training and teams in 8D problem solving techniques 
Statistical Process Control  to monitor processes and 
improve capability 
training in Statistical Process Control techniques 
plans for continuous improvement QMSC and QPT 
PLANNING   
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis training in Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and 
teams established 
control plans adoption of the international corporate quality control 
procedure QMSC, QPT, QOSS  
preliminary process capability studies design for manufacturability 
process to monitor and control sub-supplier quality supplier quality assurance handbook 
DOCUMENTING  quality manual 
CRITICAL CHARACTERISTICS   
key quality disciplines for control items QOSS 
 
Management Related Change 
 
In 1990 management adopted the Quality Control Procedure of its parent International 
Corporation.  This required all managers to agree to “assure the adherence to Quality 
Standards, which are consistent with company policy and customer requirements” 
(AM 1990).  This resulted in the company in 1991 establishing a Management 
Steering Committee (QMSC).  Membership of the Committee consisted of the 
Managing Director and six Departmental Directors/Managers.  The Committee was 
given the task of developing a quality awareness program for the company.  However 
the non-inclusion of workforce representatives on the committee reinforced the 
attitude that quality improvement was a management and specialist rather than a 
workforce responsibility.  The QMSC was assisted by monthly reports from a Quality 
Planning Team.  The Team consisted of all Departmental managers plus two 
specialist from the Engineering and Quality Departments.  There was also no 
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workforce representation on this Team.  In 1993 management adopted a company 
Quality Operating System Strategy (QOSS) as shown in Table 7.3.  
Table 7.3 
Auto Mechanical 
Quality Operating Systems Strategy 
 
Human 
Resources 
Purchasing Production Finance Product Engineering 
safety 
incidence 
inventory 
turns 
direct labour 
efficiency 
return on sales new product 
introduction – timing 
plan versus actual date 
% 
absenteeism 
delivery on 
time 
% machine 
downtime 
return on 
assets 
number of product 
changes after job 1 
training hours 
per employee 
  value added per 
employee 
 
Source: AM Quality Department 1993b 
 
The QOSS had a three-fold task.  First, to establish and monitor targets related to Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs).  Second, to develop control plans, and third, to assist 
in the dissemination of responsibility for quality throughout the company. 
 
Finally, in 1992 specialists in the Quality Department developed a company specific 
Supplier Quality Assessment (SQA) Handbook and a Supplier Quality Assessment 
Manual in an attempt to develop a process to monitor and control sub-supplier quality 
AM 1992c).  Contractual Agreements required adherence to the standards and 
processes.  The SQA committed suppliers to zero defects with total batch rejection if 
one item was found to be faulty.  Suppliers were expected to undertake monthly self-
rating.  Certification of 23 key suppliers resulted.  
 
As well as these managerial changes the company introduced joint management-
employee changes as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint – Management and Employee Change 
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First, the QOSS aimed to extend responsibility for quality improvement throughout 
the company by negotiating targets with unions and then assigning target achievement 
to various departments.  However this had limited success during the time period 
under review (AM Quality Department 1993b).  The QOSS also adopted the concept 
of ‘design for manufacturability’, although this had not proceeded into action during 
the time under research. 
 
Second, the QOSS reconfirmed the decision made in 1992 to establish an initial 
training target of 40 hours of working time per employee to be devoted to training in 
quality.  This resulted in training of specialists and some production workers in 
techniques associated with FMEA, 8D problem solving techniques, and SPC 
techniques.  However this training was limited to production downtime.  
 
Third, a new computerised Windscreen Regulator Line was commissioned.  It was to 
be designed with state-of-the-art technology and was to incorporate quality checks.  
Process workers were consulted about the design.  When installed, operators were 
trained and expected to carry out quality checks with only limited assistance from the 
Quality Department.   
 
Fourth, Quality Improvement Teams were introduced in 1992.  First, 8D Problem 
Solving Teams were established under quality specialists.  Membership was voluntary 
but workers immediately affected by the problem were encouraged to participate.  The 
team could call on technical assistance as required.  Special purpose Ford trained and 
led Productivity Enhancement Process (PEP) Teams were later introduced.   
 
As well as changes directly related to the quality management process, other changes 
affecting quality were introduced as part of institutional workplace reform and best 
practice.  They are mentioned here because of their relevance to quality improvement 
but details are provided in appropriate Sections of this Chapter.  
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First, in 1992 a World Competitive Manufacturing workshop was held as part of the 
company’s commitment to best practice.  Policies for Manufacturing, Marketing, 
Innovation, Human Resources, and Finance were developed during this workshop.  
Most policies included a commitment to continuous quality improvement and thus 
broadened responsibility for quality improvement beyond the Quality Department.  
 
Second, the 1992 Enterprise Agreement negotiated with unions as part of the 
institutional workplace reform process included a commitment to continuous quality 
improvement, with a focus on seven Key Performance Indicators.   
 
Third, implementation of the 1992 Enterprise Agreement required production workers 
to volunteer for training to upgrade skills according to the Engineering Production 
Certificate.  Teaching modules on quality improvement became the responsibility of 
specialists in the AM Quality Department 
 
Thus during the time under review Auto Mechanical introduced changes as part of its 
quality improvement strategy.  These changes were aimed principally at process 
improvements, and involved joint action by management, production workers and 
specialist employees.  They were also integrated with other changes being introduced 
as part of other reforms.  This resulted in improvements in product quality as shown 
in Table 7.4.  
Table 7.4 
Auto Mechanical 
Quality Improvement Schedule 
Key Performance Indicators 1990 1991 1992 1993 Target 
1993 
Total Quality Management no record 44% 65% 89% 92% 
parts per million (Customer returns) 3918 1536 663 192 350 
scrap no record no  record $0.82 $0.65 $0.45 
inventory 7.6X 6.0X 6.1X 5.9X 7.8X 
delivery no record no record 96% 100% 100% 
Source: AM, Quality Department, 1993a 
The company’s TQM indicator showed steady improvement, from 44% in 1991 to 
89% in 1993, against a 92% target.  Customer returns measured in parts per million 
were reduced from 3,918 in 1990 to 192 in 1993, well below the 350 target.  Cost of 
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scrap had been reduced from $0.82 in 1992 to $0.65 in 1993, against a $0.45 target.  
Finally, delivery-on-time had improved from a 96% success rate in 1992 to the 100% 
target set for 1993.  The only measure with no improvement was inventory turns 
which actually reduced from 7.6 turns a year in 1990 to 5.9 turns in 1993 against a 
target of 8.8 turns (AM Quality Department 1993a).  
 
The workforce shared with management the view that quality was improving.  This 
was demonstrated in 1993 when 89% of employees agreed with the statement – ‘My 
department is well organised and runs efficiently.  The quality of work done by my group is 
high’.  A further 98% of employees agreed with the statement – ‘In my work there is 
importance placed on meeting customer needs.  We concentrate on serving customers’ (Task 
Force Consultants 1993).  These responses also suggest employees were committed to 
quality improvements of both product and process.  Further evidence is provided by 
typical employee response as set out below to the question: 
 ‘What changes have occurred to quality in the last five years?’ 
!"new technology 
!"cleaner production process 
!"new window regulator line 
!"better layout 
!"SPC to the shopfloor 
!"PEP and 8D teams 
!"operator responsibility for quality 
!"commitment to training 
!"ongoing improvements (Focus Groups February 15 & 16 1993). 
 
Thus employees recognised quality improvements did not simply rely on 
technological improvements but also required management support for change to the 
production process, and to employee skills acquired through training.   
 
Thus the quality reform process introduced greater commitment to quality 
improvement from both management and employees through changes that required 
greater workforce participation as summarised in Table 7.5.  
Table 7.5 
Auto Mechanical 
Workforce Participation and Quality Management Reform  
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Participant Form of Workforce Participation Details 
 
Management 
1991 
Quality Management Steering Committee  
 Quality Planning Team  
 Quality Operating System Strategy  
Production 
workers 
training target for all employees 
  quality targets negotiated with unions 
  training in Statistical Process Control  and 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
  continuous quality improvement on window 
regulator line 
 involvement Productivity Enhancement Process  teams 
Specialists training Quality Planning Team 
  Quality Operating System Strategy Training 
  Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, Statistical 
Process Control, 8D 
 involvement 1992 Ford Productivity Enhancement 
Process teams 
 
It is clear there was a commitment to training employees in the skills required for 
participation in continuous quality improvement activities.  Once employees were 
trained they were encouraged to participate in quality improvement teams.  However 
this training was not accompanied by significant work reorganisation to enable 
workers to utilise these skills as part of their normal activities except on the new 
window regulator line.  The effect of this limited form of workforce participation will 
be pursued later, following discussion of changes associated with the other two reform 
processes.  
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Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
Given the employment implications of decision of the company to narrow its product 
base, it is not surprising managers availed themselves of the opportunity to devolve 
enterprise bargaining to improve productivity as shown in Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.6 
Auto Mechanical 
Institutional Workplace Reform 
1987-1993 
 
ISSUES TWO TIER1987 AWARD 
RESTRUCTURE
1989 
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENT 
(1)1992 (AIRC 
ratified)  
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENT (2) 
1993 (AIRC) 
Basic 
Employee 
wage increase - $10 
plus 4% 
wage increase – 3% 
plus $10 but no 
reclassification 
wage increase –4.5% 
plus 4.5% 
wage increase – 4% 
 wages paid by 
Electronic Funds 
Transfer 
   
  
 
consultation consultation re-commit to 
Enterprise 
Agreement 
 flexibility in rostering 
leave 
occupational health 
and safety sub-
committee 
part time and casual 
employees 
 
 grievance procedure 
 meal breaks 
 meal breaks 
flexibility  
absenteeism 
 
  equal employment 
opportunity 
equal employment 
opportunity 
 
   
 job security 
 
job security 
 
  consultation on 
training 
commitment to skills 
upgrade 
 
Production 
 
  supervisors as 
trainers 
 
flexibility and teams 
 
 
 
   consult on 
Continuous Quality 
Improvement, new 
technology and best 
practice 
 
Strategic  
 
more communication   
 
The absence before 1990 of a well-resourced human resource department able to 
effectively negotiate industrial relations matters resulted in few productivity gains 
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negotiated under the second tier agreement in 1987.  This was rectified in 1989-1990 
by the implementation of a Consultative Agreement negotiated as part of the Award 
Restructuring implementation process.  This was followed in 1992 and 1993 by 
Enterprise Agreements that committed unions and employees to seek improvements.  
In return management agreed to provide employees with equal opportunity to training 
for skills and career opportunities, within a healthy and safe work environment.  All 
these agreements were ratified before the AIRC. 
 
 Two Tier 
 
The first agreement was negotiated in 1987 in a traditional collective bargaining 
manner between the full-time union official supported by the shop steward and the 
personnel officer.  The agreement was modelled on industry level proposals.  The 
main items included were:  
!"payment of wages by Electronic Funds Transfer  
!"flexibility in the timing of meal breaks  
!"flexibility in the scheduling of Rostered-Days-Off (RDOs) 
!"new grievance procedure (AM & AMWU, ASE, ADSTE 1987) 
 
Award Restructuring 
 
The second agreement was negotiated in 1989 between the full-time union official 
supported by the shop steward and the personnel officer as part of the implementation 
of the Metal Industry Award.  This agreement accorded with the principles then 
espoused by parties at the industry level.  It gave a general commitment to company 
growth, stability, and protection for the workforce and to adoption of a more 
consultative management-workforce relationship.  The stated aim of the Agreement 
was:  
to provide more jobs and greater security, more interesting, higher skills with wages for skills 
based on the proposed Metal Industry Award (AM & AMWU, ASE, ADSTE 1989).   
 
This was to be achieved by a commitment from the company to job security as stated 
in Clause1.1.1: 
no retrenchments will occur due to productivity improvements from the award restructuring 
process... Although transfers of employees to other areas of operation may take place after 
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discussion and agreement with the Consultative Committee, employees concerned and shop 
stewards (Cl.1.1). 
 
The newly established Consultative Committee was to provide a forum for discussion 
on how to deal with economic factors outside company control that threatened to 
adversely affect employment.  This was provided for in Clause 1.1.2, which stated: 
in the event of a market turn down or loss of orders due to forces outside the control (of the 
company), discussions would take place at the earliest opportunity through the Consultative 
Committee with a view to minimising job loss (Cl.1.2). 
 
Communication was to be improved by management providing employees with more 
information, through: 
the regular and systematic provision of accurate information to employees on a range of 
financial, industrial, personnel, and organisational matters is a vital element of good employee-
employer relationships (Cl.6.1). 
It was agreed such information sharing was important for employees to understand 
company strategy.  Thus the Agreement stated there would be: 
regular and systematic sharing of information is important to ensure employees understand the 
nature and operational characteristics of the enterprise or organisation in which they work 
(Cl.6.2). 
There would also be: 
regular and systematic sharing of information is important to ensure employees have all the 
information they need to carry out work effectively and safely: 
!"employees understand how their job fits into the overall process 
!"employees know where they stand and do not suffer from uncertainty, and doubt 
about their job security, future prospects etc 
!"full use is made of employees’ skills and ideas at all levels of the enterprise 
!"problems are dealt with quickly rather than festering (Cl.6.2). 
Consultation between managers and employees was to be through a Consultative 
Committee established with the following objective: 
the maintenance and expansion of the industry, securing and hopefully the expansion of jobs, 
improvement in their working environment, in particular making work a more enjoyable 
experience through job design and training, the development of more effective communication 
between management and employees, where possible improving the efficiency of the plants, 
making the most effective use of new technology and the general development of a more 
pleasant atmosphere for all people to work in (Cl.2.2). 
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Consultation was also to be assisted by training supervisors in new leadership skills as 
follows: 
a supervision training program be developed to promote the supervisor as assistant and 
organiser, as a trainer with training skills, and to minimise the traditional control function 
(Cl.4.2).   
 
Finally, commitments were given to improve employee welfare through increased 
training, closer scrutiny of occupational health and safety and actions to assist equal 
employment opportunity, as detailed below.  
 
First, there was the commitment on training.  Clause 3 stated the company would 
establish a Training and Job design sub-committee of the Consultative Committee to “ 
investigate among other things, the required skills, how they should be obtained and 
the potential for improved Job Design”.  This training was to accord with the proposed 
Metal Industry Award, with training and accreditation provided by TAFE.  The 
agreement sought to protect the right of employees to training by stating:  
!"all employees have the right to upgrade their skills 
!"paid training leave would be available for agreed courses relate to a person’s current 
position, projected future position, or future job security 
!"training is to be voluntary and nobody is to be discriminated against who does not wish to 
participate 
!"training to include literacy and numeracy and English on the job for those people requiring 
as a basis for upgrading their skills, in order they not be disadvantaged 
!"a survey of skills be conducted to identify skill shortages and ascertain the views of 
employees on what skills they require 
!"training should pay special attention to transfer of skills for the new technology in order 
all maintenance programming and other activities are handled by the direct employees 
!"all training occur in worktime, and the amount to be decided by company negotiations 
!"induction programs be developed in consultation with the workforce 
!"training be provided in the explanation of the whole job, including information on forward 
planning and explanation of changes (Cl.3). 
 
To further assist career opportunities for employees Clause 4.1 states that: 
all employment opportunities should be open to the local workforce first before being 
advertised externally.  This is to include appropriate required training if an employee wished to 
take the job but requires new skills, subject to reasonable time (Cl.4.1). 
 
Thus, there was a clear commitment by the company to developing career 
opportunities for employees through skills upgrading.   
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Second, there were commitments on occupational health and safety.  Clause 5.1 of the 
agreement stated the aim was to improve health and safety by establishing links 
between the existing Health and Safety Committee and the Consultative Committee: 
the Health and Safety Committee to become a sub committee of the Consultative Committee 
reporting on its activities monthly (Cl.5.1). 
Further a high priority was given to development of an education-training program on 
health and safety.  
 
Third, there were commitment to equal employment opportunity.  The Agreement 
committed the company to taking a “proactive role in encouraging women to 
participate in training for skills and career development” (AM & AMWU, ASE, 
ADSTE 1989).  Clause 8.1 of the Agreement referred to equal opportunity, especially 
as this affects female employees: 
in recognition of the high percentage of women workers…..any changes that occur would take 
into account the needs of women workers.  The organisation will take a proactive role in 
encouraging women to participate in training for skill and career development (Cl.8.1). 
 
In summary the Consultative Agreement negotiated in 1989 placed emphasis on 
development of a long-term focus for the company to be explored through a 
consultative framework.  
 
Enterprise Agreement 
 
The third Agreement was negotiated between full-time union official supported by the 
shop steward and the Human Resource Director and ratified by the AIRC as the 
company’s first Enterprise Agreement in January 1992 (AM & MEWU2 1992).  This 
Enterprise Agreement was reconfirmed in January 1993. 
 
The Enterprise Agreement was a more comprehensive document than the previous 
agreement.  It was designed to compliment Part 1 of the Metal Industry Award 1984 
with the proviso “where there is any inconsistency this Award shall take precedence” 
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(AM & MEWU 1992).  The Agreement stated at its outset it should be seen as an 
integrated part of a broader change strategy being introduced by the company: 
the agreement supports the continuous improvement in all …measures to achieve, 
International Best Practice, Product cost and quality, Human Resources, Technology and 
Management (Cl.1.2).   
The aim of the Enterprise Agreement was “to support our goal to become competitive 
in the world market in price, quality and delivery”.  It was hoped the Agreement 
would provide the company with: 
greater productivity and efficiency resulting in lower unit price with a higher quality.  It will 
also allow the company greater flexibility to meet changes in the economic climate, both 
domestic and internationally at an optimal cost to the company (AM & MEWU 1992). 
 
This was to be achieved by first reconstituting the company Consultative Committee 
under the following terms of reference: 
!" implementation of the Enterprise Agreement and Award restructuring 
!"continuous improvement 
!"conditions of employment, including the changes in the work schedules agreed in the 
enterprise agreement 
!"the formulation of a gain sharing plan, 
!"equal employment opportunity programs 
!"absenteeism 
!"quality 
!"formulation of a team approach (AM & MEWU 1992). 
 
Secondly, joint commitment was given to seven Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
as follows: 
!"zero lost time accidents 
!"quality returns of less than 900PPM for 1992 
!"efficiency target of 113% in 1992 
!"zero customer lags 
!"absenteeism - target reduction to 1.2%  
!"less than $41,000 scrap 
!"nine or more inventory turns per year (AM & MEWU 1992). 
 
In return for continued participation in the change process within the company 
employees received a pay increase from the 18th January 1992 and the opportunity to 
increase skills, enlarge job responsibilities and in so doing increase job satisfaction 
and provide greater job security (AM & MEWU 1992).  Both parties committed 
themselves to a range of matters as set out below: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2 MEWU resulted from amalgamation of AMWU and ADSTE 
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Management Commitment 
 
First, management gave a commitment there would be no job reduction as a result of 
changes introduced under the agreement: 
Any changes arising from this clause (flexibility) are not the vehicle for job shedding.  On the 
contrary through improved industry competitiveness, these changes should enhance job 
security (Cl.4.5).   
 
Second, management agreed to continue its support of training and equal employment 
opportunity through providing:  
all employees with a career path through the mechanisms provided in the Award.  Each 
employee will have the equal opportunity for further training to advance through the 
classification structure based upon the company’s requirements and the employees utilisation 
of skills and qualifications at each classification level (Cl.4.1). 
 
Employee Commitment 
 
In return employees agreed to the following.  First, employees agreed to use skills 
acquired when asked.  They would “from time to time carry out duties for which they 
have been trained and are within the employees skills and competence” (Cl.4.2).   
 
Second, employees agreed to more flexible rostering of their days-off by agreeing to 
bank up to five planned RDOs by agreement with employees to be utilised by this provision to 
plan for such things as maintenance or to avoid opening the plant for one, two or three days in 
a particular week when public holidays fall mid-week….provided …at least one month’s notice 
of any change is given (Cl.8.0). 
 
Third, employees agreed to consult with management over “the number of periods and 
the length of individual periods of leave” (Cl.11.0).   
 
Fourth employees agreed to some changes to the contract of employment to enable the 
company more flexibility.  This included the ability for the company to 
utilise the part-time and casual employment facility within the Award to cover peak 
periods…and…for new employees to be employed on a probationary basis for a period of two 
months (Cl. 5.1 & 5.2).   
 
It also included the ability of the company to introduce part time work under certain 
conditions 
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these conditions including maximum hours of work per day, payment for part-time work, 
ability to use part-time work to cover and finally the use of part-time work on the 4pm to 8pm 
shift (Cl.7). 
 
To enable managers to plan production more easily employees agreed to some further 
flexibility.  Meal breaks were to be varied to meet operational requirements (Cl. 10.0).  
Two hours notice would be given where possible when an employee was to be absent, 
and single day absences would be limited to two per year (Cl. 9).  Union meetings 
would be held where possible during the specified breaks or as close as possible to the 
breaks (Cl.12.0).   
 
To reduce administration costs employees agreed wages would be paid directly into a 
bank account using Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT), (Cl.6.1). 
In accord with the condition on all agreements the Grievance Procedure introduced in 
1987 was to continue.  This would include employee access to counselling to “give an 
employee reasonable opportunity to improve performance or to correct unacceptable 
behaviour”(Cl.5.4).  Finally, the Enterprise Agreement committed both parties to 
continue to consult on a number of issues through a reformed Consultative 
Committee.   
 
Thus the institutional workplace reform process at Auto Mechanical resulted in 
substantive commitments by both parties to productivity and efficiency 
improvements.  The extent to which these commitments resulted in actual 
improvements is less easy to determine.  Data collected by the company concerning 
direct labour efficiency is inconclusive, as shown in Table 7.7 (AM Finance 
Department 1992).  
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Table 7.7 
Auto Mechanical 
Employee Productivity Improvement 
 
Key Performance 
Indicators 
Target 1990 1991 1992 1993 
absenteeism (average 
total factory). 
1.2% 6.69% 4.1% 2.9% 3.7% 
direct labour efficiency 84% not recorded not recorded 85% 80.30% 
safety 0 not recorded not recorded 1 1 
value added per employee $A104,000 $A56,700 $A66,100 $A68, 400 $A74,500 
AM Finance Department 1992 
 
First, although value added per employee increased from an estimated $56,700 in 
1990 to $74,500 in 1993 (against a target of $77,800), direct labour efficiency 
fluctuated from a high of 85% in 1992 down to 80% in 1993 against an 84% target.  
Absenteeism, on the other hand, was reduced significantly over the period from 
around 7% in 1990 to just over 2% in 1993 (against a target of 1.2%).  Finally, there 
was only one lost-time accident recorded in 1992 and 1993 (against a zero target).  To 
what degree these changes may be attributed to enterprise bargaining is, however, 
uncertain.  For example, it is likely the recession in 1991 caused the fall in 
absenteeism.   
 
When more qualitative measures are invoked, outcomes from changes associated with 
institutional workplace reform appear more positive, although they still demonstrate a 
level of employee ambivalence.  On the one hand, the company was able to introduce 
a major change without industrial relations upset despite a significant reduction to its 
labour force.  On the other hand, the level of employee commitment to the company 
was not high.  In a Climate Survey carried out 1993 almost 40% of employees 
responded they disagreed or were undecided about the statement – ‘The company is held 
together by loyalty and tradition.  Workers feel strongly supportive of the Company’.  In 
contrast, almost 90% of employees agreed with the statement ‘The company is held 
together by task and goal achievement.  Everyone wants to meet their targets’.  The question 
then becomes what will contribute to increased employee commitment to productivity 
and efficiency improvement?  This requires further research. 
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It is clear from the discussion above that consultation was viewed as an important 
means to gain employee commitment to changes proposed by the company.  
Accordingly workforce participation was viewed as of central importance to 
institutional workplace reform, with changes proposed as summarised in Table 7.8.  
Table 7.8 
Auto Mechanical 
Workforce Participation and Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
ISSUES TWO TIER 
1987 
AWARD RESTRUCTURE 
1989 
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENTS  
1992 and 1993 
Basic 
Employee 
collective bargaining with 
union 
collective bargaining collective bargaining – Single 
Bargaining Unit 
  participation on the 
Consultative Committee, the 
occupational health and 
safety committee and the 
training sub- committee 
representative participation 
on Consultative Committee 
and training sub committee 
Production  information sharing representation on 
Consultative Committee 
discussion of teams, 
continuous quality 
improvement, and 
technology. 
 
Strategic  information sharing  
 
However such representative participation workforce participation was designed in 
addition to collective bargaining through the union.  The operation of this agreement 
is discussed later in this Chapter.  In the meantime, changes associated with best 
practice are presented in the next section. 
 
Best Practice Reform 
 
In 1990 the International Corporate strategy (Credo) was imposed upon Auto 
Mechanical.  This Credo had a number of elements, as summarised in Figure 7.1, 
implementing best practice principles.  
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Figure 7.1 
International Corporation 
Credo 
 
 
* maximising the satisfaction of our customers is our most important concern 
 
* providing superior value to customers through high-quality technologically advanced, fairly-priced 
products and customer services, designed to meet customer needs better than all alternatives 
 
* people are our most important assets, making a critical difference in how well we perform we have an 
obligation for the well-being of the communities in which we live and work 
 
* excellence is the standard for all we do, achieving and encouraging and nourishing: 
                   respect for the individual 
                   honest, open communication, 
                   individual development and satisfaction 
                   a sense of ownership and responsibility for the corporations success 
                   participation, co-operation and teamwork 
                   creativity, innovation and initiative 
                   prudent risk taking 
                   recognition and reward for achievement 
 
* success is realized by: 
                  achieving leadership in the markets we serve 
                 focusing our resources and energy on global markets where our technology, capabilities and  
                 understanding of customers combine to provide the opportunity for leadership 
                 maintaining the highest standard of ethics and integrity in every action we take, in  
                  everything we do 
 
* the ultimate measure of our success is the ability to provide a superior value to our shareholder    by 
balancing near-term and long-term objectives to achieve both a competitive return in  investment and a 
consistent increase in market value  
Source: AMIC 1988 
 
First, customers were to be the focus of company attention.  Second, the importance of 
employees was recognised.  The company committed itself to excellence in its people 
management by focussing on respect for, and encouragement of, individuals, honest 
and open communication, participation, co-operation and teamwork to give employees 
a sense of ownership, and recognition and reward for achievement, especially for 
innovation and initiative.  Third the company set the goal of achieving leadership in 
the global markets it served and conducting its business with ethical standards and 
integrity.  Finally, a balance between short-term and long-term interests was 
recognised. 
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Similarly the strategy developed by Auto Mechanical to implement this credo 
accorded with best practice principles as summarised in Table 7.9 using the Rimmer 
et al best practice framework (Rimmer et al. 1996). 
Table 7.9 
Auto Mechanical 
Best Practice Reform 
 
GOALS AM EXPERIENCE 
 
strategy formal, evolutionary strategy 
OPERATIONAL PRACTICES  
organisational structures no permanent teams but team ethos 
Technology significant investment in last five years 
external relations driven by rational opportunism 
process improvement techniques primarily framework or concept driven 
people management industrial relations approach 
INFORMATION ENABLERS  
measurement and control systems macro data supplemented by key performance 
indicators 
CULTURAL ENABLERS  
change leadership erratic change leadership 
empowerment direct employees have limited control over daily 
work 
 
A Corporate Plan was developed that had a long-term strategic planning focus (AM 
1992a).  However company strategy evolved over time.  The company did commit 
money and time to new technology.  Management and employees did commit to the 
development of a team ethos, although permanent teams had not been created during 
the period under review and there was only limited direct employee control over their 
daily work.  It was recognised process improvements were required although this did 
not occur during the life of this research.  Similarly, although targets for KPIs were 
added to traditional macro data for measurement purposes, these were not well 
developed.  Finally, the company relied upon a traditional industrial relations 
approach to people management with an erratic change leadership.  
 
The next section explores these claims in more detail.  First, in 1990 the company 
incorporated the Credo into an Operating Philosophy for the company that stated: 
our objective is to achieve and then maintain an environment which encourages all employees 
to pursue never-ending improvement in quality, productivity and service of our products to our 
customers (AM Managing Director 1990).  
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This was followed in 1991 by an application to the Australian Best Practice 
Demonstration Program which stated the company had developed a proposal for best 
practice it believed was “comprehensive and integrated” (AM HRD 1991c).  To 
support this claim the proposal cited strategies formulated to covering eight major 
activities – human resources, training, customers, workload evaluation, measurement, 
technology, plant design and dissemination.  These are summarised in Table 7.10.   
Table 7.10 
Auto Mechanical 
Australian Best Practice Development Program 
Concept Proposal 
 
STRATEGY PROPOSAL 
 
Human Resources To draw on the experience of the international corporation to flatten 
management and staff structure 
Training To develop a competent, participative workforce capable of meeting quality, 
productivity, and service standards required to exceed customer expectations 
Customers To clearly identify internal and external customers and their needs, and the 
organisation and training requirements to meet these needs  
Workload evaluation To identify current and projected workloads as the basis for resource 
planning, staff training and continuous improvement in quality and 
productivity 
Measurement To implement measures to monitor improvements and competitiveness in 
relation to customer service, productivity, staff satisfaction and performance.   
To implement benchmarking against the International Group and other best 
practice organisations 
Technology To introduce leading-edge technology related to manufactured process 
Plant Design To create an ergonomically designed working environment  
Dissemination To create plans to enable the success of the project to be broadly 
communicated throughout the business community to foster a propagation 
effect 
Source: AM HRD 1991c  
 
Despite being unsuccessful in this application in 1992 the company obtained financial 
support from a Federal-State government fund to hold a series of workshops aimed at 
developing employee commitment to World Competitive Manufacturing (WCM).  A 
workshop was held in January 1992 with both management and employee 
representatives.  This workshop was successful in developing a series of detailed 
strategies for the five major activities carried out by the company - Manufacturing, 
Marketing, Innovation, Human Resources and Finance (AM 1992d).  These strategies 
are summarised in Table 7.11.  
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Table 7.11 
Auto Mechanical 
Policies 1992 
 
Manufacturing 
Policies 
* products which exceed customer requirements (Just-In-Time, quality and cost)  
* foster partnerships with suppliers 
* establish goals aimed at continuous improvement  
* implement appropriate technologies to support manufacturing policies. 
Marketing Policies * based on an understanding and commitment to total quality 
* sustainable competitive advantage through the identification of opportunities 
* promotion of products and establishment of competitor profiles. 
Innovative Policies * encouraged through the design of products and development of manufacturing 
    systems exceeding customer quality requirements 
* achieved within an environment aimed at stimulating employees to continually 
     suggest improvements through cross-functional teamwork. 
Human Resource 
Policies 
* workforce to be encouraged to be involved through  
* effective communication 
* teamwork 
* training in appropriate skills 
*a positive, rewarding, and safe environment 
Finance Policies * measure success through a combination of profits, return on assets, return on 
        sales, market share, and 
* increase in inventory turns, and reduction in absenteeism, and an increase in 
    parts per million efficiency. 
Source: AM, 1992c 
 
The strategies shared commitments to many of the best practice principles including - 
continuous quality improvement, updated technology, improved customer-supplier 
relations, increased employee involvement through teamwork and training, a healthy 
and safe environment and finally performance measurements beyond traditional 
economic measurements. 
 
Thus by 1993 there was evidence of both management and employee commitment to 
a broad agenda for change in accord with best practice principles.  This was 
demonstrated in 1993 when typical responses as follows were given to the question: 
 
‘What should be included in a plan to make the company a world competitive export company? 
!"Training –C12, supervisor, PEP, SPC, English 
!"Kanban/Just-In-Time – reduction in scrap and waste and improvements in inventory 
!"Team activities – 8D, PEP, Consultative Committee, Health and Safety Committee, Work 
Group teams, Design teams (suppliers and customers) 
!"Key Performance Indicators 
!"New technology – gauges, window regulator line, plans for motor line (Focus Groups 
February 15 & 16 1993). 
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These responses suggest employees and management were united in recognising the 
importance of a company strategy incorporating change to operational practices, 
technology, training and quality, together with development of indicators to assist the 
measurement of performance changes.  What then of the other aspects of best 
practice.   
 
Despite recognition of the need for broad change, little actual change occurred during 
the period under review.  Although the computerised window-regulator line was 
claimed as a pilot project for teams there was little evidence this line operated as a 
semi-autonomous-work-group despite operators having contributed to the “study, 
design and prototype evaluation of the line” (Manager Production December 15 
1992).  Further, although a training program on lean manufacturing work principles 
was carried out in 1993 and a Training Needs Analysis undertaken, the outcome of 
these were still under discussion at the conclusion of the research period (AM HRD 
1993).  Finally, although seven new KPIs, as summarised in Table 7.12, were 
developed through the Consultative Committee, targets for these indicators were still 
being developed.  
Table 7.12 
Auto Mechanical 
Key Performance Indicators, 1993 
 
WORKFORCE QUALITY CUSTOMER SERVICE HIGH PRODUCTIVITY 
absenteeism deliver on time direct labour efficiency 
safety incident rate customer returns unit costs 
turnover rate quality cost unit times 
staff satisfaction customer satisfaction  
skills inventory   
Source: AM HRD 1991 
 
Given the company was developing an evolutionary strategy for best practice, it is 
none the less interesting that this strategy identified an important participative role for 
employees as summarised in Table 7.13. 
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Table 7.13 
Auto Mechanical 
Workforce Participation and Best Practice Reform 
 
GOALS 
 
CHANGE WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION 
Strategy  formal evolutionary employee representatives on World 
Competitive Manufacturing workshop 
employees informed of strategy 
OPERATIONAL 
PRACTICES 
  
Organisational 
Structures  
 
team ethos encouraged employees trained and encouraged to 
take direct control of day to day work 
Technology investment in automated regulator line employees involved directly in design 
and operation 
Process Improvement 
techniques 
primarily framework or concept driven developing through collective 
bargaining and  
representative participation on 
Consultative Committee  
People Management industrial relations approach collective bargaining and consultative 
agreements 
INFORMATION 
ENABLERS 
  
Measurement and 
control systems 
macro data supplemented by measures 
for specific purposes 
representative participation - 
Consultative Committee 
CULTURAL 
ENABLERS 
  
Change leadership erratic  
Empowerment not developed in practice  
 
The traditional collective bargaining framework was to continue to be supplemented 
by Consultative Committees established under the enterprise agreements, which 
would discuss proposals in line with best practice principles.   
 
Given the finding that workforce participation was associated with plans for each of 
the workplace reform processes, the question of relevance is, what was the operational 
experience of such participation?  This is the task for the next section. 
 
Workforce Participation 
 
Before providing details on the operation of these workplace reforms it is worthwhile 
noting the Consultative Committee established under the institutional workplace 
reform process became an integrating body for each of the three reform processes.  
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First, the Quality Resolution Sub-Committee of the Consultative Committee was 
given the task of developing graphs to more clearly show the personal efforts of 
people on the shop floor in achieving quality related KPIs.  Second, KPI’s and 
associated targets recommended from the Consultative Committee to the SBU were 
included in the Enterprise Agreements.  Third, workforce representatives on the 
Consultative Committee participated in the World Competitive Manufacturing 
Workshop, which developed the company’s detailed commitment to best practice.  
Despite these initiatives it is important to recognise workforce participation 
complemented rather than replaced the managerial decision-making and collective 
bargaining processes.   
 
Direct Workforce Participation 
 
As we have seen direct workforce participation at Auto Mechanical was introduced as 
part of both quality management and best practice reforms.  These initiatives included 
improved communication, consultation with production workers concerning new work 
practices, and training in quality improvement techniques.  However this form of 
participation was relatively undeveloped in the period under review.  
 
To begin with, the Quality Management Steering Committee established in 1991 
aimed to develop a quality awareness program for the company.  This was only partly 
successful as quality continued to be seen almost solely as the responsibility of the 
Quality Department.  The Director Quality blamed this chiefly on the ‘top-down’ 
approach adopted by the Steering Committee.  Accordingly he advocated greater 
workforce participation for the next phase of quality improvement.  Further 
demonstration of the limitation in this process was the operators of the new 
computerised window regulator line who remained reliant on the quality professionals 
to detect, diagnose, and solve quality problems (Director Quality October 2 1993). 
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Secondly, 8D Problem Solving Teams were trained and established in specified work 
areas in 1991 to solve particular product-related problem.  A typical example is given 
below: 
In February 1991 an 8D team was established to solve a problem identified by a customer of a 
return spring dislodged from load position in housing.  The 8D team established to consider 
the problem was made up of a team leader, two employees affected by the problem, and two 
technical employees from production engineering and quality.  In October the team concluded 
the problem was caused 90% by a design fault in the spring, 5% by the operator not adequately 
testing the product and 5% by operator inattention.  Solutions proposed included permanent 
corrective actions of lengthening the leg of the spring, and updating operator instructions.  
Action to prevent a recurrence included, ensuring all steps are followed when designing or 
modifying new assemblies and disciplines are in place to prevent steps being skipped (AM 
1991)  
 
These were complimented in 1992, by Productivity Enhancement Process (PEP) 
teams trained and led by Ford engineers.  The first PEP team set up to review and 
improve the window-regulator rail-fabrication area did produce positive 
improvements resulted in: 
!"75% increase in Ford Falcon rail assembly output per hour 
!"10% reduction in production floor space required 
!"99% reduction of work in-process (from around 2000 components to 20 
!"elimination of regular overtime whilst maintaining output levels (AM PEP 1992) 
 
However these two team processes had common limitations on the degree of 
workforce participation.  First, specialists dominated teams and left production 
employees in the minority.  Second, discussion on quality improvements was confined 
to technical product specific improvement.  Finally, the power of the teams was 
limited to making recommendations to the Quality Department.  That employees were 
willing to play a larger role is demonstrated by employee responses as set out below to 
the question: 
‘What changes need to be made to your work area to enable you to produce a better quality 
product without waste?’ 
 
!"training for the workers in understanding the whole process 
!"all managers need to understand production 
!"more teamwork 
!"improved communication (Focus Groups February 15 & 16 1993). 
 
By this response employees demonstrated recognition that training and teamwork 
were important determinants of quality improvement.  However, despite training, it 
appears by 1993 employees had not developed skills to contribute extensively to 
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quality improvement, nor had management sufficiently encouraged communication or 
teamwork.   
 
Training of production workers in SPC techniques had began in 1992 but had been 
limited to periods of production downtime.  The Director Quality admitted this 
resulted in limited outcomes (Director Quality October 26 1993).  For example by 
1993 only nine operators had been assessed as Completed/Competent in quality 
techniques while a further 43 were classified as requiring further training (Task Force 
Consultants 1993).   
 
Direct participation introduced as part of best practice reform was also limited in 
application.  Management maintained the new computerised window regulator line 
was organised as a Natural Work Team.  However it did not act autonomously, 
operators remained heavily dependent on quality professionals, and work on the line 
remained task-based.   
 
In summary, as shown in Table 7.14 direct workforce participation introduced under 
quality management and best practice reform at Auto Mechanical was limited.  
Table 7.14 
Auto Mechanical 
Direct Workforce Participation  
 
Methods of Workforce Participation Extent of Workforce Participation 
 
information sharing Quality Management Steering Committee 
training specialists 
some employees  
participation in PEP teams pilot program – small group initially 
direct task related quality checks  process workers on regulator line trained 
 
Although a Quality Management Steering Committee was established to oversee the 
promulgation of a continuous quality improvement process throughout the company, 
by 1993 management admitted the top-down approach had not been successful.  There 
was some evidence training in quality improvement techniques had been effective in 
equipping individuals with skills required for identification and solution of specific 
quality problems, however use of these skills was confined to team deliberations on 
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specific quality problems.  The so-called Natural Work Team operating the new 
computerised window regulator line did not function effectively as a Natural Work 
Team, particularly with regard to quality.  Rather quality specialists in the Quality 
Department were still relied upon to solve all quality problems.  Given this experience 
of direct participation, what of representative participation. 
 
Representative Workforce Participation  
 
Workforce participation under the institutional workplace reform process at Auto 
Mechanical was introduced principally through the establishment of a company wide 
joint Consultative Committee.  The Committee was initially established in 1989 under 
the Consultative Agreement negotiated between the company and unions as part of 
implementation of the restructured Metal Industry Award.  It was subsequently 
reconstituted under the Enterprise Agreement in 1992.  
 
Joint Consultative Committee 1989-1992  
 
The Consultative Agreement negotiated between the company and unions in 1989 has 
been described as a framework agreement as it consisted principally of an agreement 
to establish a formal structure for consultation between management and the 
workforce.  Committee membership was to consist of a union representation from 
each section of the plant (seven to eight people) plus six to seven management 
representatives (Cl.2.6).  The Committee was established in May 1989 with fewer 
managers than expected, three senior managers from Public Relations, Personnel, and 
Quality, and six union delegates representing the toolroom, assembly, parts and 
accessories, test and laboratory, and the press shop.  To complement this committee, a 
training sub-committee was established with four management representatives 
(Financial Controller, Supervisor from Electronic Data Processing, Director of 
Engineering and the Production Controller) and four union representatives 
representing quality assurance, and three manufacturing areas (welding, maintenance 
and assembly).   
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The functions of the Committee were clearly established by the Agreement.  First, the 
Committee would be a forum for communication between managers and the 
workforce.  The Agreement stated “the Consultative Committee will hear reports by 
the management and union representatives on a range of issues” (Cl.2.3). 
 
Second, the role of the committee was to discuss issues and make recommendations 
to management.  As stated in Clause 2.5: 
the aim of the Consultative Committee will be to reach agreement to enable recommendations to 
be made to management so that they may take into account as far as possible the views of the 
employees before management make final decisions on matter affecting them (Cl.2.5). 
 
The issues for discussion were broadly defined for both parties.  From management 
would come: 
reports on future plans, proposals for new products, current and predicted market conditions, 
organisational change within the company, plans for new technology, job training, personnel 
appointments, changes in proposals re company policies, the general situation within the 
industry, government policy which affects the industry and any other relevant material which 
would affect the well being and interest of the employee (Cl.2.3). 
 
From union representatives would come: 
regular reports on issues they wish to raise on behalf of employees for the mutual benefit of 
company and employees (Cl.2.4). 
 
The Committee was not to replace the traditional managerial decision making 
process, rather these management reports were aimed at ensuring employees 
“understand the nature and operational characteristics of the enterprise in which they 
work… and…carry out work effectively and safely” (Cl.6.2).   
 
Table 7.15 summarises the proposed structure of participation in terms of the four 
elements identified in the framework introduced in Chapter Two.  
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Table 7.15 
Auto Mechanical Structure for Representative Participation 
 
Form of involvement representative 
Level at which involvement takes place company 
Type of involvement consultation 
Subject matter general situation within the industry 
 government policy affecting the industry 
 current and predicted market conditions 
 future plans 
 new products 
 company organisational change proposals 
 plans for new technology 
 changes in proposals re company policies 
 job training 
 personnel appointment 
 other matters of employee relevance 
 
There was joint agreement between management and the union for a representative 
form of participation at company level.  It is also clear it was intended the Committee 
be consultative rather than decision making upon a broad range of issues affecting the 
company’s future, both external and internal, as well as specific issues related to 
employee conditions.  Given this agreed structure and function, the next section turns 
to the operational experience of the Committee. 
 
The Committee began enthusiastically, meeting monthly during 1989 and 1990 as 
shown in Figure 7.2.  
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Figure 7.2 
Auto Mechanical  
Consultative Committee Meetings 1989-1993 
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Source: AM CC 1989-1993 
 
Training of Consultative Committee members, conducted by a mutually agreed 
external facilitator, preceded the first meeting.  This was an unusual process 
demonstrating the importance placed by both parties on developing an effective 
consultative process.  For the company consultation would ease the burden of change, 
for the union an effective Consultative Committee would be a positive demonstration 
to other companies.  Meetings were initially very formal with motions were moved, 
seconded and voted upon.  After the first two years of operation enthusiasm appears 
to have waned a little with only three meetings held 1991 and the same number in 
1992.  The Director Human Resources explained this decline as a result of other 
activity within the company as the new international corporate strategy was 
implemented rather than a rejection of the Consultative Committee (Director Human 
Resources October 27 1993).  Furthermore the Director Human Resource and the 
union shop-steward devoted considerable time to negotiating the terms of the first 
Enterprise Agreement (AMWU3 shop steward, November 9 1993). 
 
Finally, although there were few formal meetings of the Consultative Committee, 
issue based sub-committees as shown in Figure 7.3 continued to meet on a regular 
                                                 
3 A further amalgamation had created the Amalgamated Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) 
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basis to advise the committee on safety, training, quality improvement and 
absenteeism. 
Figure 7.3 
Auto Mechanical 
CC Sub-Committees 
1989-1992 
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Safety Committee
April 1989-Ongoing
Training Committee
April 1989-Ongoing
Absenteeism
August 1991-EBA 1992
Quality Problem Resolution Team
May 1990-EBA 1992
AM Consultative Committee
Source: AM CC 1989-1992 
What then of the issues discussed in the committee?  A survey of the Minutes shows 
despite training, the Committee struggled to develop an effective consultative process.  
Meetings throughout 1989 were dominated by discussion seeking to clarify the role of 
the Committee through such questions as - should the chair rotate and what was the 
role of the union.  Following a critique by a representative from the State government 
in September 1989 the Committee drew up the following list of commitments.  The 
list demonstrates the difficulty associated with the transition from a managerial 
decision making process to a more consultative process: 
!"We will turn up and be on time 
!"We will go through the chair to speak 
!"We will have a printed agenda one-week prior to the following meeting the date of the 
meeting may be changed by agreement) 
!"We won’t be interrupted 
!"Special meetings may be assembled by agreement 
!"We will not blame people  
!"We will find the problem and look for cause and effect and improvements 
!"We will voice opinion  
!"We will make decision based on facts 
!"We will listen and ask 
!"The chair will change every three months by vote (AM CC 1989). 
 
Basic employee issues dominated committee discussions as shown in Table 7.16.  
Issues remained focussed on the immediate work environment rather than at broad 
company issues, despite an attempt by the Managing Director in November to 
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broaden the agenda to the future of the company.  Job security, training and equity 
in the distribution of overtime were major issues during 1989.  By the end of the 
year, the Committee was bogged down in domestic housekeeping issues.  A 
representative from the State government attended the February 1990 meeting and 
stated the Committee needed to extend beyond ‘simple issues’. 
Table 7.16 
Auto Mechanical 
Consultative Committee 1989 
Issues Discussed 
 
SUBJECT ISSUE DATE 
 
Basic employee no industrial relations issues to be discussed 
 committee was not a forum for union activity 
August 1989 
 smoking, gloves, heat – passed to occupational health and 
safety committee 
November 1989 
 
 job security –ongoing issue of concern – management 
reply re job applications to be advertised initially 
internally 
June, August 7 November 
1989,  
 overtime – request for policy to ensure equity 
 
November 1989 
 supervisor training 
computer systems training 
July 1989 – ongoing  
 use of vacant production area, canteen facilities, 
cleanliness, refrigerator, car parking photocopier 
purchase, computer installation 
November December 1989 
 
Strategic presentation by MD November 1989 
Source: AM CC 1989 
 
The experience of the Committee in 1990 to 1992 was similarly chequered.  Once 
again basic employee concerns dominated discussion as shown in Table 7.17.  
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Table 7.17 
Auto Mechanical 
Consultative Committee 1990-91 
Issues Discussed 
 
SUBJECT ISSUE DATE 
Basic Employee training sub-committee –        video for operator training  
induction program        C12 training         English language 
August 1990 
 Absenteeism August 1991 
 health and safety sub-committee 
        safety equipment audit 
       evacuation procedure 
       training 
       smoking 
August 1991 
January, 
December 1992 
Production Quality Problem Resolution Team   
 design and display graphs for achievement towards targets for 
KPIs 
May to August 
1990 
 job rotation May 1990 
 interdepartmental communication October 1990 
Source: AM CC 1990-1992 
 
The question of how to improve consultation and communication within the company 
remained a major issue.  Basic training concerns of how to best develop training 
programs, who should be included in training and how English language training 
should be organised, were the major issues referred to the committee by the training 
sub-committee.  Recommendations from the occupational health and safety sub-
committee were principally concerned with operational matters.  Although there was 
some attention given to production issues concerned with quality improvement 
through the Quality Problem Resolution Sub-Committee, these discussions were 
chiefly concerned with how to increase the understanding and involvement of 
employees in achieving the targets set for the seven KPI targets (AM CC 1990).   
 
By 1991 a self-assessment led the committee to the conclusion it was not functioning 
effectively.  It identified three major causes.  First, the reorganisation of the company 
had diverted employee and management attention from the Consultative Committee 
process.  Second, because of work reorganisation within the company, the existing 
membership no longer represented the new work organisation.  Third, collective 
bargaining remained the principal process for negotiating wages and working 
conditions.  Workforce assessment mirrored this committee conclusion.  For example 
set out below is a cross section of typical comments given in answer to the question: 
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‘If consultation is to improve at Auto Mechanical what changes need to be made to the role of the 
Consultative Committee?’ 
 
!"Members require communication skills 
!"Work together as a team 
!"Determine what to discuss as a team and what should be left to other forums 
!"How to come to positive consultation and agreement 
!"Decide on the reason for the Consultative Committee 
!"Know how to run an effective committee  
!"Need positive achievements 
!"Develop closer links between management an the shopfloor 
!"Develop improved communication with the shopfloor 
!"Complete jobs – don’t get bogged down (Focus Groups February 15 & 16 1993). 
 
These responses indicate committee members recognised there was need to improve 
both their internal processes and their external communication with the broader 
workforce.   
As a result of these findings it was agreed by all parties the committee should be 
reconstituted.  This was in accord with the agreement reached in the Enterprise 
Agreement ratified before the Commission in 1992.  For example set out below is a 
cross section of typical comments given in answer to the question –  
‘If consultation is to improve at Auto Mechanical what changes need to be made to the role of the 
Consultative Committee?’ 
 
!"Members require communication skills 
!"Work together as a team 
!"Determine what to discuss as a team and what should be left to other forums 
!"How to come to positive consultation and agreement 
!"Decide on the reason for the Consultative Committee 
!"Know how to run an effective committee  
!"Need positive achievements 
!"Develop closer links between management an the shopfloor 
!"Develop improved communication with the shopfloor 
!"Complete jobs – don’t get bogged down (Focus Groups February 15 & 16 1993). 
 
These responses indicate a recognised need to improve both their internal processes 
and their external communication with the broader workforce. 
 
However, before the new Consultative Committee could be reformed, as part of the 
company’s adoption of the need for best practice reform, a World Competitive 
Manufacturing workshop was held in January 1992 to which employee 
representatives on the Consultative Committee were invited.  This was the first 
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involvement of committee members in a major issue concerning the future of the 
company.   
 
Joint Consultative Committee 1992-3 
 
The newly constituted Consultative Committee held its first meeting in February 
1992, followed by two more meetings in April and June.  There were no meetings in 
the second half of 1992.  Table 7.18 summarises issues discussed within the 
committee between 1991 and 1992.  
Table 7.18 
Auto Mechanical 
Consultative Committee 1992 
Issues Discussed 
 
SUBJECT ISSUE DATE 
 
Basic Employee consultation and communication 
       employee survey 
      newsletter 
      suggestion schemes 
February 1992 
 employee conditions - gain sharing April 1992 
 electricity use June 1992 
 canteen June 1992 
Strategic World Competitive Manufacturing 
presentations by outside bodies (AMWU, State Training Board) 
February 1992 
Source: AM CC 1991-2 
 
The first meeting endorsed the Policies for company strategic direction developed at 
the World Competitive Manufacturing workshop and designed a communication 
process by which all employees would be informed of these policies.  The next two 
meetings were devoted to development of a strategy to improve committee 
effectiveness.  This included first, extending the knowledge of committee members 
about environmental influences on the company by arranging for speakers on 
government policy and training opportunities.  Second, to improve internal 
communication it was decided the committee would organise regular Employee 
Attitude Surveys, and the committee would write a regular report for the Company 
Newsletter.  Third, to increase employee participation in the committee, a suggestion 
box would be introduced.  Other issues discussed were more narrowly concerned with 
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basic employee issues such as improving canteen facilities, reducing the use of 
electricity, developing a new induction program, and considering a Gain Sharing Plan. 
 
Although there were no formal meetings of the Consultative Committee after June 
1992 the sub-committees continued to meet.  The Training sub-committee became an 
important part of a detailed plan for employees to increase their skills through training 
associated with the Engineering Production Certificate (EPC).  This resulted in 14 
process workers in 1992 and a further 15 process workers in 1993 being enrolled in 
C12 programs.  Females made up 65% of those enrolled in the first year.  A 
considerable percentage of this training was devoted to English language classes 
aimed at enhancing career opportunities for process workers from non-English-
speaking backgrounds.  Employees responded positively to this training as 
demonstrated by the fact that 70% of employees responded in the affirmative to the 
statement – ‘My supervisor encourages me to obtain further education and training.  Support 
for training is widespread throughout the company’ (Task Force Consultants 1993).  Due to 
these positive outcomes, in 1993 the sub-committee was given responsibility for 
administration of a government-funded program aimed to help the company identify 
training plan to assist employees made redundant by company changes.   
 
The Safety sub-committee also continued to meet throughout 1992.  It recorded the 
following achievements: 
!"development of a new safety plan evacuation procedure 
!"completion of a safety audit on equipment, 
!"review of data on workers compensation and lost time injury during the year 
!"nomination and training of first-aid persons 
!"training for supervisors in occupational health and safety 
!"discussion on a smoking policy 
!"ongoing discussion on day to day safety problems such as placing of ladders, the existence 
of a blind corner, a leaking roof and hearing tests (Safety Sub Committee 1992).  
 
Thus, sub-committees were more effective as the Consultative Committee struggled 
with how to develop effective consultative skills and knowledge.  The outcome of this 
experience was a further training program for Consultative Committee members held 
in February 1993.  During this training the committee prepared a new ‘Draft 
Constitution’ which was taken to the workforce for discussion leading to 
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endorsement.  Through this communication process it was hoped employee 
knowledge of, and interest in, the Consultative Committee would be developed.  The 
draft Constitution broadened the aims of the committee to include best practice.  Thus 
the aim of the committee was identified as: 
!"to assist in implementing the world competitive manufacturing policies and to uphold the 
principles of the credo 
!"to assist with changes in the workplace to implement world competitive manufacturing 
policies 
!"to be the intermediary between management and the workforce (AM CC 1993) 
 
The issues for discussion within the committee were broadened to include: 
!"training 
!"gain sharing 
!"self managing teams 
!"continuous process of improving communication 
!"health and safe environment  
!"quality 
!"cost 
!"delivery 
!"individual rewards and recognition (AM CC 1993) 
 
It was, however, agreed the committee would not involve itself in award related issues 
which would remain within the purview of traditional collective bargaining.  The 
committee also developed Key Performance Indicators of its own performance.  These 
included: 
1. Customer (workforce) satisfaction –  
!"number of ideas generated from the workforce per month 
!"percentage response time between initial discussion and implementation of change 
!"survey of employees  
!"number of nominations for Consultative Committee representatives 
2. Consultative committee activity 
!"regularity of meetings 
!"regularity of report-backs 
!"regularity of member attendance at meetings 
!"adherence to the articles of the constitution  
!"number of decisions made 
!"number of decision implemented 
!"number of items under discussion against items completed 
!"time taken for decision against target time set by committee  
3. Financial measures 
!"hours spent in committee against customer satisfaction, customer benefits and quality 
indicators (AM CC 1993). 
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Following this training the Committee met on a regular monthly basis throughout 
1993.  However, as shown in Table 7.19, discussion remained principally on basic 
employee issues.  
Table 7.19 
Auto Mechanical 
Consultative Committee 1993 
Issues Discussed 
 
SUBJECT 
 
ISSUE DATE 
Basic 
Employee 
Industrial Relations 
sick leave payout  
reward sharing 
April 1993 
May, August  
1993 
 Housekeeping 
canteen and washroom cleanliness 
distribution of stationary 
paper recycling  
environmental concerns (styrofoam cups) 
keys for conference room 
budget for charity days  
world quality day 
May, June, July, 
August 1993 
 Human Resources 
smoking policy 
uniforms and safety shoes 
contractors 
forklift trucks-walkways 
training plan  
government funding - training matrix-taskclimate survey 
March, May, 
June, July 1993 
 
 
 
September, 
October 1993 
 
Production training for teams (lean production) 
 
November 1993-
January 1994 
 training plan  
government funding - training matrix-TASK 
March, May, 
June, July 1993 
 quality 
Suggestion SchemeTotal Quality Management targetsPEP Teams 
Report 
April 1993-July 
1993October 
1993 
Source: AM CC 1993 
 
A Reward System/Suggestion Scheme of $50 a month was agreed to.  This was to be 
paid to any management or activity area could demonstrate outstanding improvements 
in quality, cost, and delivery.  A number of issues were referred to the single 
bargaining unit negotiating industrial matters, or to the safety sub-committees 
(smoking, uniforms, and safety shoes, contractors working safely, path of the forklift 
trucks).  By the middle of the year housekeeping issues had again begun to dominate 
the agenda.   
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This concentration on basic employee issues was reversed in October when the 
training sub-committee presented a training plan to the committee.  The plan was in 
the form of a matrix identifying skills achieved and skills required of each employee, 
together with an individual training plan to assist the company in introducing teams as 
part of lean production (Task Force Consultants 1993).  Despite the importance of this 
as a strategy issue, the plan was rejected by the workforce in 1994 because of fears for 
job security 
 
The only other issues of import discussed during 1993 were at the October meeting 
when the Managing Director made a presentation about success sharing, the Ford PEP 
team gave a report of its achievements, and the results of the Climate Survey were 
presented.  Finally at the November meeting it was agreed that the workforce would 
be trained in lean production principles. 
 
In summary although there was formal commitment from both management and the 
workforce to representative participation through the Consultative Committee, an 
effective consultative process proved difficult to implement.  As shown in Table 7.20 
collective bargaining by full-time union officials remained the principal means by 
which wages and salaries were negotiated.  
Table 7.20 
Auto Mechanical 
Representative Workforce Participation 
1987-1993 
 
Change Method of Participation Extent of Participation 
 
Quality Management collective bargaining  commitment to CQI in agreements 
 elected representatives on Consultative 
Committee sub-committee 
quality issues 
Institutional Change collective bargaining full-time union official supported by 
shop stewards 
 elected representative to the 
Consultative Committee 
advisory body, recommendations 
accepted 
  basic employee  issues 
Best Practice elected representative to the 
Consultative Committee  
included in World Competitive 
Manufacturing Workshop 
 
 
elected representative 
participation through the  
members of training sub-
committee considering lean 
production 
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The Committee remained advisory to management, however the company did implement 
several of its important recommendations.  Consultation within the Committee remained 
dominated by basic employee issues.  However sub-committees of the Consultative 
Committee did discuss issues related to quality and training for lean production.  
Furthermore workforce representatives were included in the company World Competitive 
Manufacturing strategy setting exercise.  Thus representative workforce participation 
through the Consultative Committee did serve to integrate to some degree the three 
reform processes, at least as far as discussion of proposed changes.  However these 
discussions had not been substantially operationalised during the period under review.   
 
Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation 
 
This chapter has shown that Auto Mechanical was discussing change associated with all 
three reform processes under review.  However actual change arising from these 
discussions was minimal, apart form that associated with strategy change imposed by the 
international parent company.  There was some attempt to develop greater quality 
consciousness among the workforce but this was limited to temporary team processes.  
There was some discussion of lean production concepts associated with best practice but 
no operational change had occurred.  The major innovation was the establishment of 
company level Consultative Committees as part of the company-union agreement 
associated with institutional workplace reform.  This Consultative Committee served to 
make representative participation a central element of the reform processes as it assisted 
some integration of changes associated with each of the reform processes as outlined in 
Table 7.21. 
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Table 7.21 
Auto Mechanical  
Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation 
 
Reform Process Direct Participation Representative Participation 
 
Quality Management employees trained but 
knowledge not used 
sub-committees on quality 
 temporary productivity enhancement 
teams 
agreements include commitment to 
QQI 
Institutional 
Workplace Reform 
 collective bargaining by full-time union 
officials 
  workforce election to consultative 
committee 
Best Practice training/upskilling for lean 
production 
new computerised line 
consultative committee participation in 
workshop on world competitive 
manufacturing 
 
Direct participation was limited to employees being temporary members of specific issue 
quality teams.  Representative participation through the Consultative Committee, 
however, although supported by both managers and workers was limited in its operation 
by the inability of worker representatives to focus beyond basic employee issues.  
Collective bargaining by full-time union officials remained the chief form of negotiating 
wages and award conditions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This case study has described a business that, in the late 1980s, was faced with an 
external requirement for strategic change by its parent international corporation.  This 
strategy had important implications for its workforce causing loss of jobs for some and 
the need to develop more sophisticated technical skills to produce a world competitive 
quality product.  Faced with this imperative management used the opportunity created by 
quality reform demands from its major customer to encourage employees to ensure 
quality improvement was a continuous part of their work ethic.  Management also used 
the institutional workplace reform process to establish a joint Consultative Committee to 
gauge employee response to change.  By 1993 there was also evidence that the company 
was ready to embrace change associated with best practice reform. 
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Despite the aim of both parties to develop workforce commitment to change through 
workforce participation, actual change was minimal.  This was equally the case with both 
forms of workforce participation – direct and representative.  Despite mutual commitment 
to more consultation both management and employees found it difficult to translate this 
commitment into effective action.  The difficulty was due primarily to a lack of 
experience and knowledge among workforce representatives on the nature of company 
managerial responsibility.  This led to resistance by workers to accept greater 
responsibility for issues broader than their own basic concerns.  Furthermore mangers 
were ill equipped to help employees develop the knowledge they required.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 
AUTO AIR (I) 
Competing Through Growth 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This chapter sets out the introductory research findings from the third case study, Auto 
Air (AA).  The format for this chapter is similar to Chapters Four and Six, dealing 
respectively with an outline of the company organisation and operations, followed by 
an account of commercial and other pressures for change. 
 
Auto Air was the only case study included in this thesis to develop an integrated 
approach to the kind of change termed best practice.  This is associated with the fact 
the company participated  - from 1991 to 1994 - in the Australian government’s Best 
Practice Demonstration Program.  This resulted in structural and operational 
initiatives, which changed the company from a managerial hierarchy typical of mass 
production organisations, to a company characterised by lean production techniques.  
This change was achieved without industrial disputation.  Given this major restructure 
which occurred in 1992, information presented in this chapter relates to 1990 to 
ensure two points in time for comparison.  Chapter Nine will present research findings 
following the changes. 
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Auto Air: Ownership and Corporate Role: 
 
Auto Air is an Australian owned public company.  It was established in 1967 as a 
private company, subjected to a public float in 1982, expanded into an Auto Air 
Group in the late 1980s and finally merged with a larger and more diverse Perth based 
Australian owned company in 19901.  The merger was undertaken to provide funds for 
growth and had little effect on the structure of the company.  Between 1989 and 1992 
Auto Air expanded from a single company to a five company Auto Air Group.  This 
expansion resulted from an increase in, and broadening of, the traditional product 
market and from an expansion into new product markets.  The first new company was 
established in Victoria in 1989 when increased demand for hoses and pipes required 
for the air-conditioning systems caused this production to be transferred from Auto 
Air to a new company.  This was followed in 1991 by the establishment of a new 
company in South Australia (Auto Air, South Australia) at the request of GMH, so 
that component production could be relocated close to the new South Australian plant.  
This made JIT delivery requirements easier to satisfy.  Also in 1991 the company took 
over a bus air-conditioning manufacturer in Queensland and a metal products 
manufacturer in South Australia.  Finally, the Group expanded out of the automotive 
air conditioning market through purchase of a steering systems manufacturer in South 
Australia (AAG 1992). 
 
Product  
 
The Manufacturing Manager explained Auto Air assembles a broad range of 
automotive air-conditioning and heating systems into complete air-conditioning Unit 
Systems for private motor vehicles and trucks.  It also produces electronic cruise 
control systems, and between 1986 and 1990 it produced mobile phones for cars.  
Around 15% of its product are Original Equipment (OE) with the much larger 85% 
being Parts and Accessories, including Spare Parts (PA).  The company supplied the 
                                                 
1 The activities of company with which Auto Air merged are diverse, ranging from the manufacture of; 
equipment for railways, and mining, clay bricks and tiles, china crockery and hardware and tableware 
and industrial products, and the cartage and distribution of sporting apparel, footwear and sporting 
goods.   
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entire product systems and design to GMH for 14 years from 1976 to 1990, after 
which this production was moved to South Australia.  It has supplied half of the Ford 
Australia requirements since 1987 (having lost the previous contract to the Ford 
owned Plastics Plant in 1983).  The company has also supplied all of Mazda 
Australia’s requirements since 1987 and 80% of those of Mitsubishi Motors Australia 
Ltd since 1981.  Finally it supplied 20% of requirements of (the now defunct) Nissan 
Australia from 1977.  The major source of competition within Australia is from 
component manufacturers owned by the major locally based assembly companies such 
as Ford Plastics Plant and Japanese owned Nippondenso (now Nippon), 
(Manufacturing Manager October 13 1992). 
 
Market 
 
The Business Unit Co-ordinator Marketing explained the market for company 
products is unique for a number of reasons.  First, there are factors concerning the 
local market.  Like other Australian automotive component manufacturers, the 
relationship between the company and its local PMV customers extends beyond a 
traditional commercial relationship into collaborative design of new product.  An 
additional feature of automotive air-conditioners is they are capable of being added to 
vehicles after sale and thus Australian based customers include vehicle importers such 
as Nissan, Isuzu-GM and Hyundai, as well as local PMV producers.  Second, the 
company has an export market.  Unlike the other two case study companies Auto Air 
realised the importance of developing an export market early in the 1980s.  To this 
end it developed a strategic export plan with three elements.  Firstly, in 1982 sister 
companies were founded in the USA and in Canada and in 1987 in the UK and New 
Zealand.  Secondly, export facilities were established overseas beginning with the 
USA.  In 1984 a facility was established in the United States through which the 
company sold Units for Subaru and Hyundai.  This was followed in 1986 by 
establishment of a similar export facility in New Zealand for Mitsubishi and General 
Motors, followed by Ford and Mazda in 1990.  Thirdly, in 1984 the first joint venture 
agreement was signed with a Japanese company.  By 1990 this export strategy had 
resulted in the company producing almost 1.5 million Systems Units for global 
distribution, with specialised Units designed and developed for the Korean Daewoo 
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Automotive Co. and British Group Lotus PLC (Business Unit Co-ordinator Marketing 
October 13 1992).   
Costs 
 
Auto Air divides its costs into three major areas – material, capital, and labour, with 
overheads included as part of material costs.  The Manager Supply explained the 
company does not rely significantly on technology given its principal assembly 
function, and thus capital costs are low.  The assembly nature of the production 
process places a heavy reliance upon its 100 core suppliers from which it purchases 
around 12,000 different line items, over 500 of which are handled monthly.  Around 
70% to 80% of its component parts are imported, with the most expensive single 
component costing around $200-$250.  This heavy reliance on imports results in high 
levels of inventory at considerable cost to the company (Manager Supply October 13 
1992).  The distribution of costs is shown in Figure 8.1. 
Figure 8.1 
Auto Air 
Analysis of Cost Distribution 1990 
 
Source: AA Finance Report 1990 
 
In 1990 cost of materials contributed around 70% of cost of goods manufactured, with 
capital and labour costs being a much lower contribution of around 15% each.  
Consequently, to stay competitive in the international market, the company required 
initiatives to decrease either the amount, or cost of material inputs. 
Material
70%
Capitol
15%
Labour
15%
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Organisational Structure 
 
The company’s organisational chart for 1990 (AA HRD 1990a), is presented in Figure 
8.2.  
Figure 8.2 
Auto Air 
Organisational Chart-Departments 1990 
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This chart show Auto Air was structured into five functionally separate departments - 
Engineering, Quality (separated from Engineering in 1989), Marketing, Finance and 
Manufacturing.  Departments were further divided into 17 functionally determined 
sub-departments.  Departments were formally linked through the computer based 
MRPII system but otherwise acted independently.  The only joint activity was the 
administration of projects through management teams. 
 
Employment is unevenly distributed between departments as shown in Figure 8.3 (AA 
HRD 1991a). 
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Figure 8.3 
Auto Air 
Employment Distribution by Department 1990 
Manufacturing Engineering Marketing Quality Finance
0
50
100
150
200
250
 
Source: AA HRD 1991a 
 
In 1990 Manufacturing employed 70% of the 320 employees.  This continued until 
1992 when a change in company function within the developing Auto Air Group 
decreased to 61% the contribution of Manufacturing.  The second largest department 
in 1990 was Engineering with a much lower 27 employees; (17 employees had in 
1989 been relocated from Engineering to the new Quality Department).  Marketing 
followed with 24 employees and Finance with 13 employees.  
 
Corporate Plan 
 
As part of the development of the Auto Air Group the company extended its corporate 
planning process from a traditional short-term budget process of between six and 12 
months to a five-year plan.  This was in line with the adoption of a company business 
philosophy focussed on “the extension, expansion and growth of technologies through 
a broad customer base in Australia and internationally (AAG 1991a).  The need for 
continuous change was extended to the Plan in the belief that what was needed was a 
“fluid document, given the substantial expansion in business” [which] has more 
relevance to Auto Air’s expansion as our market matures” (AAG 1991a).  A number 
of operating philosophies were developed to “control planning, product development, 
manufacturing, cost control, marketing, administration and financial management”.  
These were translated into department and individual goals and objectives with 
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associated administrative tools to “identify variance to objectives, outside market 
forces, commercial competition” (AAG 1991a).  Performance measurements included 
- capital expenditure, plant location and/or expansion, personnel development, market 
objectives, technology objectives, and finally, product expansion and/or 
diversification. 
 
Alongside the new Plan, the budget process was changed to reflect the need for initial 
expenditure before growth could occur.  Budgets were drawn up for six to 12 month 
intervals with reviews to occur at regular intervals within this period depending on the 
item.  For example labour costs were assessed by standard hours versus charged hours 
on a quarterly basis and distributed as a factor of standard manufacturing time (AAG 
1991a).  On the other hand, project administration in Engineering was assessed against 
budget monthly in arrears and simultaneously projected forward by six months for 
comparison to standards.   
 
Work Organisation (AAG 1991a) 
 
The Manufacturing Manager stated before work was reorganisation in 1991; 
production (more accurately termed assembly) was structured according to mass 
production principles.  The company operated a single shift, five days a week 
assembly process.  Planning for production was undertaken by professional engineers, 
technicians and tradespersons who set production targets, line speeds and maintenance 
schedules and issued written variations to production.  These plans were produced in 
conjunction with Sales and Marketing using customer schedules, a capacity planning 
modelling system and JIT daily scheduling.  Weekly production scheduling meetings 
were held between the two departments to discuss timing requirements and any 
problems that had arisen.  Build Plans were developed according to the Materials 
Resource Planning system (MRPII), and issued weekly to forepersons2. 
(Manufacturing Manager October 13 1992). 
 
                                                 
2 Classification was changed to Supervisor and then Team Leader during the time period under review 
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Experienced buyers within the Supply Department were responsible for materials 
procurement after discussion with the Purchasing/Materials Management Group and 
the Engineering Design and Development Group.  The company used a range of 
methods to select component and/or subcontractor sources including vendor selection, 
vendor bidding, and the Auto Air initiated vendor development program, against a 
purchasing policy which set terms, conditions, and compliance to standards.  The 
warehouse received inputs, organised for them to be checked by Quality Assurance, 
and stored them (allocated to an aisle) before delivery to production (picked) 
according to the daily Build Plan.  A fixed location system was operated in which 
parts and accessories were lot-batched by either suppliers or the warehouse.  The 
warehouse was also responsible for delivery of prototypes to Engineering for 
checking, and all material movement throughout the factory according to a Master 
Delivery Schedule linked to the MRPII system.  Components were issued from the 
warehouse directly to the dedicated-product assembly line.  Final goods were 
packaged on the line before delivery to the warehouse.  Thus work within the 
warehouse was primarily administrative and clerical and as such was considered by 
the production workforce to be a promotion.  Finally, supporting all these functions 
was the Human Resources Department which in 1990 was expanded from a wage and 
salary administrative role to a more inclusive human resource function.  Employment 
within this department was experience based rather than professionally qualified, for 
example the Human Resource Manager was a qualified primary teacher who had been 
with the company for over 10 years having begun work in production, while the two 
other positions were experienced based administrative positions.   
 
Production was undertaken on both a batch and flow basis with work organised in 
dedicated lines according to the product being assembled.  The number of lines 
operating depended on the number of products being produced.  In any one month 60 
different models, in varying volumes, could be required.  Lines were split into OE, 
P&A or Spare Parts (Kits) and were product, customer and model dedicated.  For 
example in 1990 there were two Nissan lines (heater and blower), two Ford lines and 
two GMH lines.  Several small cells were established to handle lower volume 
products such as truck air conditioners for International Harvester and electronic 
cruise controls for the GMH Commodore.  Two lines were dedicated to use of 
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specialised testing equipment.  Finally, sub-assemblies and parts and accessories were 
packed into Kits (about 600 per month). 
The production process involved assembly of parts (doors, brackets, washers, pipes, 
springs, rods, clips gaskets and thermostats) to form heaters, coils and blowers.  On 
the evaporator line valves, tubes, brackets, and an air sensor thermostat, were 
assembled.  Detailed written instructions were provided for assembly and there was 
some, although limited, rotation between tasks, especially in the smaller volume 
products.  Machinery was mainly hand-tools such as air guns, and jigs and fixtures, 
although there was some technologically advanced equipment for testing pressure 
coils, leaks, and calibrations.  Kit assembly was undertaken using a bill of materials 
with kits packed to specifications as indicated on computer-linked lists.  A shrink pack 
process completed the packaging, with finished goods being moved by conveyor into 
the warehouse for despatch.   
 
Thus the work undertaken in production was essentially semi-skilled assembly, using 
simple machines and hand tools.  This resulted in over 80% of the production 
workforce being semi-skilled and only 8% being trade, technically or professionally 
skilled as shown in Figure 8.4 (AA HRD 1991b).   
Figure 8.4 
Auto Air 
Classification of Manufacturing Workforce 1990 
Semi Skilled
81%
Prof./Tech.
6%
Trade
2%
Other 
11%
 
Source: AA HRD 1991b 
 
Low levels of literacy and numeracy of the predominantly overseas born workforce 
(75% of the production workforce was from South East Asia) meant the semi-skilled 
nature of the workforce was maintained.  The low skill base of the production 
workforce was addressed by changes to training introduced in 1992.  As this was 
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associated with institutional and best practice reform they will be explored in Chapter 
Nine. 
Four service departments supported Manufacturing.  Comprehensive procedures 
manuals for account, project, and contract administration connected these 
departments.  Regular meetings were held between the project team and customers 
and or vendors.  Problems were solved at source where possible.  
 
The Business Unit Co-ordinator Engineering explained Engineering was the second 
largest employing department.  It was divided into three sub-departments - Electrical 
and Technical Services, Engineering Management, and Research and Development.  
Cross-functional project design and development teams were established for each new 
project.  These design teams consisted of qualified engineers from the fields of design 
and applications and mechanical/electronics, qualified draftspersons from mechanical 
and electronics, qualified technicians from metal fabrication, applications, and 
electronics/electrical, and qualified pattern and model makers.  Teams communicated 
with other relevant personnel during the design phase.  A technological interface 
through CAD/CAM was maintained between the department, its customers, and its 
vendors.  Design changes were controlled through an audit system that ensured all 
procedures were up to date and changes introduced to the change-flow system were 
bought onto the process charts immediately.  Product testing was performed during the 
design, prototype, off tool, and production phases, to ensure design specifications 
were maintained throughout the product-manufacturing period.  The department had 
facilities for laboratory engineering performance testing, field and environment 
performance testing, durability, and reliability testing.  It also had a NATA approved 
laboratory, testing facilities such as an internal calorimeter room, a wind tunnel, and 
high technology electronics.  The engineering design office, research and 
development, and performance/durability/reliability testing areas were protected by 
security-coded entry and 24 hour security surveillance.  The company prided itself on 
its leading edge, environmentally sensitive product design and development.  For 
example in 1989 the company designed the first air-conditioning system (the R134a) 
capable of meeting emission requirements of the international marketplace (Business 
Unit Co-ordinator Engineering October 13 1992).   
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The Manager Quality explained that in 1989, in response to increased customer 
demand for improved quality, the Quality department was separated from 
Engineering.  The new department consisted of professionally and technically 
qualified employees (Manager Quality October 13 1992).  At the same time the 
company developed a total quality management plan which assigned the task of 
developing appropriate performance targets for particular activities to each department 
thereby “drawing on the concept of cross-functionality and communication” (AAG 
1991a).  The plan identified quality under three elements – quality planning, process 
control and supplier development.  This is the subject of detailed analysis as part of 
the quality reform process in Chapter Nine.  What is relevant for the current purpose is 
the company developed a quality assessment process based on current production.  
Although attribute and variable control charts are still used, their purpose is to 
establish stability of the process and in turn to monitor the effects of process changes 
aimed at reducing variation, rather than to focus on final product assessment.  
Reliability of finished product is both internally and externally monitored and 
analysed, particularly through warranty returns, but the company is developing plans 
to test all products in process at least once a year.  Although the Quality Department 
was seen as responsible for co-ordinating quality for the company, especially by 
updating the quality manual, a quality auditing process was being developed to enable 
departmental self-assessment.  Process capability indexes were being developed to 
replace traditional economic indicators such as rate of return, turnover, and profit as 
measures of quality performance.  Finally, the company had developed a supplier 
performance index to monitor and assess supplier quality in respect of delivery, 
quality, innovation, price, and performance.   
 
The marketing department handled all liaisons with customers, including negotiations 
over delivery schedules, service requirements and warranty.  The Department was 
staffed principally by technically and professionally qualified employees supported by 
experienced administrative staff.  Employment within the department was halved in 
1989 with closure of the mobile-phone facility.  Finally, the Finance Department was 
responsible for all costing, budgets and accounts, general administration and data 
processing (including the computerised Management Information System).   
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Thus, although the work system employed within Auto Air was based upon a 
traditional division of labour, by the late 1980s attempts were being made to break 
down departmental barriers.  Little attempt, however, had been made to decrease the 
gap between manufacturing and support departments.  The assembly nature of 
production had resulted in a predominantly low skilled workforce as demonstrated by 
the fact almost 60% of the workforce was classified at the least skilled level as shown 
in Figure 8.5 (AA HRD 1991c).   
Figure 8.5 
Auto Air Pty Ltd 
Classification of Workforce 1990 
Semi-skilled
59%
Prof./Tech.
27%
Trade
1%
Other 
13%
 
Source: AA HRD 1990c 
 
These employees undertook repetitive, task based production activities with little 
ability to exercise autonomy.  This contrasted with a much smaller number of high 
skilled professional and semi-professional employees who were able to vary their 
tasks and to make decisions concerning their work 
 
Management 
 
Management was structured into a multi-level hierarchy, as shown in Figure 8.6 (AA 
HRD 1991d). 
 
A Management Committee, made up of a Chairman, the Managing Director, and the 
five departmental Directors, managed the company.  There were 11 departmental 
managers reported to these Directors.  There were seven forepersons reporting to the 
Production Manager, with four leading hands and two second-in charge persons 
assisting them.  The company merger in 1990 did not change this structure apart from 
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adding another Director to the new Auto Air Group Board that reported to the Board 
of the new owner.  
 
Figure 8.6 
Auto Air 
Organisational Chart-Management 1991  
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Management was responsible for all decision making within the company.  
Preparation and administration of the forward plan was the responsibility of the 
Management Committee.  The Management Committee set the broad objectives for 
the Five-Year Business Plan.  The construction of a more detailed document dealing 
with major elements of capital expenditure, plant location and/or expansion, personnel 
development, market objectives, technology objectives, product expansion and/or 
diversification objectives, was undertaken by a smaller group of managers.  Budgets 
set by departments were reported up to the Management Committee and down through 
the management group “with specific extraction of data for those relevant departments 
and personnel, for example production forecasts, to on-line” (AAG 1991a). 
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The company appointed an Accounts Manager for each customer and each project.  
This Manager was responsible for establishing an inter-disciplinary management team 
to administer the project, contracts, and customer account.  Two principal 
management personnel typically administered a project.  One manager was appointed 
from Sales and Marketing to handle commercial aspects such as timing decisions and 
information flow, the other manager from Engineering was responsible for project 
management, project design and timing. 
 
By the late 1980s there appeared to be some change in the way managerial decision 
making was processed, at least at the first-line level of production management.  This 
is demonstrated by typical responses as follows to the question: 
 ‘What are the main task of your current job as foreperson’ : 
Traditional - control 
!"decision making and maintenance of safety regulations 
!"ensure correct procedures are followed 
!"solve day to day problems 
!"ensure daily work requirements are achieved efficiently 
!"ensure line discipline and housekeeping 
!"ensure efficient manpower usage 
!"allocate jobs to worker 
!"solve quality problems 
!"ensure components conform to specification 
!"satisfying customer requirement 
!"plan - liase with, planners and managers 
New - leadership 
!"communication and high level of information flow 
!"maintaining a secure job for everyone 
!"inform employees of their ongoing performance 
!"challenging current methods and procedures to gain improvements (AA 1990b). 
 
These responses show forepersons were still heavily influenced by technical means of 
controlling the production process, however some attention was also being given to 
people oriented processes requiring improved communication.  This latter role was 
more evident in typical responses by forepersons in answer to the question: 
‘What tasks are performed by a foreperson?’ 
!"trainer 
!"parental figure 
!"leader 
!"work with union representative (AA 1990b). 
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To ensure forepersons could perform this role of a leader, communicator, counsellor 
and trainer, it was recognised new skills were required.  Typical responses as set out 
below were given to the question:  
‘What skill are required of forepersons?’: 
People related 
!"negotiation 
!"communication 
!"delegation 
!"counselling 
!"understanding company industrial relations policy 
!"interview skills 
!"skills to promote harmonious relationships 
!"human relations 
!"ability to represent both management and employees 
Technical 
!"technical and work procedure skills 
!"planning, organising ,directing and controlling 
!"costing and purchasing 
!"production planning (AA 1990b). 
 
These responses demonstrate that as early 1990 the front-line level of management 
had accepted the need for change.  This incorporated a role change from controlling 
ruled by technical requirements, to leading guided by a human centred approach. 
 
On the other hand, a continued reliance by the workforce on forepersons as decision-
makers was still evident in 1992.  Employee responses are as set out below were given 
to the question –  
‘What are your main concerns about moving to a team structure?’ 
!"who will decide when we can go to the toilet 
!"who takes over when the team leader is absent 
!"who is going to arrange the jobs people do daily 
!"how do we get people to think for themselves 
!"how will overtime be distributed (Focus Groups January 3 & 4 1992). 
 
These responses suggest the degree to which employees had been empowered to make 
decisions was limited and this led to a high degree of fear amongst employees as to 
their decision-making capabilities.   
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Human Resource Management 
 
The Manager Human Resources explained the company did not have a formalised 
employment relations strategy until the Human Resource Management position was 
created in 1990.  The personnel role before this time was primarily concerned with 
managing payroll.  Recruitment occurred as needed without any systematic process for 
determining the suitability of candidates.  Most personnel functions were handled by 
forepersons.  The company reacted to government legislation rather than embarked 
upon a proactive approach (Manager Human Resources August 21 1992).  This is 
demonstrated by company action on Equal Employment Opportunity, Training and 
Occupational Health and Safety. 
 
First, let us look at Equal Employment Opportunity.  In 1989 the company developed 
a formal EEO Policy and Plan (AA HRD 1994).  However no action was taken to 
action these policies until 1991 when, as part of the institutional workplace and best 
proactive reform processes, positive strategies to enhance EEO were developed.  
Consequently, details are left to the appropriate section in Chapter Nine.  
 
A second example is training.  Although in 1990-the company spent 1.9% of payroll 
on training, thus exceeded the government requirement of 1.5%; there was no 
formalised training program until 1990 when one was developed as part of 
institutional workplace reform.  Consequently, details are left to the appropriate 
section in Chapter Nine.  The training in 1990-1 was mainly individual or small group 
training on specific issues.  Training undertaken included: 
!"health and safety issues - smoking in the workplace and first aid 
!"quality - FMEA, Ford 8D Problem solving, Process Improvement Groups, 
Quality Management Systems Auditing 
!"technical skills - forklift and articulated vehicle, stock control, import and 
export documentation and activity-based-cost-accounting 
!"technology – computer skills, CAD, MRPII,  
!"personnel, and industrial relations training - workplace literature, effective 
presentations skills, award restructuring, supervisory skills and senior 
executive skills, leadership skills, report writing, counselling and retrenchment 
skills.   
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Third, there was Occupational Health and Safety.  The Health and Safety Consultant 
explained occupational health and safety was more developed having been assisted by 
adoption of a new policy in 1986 focused on the three principles of Prevention, 
Participation, and Rehabilitation.  At this time an Occupational Health and Safety 
nurse had been employed.  Since then the responsibility of this position had grown as 
a preventative approach developed.  In the same year a joint Occupational Health and 
Safety Committee was established with workforce representatives chosen by 
management.  This was changed to elected representation in 1987 when designated 
work groups, with health and safety representatives, were established in accord with 
the Victorian Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Health and Safety Consultant 
October 28 1992).  These initiatives had resulted in improvements to the company’s 
health and safety record as shown in Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1 
Auto Air 
Safety Record 1986-1991 
 
 1986 1991 
Total number of accidents/injuries 200 82 
Loss incurred claims 143 21 
Loss incurred claims per capita 58% 7.8% 
Source: AA HRD 1991e 
 
The total number of accident/injuries reported was reduced from 200 in 1986 to 82 in 
1991.  Similarly, loss incurred claims were reduced from 143 in 1986 to 21 in 1991.  
This represented a reduction in the incidence rate of loss incurred claims per capita 
from 58% in 1986 to just under 8% in 1991. 
 
These improvements resulted in the company being chosen by the Department of 
Labour in 1989 as one of the top 20 companies in ‘producing a caring culture’ (Health 
and Safety Consultant October 28, 1992).  By 1991 the health and safety levy had 
been reduced to 3%.  However it was recognised the focus on health and safety 
improvement had waned in the early 1990s as other changes occurred.  To this end in 
1992 the Safety Committee was reconstituted.  This is discussed further under the 
institutional workplace reform process in Chapter Nine. 
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Wages and Industrial Relation 
 
The Metal Industry Award set wages and working conditions for all production 
employees.  Over award payments of around 20% above the minimum are paid, with 
overtime regularly averaging a further 20% of gross wage.  Remuneration for qualified 
specialists and managers was negotiated individually and based upon market rates.  
This was found to cause some difficulties when the company restructured in 1991 as 
differentials in pay for people performing the same work became obvious (Manager 
Human Resources September 28 1992).  This is discussed in relation to best practice 
reform in Chapter Nine.  
 
The manufacturing facility was not unionised until 1985 when several employees from 
the warehouse joined the then Storemen and Packers’ Union [later renamed the 
National Union of Workers - (NUW)].  Immediate strike action was undertaken 
resulting in extension of union membership to the rest of production workforce 
through the Australian Society of Engineers (now FIMEE).  This resulted in the total 
unionisation of Manufacturing, with three elected shop stewards representing 
employee interests.  A third union, the Transport Workers Union (TWU) represented 
two transport drivers until the function was contracted-out in 1991.  In 1990 
management adopted a pragmatic response to industrial relations- “our concern is for 
getting it right and having it work, not so much getting it legitimised in the industrial 
relations arena” (Manager Human Resources September 28 1992).  Accordingly, shop 
stewards handled most industrial problems with little reference to the full-time 
officials.  
 
Pressures for Change 
 
By the late 1980s Auto Air had expanded its market to the extent it needed to establish 
new companies, separate from, but part of an Auto Air Group (AAG).  The pressure 
for change thus arose principally from within the company, fuelled and assisted by 
external pressures for change.   
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In adopting a growth strategy the company rated its achievements in terms of its 
growth in market share and return of equity rather than profits.  Indeed the company 
merger in 1990 was undertaken to provide funds for further growth given the 
company’s lack of profitability.  Data provided by the company (AAG 1992b) shows 
market share for Auto Air was steady at around 2% until 1980, after which it 
expanded rapidly to reach 35% of the market in 1991.  In 1990 sales turnover reached 
$106 million, a 10-fold increase from the $10 million sales achieved in 1981.  This 
resulted in yearly sales increases of more than 25%, as shown in Table 8.2.  
Table 8.2 
Auto Air Group 
Key Performance Data 1988-1993 
 
Year Sales ($M) 
AA 
Sales ($M) 
AAG 
Return On Equity 
(%)-AA 
Return On Equity 
(%)-AAG 
1987 50,000 N/A 22 N/A 
1988 63,000 N/A 8 N/A 
1989 87,000 N/A 42 N/A 
1990 106,000 N/A 25 N/A 
1991 82,258 119,258 ---- 24 
1992 73,500 97,000 ---- 31 
1993 75,900 107,000 --- 26 
Source: AAG 1993a 
 
The decision to expand into an Auto Air Group decreased the sales from Auto Air by 
around $24 million to a low of $82 million in 1991, with a further decline to $73 
million in 1992.  However in 1993 a small recovery to almost $76 million was 
recorded.  The initial sales reduction in 1991 was balanced somewhat by an increase 
in sales for the Auto Air Group of $13 million to $119 million.  However this was 
followed by a reduction of $21 million to $97 million in 1992.  This decline was also 
reversed for the Auto Air Group in 1993 with sales increased by $10 million.  The 
downturn in 1992 appears to have been principally a result of the recession, while the 
increase in 1993 was due principally to the increase in exports that by 1993 had 
reached 14% of Auto Air Group product.  The company had eight new customers; it 
was selling in 18 new markets and had developed several strategic alliances.  
Moreover it had plans to increase exports into Asia to 25% by 1996-7 through 
regional offices in China, Kuala Lumpur, and the UK.  Given the corporate role 
adopted by Auto Air it is important that overall sales of the Auto Air Group are 
recognised against the decline for the original company. 
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The need for funds for expansion meant return-on equity fluctuated throughout the 
period under review.  A high of 42% return on equity was recorded in 1989, after 
which it was reduced and fluctuated around 25%.  Despite these fluctuations the 
positive export growth strategy resulted in the company amassing $129 billion of 
export credits by December 1993.  This led the Managing Director to comment  
as an Australian manufacturer, the company has been successful in developing substantial 
markets for automotive, bus and mobile systems, electronic and associated components (AAG 
1993b). 
Despite growth of the Auto Air Group as a whole, the strategy had adverse 
consequences for employment within Auto Air.  Prior to establishment of the first new 
company in 1989, employment within Auto Air reached a peak of 395 persons.  The 
establishment of a company to produce hoses and pipes previously produced by Auto 
Air, followed by the relocation of product for GMH to South Australia, resulted in a 
significant decline in the number of employees required by the original company.  The 
closure of the mobile-phone facility operated by the company further reduced 
employment.  Between 1989 and 1990, 93 employees left the company.  Further 
reductions led to a low overall employment of 160 employees in 1992.  
Retrenchments were chiefly from manufacturing.  This resulted in between 1991 and 
1992 a reduction from 73% to 61% in the contribution of the manufacturing 
workforce.  At the same time the contribution from engineering increasing from 9% to 
14%, and from 5% to 7% from quality.  Two interesting developments were the 
increase from 6% to 7% in the contribution from Marketing and from 4% to 8% from 
finance.  This reflects the changing role for Auto Air from being principally a 
manufacturing company to the growth in its corporate responsibility for Auto Air 
Group.  The effects on employment are shown in Figure 8.7.  The reduction in 
employment within Auto Air was offset by employment within other companies in the 
Group - indeed some employees from Auto Air were relocated to the new companies.  
Once again the recession took its toll on employment levels in 1992, but by 1993 there 
were signs of recovery for employment levels in both Auto Air and Auto Air Group.  
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Figure 8.7  
Auto Air and Auto Air Group 
Employment 1988-1993 
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The second environmental pressure came from customer quality demands forcing the 
company to implement new quality processes.  Ford (Australia) Pty Ltd. was most 
forthright in applying this pressure and eventually conducted PEP training courses for 
production employees.  The company response was developed as part of a total 
quality program and so details are outlined in Chapter 9. 
 
The third and final environmental pressure came from industrial relations changes.  
The new bargaining structure required a more sophisticated collective bargaining 
process at the enterprise.   
 
Summary 
 
In summary, Auto Air is an Australian owned company established in the 1960s when 
government incentives for the local automotive industry were positive.  Management 
adopted an export growth strategy in the early 1980s, which resulted in the 
development of significant markets overseas.  The company also demonstrated 
flexible adaptation to customer demands by producing air conditioning Systems Units 
for a variety of models and vehicle types.  Faced with expanding market opportunities 
a decision was taken in the late 1980s to extend beyond one manufacturing site into an 
Auto Air Group, acquiring funds for this growth by merging with a larger, more 
diversified and profitable Australian owned company.  This strategy required change 
by Auto Air as product was relocated to new companies, employment opportunities 
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were reduced and the skills required of remaining employees were changed as Auto 
Air adopted more corporate responsibilities.   
 
The extent and type of change required placed pressure on the company to reassess its 
existing work organisation, which had been built on the Fordist mass production 
principles shown in Table 8.3.  
Table 8.3 
Auto Air  
Work Organisation-Mass Production Model 
 
Departments segmented, functional departments and sub-departments but connected 
by regular meetings and a comprehensive procedures manual 
Process  standardised by industrial engineers 
short time cycles 
no preventative maintenance 
hand assembly rather than technologically assisted 
Job design narrow, individual, tasks based 
limited job rotation and flexibility 
some promotion prospects into warehouse 
Skills and Depth of 
Knowledge 
principally semi-skilled production workforce supported by technically 
and professionally qualified 
Product design superior performance systems units 
designed to environmental standards 
model specific style options 
no design for manufacturability 
cross functional teams of specialists although no production 
representation 
technology sophisticated design capability 
Human Resource 
Management 
reactive, but some sign of change 
Industrial Relations adversarial but moving to accommodating 
Product Quality  quality inspection post production 
no continuous quality improvement 
no employee involvement 
Market Segment local Australian market plus importers plus exports 
Management centralised hierarchical 
dominated by managerial prerogative 
. 
Greater co-ordination was required between departments to ensure delivery of a 
quality product in a timely manner.  This was achieved through regular meetings 
between departments, the production of a comprehensive procedures manual, and 
establishment of cross-functional teams for planning purposes.  However these teams 
did not include representation from Production.  Moreover the production process 
remained standardised by industrial engineers into short time cycles with little or no 
built in preventative maintenance.  Job design remained narrowly task based 
determined by the assembly nature of production, although jobs for specialist support 
staff were more varied.  Knowledge and skill requirements remained influenced by the 
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assembly nature of the work although the increasing responsibility of the company for 
Auto Air Group and increased quality requirements placed pressure on the company to 
rethink its skill base. 
 
In this environment although product development emphasised sophisticated, 
environmentally acceptable, Unit Systems, and despite some mention of design for 
manufacturability, the production-based workforce was not included in these teams.  
Furthermore, although the company had begun to develop a more process-oriented 
approach to product quality this was not well developed.  Human Resource 
Management and Industrial Relations were showing some sign of a managerial 
acceptance of the need for a more accommodating approach but little operational 
change had been recorded.  Consequently, management and the workforce remained 
separated by the centralised and hierarchical management, which was embodied with 
responsibility for all decision making. 
 
Thus the decision in the late 1980s to expand the number of companies into an Auto 
Air Group required substantial changes to the way work was organised, the skills of 
the workforce, and decision making process within the pre-existing single company.  
In this context the decision by the company to take advantage of opportunities 
presented by the three workplace reforms under analysis is understandable.  The next 
chapter discusses these changes.   
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
 
AUTO AIR (II) 
Integrated Reform and Participation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
From a company perspective, the transition from a single company into a world 
competitive Auto Air Group (AAG) required considerable change for both managers 
and employees.  As the company sought to expand its exports, product quality had to 
be improved.  Employees had to be encouraged to adapt to change including loss of 
employment for some and an upgrading of knowledge and skills for those continuing 
in employment.  Managers and employees needed to work together to develop an 
integrated package of reforms.  To assist this change the company utilised each of the 
workplace reform processes – quality management, institutional workplace, and best 
practice.  This chapter sets out in detail the reforms.  Similar to the other two case 
studies, the chapter is structured as follows.  The first section presents major changes 
introduced under each of the reform processes.  These are summarised in Table 9.1.  
The second section explores changes in terms of workforce participation.  The 
conclusion reached is threefold.  First, these reforms did not occur in a vacuum, rather 
they assisted in realisation of a business decision made in the 1980s to expand the 
production and scale of components both within Australia and into the export market.  
Second, changes associated with each reform process were at first fragmentary but 
were later integrated into a complete package of reforms.  Third, workforce 
participation was important in integrating the reform processes.   
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Table 9.1 
Auto Air 
Workplace Reform  
 
DATE Quality Management 
Reform 
Institutional Workplace 
Reform 
Best Practice Reform 
1987  Two tier  
1989 Quality Excellence Committee  Award Restructuring 
Agreement – increased 
flexibility 
Managing Director – Industry 
Study tour 
1990 departmental targets   
 design for manufacturability   
 Quality Assessment Teams   
 Ford Q101 and GMH B+   
1991 ongoing development of 1990 
initiatives 
Enterprise Agreement (1) 
ratified 
 
1992 Ford Q1  teams – production 
   business units – support 
   managerial restructure 
   five year plan 
   equal employment 
opportunity initiatives 
   Australian Best Practice 
Demonstration Project 
1993 Supplier Quality Assurance 
Program 
Enterprise Agreement (2) Australian Best Practice 
Demonstration Project 
 
Quality Management Reform 
 
The Manager Quality stated that in 1990 the company was awarded a Ford Q101 
Supplier Quality Rating, which was upgraded to Ford Q1 rating in 1992, as well as a 
GMH, QSA B+ rating.  Despite this external quality accreditation, the company 
decided that further internal change was required for continual process improvement 
to become a reality (Manager Quality October 13 1992).  How these changes were 
implemented is of interest to this thesis.  
 
The quality management reform process at Auto Air occurred in two major stages.  
The first stage introduced processes linked to quality improvement in isolation from 
other changes being introduced by the company.  This phase is dealt with in this 
section.  The second stage integrated all three reform processes – quality management, 
institutional workplace, and best practice.  This second stage is discussed under the 
sections dealing with the two other reform processes.  
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The Manager Quality explained that the loss in 1983 of the Ford Australia contract 
had created concern within the company, however it did not result in any significant 
change until the late 1980s (Manager Quality October 13 1992).  The catalyst for 
eventual change included two major pressures.  First the decision by the company to 
expand into the export market and second, the decision by PMV assemblers to 
demand new internal quality processes from suppliers.  Table 9.2 provides a summary 
of these changes in terms of the Ford Quality System Standards (1990) (given the 
importance to the company of regaining the Ford custom lost in 1983).  
Table 9.2 
Auto Air 
Quality Management Process  
1990-1993 
 
Strategy Required 
 
Change Process 
PROCESS and PRODUCT QUALITY   
evaluate process capability (current - post 
production assessment) 
Quality Excellence Strategy Committee 
Process Improvement Groups 
Departmental targets  
product control (traditional)  Quality Excellence Strategy Committee - control charts 
Process Improvement Groups 
process control  Corrective Action Requests (CAR) 
engineering specification tests Taguchi methods 
analyse and document returned parts departmental targets   
8D reports training in 8D techniques 
Statistical Process Control to monitor 
processes and improve capability 
training in SPC and in Ford PEP 
plans for continuous improvement Quality Excellence Strategy Committee 
PLANNING   
feasibility assessments Quality planning process 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis training in Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
control plans Quality Excellence Steering Committee and departments 
preliminary process capability studies improve preliminary process capability  
design for manufacturability  
written process monitoring and control 
instructions 
Group Quality Procedures manual 
process to monitor and control sub-supplier 
quality 
supplier guide; supplier performance index  
encourage local suppliers 
DOCUMENTING  Group Quality Procedures manual 
CRITICAL CHARACTERS CONTROL   
Key quality disciplines plan targets developed 
Document control items Group Quality Procedures manual 
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Management Related Change 
 
In 1989 an Auto Air Group Quality Excellence Strategy Committee (QESC) was 
established.  This Committee reported to the Group Committee of Management.  It’s 
role was to “establish broad-based, company-wide implementation of Total Quality 
Management systems to achieve ‘Best in Class’ status with the customers” (AAG 
1992a).  The Committee was made up of senior managers with no workforce 
representation.  This suggests that initially quality improvement was seen as a 
managerial responsibility.  The outcome was a Group Plan aimed to achieve 
International Standard recognition through achieving ISO9001 quality accreditation. 
 
In 1990 a new Auto Air Group Quality Procedures Manual was produced.  This 
differed from other Quality manuals because as well as product quality standards 
through written specifications for purchase materials and finished products it added 
process requirements for documentation of on-line quality procedures. 
 
In 1991 Group Plan targets for quality were established for particular activities within 
departments.  This aimed to link departmental responsibility for quality by “drawing 
the concept of cross-functionality and communication into the total quality 
management process” (AAG 1991b).  The plan was broken down into three principal 
elements –  
!"quality planning – feasibility analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, quality 
function deployment, design review, design of experiments, Taguchi methods 
!"process control – statistical tools and their use for process variation and reduction 
!"supplier development – improve preliminary process capability (Ppk), improve first-
off Off Tool Sample (OTS) submissions, improve Controlled Process Capacity (Cpk), 
(AAG 1991b). 
 
Under this strategy the Group sought to improve production process control by using 
statistical tools to monitor process outputs.  Control charts were used to establish 
process stability and in turn to monitor the effects of process changes aimed at 
reducing variation.  Once process stability was established, process capability indexes 
were used to ensure variation was kept within targets and to reduce waste.  This also 
addressed the issues of engineering specification and process capability compatibility.  
The plan was built on the premise that the establishment of cross-functional activities 
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would lead to total organisational commitment to quality (Manager Quality October 
13 1992). 
 
As well as these Group management initiatives Auto Air as a single entity within 
Group introduced change.  Unlike the other two case studies, Auto Air management 
devolved responsibility for improving internal quality to each department.  Each 
department was asked to develop quality improvement targets relevant to their own 
activities.  This was to include target improvements for quality planning, process 
control, and supplier development, with particular attention to waste reduction.  
Initially it was expected emphasis would be on improving engineering specifications 
and process capability compatibility, and reducing variation, with a request 
departments consider product design according to the capability of the production 
process.  This is often termed ‘design for manufacturability’ (Manager Quality 
October 13 1992).  
 
To support these changes management introduced a number of other changes: 
 
1) Six accredited auditors were employed to assist with the auditing and reporting of 
quality. 
2) A Statistical Process Control program was developed.  This introduced process 
controls through on-line measurement using –  
X–bar-R-charts to monitor process characteristics requiring ongoing monitoring 
P-charts to identify total line defect rates.  This information formed the basis of Pareto analysis 
and assisted a program of ongoing defect prevention rather than defect detection 
Cause and effect brainstorming tools to identify possible areas for improvement and assist in 
problem resolution  
 
3) A procedure to handle Corrective Action Requests (CAR) to resolve non-
conformance of product to engineering specifications, customer standards, or 
testing conditions, was developed in accordance with the Auto Air Group Quality 
manual.  Emphasis was placed upon clearly identifying the origin of quality 
problems and facilitating problem resolution (Manager Quality October 13 1992). 
 
Finally, the company produced a Supplier Guide with basic requirements for the 
supplier family.  The index again went beyond simple final product analysis to include 
five performance indicators: - delivery, quality, innovation, price, and performance.  It 
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was planned suppliers below a rating of 98% would be counselled and joint 
discussions held to establish revised targets.  Vendor engineering teams, vendor 
tracking systems and off-tool tracking assisted the process.  
 
Management also adopted the view suppliers have knowledge and experience can be 
used to the mutual benefit of the supplier and customer.  The Quality Assurance 
Manual states suppliers have a: 
rich source of manufacturing experience, technical ability, and development ingenuity…Auto 
Air… welcomes constructive suggestions and actively encourages their participation in the 
design and development through the tools of Quality Function Deployment and Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (AA Quality Department 1992). 
 
To this end the company established a management sub-committee of engineers, 
production, purchasing, marketing and quality assurance staff to which vendors could 
present technological innovations.  Thus the SQA program developed by Auto Air not 
only placed emphasis on more rigorous checking of input quality, but also providing 
opportunity for joint customer-supplier innovations (Manager Quality October 13 
1992) 
 
Employee Related Change – Production 
 
In 1990 Process Improvement Groups (PIGs) were established.  These Groups 
consisted of employees from both production and stores who volunteered to join a 
group.  They were trained in SPC techniques to identify and solve quality problems 
and were to meet weekly.  The outcome of these PIGs is discussed later in this 
Chapter. 
 
In 1992 Ford engineers undertook intensive training for all production employees in 
the Ford Productivity Enhancement Process (PEP). 
 
Employee Related Change – Specialists 
 
In 1990 quality specialists were trained in FMEA, 8D problem-solving techniques, 
SPC techniques, and in-group dynamics.  This resulted in training in quality 
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improvement being in 1991 the single largest contributor to company expenditure on 
training.   
As well as changes directly related to quality management processes, other changes 
that affected quality were introduced as part of both institutional workplace reform 
and best practice.  They are mentioned here because of their relevance to quality 
improvement with details provided under appropriate sections of this Chapter.   
 
In 1991 production was reorganised into Semi-Autonomous Work-Groups (SAWGs) 
in accordance with the principles of lean production associated with best practice 
reform.  Responsibility for Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) was devolved to 
these SAWGs.   
 
Also in 1991 employee agreement to the change to semi-autonomous work-groups 
was negotiated with unions through the enterprise agreement as part of institutional 
workplace reform.   
 
Thus by 1991 Auto Air had begun major reforms to change its focus from post-
production quality assessment to process quality improvement.  First, a new approach 
to both customers and suppliers was developed portraying all parties as an integrated 
family.  Second, the Quality Manual was rewritten as a process, rather than a control, 
manual.  Third, plan targets were developed for particular activities that recognised 
cross-functionality between tasks and departments.  Fourth, managers, specialists and 
production workers were trained in quality improvement techniques such as SPC, 
FMEA, 8D problem solving, and cross functional, Process Improvement Groups of 
production workers and specialists were established.   
 
Table 9.3 presents a summary of workforce participation introduced under quality 
management reform.  
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Table 9.3 
Auto Air 
Workforce Participation and Quality Management Reform  
 
Participant Form of Workforce 
Participation 
Details 
Management 1989 Quality Excellence Strategy 
Committee 
 
Production 
workers 
training volunteers for Process Improvement Groups in 
Statistical Process Control and 8D 
 direct task productions workers implement Corrective Action 
Requests 
 involvement Process Improvement Groups established with 
volunteers 
  Process Improvement Groups integrated into 
teams under best practice reform 
Specialists  training Taguchi methods, Statistical Process Control, 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and 8D. 
 
There was strong management support for increasing the involvement of workers in 
continuous quality improvement.  This is clear from the early establishment of Process 
Improvement Groups of volunteer process workers and the emphasis placed on 
training these volunteers.  It is also interesting that over time these temporary quality 
improvement groups were transformed into permanent teams; this will be explored 
later.  Given this intent, the question is once again – how effective was this form of 
participation in assisting workplace reform?  This will be pursued following 
discussion of changes associated with the other two reform processes.   
 
Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
Auto Air became unionised only in 1985.  Consequently it was slow to participate in 
the decentralised bargaining.  Nevertheless, it did take part in several sets of 
negotiations which became progressively more significant in terms of facilitating 
company change programs.  The two enterprise agreements were ratified by the AIRC.  
Agreements reached are summarised in Table 9.4. 
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Table 9.4 
Auto Air 
Institutional Workplace Reforms 
 
ISSUES TWO TIER 
1987 
AWARD 
RESTRUCTURE 
1989 
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENT (1) 
1991  
AIRC ratified 
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENT 
(2) 
1993 
AIRC ratified 
Basic 
Employee 
wage increase - 
$10 plus 4% 
wage increase – 3% plus 
$10 
wage increase –4.5% 
plus 4.5% 
wage increase – 
4% 
 payment by 
Electronic Funds 
Transfer 
no reclassification   
  change in pay cycle   
  reschedule Rostered 
Days Off 
  
Production  driver training major work 
reorganisation into 
production teams 
commitment to 
skills training 
  reduce demarcation 
between Production and 
Warehouse 
teams committed to 
continuous quality 
improvement 
continued 
commitment to 
teams 
  continued commitment 
to quality improvement – 
Process Improvement 
Groups 
  
 
Two Tier 
 
The first agreement was negotiated in 1987.  Multiple negotiations occurred between 
the personnel officer and full-time officials assisted by local shop stewards of each of 
the three newly established unions.  It is not surprising given the lack of experience in 
such negotiations the agreement was limited to the common industry agreement 
employees would be paid by Electronic Funds Transfer.  However an Employee 
Participation Group (EPG) was established in 1988 to assist future negotiations. 
 
Award Restructuring 
 
The second agreement was made in 1989 as part of the Award Restructuring process.  
Negotiations were conducted between the newly appointed Manager Human 
Resources and full-time union officials assisted by shop stewards, with some input 
from the EPG.  Negotiations occurred separately with the two major unions.  The 
Agreement was significant in that both unions agreed to reduce demarcations between 
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the Production and Warehousing functions by allowing some flexibility between the 
two areas as follows:  
!"a storesperson would be upskilled as a driver for relief purposes  
!"several production employees would be upskilled as forklift drivers 
!"production employees could replace absentees in the warehouse provided overtime under full 
staffing levels would not be affected 
!"warehouse employees could work on end packaging areas and pick up from the production 
lines as long as they were not required to work in the production process  
!"assembly line workers could enter the warehouse and draw their own supplies (Manager 
Human Resource August 21 1992). 
 
Thus the agreement introduced some important production related changes showing a 
willingness by employees to introduce flexibility rather than be restrained by job 
demarcations.   
 
Apart from this initial implementation of the restructured Metal Industry Award there 
were no employee reclassifications.  However it was agreed a joint Auto Air Group 
Award Restructuring Steering Committee and a joint Auto Air Award Restructuring 
Working Party Committee would be established to explore the possibility of future 
skills-based reclassifications.  These Committees were to function in addition to the 
existing EPG, with a focus on the development of a skills-based training plan.  
 
Enterprise Agreement 
 
The third Agreement was the Enterprise Agreement signed in 1991.  The Agreement 
was negotiated through a Single Bargaining Group (SBU) consisting of management, 
represented by the Human Resource Manager, the Manufacturing Manager, and two 
shop stewards supported by full-time union officials. The Agreement was ratified 
before the Commission in December 1991 as the Auto Air Site Agreement - 
Restructuring and Productivity, and was implemented in January 1992.  It resulted in a 
major reorganisation of work into semi-autonomous work groups (SAWGs).  
Employees agreed to: 
accept and participate in the implementation of a restructuring of the plant layout, departments 
and jobs which would result in the adoption of a semi autonomous team concept (AA & 
FIMEE, NUW & TWU 1991).  
Also included in the Agreement was:  
!"a commitment by employees to continue to participate in the quality based PIGs  
!"the acceptance of a rescheduling of Rostered-Days-Off from a Friday to Monday 
!"the acceptance of a change to the pay cycle 
!"continued commitment by both managers and employees to the Award Restructuring 
process (AA & FIMEE, NUW & TWU 1991). 
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The new work organisation removed the division between manufacture of product in 
Production and its storage in Warehouse and Distribution.  It established four SAWGs 
(called teams) within Production, two of which were customer based (Ford/Mazda and 
Isuzu/Hyundai, and MMAL/GMH), with the other two being special purpose teams 
(receiving/despatch and evaporator) servicing customer-based teams.  It recognised 
training of all new team members was required to ensure members were multi-skilled 
in both assembly and warehouse tasks.  This was to be co-ordinated by the joint 
Working Party. 
 
Employees did express reservations about the move to teams.  Set out below are 
typical concerns raised by employees in response to the question: 
‘What issues do you think team members will have to decide?’ 
!"How will stores and production work together 
!"How will we get the consumables every morning 
!"Who replaces the storemen when they go on strike 
!"How do we resolve union disputes 
!"How do we become trained in all functions 
!"How will overtime be divided between the teams 
!"“Will this means we have to work harder” 
!"What will happen to the slower worker 
!"Can we make a decision to extend our tea breaks 
!"What if people do not want to change their jobs 
!"What happens to our jobs if the teams don’t work  
!"What will happen to health and safety (Focus Groups A January 3 & 4 1992). 
 
 
These responses suggest employees were not against the move to teams but were 
concerned about how it would work in practice.  What would happen to traditional job 
demarcations, how would they become trained in all tasks required, and to what extent 
were they protected if the teams were to fail?  Underlying these responses was the 
question of how would decisions be made when the traditional decision-maker, the 
foreperson, became a team leader whose job it was to make decision jointly with the 
team.  However as there was no opposition to the change it appears it was accepted 
change was necessary.  
 
 Productivity Agreement 
 
The final Agreement negotiated as part of institutional workplace reform was the 1993 
Productivity Agreement.  The SBU negotiating the Agreement was made up of two 
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Managers from the Human Resources department and Manufacturing.  The union 
remained represented by two local shop stewards supported by full time union 
officials as required.  The Agreement reiterated the commitment of parties to changes 
negotiated as part of the 1991 Site Agreement, with a further commitment from 
unions that members would increase their skill levels in order to: 
!"undertake all duties in the skill structure so the team can use those skills on an at-need basis 
!"undertake training after hours if it could not be done during normal hours at single time 
subject to attendance at training courses being voluntary (AA, FIMEE, NUW 1993) 
 
On top of the wage increase management agreed to a team bonus of an additional 25% 
of the first year’s cost saving to be paid for any cost saving resulting from any 
improvement activity.  
 
It is clear from this discussion both management and unions at Auto Air accepted the 
need for a dramatic work reorganisation.  It is also clear both recognised the mutual 
benefit would result and the need for sharing of these benefits.  To this effect the 
agreements sought to compensate employees for change and to provide some security 
of employment for those willing to undertake training for multi-skilling.  The 
Agreements were facilitated by institutional reforms introduced by the AIRC enabling 
unions and management at the enterprise to negotiate mutual gains outcomes.  
Accordingly the first demonstration of increased workforce participation was through 
union representation.  What these agreements also enabled was support by both 
management and employees of a consultative process through the establishment of 
joint Consultative Committees as well as employee involvement as team members.  
This is summarised in Table 9.5.   
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Table 9.5 
Auto Air 
Workforce Participation and Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
ISSUES TWO TIER 
1987 
AWARD 
RESTRUCTURE 
1989 
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENT (1) 
1991  
AIRC ratified 
ENTERPRISE 
AGREEMENT (2) 
1993 
AIRC ratified 
Basic 
Employee 
Collective 
bargaining-each 
union separately 
collective bargaining collective bargaining 
through a Single 
Bargaining Unit 
collective bargaining 
Single Bargaining 
Unit 
  participation on joint 
Consultative 
Committee for AAG 
and AA 
  
Production  collective bargaining collective bargaining collective bargaining 
  participation on joint 
Consultative 
Committee for AAG 
and AA 
participation on joint 
Consultative 
Committee for AAG 
and AA 
participation on joint 
Consultative 
Committee for AAG 
and AA 
   
 
individual 
participation in 
teams 
 
 
 
 
It is clear institutional workplace reform at Auto Air was supported by workforce 
participation.  Accordingly a more detailed exploration of the practice of this 
relationship is appropriate.  Before so doing the nature of the third workplace reform 
process – best practice – is presented. 
 
Best Practice Reform 
 
As explained in Chapter Eight the expansion of Auto Air into the Auto Air Group was 
accompanied by development of a broader long-term strategy.  This was assisted in 
1989 by participation of the Managing Director of Auto Air Group in an automotive 
industry study tour of companies in the USA had adopted principles of lean-
production3.  However it was not until January 1992 that there were any observable 
change to company operations.  The Manager Human Resources explained the delay 
as caused not by a lack of willingness to change but because of the magnitude of the 
change (Manager Human Resources July 1 1993).  This required managerial and 
employee support for the change.  A summary of the changes undertaken as part of 
                                                 
3 The same study tour attended by the Managing Director of Auto Electrical mentioned in Chapter 5.  
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best practice reform is provided in Table 9.6.  These are explained in more detail 
below. 
Table 9.6 
Auto Air 
Best Practice Reform 
 
GOALS Auto Air Experience 
 
Strategy  formal, integrated strategy developed in 1992 
OPERATIONAL 
PRACTICES 
 
Organisational structures permanent teams –(semi-autonomous-work-groups) 
Technology significant investment planned within a year 
External relations driven by competitive considerations 
Process improvement techniques guided by the concept and the people 
People management  integrated human resources/industrial relations approach 
INFORMATION ENABLERS  
measurement and control 
systems 
macro data supplemented by measures for specific purposes 
CULTURAL ENABLERS  
Change leadership steady change leadership 
Empowerment direct employees have substantial or full control over own work 
 
This summary shows the company embraced an integrated change process in 
conformance to best practice principles.  First, the strategy adopted was formal and 
integrated.  Second, permanent teams were established for both direct and indirect 
employees.  Third, significant investment in technology was planned.  Fourth, external 
relations were driven by competitive considerations.  Fifth, the company developed an 
integrated human resources/industrial relations approach to people management.  
Sixth, macro data was supplemented by measures for specific purposes.  Seventh, both 
managers and union representatives demonstrated steady change leadership.  Finally, 
direct employees were empowered to have substantial or full control over their own 
work.   
 
The section below provides a detailed description of the Strategy developed by the 
company and the organisational restructure.  Outcomes from this strategy as perceived 
by the company conclude this section.  Details of the changes to people management 
and employee empowerment are provided in the section dealing specifically with 
workforce participation associated with best practice reform. 
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Strategy 
 
In 1992 the Executive management team released an integrated ‘Five Year Plan’ for 
the Auto Air Group.  The Manager Human Resources stated this Plan actually 
formalised a strategy that had been evolving for some years rather than producing a 
totally new strategy divorced from existing changes (Manager Human Resources July 
1 1993). The Mission adopted for the Group was stated as follows: 
Auto Air will design, manufacture and supply to the global automotive industry components 
and systems which will meet the highest of its customers’ expectations in quality, value and 
technology (AAG 1992b). 
 
Along with this strategy Corporate Goals were identified.  These were:  
!"To compete in the global economy 
!"To produce high quality and reliable products delivered on time  
!"To undertake continuous improvement in all activities 
!"To support individual initiative and excellence within a team building environment 
!"To provide: 
⇒ appropriate returns to shareholders 
⇒ the provision of value to customers 
⇒ satisfying and rewarding work to employees  
⇒ rewarding and profitable business for suppliers.  
 
Although developed by the executive management team, the Managing Director 
explained the strategy to all employees in small discussion groups allowing for 
employee response (Manager Human Resources July 1 1993). 
 
The strategy adopted by the company recognised the importance of developing its 
employees.  This is illustrated by the action taken on training for literacy and 
numeracy and on providing the means for female employees to take advantage of 
skills development opportunities.  First, turning to literacy and numeracy of 
employees.  In 1991 the company obtained government support to develop literacy 
and numeracy of its employees through classes run by the Australian Migrant English 
Services.  The 30 employees who had tested ‘poor’ in reading and writing skills were 
placed in literacy and numeracy classes for three hours per week during normal 
working hours (Jones 1994).  This was followed by development of a comprehensive 
training schedule estimated to cost almost 60% of the company budget for the ABPDP 
reform project (Manager Human Resource July 1 1993).   Second, turning to equal 
opportunity.  The company adopted an integrated approach to equal employment 
opportunity and affirmative action into all aspects of company activity.  For example 
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training for upskilling took particular notice of the importance of women to the 
company “upskilling of the existing employees….particular recognition of the fact 
women form an integral and important role within the company” (AA HRD 1994).  In 
accordance with this approach between 1992 and 1993 a number of changes were 
introduced including the: 
!"elimination of sex demarked jobs traditionally associated with some equipment and 
machinery through the skills based classification structure.   
!"broadening of the scope of duties for secretaries into administrative roles.  This included 
attendance at meetings, liasing with customers on basic technical matters and developing 
basic engineering knowledge of skills relevant to the company product. 
!"replacement of all sexist and male titles with gender free skills based titles. 
!"introduction of a structured literacy and numeracy training program to allow for family and 
private commitments.   
!"introduction of some flexibility in the application of conditions of employment to 
accommodate family and personal needs.  For example sick leave could be taken in single 
days without medical certificate and time could be taken off during the day to attend short 
appointments without loss of pay if it was prearranged with the team leader. 
!"increase in the ability to undertake part time employment  
!"inclusion of females in training courses dealing with the principles of the Systems Unit 
!"dedication of a complete day of the ‘Leadership 2000 Training Program’ to discussion of 
issues around Equal Employment Opportunity and sexual harassment. 
!"inclusion of females on the Consultative Committees (AA HRD 1994).   
 
The outcome of these measures was that there was a 40% increase in female 
attendance in literacy training.  By 1993 all but three of 16 women working in 
production were assessed at the C13 skills level, with the remaining women awaiting 
assessment to higher skills levels and two females trained to drive and operate 
forklifts4.   
 
In 1992 AA was successful in its submission, based on the Group Plan, to become part 
of the Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program (ABPDP).  In its submission 
the company stated the purpose of the best practice project was to adopt lean 
production principles: 
to develop a workplace culture which accepts, adopts and practices the philosophy of Lean 
Manufacturing in place of the traditional Western production system (AA 1992). 
 
The proposal reiterated the specific business objective: 
to raise the level of quality, productivity, time usage, cost effectiveness, and people abilities to 
a level which is comparative to the world best component manufacturers system (AA 1992) 
 
The key activities to be undertaken as part of the project were stated as: 
!"an extension of lean manufacturing and teams  
!"the development of performance measures 
                                                 
4 Postscript: In 1994 the company was awarded the Business Review Weekly Affirmative Action Award 
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!"the commencement of benchmarking 
!"the continuation of the development of competency based training 
!"an expansion of literacy and numeracy education 
!"the dissemination of the company’s best practice experience to Australian industry 
 
Thus, by the end of 1992 AA had not only adopted the rhetoric of the Group strategy 
but had also taken positive steps to ensure translation of the rhetoric into practice.  
Moreover, although management developed the Strategy, it was communicated to the 
workforce as a two-way communication process.  Finally, union support was required.  
The company also showed it was not concerned about external scrutiny of its strategy.    
 
Operational Practice 
 
As the first step in implementation of this strategy in 1992 a major organisational 
restructure was started.  This work reorganisation took place in four stages.  In the first 
stage, as mentioned above, production was reorganised into Semi-Autonomous-Work-
Groups.  In the second stage support services were similarly restructured into semi-
autonomous-work-groups (termed business units).  In the third stage departments were 
reorganised into three principle streams of activities.  In the final stage a managerial 
restructure occurred.  These stages are described in detail below. 
 
i) Stage One. 
 
The first stage of the restructure was reorganisation of production.  This was 
negotiated through the enterprise agreement and implemented in January 1992 (AA & 
FIMEE, NUW & TWU 1991).  The new production process replaced the previous 
flow-lines with four self-managing teams.  This is shown in Figure 9.1.  
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Figure 9.1 
Auto Air 
Organisational Chart-Manufacturing 1992 
   
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
  
  
    
    
                                                                                                                                                          
Team 1
Receiving & Despatch
Team Leader & Members
Team 2
Ford/Mazda & Isuzu/Hyundai
Team Leader & Members
Team 3
MMAL & GMH
Team Leader & Members
Team 4
Evaporators Org. Group
Team Leader & Members
Manufacturing
Manager
Operations
Director
 
Source: AA HRD Organisational Chart 1992 
 
Two of the teams were customer-based [Ford/Mazda and Isuzu/Hyundai, and 
Mitsubishi (MMAL) and GMH].  The third team, because of the complexity 
associated with the many suppliers to this essentially assembly plant, remained as a 
receiving and despatch team.  It was the company’s intent to reduce suppliers by 
introducing a smaller, and local, ‘family of suppliers’, and thus eventually this team 
would be again reorganised to form a third customer-based team.  However, this had 
not been achieved during the time under review.  The fourth team housed the 
company’s only evaporator unit required by each of the customer-based teams.  This 
team was reorganised into a customer-based, MMAL, team in June 1992 following 
purchase of several new evaporators.  There was also a small group formed including 
a production engineer, a maintenance fitter, an apprentice fitter, and a tool store co-
ordinator to assist the teams.  All team leaders reported to the Manager 
Manufacturing.  The position of Manager Warehouse was removed as part of the 
reorganisation.  Finally, management identified six goals for the teams aimed to 
increase motivation.  The six goals were customer satisfaction, integration, change in 
workplace culture and environment, employee involvement, skill formation, and 
continuous improvement.   
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Each of the two customer-based teams was made up of 20 employees, mainly process 
workers, a small number of warehouse and stores employees, and a production 
planner.  Thus three previously separate functions (production planning, assembly and 
storage) were bought together under one process.  Each team had a team leader chosen 
by management, however employees were given the opportunity to join the team 
leader of their choice.  This did cause an initial difficulty with one team leader being 
the choice of most employees, and management having to encourage some employees 
to volunteer for the alternate team.  However within six months, no member of this 
team wanted to leave it when they had the choice to joint the newly created third 
customer-based team (Manager Human Resources September 28 1992).   
 
Each team was responsible for total product assembly for the specified customer.  This 
included internal materials movement, assembly, despatch of final product to the 
receiving team, and communication with the customer.  It was the stated intent that all 
employees would be trained to be multi-functional and multi-skilled to provide teams 
with maximum internal flexibility.  A process worker was trained and promoted as a 
trainer to ensure this training was co-ordinated.  Finally, the physical layout of 
production was changed to locate sub-components close to production.  
 
Turning to the receiving and despatch team.  This team had only 11 employees given 
its role was reduced to dealing only with external customers and suppliers not with 
internal materials movement.  The team worked closely with the Quality Department 
in line with the new QOSS, especially as it concerned ‘off-tool samples’ of new sub-
components.  By 1993 the team had only nine members and reduced functions, but 
still existed as a separate team. 
 
A cultural change to assist the structural change was planned in the restructuring 
process.  First, physical reorganisation of the manufacturing facility was achieved not 
by using external contractors but rather by employing volunteer employees and 
managers from the company during the Christmas shutdown to reposition storage and 
repaint the facility.  Meetings of team members, specialists, and managers followed 
this before the teams began.  During Focus Groups held in January 1991 typical 
employee responses were as follows to the question: 
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‘What needs to be done to assist the successful implementation of teams?’ 
!"Communication needs to improve to provide links between teams 
!"Employees need to be better informed of the team concept 
!"Employees need to be encouraged to positively support the team process 
!"What happens if you don’t want to work in a team? 
!"How are roles within a team determined? 
!"Employees need to be trained in all skills 
!"A system for relieving workers needs to be developed 
!"Workers need to be encouraged to be innovative 
!"Quality standards need to be clear and understood by all 
!"Language skills needed to be improved (Focus Groups A January 3 & 4 1992). 
  
These responses suggest employees recognised the need for group dynamic and 
communication skills as well as technical skills if they were to perform as a SAWGs.  
In response a flexible training program was designed in consultation with each team.  
It was also agreed to hold brief team meetings at the beginning and end of each day for 
the purpose of discussing job scheduling and other issue.  Finally, a literacy training 
program for the largely overseas born workforce was designed.  
 
Thus the company developed a training and communication strategy it hoped would 
assist a cultural change to complement the structural change.   
 
ii) Stage Two 
 
The second stage of the restructure was reorganisation of separate service departments 
into cross-functional SAWGs (business units).  This restructure was introduced in 
June 1992.  The new structure replaced the previous separated departments of 
Engineering, Production Engineering, Marketing, Technical Support and Service, 
Drafting and Design, and Purchasing, with three customer-based business units 
(GMH, Ford/Mazda, and Mitsubishi).  This is shown in Figure 9.2.   
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Figure 9.2  
Auto Air 
Organisational Chart-Business Units 1992 
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Source: AA HRD Organisational Chart July 1992 
 
Each Business Unit had a co-ordinator appointed by management.  These co-
ordinators reported to the Manager Engineering, and the Manager Sales.  The Team 
Leader from each of the three production teams was also considered to the part of the 
Unit, although not on a permanent basis.  Production Team Leaders were expected to 
attend weekly meetings with Business Unit Co-ordinators as the means to developing 
the concept of ‘design for manufacturability’.  A fourth Business Unit was added in 
1993 to provide specialist support in testing and laboratory areas. 
 
The size of the Business Units varied from nine employees (Mitsubishi) to 15 
(Ford/Mazda), with 13 servicing GMH.  Each Unit included a specialist from 
Marketing, Engineering, Service, Technical, Drafting, Production Engineering, 
Patterns, Purchasing, and a secretary.  There was a shared representative from After-
Market, Technical Support, Electronics, and Drawing.  Within a year a further, 
smaller, Business Unit of Specialists was created.  This consisted of specialist 
engineers and technicians/technical officers who had previously been located in the 
quality testing area of the Quality Department.  Once again this reorganisation was 
accompanied by the physical relocation of specialists into an open-plan office located 
closer to production.  There was also a secretary shared between the Units. 
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This reorganisation resulted in much greater resistance than in production.  The 
following responses were typical of those given in response to the question: 
‘What are your main concerns about moving to the new business unit structure?’  
!"Loss of status 
!"Loss of secretarial support 
!"Open planned office does not ensure privacy 
!"Production team members do not understand 
!"Physical move to a new building 
!"Different employees receive different remuneration 
!"Engineers do a different job and need to be separated (Focus Group B October 14 1992). 
 
It is clear from these replies that specialists were less prepared than production 
employees to accept the changes introduced by the reorganisation.  Objections from 
specialists centred upon their lack of status and autonomy from the change rather than 
concern as to whether they had the skills for team interactions.  This led to the 
company embarking upon a number of further changes to encourage a leadership style 
by both specialists and managers.  The most significant was the adoption of a 
‘Leadership 2000’ training course designed to develop “a strong group of leaders 
within the company capable of ensuring continued growth and competitiveness in a 
team based organisational environment” (AA 1992b).  
 
The reorganisation into Business Units did not affect the structure of several 
departments.  This included the Departments of International Accounts, 
Finance/Management Information Systems, and Quality Assurance (although the 
creation of the fourth business unit in 1993 removed the quality test area from the 
Quality Assurance Department).  Within Manufacturing several departments also 
remained intact - Human Resources and Supply.   
 
iii) Stage Three 
 
The third stage of the operational practice restructure began in 1992.  This 
reorganisation aimed to develop cross-departmental links by producing three clusters 
of activity: 
• customer opportunity and product development - Departments of Engineering, Sales 
and International Business.   
• product development and product manufacture - Departments of Finance and Human 
Resource Management.   
• product manufacture and customer supply - Departments of Quality, Supply and 
Manufacturing. 
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Although functional responsibility did not change, it was hoped a strategic planning 
focus would develop within these clusters.  Departmental groupings appear to suggest 
management envisaged, first, the international customer market would be built upon 
state-of-the-art technology through engineering.  Second, product development was 
seen as having both people and cost related components.  This explains company 
commitment to the institutional workplace reform.  Third, it appears management 
envisaged a link between production and logistics in ensuring quality of both product 
and delivery scheduling of inputs from suppliers and outputs to customers.  A further 
advance in this area was the adoption of a scheme to encourage local suppliers to the 
Whitegoods industry to expand into the automotive industry (Business Unit Co-
ordinator Marketing October 12 1992).   
 
iv) Stage Four 
 
Finally, in mid 1992 a managerial restructure of the Auto Air Group created an 
executive management team to function as a strategic planning group.  The Auto Air 
Group Strategy team comprised six Directors – three non-executive and three 
executive directors (Managing Director, Financial Director, and Operations Director).  
Reporting to these Directors were eight senior managers from Auto Air representing 
Engineering, Sales, and International Business (to the Managing Director); Human 
Resources, Quality, Supply, and Manufacturing (to the Operations Director) and 
Finance (to the Finance Director).  The new structure is shown in Figure 9.3.   
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Thus implementation of reforms in line with best practice reforms principles within 
Auto Air encompassed a broad range of change associated with an organisational 
restructures.  This changed the production process to one built on lean production 
principles.  This is summarised in Table 9.7. 
Table 9.7 
Auto Air  
Work Organisation: Pre 1992 and Post 1992  
 
 MASS PRODUCTION Pre 1992 
 
LEAN PRODUCTION-1992 
Management centralised – hierarchical centralised flat 
Process  standardised by industrial engineers standardised by teams 
Product Design superior performance systems units 
designed to environmental standards 
no design for manufacturability 
management and industrial engineers 
superior performance systems units 
designed to environmental standards 
design for manufacturability encouraged 
by production team-business unit 
interface 
Market Segment local Australian market  
developing export and joint ventures 
local Australian market  
developing export and joint ventures 
Departments segmented, functional integrated, cross functional 
Product Quality  quality inspection post production 
no continuous quality improvement 
no employee involvement 
 
TQM built into semi-autonomous work 
teams for continuous quality 
improvement. 
direct employee involvement 
Job design narrow, individual, tasks based 
limited job rotation and flexibility 
broad, multi-tasked and multi-skilled 
flexible 
Skills and Depth 
of Knowledge 
low skills in production - emphasis on 
experience rather than qualifications in 
specialist support  
emphasis on developing high skill base 
through formal training and experience 
Human Resource 
Management 
Reactive 
 
progressive-especially in training, and 
equal employment opportunity 
Industrial 
Relations 
adversarial- strong union co-operative 
 
First, management became flatter although it was still centralised.  Second, more 
employees became involved in product and process design as departments were 
integrated into cross-functional units.  This also resulted in jobs being designed on a 
broader skill basis.  These links suggested improved communication flows between 
functions and established the basis for ‘design for manufacturability’.  Third, these 
new teams and business units were customer-based in an attempt to improve 
communication with both customers and suppliers.  This was further developed in 
1993 when teams were computer-linked to the customer by Electronic Data 
Interchange.  Greater flexibility in work allocation was made possible by the 
replacement of task based jobs with skill based work.  Finally industrial relations 
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became less adversarial as a co-operative approach to enterprise agreements was 
developed 
 
Although it is difficult to precisely assess the outcome of these changes for Auto Air it 
is interesting that in 1993 the performance self-assessment results, as summarised in 
Table 9.8, were recorded.  
Table 9.8 
Auto Air Group 
Performance Target Status-September 1993 
 
Performance Target 1992/3 
 
Status Sept 1993 
markets serviced-exports products sold in 18 new markets 
sales 18% increase over 1992 
new products increase in refrigerant models 
market share. New orders, eg Magna, will see growth 
strategic alliances  four or five new relationships 
customers eight new customers 1992-3 
customer perception better but fragile 
delivery performance erratic but higher focus 
quotation success rate achieved Commodore and Magna 
product development and manufacturing lead time improving slowly under more control 
productivity and efficiency -  lower than target but slow improvement  
product costs slightly improved 
work-in-progress reduced, further improvement needed 
out-of-stock incidence reduced substantially 
inventory levels, inventory turnover targets not achieved 
warranty not yet controlled 
scrap/rejects no measurable improvement 
skills and training increased and more relevant 
job satisfaction increasing 
motivation growing 
communication inadequate but more honest and issue focussed 
frustration focussed on inability to solve problems 
teamwork/co-operation progressing, more customer focussed 
Source: AAG 1993a 
 
Sales increased between 1992 and 1993 by 18%, with product being sold in 18 new 
markets and eight new customers added.  There were new orders for the Magna, the 
new GMH model and new Mitsubishi model.  There had also been an increase in the 
number of models supplied and several new strategic alliances had been forged.  
Customer perception of product had improved, although it was recognised that further 
effort was required.  On the other hand delivery performance, product development 
and manufacturing lead-time required further attention.  Productivity and efficiency 
showed some improvement but needed continuous attention.  There was some 
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reduction of work-in-progress and out-of-stock incidence and a slight improvement in 
product costs, but targets for inventory and turnover had not been reached.  Warranty 
was still a problem, as were scrap and rejects.  Training had resulted in increased 
workforce skills, increased job satisfaction and motivation, and more teamwork and 
co-operation.  However it was recognised that successful problem solving required 
better communication.  
 
Thus by 1993, improvements had been recorded for the Auto Air Group related to the 
changes introduced.  What is interesting is what was the relationship between these 
reform and workforce participation?  Table 9.9 shows workforce participation was 
associated with best practice reform. 
Table 9.9 
Auto Air 
Workforce Participation and Best Practice  
 
GOALS CHANGE 
 
WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION 
strategy  
 
formal, integrated strategy 
developed 1992-  
workforce informed through briefings 
OPERATIONAL 
PRACTICES 
  
organisational structures permanent teams –(SAWGs) employees in teams 
representation through union 
technology significant investment planned 
within a year 
representative participation through 
Consultative Committees 
external relations driven by competitive 
considerations 
employees in teams directly dealing with 
customers and suppliers 
process improvement 
techniques 
guided by the concept and the 
people 
employees in teams 
representation through unions 
people management  integrated human 
resources/industrial relations 
approach 
co-operative approach to unions  
representative participation through joint 
consultative groups 
employees in PIGs 
INFORMATION 
ENABLERS 
  
measurement and control 
systems 
macro data supplemented by 
measures for specific purposes 
employees in teams 
CULTURAL 
ENABLERS 
  
change leadership steady change leadership new management leadership role  
empowerment direct employees have 
substantial or full control over 
own work 
participation in teams 
 
It is evident employees participated on a daily basis as team members as well as being 
represented on a number of Consultative Committees.  Given this the question of 
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relevance is what was the experience of this participation.  This is explored in the next 
section. 
 
Workforce Participation 
 
Each of the workforce reforms implemented by Auto Air was associated with some 
form of workforce participation.  The experience of participation at Auto Air shared 
some characteristics with the other case studies as it complemented rather than 
replaced collective bargaining by unions representing employees and managerial 
decision-making.  However differences in approach within Auto Air are also evident.  
First, local shop stewards played a larger role.  Over time effective team processes 
served to reduce the need for unions as alternate sources of authority (Shop Steward 
FIMEE September 21 1992).  Second, management accepted increased workforce 
participation required a new leadership style at all levels of management.  For 
example typical responses from first line managers were as set out below to the 
question - ‘How do you think your job will change with award restructuring?’ 
!"Greater level of responsibility 
!"Less job pressure as responsibility is dispersed 
!"More involvement in training and problem solving 
!"Move to coaching, counselling role of work teams 
!"More time spent on monitoring progress of teams and helping to assess competencies 
!"Change from direct supervision to a co-ordinator, trainer, technical advisor role 
!"A more supportive role (AA HRD 1990b). 
 
It was accepted that this required managers to develop new skills.  This is 
demonstrated by typical responses to the question – What new skills will be needed to 
carry out your new job?’: 
!"Broader managerial skill 
!"Co-ordination 
!"Training 
!"Industrial relations 
!"Communication (AA HRD 1990b) 
 
Accordingly, there is evidence managers accepted that workers required a supportive 
managerial culture for increased workforce participation to be successful.  The 
company did provide such skills training for both employees and management.  This 
had been largely ignored in the other two case studies.  Third the company 
experimented with different forms of participation over time.  Fourth, communication 
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was improved to ensure employees were informed of changes before they occurred.  
Finally, workforce participation, both direct and representative, became an important 
integrating factor in the reforms.  However there were differences in approach and 
outcome between direct and representative participation as described in the next 
section. 
 
Direct Participation 
 
Direct workforce participation by individual workers at Auto Air was took a number 
of forms.  First there was direct participation of employees in quality circles, termed 
Process Improvement Groups (PIGs), as part of quality reform.  Second there was 
direct participation of employees in cross-functional, customer-based SAWGs, as part 
of institutional workplace and best practice reform.  The next section explores 
company experience with direct employee involvement in PIGs. 
 
Process Improvement Groups 
 
PIGs were established in 1990 to explore suggestions for process improvements and to 
make suggestion for change to management.  Specific quality issues targeted for 
improvement included - reduced scrap and downtime, improved methods and safety, 
and reduced customer problems.  Each PIG was made up of a leader chosen by 
management (usually a foreperson or leading hand), two process operators from the 
immediate area under analysis, plus a representative from another area and a 
representative from the Production-Engineering Department.  Each Group met for 
three hours, once a week.  Management gave a commitment no employee would be 
made redundant as a result of any suggestions arising from the PIGs.  To encourage 
employee participation the company offered to send all members of the PIG judged to 
have made the greatest contribution to the annual Calsonic Quality Circle Conference 
in Japan to present their achievement.   
 
Recommendations from the PIGs throughout 1990 and 1991 resulted in significant 
cost savings for the company as shown Table 9.10.  Overall more than $370,000 
savings were made as a result of recommendations from the PIGs.  Although this 
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resulted in lesser overall cost reduction for the company as management had agreed 
employees displaced by recommendations would be transferred to other sections of 
the company. 
Table 9.10 
Auto Air 
Process Improvement Group Projects 1990-1991 
ISSUE JOB ACTION SAVINGS TIMING 
Process 
Redesign 
P&A small parts packaging  $10,240 February to May 
1990 
Labour Sub Assembly  reduce two operators $115,400 June to September 
1990 
Labour Assembly line reduce one operator $57,700 September to 
October 1990.  
Process 
Redesign 
Production –general re-use and sell boxes $29,700 September to 
October 1990. 
Job Redesign Production combine three labels into 
one 
$10,518 October to 
November 1990 
Labour Assembly line reduce one operator $57,700 October to 
December 1990 
Process 
redesign 
P&A reduce rework kits  May to November 
1991 
Process 
redesign 
Assembly line jig and process 
improvement 
 June to November 
1991 
Process 
redesign 
Warehouse new packaging system  June to November 
1991 
Process 
redesign 
Production  deletion of testing 
process 
$2,500 June to October 
1991 
Process 
redesign 
Warehouse cardboard recycling $58,000 June to November 
1991 
Job Redesign Production  reduce waste -new 
technology  
$7,500 June to October 
1991 
Process 
redesign 
Production reduce process  $23,500 July to December 
1991 
TOTAL    $372,758  
Source: AA PIGs 1991 
 
Despite these gains suggestions for quality improvement remained confined to the 
PIGs and did not extend through the company generally as part of day to day 
production.  The Manager Human Resources blamed this on the limited number of 
employees involved in PIGs, and the temporary nature of PIG meetings.  Employees 
demonstrated quality had not become a continuous improvement activity by their 
concern with how quality would be handled in the new teams (Manager Human 
Resources September 28 1992).  Typical questions repeated in Focus Groups held 
January 1992 were: 
How will we know what are the accepted quality standards? 
Who will measure/monitor quality standards? (Focus Group A January 3 & 4 1992).   
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These questions show a continuing reliance on specialists from the Quality 
Department and managers for assessment of product quality.   
 
Thus direct participation by a small number of self-selected process workers in 
temporary quality circles resulted in limited workforce participation, with quality 
assessment remaining principally a post-production activity by quality experts rather 
than a continuous improvement process by employees.  The second form of direct 
participation was SAWGs. 
 
Semi-Autonomous Work Groups 
 
Workforce participation under the best practice changed the nature of direct 
participation from temporary activity within PIGs to permanent activity within semi-
autonomous-work-teams.  A summary of workforce participation associated with best 
practice reform is provided in Table 9.11.  
Table 9.11 
Auto Air 
Workforce Participation and Best Practice Reform  
 
Elements of Best Practice Method of Participation 
 
Extent of Participation 
organisational 
structures 
direct participation through teams semi-autonomous work teams 
empowerment - direct 
employees 
direct employees have substantial 
or direct control over daily work 
daily team meetings 
direct contact with suppliers and 
customers through MRPII 
 
 
This shows employee empowerment associated with the SAWGs.  The replacement of 
supervisor controlled production-line processes by self-managing teams led to direct 
participation by the production workforce in day-to-day activities of the company.  
Employees perceived they would be empowered to make decisions about a broader 
range of issues.  However these related principally to immediate work area production 
and basic employee issues, rather than production issues of broader company 
relevance as demonstrated by the following typical responses to the question –  
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‘What issues do you think team members will have to decide?’  
Basic Employee 
!"health and safety 
!"amount of workplace resolutions  
Production 
!"exchange of jobs within the team 
!"replacement for an absent team leader  
!"sharing rotten jobs 
!"replacement of sick team members 
!"rotation of jobs 
!"time management 
!"housekeeping 
!"skills development 
!"allocation of tasks 
!" overtime 
!"team representation at meetings 
!"dealing with internal team problems 
!"communication with other teams 
!"efficiency (Focus Groups A January 3 & 4 1992). 
 
These responses suggest employees perceived their role within the teams as primarily 
concerned with immediate work area production issues such as work methods 
communication, quality, and efficiency.  Basic employee issues of terms and 
conditions of employment, wages, staffing/manpower, absence, and such were left to 
traditional collective bargaining, while strategic issues of company future were left to 
management.  However within two years team responsibility for production issues had 
broadened to include reduction of absenteeism (a traditional collective bargaining 
issue).  Furthermore in 1992 teams were given responsibility for the Electronic Data 
Interface with customers.  This had strategic implications for the company.  Team 
responsibility continued to increase until in 1993 they were given responsibility for 
their own budgets, including decisions on overtime and short-term labour 
requirements.  Finally in that year team members in one team participated in 
interviews for a new team leader.  Soon after all team members were trained in the 
development and monitoring of Critical Success Factors and related KPIs.   
 
Thus direct participation introduced as part of best practice reform increased employee 
empowerment in production decisions involving their immediate work area, and 
provided opportunity for input into company level production and strategic decisions.  
 
In summary direct participation developed from a part-time to a full-time activity 
under best practice reform as shown in Table 9.12. 
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Table 9.12  
Auto Air Direct Workforce Participation 
 
Methods of Workforce Participation Extent of Workforce Participation 
 
information sharing Managing Director in small groups about company 
strategy 
training specialists 
 employee volunteers in PIGs 
 literacy and numeracy  
 communication and group process techniques 
 leadership 
 as EEO 
PIGs employee volunteers  
SAWGs  production workers and specialists  
 
Direct workforce participation had minimal affect on the company until the 
production process was reorganised as part of the adoption of lean production 
principles associated with best practice reform.  Despite these changes developing 
employee confidence in their ability to make decision required significant training, 
regular information sessions and a gradual development of responsibility for 
production issues of more general import to the company.  It also required managers 
to be trained in new leadership techniques required to ensure employees were 
encouraged to involve themselves.  Indeed the company requested the government to 
allow it to spend more money on training before it attempted development of 
benchmarks.  Turning now to representative participation. 
 
Representative Workforce Participation 
 
Within Auto Air representative workforce participation has a long history and is more 
diverse than direct participation.  It became, in its various guises, central to the 
integration of the reform processes.  Consultative Committees were the most typical. 
Following the limited response to the first-tier proposal, in 1988 Auto Air established 
the first of several Consultative Committees (AA EPG 1988).  This Employee 
Participation Group (EPG) was established to replace previous ad-hoc meetings 
between management and shop stewards.  The EPG continued to function throughout 
the period under review although it met less regularly during periods when specific 
issue Consultative Committees were operating.  For example in 1990 the Auto Air 
Award Restructuring Working Party Committee (ARWPC) was established to assist 
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company implementation of the restructured Metal Industry Award (AA ARWPC 
1990).  This Working Party was supported at Auto Air Group level by an Award 
Restructuring Steering Committee (ARSC), (AA ARSC 1990a).  This Steering 
Committee was never formally disbanded although in 1992 a Training Consultative 
Committee was established that effectively took over what had become the role of the 
Committee.  Existing alongside these Consultative Committees was a Productivity 
Bargaining Group established in 1991 to negotiate an Enterprise Agreement.  All these 
committees appeared to exist harmoniously without problems of either duplication or 
demarcation through good informal relationships.  As shown in Figure 9.4 each of the 
three consultative forums continued to meet during the period under review, albeit at 
differing levels of intensity. 
Figure 9.4 
Auto Air and Auto Air Group Consultative Committee  
Meetings 1989-1993 
Source: AA EPG 1988-1992; AA ARSC 1990-1993; AA ARWPC 1990-1993. 
 
Meeting frequency of the EPG declined as the activity of the ARWPC and the ARSC 
increased.  In 1992 the Training Consultative Committee effectively replaced the 
ARSC, meeting monthly until the company became part of the metal industry pilot 
study to test the new skills structure.  Given the existence and activity of these 
Consultative Committees, what is of interest is the influence these committees had 
within the company.  The activities of each committee will be explored separately. 
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Employee Participation Group (EPG) 
 
The EPG was established in 1988 following unsuccessful attempts to trade workplace 
productivity improvements for wage increases under the second tier.  It was made up 
of four managers (Director of Production, Manufacturing Manager, Production 
Manager, and Personnel Officer) and four Shop Stewards representing the workforce 
(two were also leading hands).  Each supervisor was accorded observer status on a 
rotating basis.  The Terms of Reference stated the Group was to “make 
recommendations and decisions in the interests of the groups they represent and the 
majority of employees within the organisation” (AA EPG 1988).  Its role was 
therefore as an advisor to management  
 
The EPG began meeting on a monthly basis in January 1988 until May when meetings 
became bi-monthly.  In 1989 there were four meetings, three meetings in 1990, 1 in 
1991 and two in 1992 and 1993.  These fluctuations were apparently due not to 
decline in support for consultation but rather because other consultative forums were 
introduced.  
 
The EPG initially functioned primarily in a limited form as an information exchange 
on issues of basic employee concern as shown in Table 9.13.  Production related 
issues were confined to skills training and quality improvement.  
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Table 9.13 
Auto Air 
EPG 1988-1992 
Issues  
 
SUBJECT  ISSUE ACTION DATE 
 
Basic 
Employee 
use of non-union 
employees 
information sharing  
consultation 
May 1988 
 grievance procedure  May 1988, November 
1989 
 overtime procedure  October 1988 
 use of contractors  February 1989 
 Electronic Funds Transfer  December 1989 –from  
May 1 1990 
 award restructuring agreement to establish 
ARSC and ARWPC 
December 1989; August 
1990; February 1991 
 enterprise agreement  January 1991 
 absenteeism sub-committee report November 1990 
 hazardous maintenance 
work 
consultation May 1988 
 EEO policy and 
Sexual harassment 
guidelines 
for information December 1989, March 
1990 
 higher duties policy for information March 1990 
 unpaid leave policy for information September 1988 
 counselling and discipline 
policy 
for information August 1990 
 company newsletter, car 
parking, uniforms 
consultation December 1988, 
December 1989 
Production literacy classes consultation February 1991 
 external speaker agreement to training 
numeracy and literacy sub-
committee established 
May 1992 
 Engineering Production  
Certificate-skills training 
consultation September 1991 
 Process Improvement 
Groups established 
for information November 1989 
Source: AA EPG 1988-1992 
 
It was not until 1991 the EPG was given a larger role.  In this year it was assigned 
responsibility for administrating the new literacy-training program.  It was also 
responsible for establishment of a sub-committee to explore the reasons for, and to 
propose ways to reduce, high levels of absenteeism.  By the end of the year a Report 
from the sub-committee suggested a target of 50% reduction over 12 months be 
established.  This reduction was to be achieved by providing incentives for employees 
to reduce their absenteeism through the Award Restructuring implementation process 
such as:  
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!"multiskilling the workforce and redesigning jobs to reduce boredom 
!"providing financial incentives to decrease the non essential use of sick leave 
!"decreasing the requirement for documented evidence of sickness 
!"introducing greater flexibility in the use of Rostered-Days-Off 
!"developing incentives to break the nexus between sick leave and overtime 
!"encouraging workgroups to help each other 
!"developing an open management style 
 
These recommendations were included in the Enterprise Agreement negotiated in 
1991, and became part of operating procedures for teams 
 
Thus by 1991 the EPG had established itself as an important part of the program 
designed to assist implementation of the restructured award.  Its recommendations had 
been incorporated into the new teams.  After 1991 meetings of the EPG declined as 
teams were introduced, however the Group was never officially disbanded and in 1992 
it was reformed to provide a broad forum for consultation.   
 
Auto Air Group Award Restructuring Steering Committee (ARSC).   
 
The ARSC was established in 1989 to produce a Group strategic plan for 
implementation of the restructured Metal Industry Award.  The Committee was asked 
to develop a detailed program for information dissemination to the workforce.  It was 
also planned this Committee would negotiate an Enterprise Agreement for the Group.  
 
The Committee met five times during 1990.  Table 9.14 summarises the issues 
covered by the committee.  
Table 9.14 
Auto Air Group  
Award Restructuring Steering Committee 
Issues Discussed 
 
SUBJECT ISSUE ACTION DATE 
 
Basic Employee information kit on award restructuring agreement February, June 
1990 
 speaker on training analysis information May 1990 
 human resource manager - presentation information September 1990 
Strategy company secretary – future company information June 1990 
AA ARSC 1990c 
 
The first two meetings were devoted to reaching agreement on terms of reference and 
operating procedures for the Committee, and developing a detailed plan of activities 
for the award restructuring process.  This plan was a detailed staged and multi-facetted 
reform plan as follows: 
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!"formation of Joint Steering Committee – establishment of strategy and objectives, timetable 
and workplan, industrial negotiations and communication and education 
!"workplace briefings – joint union/management presentations on restructuring principles, 
company approach and benefits 
!"election of Working Party Committee – responsible for skills review, skills audit, work 
organisational change, skill formation and job design 
!"education program – through working party committee exploration of types of educational 
programs and delivery agents 
!"skills review – assess current jobs and skills, match them against classification, transfer old 
jobs to new structure and identify career paths 
!"skills audit – develop and administer skills audit questionnaire initially through pilot test, 
collect skills information, analyse and validate and reclassify individuals as required 
!"skills formation – establish a training committee to identify future needs, develop a master 
training plan, approach TAFE for training and develop in-house skills formation opportunities 
!"identify improvement opportunities – through environmental scan, exploration of best practice 
in technology, work practices, management practices and work environment, and implement 
change 
!"enterprise agreement – trade off between flexibility and efficiency, payment/reward system, 
new work organisation and reduction in demarcations.   
 
The plan sought to provide an integrated process to increase the flow of 
communication within the Group, as well as providing on-going training 
opportunities.  To this end the committee spent most of 1990 gathering information 
and presenting it in a useful form to the workforce.  For example an outside expert 
addressed the May meeting on how to undertake a skills audit.  At the June meeting 
the company secretary gave a presentation on company performance over the previous 
10 years.  This was followed at the September meeting by the Human Resource 
Manager summarising changes to industrial relations.  As a result the Committee 
decided to produce a regular ‘Restructuring Newsletter’ to keep the workforce 
informed of action being undertaken.  Meanwhile, committee members visited eight 
companies that had embarked on reform to learn from their experiences.  The plan 
was extremely detailed, especially as regards the many stages through which the 
process must proceed and the need for communication to be open and frequent.  This 
suggests both management and employees accepted the need for the process of 
consultation to be as transparent and detailed as possible if employees were to be 
expected to place their trust in the change process. 
 
By the end of 1990 the outcome of the Steering Committee was a detailed plan of 
activities required to increase skill levels within the company.  The Award 
Restructuring Working Party Committee (ARWPC) adopted this plan as a guide to its 
activities.  
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Award Restructuring Working Party Committee  
 
This Committee was established in 1990 as a joint-company committee for the two 
Victorian operations.  The Committee was to undertake a detailed investigation of 
productivity improvements to negotiate with unions and make recommendations to 
management.  The Committee was made up of equal numbers of management and 
workforce representatives for each of the major functional areas within the company 
(18 in total).  Many representatives on the committee held dual membership on the 
EPG.  In theory the ARWPC was responsible for all issues associated with award 
restructuring, while the EPG retained responsibility for all other issues.  In practice, 
however, the change process associated with award restructuring became so all 
encompassing there was little need, or time, for other issues to be discussed in 
alternate consultative forums.  Employee representatives were elected to the ARWPC 
on the basis they: 
!"had a good understanding of the majority of tasks completed in the work area to be represented 
!"were able to communicate effectively in the English language and to voice the views of the 
work group 
!"had credibility with the workforce 
!"were committed to the success of the restructuring process (AA ARWPC 1990:8).   
 
By having these pre-requisites it was hoped the Committee would have both 
credibility with employees and skills to perform the detailed work required.  At its 
first meeting the Committee adopted the detailed skills development program 
recommended by the ARSC.  A timetable for activities was developed as summarised 
in Table 9.15.  
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Table 9.15 
Auto Air  
Award Restructuring Working Party Committee 
1990-1991 
Restructuring Timetable 
 
ISSUES  
 
TIMETABLE 
 
SKILLS REVIEW 
identify current tasks and skills using appropriate techniques 
and develop job profiles based on skills 
October 1990 
 develop flow charts and analyse how work system functions and 
where errors occur 
November 1990 
 determine technology, work practices, management practices and 
work environment required-present and future 
on going 
NEW 
CLASSIFICATION 
STRUCTURE 
match current skill levels in new metal industry classification 
structure 
November 1990 
 identify career paths and future skill deficiencies November 1990 
 formulate proposals to steering committee for proposed changes on going 
SKILLS AUDIT develop skills review questionnaire to be completed by each 
individual 
December 1990 
 conduct pilot test and modify/revise questionnaire if necessary December 1990 
 
 distribute questionnaire and collect information February 1991 
 
 analyse information and validate data February 1991 
 match individuals into new structure March 1991 
 re-classify employees if necessary using metal industry procedure March 1991 
 report of suggestions, options and recommendations for improved 
skills formation, work organisation and job design 
on going 
Training Working 
Committee 
form a consultative committee to consult on training needs and 
priorities 
March 1991 
 develop a training plan for new classifications April 1991 
 develop objectives and expected outcomes for all training on going 
 decide on mode of execution of training on going 
 
 
monitor and evaluate against expected outcomes on going 
Source: AA ARWPC 1990a 
 
The detail in this skills development program again demonstrates the level of joint 
commitment to skills upgrading.  In the event the timetable was not adhered to as it 
was found to be too ambitious.  However, instead of rejecting the plan in 1992 the 
company established a separate Training Sub-Committee to handle all training. 
Following the initial adoption of this timetable the committee discussed a number of 
other issues associated with implementation of the new award.  These are summarised 
in Table 9.16.   
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Table 9.16 
Auto Air  
Award Restructuring Working Party Committee 
1990-1991 
Issues Discussed 
 
SUBJECT ISSUE 
 
ACTION DATE 
Basic 
Employee 
information kit   
 
consultation and information 
sharing 
September,  
October 1990 
 presentation-training for information  
 relationship to Employee 
Participation Group 
discussion and agreement to 
alternate meetings to Employee 
Participation Group 
 
 workforce understanding of 
productivity bargaining 
rotate employees through the 
committee, information briefings 
supervisor training 
 
 TAFE presentation 
 
for information December 
1990 
 absenteeism and turnover 
Employee Participation Group 
sub committee report 
consultation - 
recommendations used in 
negotiations 
May 1991 
 
 
payment for skills pay for skill acquired  
Production use of production employees in 
stores as per agreement in 1989 
discussion and agreement-
flexibility 
December 
1990  
  19 suggestions to the SBU for the 
Enterprise Agreement 
November 
1990, 
April 1991 
Source: AA ARSC 1990c; AA ARWPC 1990-1991 
 
As well as the development and dissemination to employees of a detailed information 
kit on Award Restructuring (AA ARSC 1990b) the Committee recommended detailed 
changes to work organisation and job design (AA ARSC 1990c).  These 
recommendations included both managerial and workforce related changes such as 
!"supervision improvement 
!"increase flexibility in tasks performed by production and warehouse employee 
!"increase skill levels 
!"improve housekeeping 
!"remove gender discrimination  
!"removal of overtime limits 
!"introduce flexible starting and finishing times 
!"recognise the contribution made by the PIGs 
!"improve communication with the workforce (AA ARSC 1990c) 
. 
These recommendations recognised the interrelationship between a new style of 
supervision, the need for improved communication and the removal of discrimination, 
and the introduction of more time flexibility for work, alongside improved product 
quality.  Many of these recommendations became part of  the Enterprise Agreement 
negotiated in 1991.  Thus the ARWPC played an important role in providing a joint 
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consultative forum in which recommendations for change associated with work 
organisation could be discussed amicably before becoming part of a bargaining 
process.  
 
Training Sub-Committee 
 
A joint union management Training Consultative Committee was established in 1992.  
This Committee replaced the ARWPC and enabled the company to progress the 
development of an appropriate skills based classification structure for employees.  It 
was planned in conjunction with industry level negotiations; the company would 
develop skill competencies in accord with the Engineering Production Certificate.  
These competencies would take account of the site-specific skills required by process 
workers, especially literacy and numeracy skills.  The Committee set a target of 
November 1992 for completion of this structure, however it was not completed when 
this research concluded.  This is not surprising given the complexity of the task and a 
similar delay was being experienced at industry level.  Indeed the progress made by 
the company resulted in it being included as part of joint employer/union pilot study 
of the Metals classification structure.  Thus although it had not met its target 
completion date, the Committee had made considerable progress on an extremely 
difficult issue.   
 
Before leaving this section it is appropriate to mention one other specific issue 
committee - the Safety Committee.  As mentioned in the last chapter the company had 
established a safety committee in the mid-1980s.  The Committee had been relatively 
inactive during the late 1980s as other changes were introduced.  In 1992 it was agreed 
it would be reconstituted as a joint Consultative Committee with an equal number of 
management and workforce representatives.  The aim of the new Safety Committee 
was identified as: 
to facilitate co-operation between management and employees in initiating, developing, 
carrying out and monitoring measures designed to ensure health, safety and welfare at work of 
the employees (AA Safety Committee 1992).  
 
The committee was empowered to: 
!"seek resolution of issues and formulate review and disseminate procedures and policies,  
!"consult with management on any proposed changes to practices, procedures or policies,  
!"review the rehabilitation and employment of people with disabilities 
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!"assist in the return to work of injured workers  
!"investigate accidents 
!"investigate violations of safety rules 
!"present an injury statistics report 
!"present safety promotion activities and training programs 
!"Update and review legislation and statute changes (AA Safety Committee 1992). 
 
The Committee was to make recommendations to the Company Board on Policy 
decisions expenditure requirements.  The Committee had not made any significant 
recommendations during the period under review. 
 
Thus it is clear representative participation was introduced through the Consultative 
Committees introduced under institutional reform.  As shown in Table 9.17 the 
importance of Consultative Committees developed over time.   
Table 9.17 
Auto Air 
Representative Workforce Participation 
1987-1993 
Institutional Change Method of Participation 
 
Extent of Participation 
Second tier collective bargaining full time union officials 
 elected representatives to the 
Employee Participation Group 
advisory – limited recommendations 
  basic employee and some production 
issues 
Award Restructuring collective bargaining shop stewards advised by full-time 
union officials 
 elected representatives to the 
Consultative Committees 
advisory – substantial 
recommendation re restructuring  
  basic employee, production and 
strategic issues 
Enterprise Agreements 
1991 and 1993 
collective bargaining  workforce representatives on the 
Productivity Bargaining Group 
 
Although the Committee remained advisory to management the company did 
implement several of its major recommendations.  Further, although collective 
bargaining remained the principal forum for award negotiations, local shop stewards 
were the principal negotiators rather than full-time union officials.  Finally, although 
much time was spent on basic employee issues, the development of a training plan to 
increase the skill base of employees to assist best practice was the responsibility of the 
Committee.  Indeed the Consultative Committees became important for the 
development and overseeing of an integrated best practice reform process.   
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Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation 
 
This chapter has shown that Auto Air did introduce substantial reforms resembling the 
three types of workplace reform.  These reforms were integrated as the company 
strategy evolved from its 1980 single-issue strategy (export growth) into an integrated 
best practice strategy.  The various issue based Consultative Committees served as 
useful consultative forums for discussing plans for the future and identifying the 
means (training and skills development) to ensure the workforce was able to meet 
future company requirements.  Eventually the importance of the Consultative 
Committees diminished as continuous direct participation by workers in teams 
replaced temporary direct participation by workers in quality improvement groups.  
Table 9.18 provides a summary of the relationship between each workplace reform 
under analysis in this thesis and workforce participation.   
Table 9.18 
Auto Air 
Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation 
 
Issues Direct Participation Representative Participation  
Quality 
Management 
employees trained in Statistical Process 
Control 
 
 
 
temporary problem solving Process 
Improvement Groups 
 
Institutional 
Workplace 
 collective bargaining – shop stewards 
supported by full-time union officials 
  Consultative Committees 
Best Practice work reorganisation into teams Consultative Committee 
 
Direct participation developed over time from a temporary activity concerned with a 
specific quality improvement to a permanent team activity concerned with broad-
spectrum quality improvement.  Representative participation through Consultative 
Committees became important forums for discussion of work re-organisation.  These 
Committees helped to integrate change associated with each reform to suit the 
company’s specific character. As stated by the Human Resource Manager: 
best practice is what works for your company...We do things because they work for us....It is 
not the structure but the culture and attitude that are important.  We decided to get the culture 
right first, rather than go the technical way and spend our time doing TQM, SPC and so on 
(reproduced in MacNeil 1997:42) 
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Conclusion 
 
This case study has described an Australian owned company that in 1989 faced two 
apparently conflicting market challenges.  On the one hand sales within Australia were 
declining.  On the other hand there was potential growth in both the Australian and 
export market.  The company addressed these issues by developing a two-part external 
growth strategy.  First, in the early 1980s an export strategy was developed.  Second in 
the late 1980s a growth strategy into an Auto Air Group was adopted.  By 1990 the 
Auto Air Group had grown sufficiently to successfully negotiate a profitable merger 
with a larger Australian owned non-automotive related Corporation that gave it access 
to funds for further expansion.   
 
To support this external growth strategy, management developed a plan for internal 
company change using all three workplace reform processes discussed in this thesis.  
First, as part of quality management reform temporary quality improvement groups 
were established.  Eventually permanent teams (SAWGs) replaced these temporary 
groups, with training in continuous quality improvement provided for all team 
members.  Second, institutional workplace reform was used to negotiate worker 
agreement to a fundamental reorganisation of work into teams.  Third, best practice 
principles were used to restructure the company into less segmented and hierarchical 
management structures.  Thus the company integrated each successive reform process 
into an evolutionary strategy to meet world competitive manufacturing practices.  
 
These reforms were assisted by positive managerial encouragement for increased 
workforce participation.  Individual employees were encouraged to directly participate 
in quality improvement initiatives and to become involved in training provided by the 
company to provide the appropriate knowledge and skills for problem identification 
and solution.  Over time changes were made to assist individual employees to 
participate as members of permanent quality improvement teams.  This included the 
provision of more flexible training and more control to the teams to manage their 
operations.  Workers were encouraged to elect representatives to company level 
Consultative Committees with wide ranging terms of reference.  Although these 
Committees were only advisory their recommendations were generally implemented.   
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Thus the experience of workplace reform at Auto Air was positive.  An integrated 
process of change was introduced with workforce commitment demonstrated through 
their willingness to participate both as individuals and part of a collective, and their 
acceptance of the need to upskill to assist the team system.  Management commitment 
to employee participation was also critical to the success of the overall strategy for 
workplace reform. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Aligning Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis has sought to advance understanding of the politics of workplace reform.  
It was noted in Chapter One that it is commonplace for workplace reform to be 
predicated on greater workforce participation.  However the nature of the relationship 
is not clear.  Given this the question posed for the thesis was - what is the nature of 
the relationship between workplace reform and workforce participation?  It is the task 
of this final chapter to analyse the research findings from the three case studies.  The 
chapter first restates the theory behind the research question and rationale for the 
methodology chosen.  This is followed by a comparative analysis of findings from the 
three case studies.  Finally, the conclusion as to the relationship between workplace 
reform and workforce participation is presented.   
 
In Chapter One it was argued that despite widespread agreement that workplace reform is 
required for companies seeking to remain internationally competitive, many questions 
remain as to the best means to achieve this reform.  Workforce reform was categorised 
for the purposes of this thesis under three different headings.  The first was quality 
management, defined as the need to develop a new quality consciousness focussed on 
Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI).  The second was institutional workplace reform, 
defined as collective bargaining with unions for productivity improvements in exchange 
for wage gains.  The third was best practice, defined as a comprehensive and integrated 
approach to continuous quality improvement in all facets of an organisation’s operations.  
It was argued that, notwithstanding the commitment to increased workforce participation 
in all workplace reform proposals, there is no agreement as to the form such workforce 
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participation should take.  Therefore the research question for the thesis was formulated.  
It was argued that both the complexity of the question and the dynamic relationship 
between workplace reform and workforce participation requires the research be carried 
out through longitudinal case studies of several companies.  Given the pressures on the 
Australian automotive industry by the late 1980s the three companies’ chosen, all of 
which had pursued or proposed change resembling the three types of workplace reform, 
were from within this industry.  
 
Chapter Two summarised relevant literature on workplace reform, particularly quality 
management, institutional workplace refo rm, and best practice.  It also reviewed some 
literature on workforce participation to develop the distinction between direct and 
representative forms.  The Chapter clarified terms and gave focus to the research 
question.  First, the principles and practices of the chosen workplace reform processes 
were outlined.  This showed that all three reforms fit the test for workplace reform.  They 
are all concerned with business competitiveness, the level of change is located at the 
workplace, and each operates through varying the human input into work.  It was also 
clear each reform process relies on greater employee commitment to company 
performance.  However it was found that the form of workforce participation associated 
with various workplace reform types is more difficult to determine.  There is no 
agreement in the literature on the form to be adopted in terms of the effectiveness in 
either decreasing the power imbalance between management and employees or increasing 
employee commitment to enterprise goals.  
 
Chapter Three explored the economic imperatives facing the Australian automotive 
industry and concluded that, by the late 1980s the industry faced pressures requiring 
workplace reform.  It was found that all three reform processes - quality management, 
institutional workplace reform, and best practice – were accepted and implemented by the 
industry as useful approaches to reform.  It was also found that workforce participation 
was central to such reforms.  Finally, Chapters Four to Nine presented the case study 
findings.  It is the task of this chapter to compare these findings keeping in mind the 
question raised for this thesis - what is the relationship between workplace reform and 
workforce participation?  The next section presents a comparative analysis of the case 
studies. 
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The Companies 
 
All three case study companies are SCP’s supplying product to local PMV producers.  
Table 10.1 presents a comparison of company characteristics. 
Table 10.1 
Cross Company Comparison 
Characteristics 
 
Characteristics Auto Electrical  Auto Mechanical  
 
Auto Air  
Origin 1961 1953 1967 
Ownership German Australian Australian 
  1960 – United Kingdom 1989 Australian - AAG  
  
 
1979 United States 1990 Australian company 
merger 
Decision making
Authority 
Australian Board of 
Directors (expatriate 
Germans) 
responsible to Germany 
Australian Board of 
Directors 
AA Board of Directors 
  1990 Managing Director 
 to American Board of 
Directors 
AAG Board of Directors 
  
 
 
 
1990 Board of Directors 
of 
merged company 
Market Australian PMV Australian PMV Australian PMV 
   vehicle importers 
  1990 export opportunities 1982 export plan 
Competition local 
 
local  local 
 
Each company was initially established in the period between 1950 and 1970 under 
supportive Australian government policies.  La rgely due to their foreign ownership, 
neither Auto Electrical nor Auto Mechanical had developed an export strategy.  However 
in 1990, as part of an International Corporate Strategy, Auto Mechanical was encouraged 
to produce and export a specialist component to sister companies.  The third company, 
the locally owned Auto Air, had in 1982 begun developing a strategic multi- facetted 
export strategy.  Finally, each company had traditionally held a relatively secure market 
share, with competition principally provided by locally based companies.   
 
There was little to distinguish internal structures of the companies.  Each company was 
structured according to the hierarchical and segmented principles of mass production as 
summarised in Table 10.2. 
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Table 10.2 
Cross Company Comparison 
Internal Structure 
 
Structure Auto Electrical  Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
Management hierarchical hierarchical hierarchical 
 managerial prerogative managerial prerogative managerial prerogative 
Departments segmented functional 
 
segmented functional  segmented functional  
but linked 
Employees 
 
semi -skilled process workers semi -skilled  
process workers 
semi -skilled  
process workers 
 highly qualified and skilled 
specialists 
qualified and/or  
experienced specialists 
qualified and 
experienced 
specialists 
 
In all companies a hierarchical management structure governed all decision-making.  
Departments were segmented by function, with little communication between them, 
either through management or the workforce, although in Auto Air there was some 
attempt to link departments.  Skill levels and qualifications of production workers and 
specialists differed, leading to different pay and conditions of employment.  Country-of-
origin and gender also differentiated specialists from production workers and from 
managers, with most managers and specialists being male and from English-speaking 
backgrounds (except for Auto Electrical where the German parent resulted in a majority 
German origin Board of Directors).  All these factors led to an entrenched social and 
cultural separation between production workers, and specialists and managers.  
 
These principles also determined the production process as summarised in Table 10.3.  
Production was standardised in short time cycles.  The production process was planned 
around technology and governed by quantity rather than quality considerations.  Jobs 
were designed as narrow, repetitive tasks often limited by technology.  The Award 
governing wages and conditions of workers enshrined this job design in demarcations 
used to protect employment security.  There was little independence or flexibility for the 
employee, little concern for employee welfare, and consequently an adversarial industrial 
relations culture.  Wages and working conditions were determined through collective 
bargaining at federal and industry level, with full-time union officials assisting shop 
stewards in handling local issues.  Auto Air was the most recently unionised plant, with 
the other two companies having a long history of union workforce representation. 
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Table 10.3 
Cross-Company Comparison 
Production Process and Workplace Culture 
 
Characteristics Auto Electrical  Auto Mechanical  
 
Auto Air  
Production  
Process 
standardised  standardised  standardised 
 short cycles  short cycles  short cycles  
 technological focus technological focus technological focus 
Job design narrow, individual, task 
based 
narrow, individual, task 
based 
narrow, individual, task 
based 
 limited flexibility limited flexibility limited flexibility 
 separation production and 
specialists 
separation production and 
support 
separation production and 
support 
Quality inspection post production inspection post production moving to continuous 
process  
 technological test technological test  
Human 
Resources  
reactive reactive reactive 
Industrial 
Relations 
adversarial adversarial, moving to co-
operation 
adversarial, moving to 
accommodating 
 
Thus, apart from specific product output, the single major factor distinguishing these 
companies was country of origin, which in turn influenced their marketing strategies.  All 
companies suffered from lack of natural competitive advantage, which made them 
dependent on government policy.  By the end of the 1980s all three companies were 
faced with a number of challenges resulting from the response of government and 
customers to the economic downturn.  These pressures required reforms at the workplace 
in response.  The next section explores these pressures. 
 
Pressures for Reform 
 
By the late 1980s a number of pressures faced the automotive industry.  These affected 
all three case study companies.  First, there is sales.  Auto Air recorded consistently 
higher sales than the other two companies over the period under review despite being a 
somewhat smaller and more recently established company.  Auto Mechanical, on the 
other hand, consistently recording the lowest level of sales.  As shown in Figure 10.1 
despite a gradual increase in sales by all companies in the last years of the 1980s, in 1991 
each company suffered a decline as a result of the recession and price competition from 
new domestic and South East Asian companies.  
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Figure 10.1 
Cross Company Comparison 
Total Company Sales 1988-1993 $M 
 
For Auto Mechanical further sales declines followed in 1992 until they reached a plateau 
in 1993 as the company narrowed its product range in line with the International 
Corporate Strategy.  For Auto Electrical, sales continued to decline in 1992, although a 
slight recovery was recorded in 1993.  Auto Air, on the other hand, was quick to reverse 
the 1991 slump with a steady increase in 1992 and 1993, although sales continued below 
the 1990 peak.   
 
Second, there is employment.  As shown in Figure 10.2 Auto Electrical remained the 
largest employer throughout the period under review.  Indeed the company employed 
almost double the number of persons of either of the other two companies.  
Figure 10.2 
Cross Company Comparison 
Employment 1988-1993 
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However Auto Electrical suffered an unplanned steady decline in employment from 1988 
until 1992 when adverse sales caused it to retrench workers through voluntary 
redundancy.  Both the two other companies, Auto Mechanical and Auto Air, although 
each employing only around half the workforce of Auto Electrical, varied their workforce 
according to a strategic plan.  For Auto Mechanical the steady increase in employment of 
1988 and 1989 was reversed with an offer of voluntary redundancy in 1990 as the first 
stage of implementation of its International strategy.  Auto Air followed in 1990, offering 
voluntary redundancy as the first stage of diversification into an Auto Air Group.  By 
1992 both companies had stabilised their employment, albeit at lower levels, and both 
showed signs of recovery in 1993.  
 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the future of these three companies from this 
information, although it does appear that both Auto Mechanical and Auto Air had better 
developed long term growth strategies to address economic pressures than Auto 
Electrical.  To these pressures were added demands from customers to improve quality, 
the need to improve productivity and efficiency as the government reduced protection for 
the industry.  Workplace reform to improve quality, increase employee commitment, and 
improve internal company processes.  The need for reform applied equally to all case 
study companies, however responses varied between companies.  
 
Workplace Reform 
 
In response to these pressures each company adopted a policy of structural change 
associated with all three approaches to workplace reform – quality management, 
institutional workplace reform, and best practice.  First, by 1990 each company had 
introduced tailored Quality Improvement strategies.  By 1992 each company had 
negotiated its first enterprise agreement, and by 1993 each company had committed 
itself to best practice.  The way these policies were integrated varied as shown in 
Table 10.4.  
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Table 10.4 
Cross Company Comparison  
Integrating Workplace Reform  
 
Type of 
Reform 
Auto Electrical  Auto Mechanical  
 
Auto Air  
Quality 
Management 
1988 strategy 1990 strategy 1989 strategy 
 Quality Department 
responsibility 
Quality department 
responsibility 
joint departmental 
responsibility 
 stand alone from other 
reforms  
 
partly integrated into 
enterprise agreement, but 
no direct wage trade-off 
fully  integrated into 
enterprise agreement 
Institutional 
Workplace 
Reform 
enterprise agreements 
(1991 and 1992) 
enterprise agreements 
(1992 and 1993) 
enterprise agreements 
(1991 and 1993). 
 
 
stand alone from other 
reforms  
 
partly integrated integrated with best 
practice through an 
organisational restructure 
 Corporate Services 
Department responsibility 
Human Resource 
Department responsibility 
cross departmental 
responsibility 
 quality improvement 
separated 
no link to quality 
improvement 
fully integrated quality 
improvement 
Best Practice 1993 mission 1992 Business Policies 1992 
 devised by management   devised by management 
and workforce 
representatives  
developed through 
consultation with unions 
 not integrated - 
Engineering Department 
responsibility 
cross department 
responsibility 
totally departmentally 
integrated strategy 
  
limited commitment to 
change  
 linked to quality 
improvement and best 
practice. 
 
work reorganisation on 
lean production principles  
 
Auto Electrical treated each reform as a stand-alone process.  Responsibility for each 
reform process differed between departments – the Quality Department was 
responsible for quality improvement, the Corporate Services Department was 
responsible for institutional workplace reform, while the Department of Engineering, 
Research and Development (ER&D) was assigned best practice reform.  There was no 
attempt to integrate the reforms or build one upon the other.  Indeed managers from 
the departments involved did not co-ordinate or communicate their activities to each 
other, and refused requests from worker representatives on the Consultative 
Committee for information on changes under consideration.   
 
In Auto Mechanical, although initial changes associated with quality reform were 
isolated to the Quality Department, more integration occurred with the commitment 
by managers and employees to continuous quality improvement (CQI) in the 1992 
enterprise agreement.  In 1992 workforce representatives on the joint Consultative 
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Committee participated in a joint strategy planning workshop with management 
aimed at best practice reform through World Competitive Manufacturing.  
 
Auto Air developed the most integrated approach to reform with the enterprise 
agreement negotiated with unions in 1992 used as the blueprint for work 
organisational change aimed at continuous quality improvement, increased 
productivity through implementation of lean production principles associated with 
best practice reform.  Detailed operationalisation of each of the reforms also varied 
between case studies as shown below.  
 
Quality Management Reform 
 
In each case study quality had traditionally been relegated to a post-production 
checking activity rather than a continuous part of the production process.  This 
resulted in quality improvement being considered the responsibility of the technical 
experts in the quality department with little or no involvement from other 
departments.  Lack of knowledge and skills in quality improvement techniques meant 
production workers had little opportunity to contribute to quality improvement.  In all 
cases quality reform was management initiated and controlled as shown in Table 10.5.  
Table 10.5 
Cross Company Comparison 
Quality Reform Processes  
 
 Auto Electrical  Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
Management 1989 Quality Council 1991 Quality  
Management Steering 
Committee and  
Quality Planning Team 
1989 Quality Excellence 
Strategy Committee 
Production 
employee 
limited workforce role limited workforce role initially limited workforce 
role  
 eight production workers 
trained as quality 
controllers 
window regulator line 
designed to include 
quality control 
 
 
BUT 
 focus on technological 
and quality expert 
responsibility 
focus on quality expert  
 no work reorganisation no work reorganisation  potential increased role 
through work 
reorganisation as part of 
an integrated reform 
process. 
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Each company established a managerial steering committee with responsibility for 
overseeing quality improvement.  In Auto Mechanical this Committee also included 
quality specialists who were largely responsible for the writing of a Quality Operating 
System.  None of these committees had workforce representatives.  Each committee 
reported to the existing managerial decision making hierarchy rather than establishing 
a new decision-making structure to support quality improvement.  The focus of 
attention was on technologically driven quality improvements, only in Auto Air was 
work reorganised to enable a continuous quality improvement culture to develop.  
This resulted in mixed outcomes as shown Table 10.6.  
Table 10.6  
Cross Company Comparison 
Quality Reform Outcomes 
 
Auto Electrical  
 
Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
1992 Supplier Quality 
Assurance Policy 
1992 Supplier Quality Assurance 
Policy 
1992 Supplier Quality 
Assurance Policy 
1989 Ford Q101 
1992 Ford Q1 
1991 Ford Q101 
1993 Ford Q1 
1989 Ford Q101 
1992 Ford Q1 
no continuous improvement 
culture – quality specialist 
responsibility 
no continuous improvement 
culture – quality specialist 
responsibility 
continuous quality 
improvement through integrated 
reform process 
 
Externally, all companies had by 1993 been awarded preferred supplier status by their 
respective customers, and each had developed their own family of preferred suppliers 
through their own Supplier Quality Assurance Assessment programs.  However, 
quality continued to be the regarded internally as the responsibility of quality 
specialists rather than as everyone’s responsibility through continuous quality 
improvement.  Post-production inspection by quality experts remained the principal 
means of quality assurance.  In Auto Air, although temporary quality improvement 
groups (PIGs) met on a regular weekly basis there was no evidence of problem 
solving techniques being used outside these group meetings.  Only when work was 
reorganised into teams did employees begin to take responsibility for quality 
improvement.   
 
Institutional Workplace Reform 
 
In each case study company wages and working conditions of the workforce were 
traditionally established through the Metal Industry Award.  This Award was 
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negotiated centrally by collective bargaining between full-time union officials and 
full-time employer association representatives.  Industrial relations negotiations at the 
workplace between shop stewards and management dealt chiefly with local issues 
concerning implementation of award conditions.  Reform aimed at decentralising 
negotiations over wages and working conditions to the enterprise led, in the first 
instance to minimal changes in the structure for bargaining at the workplace as shown 
in Table 10.7. 
Table 10.7 
Cross Company Comparison 
Institutional Workplace Reform Process 
 
Characteristics Auto Electrical  
 
Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
Negotiating 
Team 
union officials supported 
by shop stewards 
union official supported 
by shop stewards   
shop stewards supported 
by  union officials  
 industrial 
relations/personnel 
human resources manager 
shop steward 
human resources plus 
manufacturing manager 
 
 
Negotiations over wages and working conditions remained between the traditional 
bargaining partners, unions, and managers.  However in Auto Air the union 
negotiating team was led by company shop steward rather than the full-time union 
official, and the management team included the manufacturing manager as well as the 
human resource manager. 
 
The experience of each company demonstrates clearly the difficulty of moving from a 
centralised system to company level negotiations.  The first stage of institutional 
reform, as shown in Table 10.8, yielded limited improvements. 
Table 10.8 
Cross Company Comparison 
Institutional Workplace Reform Outcomes 
 
AIRC 
Decision  
Auto Electrical  Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
Two Tier industry wide changes  
minor task changes  
industry wide changes  
minor task changes  
industry wide changes  
Award 
Restructuring 
translation into new 
classifications 
translation into new 
classifications 
flexibility between 
production and stores 
Enterprise 
Agreement 
(1) 
limited to basic employee 
issues  
commitment to 
consultation  
introduction of SAWGs  
continuous quality 
improvement  
Enterprise 
Agreement 
(2) 
non specific changes  reaffirm first enterprise 
agreement 
strategic issue – skills 
training plan to be 
developed 
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All companies treating the new classification structure in the Metal Industry Award as 
simply a classification translation rather than a reclassification process, although Auto 
Air established a sub-committee to explore training to upgrade skills.  The only 
company to achieve any productivity improvement was Auto Air, although Auto 
Mechanical did establish the framework for improvement through consultation.  Auto 
Air negotiated agreement to work reorganisation introducing lean production 
principles with commitment to continuous quality improvement.  Thus the company 
integrated quality reform into the institutional reform process.  
 
Best Practice Reform 
 
Each case study company traditionally relied upon short term; financial performance 
planning based on annual budgets.  Performance measurement was confined to 
product output rather than process improvement, with mass production principles 
determining work organisation.  Adoption of a policy of best practice was evident by 
the early 1990s, but again varied as shown in Table 10.9.   
Table 10.9 
Cross Company Comparison 
Best Practice Reform Process 
 
 Auto Electrical  Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
 
Strategy limited strategy, driven 
by single factor (cost) 
formal evolutionary formal integrated 
External 
relations 
driven by competitive 
considerations 
driven by rational 
opportunism 
driven by competitive 
considerations 
Technology technological focus for 
change  
computerised state-of-
the-art technology to 
improve process 
technology to 
complement work 
reorganisation  
design for 
manufacturability 
Measurement 
and control 
systems  
limited to macro 
accounting and financial 
data 
macro data supplemented 
by key performance 
indicator targets  
process measurements 
Organisational 
Structure 
no active encouragement 
of team ethos 
no permanent teams but 
team ethos actively 
encouraged 
permanent teams for 
production and specialist 
support 
Process 
Improvement 
techniques 
identification of person 
from whom poor product 
had originated 
managerial concept 
rather than employee 
reality 
employees working with 
management 
 
Auto Air was the only company to develop an integrated best practice reform process 
that built upon the other two reforms.  This evolved over time as successive reforms 
were attempted.  Auto Mechanical had a written strategy that had not progressed to 
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implementation in the period under review.  On the other hand, Auto Electrical did 
not attempt to develop a strategy until 1993 and even then it was driven solely by 
considerations of cost containment rather than productivity improvements.  Auto 
Electrical did not undertake any significant restructure.  Rather technological 
leadership remained the focus of company strategy with little attention given to 
process improvement through measurement and control systems.  Although Auto 
Mechanical actively encouraged a team ethos, it relied principally upon state-of-the-
art computerised technology to improve production.  The company developed Key 
Performance Indicators with targets related to both product and processes, however 
process improvement techniques remained primarily a managerial concept  rather than 
being guided by employees.  Auto Air was the only company to embark upon 
significant work reorganisation.  In 1992 SAWGs replaced task specific functional 
flow-line production processes and skill separated service departments.  The 
restructure was supported by some investment in technology, but relied more upon 
improving processes through developing design for manufacturability and identifying 
process related measurement and control systems.  A managerial restructure aimed at 
giving employees more autonomy over operational matters complemented the work 
reorganisation and enabled managers to develop more strategic plans.  Accordingly 
outcomes varied as shown in Table 10.10.   
Table 10.10 
Cross Company Comparison 
Best Practice Reform Outcomes 
 
 Auto Electrical  Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
 
Workforce involuntary redundancy redundancy but planned 
and balanced by skills 
enhancement 
redundancy but planned 
and balanced by skills 
enhancement 
Organisational 
Structure 
mass production 
principles 
mass production 
principles 
lean production 
principles 
 
Having no long-term strategy, Auto Electrical was forced in 1993 into offering 
involuntary redundancy.  Although redundancy did occur in both other companies this 
was planned as part of the strategy and remaining employees were encouraged to 
upskill through company supported training.  In both Auto Electrical and Auto 
Mechanical mass production principles continued to influence organisational 
structures.  This meant departments remained separated, as did management and 
employees.  The only process improvement measure focussed on people rather than 
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processes.  Auto Air on the other hand achieved major organisational change that 
committed employees to the achievement of company targets. 
 
In summary, the degree of change associated with operationalisation of workplace 
reform varied.  Auto Electrical introduced little change, retaining a highly specialised 
and fragmented organisational structure.  At the other extreme Auto Air introduced 
significant change under a highly integrated reform process.  This resulted in a new 
organisational and managerial structure aimed at improved productivity, efficiency, 
and quality.  Auto Mechanical belongs somewhere between these two extremes with 
verbal commitment to reform, but limited operational change.  Given these findings 
the next section explores workforce participation associated with these reforms.  
 
Workforce Participation 
 
All companies introduced direct and representative workforce participation as shown 
in Table 10.11.   
Table 10.11 
Cross Company Comparison  
Workforce Participation 
 
Type of 
Participation 
Auto Electrical  Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
 
Direct  temporary Kaizen 
groups 
 
temporary Productivity 
Enhancement Process  
teams  
temporary Process 
Improvement Groups 
 training in quality 
improvement 
training in quality 
improvement techniques 
training in quality 
improvement techniques 
 eight process workers 
upskilled to quality 
control 
computerised window 
regulator line designed for 
continuous quality 
improvement 
production workers to 
implement Corrective 
Action Requests  
 no work reorganisation no other work 
reorganisation. 
SAWGs 
Representative  collective bargaining – 
full-time union officials  
collective bargaining full-
time union officials  
collective bargaining local 
shop stewards 
 Consultative 
Committees  
Consultative Committees   Consultative Committees  
 
First, direct participation was introduced through QCs.  In 1990 Auto Air was the first 
company to establish what were termed Process Improvement Groups.  Auto 
Mechanical followed in 1992 with Productivity Enhancement Teams.  Finally, in 
1992, Auto Electrical introduced ‘Kaizen’ teams.  As shown in Table 10.12 
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membership was voluntary and usually confined to employees immediately affected 
by the problem.  
Table 10.12 
Cross Company Comparison 
Direct Workforce Participation Process 
 
Characteristics Auto Electrical  
 
Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
level immediate work area  immediate work area Immediate work area 
form voluntary voluntary Voluntary 
 temporary temporary Permanent  
type consultation consultation Consultation 
subject matter product quality  
 
product quality 
 
production quality 
work process  
 
Volunteers were trained in quality improvement techniques, however in both Auto 
Electrical and Auto Mechanical training was ad hoc, during periods of slack 
production, rather than strategically integrated into an overall reform process.  Auto 
Air was the only company to develop a formalised training program, which included 
training in group-dynamics as well as technical training.  The QCs were confined to 
the immediate work area, with issues discussed restricted to quality issues.  Groups 
met temporarily and were often disbanded once a problem was solved. There was 
little recognition of, or reward for, the contribution made by employees except in 
Auto Air, in which members of the PIG regarded as the most effective in any one year 
were sent at company expense to participate in the annual international industry 
quality conference.  Direct participation as a permanent feature of work was only 
introduced in Auto Air, although the issue was under discussion in Auto Mechanical.   
 
As a result direct participation provided only limited opportunities for employees to 
influence decision making within companies except in Auto Air in which temporary 
direct employee participation was transformed into permanent team process.  The 
outcome was Auto Air was the only company to achieve employee commitment to 
continuous quality improvement.  
 
Second, representative participation was introduced through consultative committees 
as shown in Table 10.13.  
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Table 10.13 
Cross Company Comparison 
Representative Workforce Participation  
 
Characteristics Auto Electrical  
 
Auto Mechanical  Auto Air  
Level  company  company company 
form  Consultative Committee  Consultative Committee Consultative Committee 
type  consultation consultation consultation 
 
All companies established company level Consultative Committees as part of 
institutional workplace reform.  These Committees consisted of an equal number of 
employee representatives elected through the union, and management representatives.  
They were consultative to management rather than decision-making bodies.  This 
suggests a wary attitude by management to the principle of managerial prerogative in 
decision-making.  The outcomes of these Committees varied as shown in Table 10.14.  
Table 10.14 
Outcomes of Re presentative Workforce Participation  
Under Workplace Reform 
 
 Auto Engineering 
 
Auto Mechanical  Auto Air 
management 
commitment 
minimal 
refusal to provide 
information 
demonstrated 
commitment to continual 
improvement of 
consultative process 
management support and 
preparedness to discuss 
employee 
commitment 
focus on basic employee 
issues  
focus on basic employee 
issues  
focus on basic employee 
issues  
  some discussion of 
production changes  
some discussion of 
production changes  
  preparedness to train to 
implement company 
strategy 
commitment to company 
strategic direction 
 written complaints 
leading to rejection of 
Committee 
recommendations and 
finally union withdrawal 
ongoing commitment 
despite adverse 
employment 
consequences  
shop steward prepared to 
discuss issues outside 
formal union process 
 
Although the terms of reference for Committees were broad, managerial commitment 
varied.  In Auto Electrical managerial rhetoric supporting consultation was not 
operationalised.  Management first avoided giving information and later openly 
ignored employee request for information.  This differed from the support given by 
management in the Consultative Committee process in both other case studies.  In 
response employee commitment varied.  In Auto Electrical, discussion remained 
focussed on basic employee issues with no discussion of productivity improvements 
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or strategy issues.  By contrast, although the majority of issues discussed in 
Consultative Committees in both other companies remained focussed on basic 
employee matters, there was some discussion of productivity improvement and 
strategic issues.   
 
The result was varied employee commitment to an ongoing consultative process.  In 
Auto Electrical, lack of response to employee complaints to the Managing Director 
resulted initially in workforce rejection of committee recommendations and 
eventually in union withdrawal from the committee.  More positive employee support 
was recorded in Auto Mechanical and Auto Air.  Auto Mechanical was able to 
implement the externally imposed strategy that resulted in a decline in employment 
without adverse industrial response.  In Auto Air the positive employee feedback led 
the shop steward to suggest that the Consultative Committee may eventually replace 
the union.   
 
In summary these different approaches to workplace reform and workforce 
participation resulted in different outcomes.  Auto Electrical achieved little 
productivity and efficiency improvement and by 1993 was forced to introduce 
unplanned retrenchment of its workforce.  Auto Air achieved a major work 
organisational change that produced productivity and efficiency improvements.  This 
enabled it by 1993 to record some degree of market recovery despite its smaller 
production role within an expanded Auto Air Group.  Auto Mechanical succeeded in 
introducing major externally induced change, which significantly reduced its sales 
and employment levels without industrial dispute.  It remains to be seen what long 
term benefits this international strategy afforded the company. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis sought to advance understanding of the politics of workplace reform.  
Specifically, it is concerned with the alignment between particular approaches to 
workplace reform and forms of workforce participation.  In Chapter Two the literature 
upon workplace reform and workforce participation was reviewed.  On this basis it 
was suggested that many alignments are likely: 
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· Quality Management will be associated with direct participation 
· Institutional workplace reform will be associated with representative 
participation. 
· Best practice will be associated with both.  
 
This relationship between workplace reform and workforce participation was 
explored in the context of Australian policy and practice in the period 1985-1992 – a 
time of rapid innovation in the search for enterprise competitiveness.  Conceptually, 
this period of innovation in Australia was associated with a succession of ideas for 
workplace reform – quality management, institutional workplace reform, and best 
practice.  Similar intellectual fe rment was evident upon workforce participation, 
captured, it was suggested, in the distinction between direct and representative forms.  
Empirically the relationship between workplace reform and workforce participation 
was explored from 1985 to 1992 within three Australian automotive component 
manufacturers.  Through longitudinal case studies, commercial pressure and Taylorist 
work organisation were depicted as the seedbed for successive experiments in 
workplace reform and workforce participation. 
 
To return to the central problem, what does the evidence show about the alignment 
between forms of workplace reform and workforce participation?  The detailed 
findings from the case studies are presented above.  They will now be summarised in 
two parts, the first relating to processes and the second to outcomes. 
 
Table 10.15 shows the basic pattern for the alignment of workplace reform and 
workforce participation processes. 
Table 10.15 
The Processes of Workplace Reform and Workforce Participation 
 
 Auto Electrical Auto Mechanical Auto Air 
Quality Management temporary Kaizen temporary QCs  temporary QCs 
changing to permanent 
teams  
Institutional 
Workplace Reform 
collective bargaining collective bargaining collective bargaining 
 representative 
participation 
representative 
participation 
representative 
participation 
Best Practice under management 
discussion 
planned operational and linked 
to direct teams  
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The first conclusion to be drawn from this table is that all three companies employed 
representative and direct methods of workforce participation to support a succession 
of workplace reform initiatives spanning at least quality management and institutional 
workplace reform and best practice in the case of Auto Air.  At this level the 
hypothesised relationship appears to be supported.  Broadly, where companies 
implement quality management, institutional workplace reform, and best practice 
reform strategies, they will turn to the appropriate methods of participation. 
 
More important is the efficacy with which this is done.  The case studies make clear 
there were differences in effective implementation.  These can be summarised as 
follows.  Auto Electrical made least progress in both workplace reform and workforce 
participation.  By 1992 successive experiments with quality management and 
institutional workplace reform had been largely unproductive and short- lived.  
Related to this, a system for representative participation had been tried and declined, 
while direct participation was not sufficiently developed to produce any conclusions.   
 
Auto Mechanical by 1992 had developed several plans for change associated with the 
three reform processes although little actual change had been achieved apart from that 
associated with implementation of the externally set strategy of the parent company.  
There was widespread support for experiments in both direct and representative 
participation, but this had achieved limited success as workers strove to understand 
broader company concepts and strategies. 
 
Finally, Auto Air had succeeded in both workplace reform and workforce 
participation.  It had progressed rapidly from quality management through best 
practice and had utilised a multi- layered approach combining direct and representative 
forms of participation.   
 
Table 10.16 shows these findings with respect to workplace reform outcomes and the 
implementation of workforce participation. 
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Table 10.16 
Workplace Reform Outcomes and Implementation of Workplace Reform Processes  
 
 Auto Electrical Auto Mechanical  Auto Air 
Quality Management temporary and delayed 
Kaizen groups 
temporary QCs  temporary QCs * 
 no CQI 
 
no CQI no CQI 
Institutional 
Workplace Reform 
complaints and 
rejection of 
Consultative 
Committee 
ongoing commitment 
to consultation through 
Consultative 
Committee 
successful consultation 
and ongoing 
Consultative 
Committee 
 basic employee issues 
only 
basic employee issues 
and production issues, 
some strategic 
basic employee issues 
extended to production 
and strategy 
Best Practice management discussion planned successful SAWGs and 
Consultative 
Committee 
   CQI and productivity 
improvement 
* NOTE: This data related to an early phase in workplace reform at Auto Air, which was integrated 
into subsequent initiatives.  
 
From the analysis of outcomes it may be inferred that the formal characteristics of 
reform and participation are less significant than their quality.  What most 
distinguished Auto Air from Auto Electrical is not that it advanced to best practice 
rather than becoming mired in institutional workplace reform, but rather that it 
implemented workplace reform better, primarily through integration of the structures 
created for reform with their operation.  What secondly distinguished Auto Air from 
Auto Electrical is not the superiority of multi- layered direct participation and 
representative participation over representative participation, but rather managements’ 
readiness to sustain ‘high trust’ participation by the workforce. 
 
The evidence in these case studies suggests that effective workforce participation is a 
condition for effective workplace reform.  In Auto Air, the two are intertwined such 
that workforce participation becomes a building block for successful reform.  In 
contrast, at Auto Electrical the exercises remained substantially separate.  
Participation was confined to minor housekeeping issues and contributed nothing to 
an equally arid approach to workplace reform.  
 
The categorisations drawn by the thesis from the literature – quality management, 
institutional workplace reform, and best practice on the one hand, and direct 
participation and representative participation on the other hand – do not appear to 
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convey the key distinctions needed to understand the essential differences between 
Auto Air and Auto Electrical.  Rather a different typology is needed.  This one 
distinguishes operational workplace reform (in which action follows structures) from 
policy workplace reform (in which reality does not follow rhetoric), and low trust 
versus high trust forms of workforce participation.  It is the coincidence of operational 
workplace reform and high trust workforce participation that explains Auto Air’s 
success.  Their actual relationship can be shown diagrammatically as follows  
 
                                    Workplace 
 
Reform 
  Policy 
 
Operational 
 
Workforce 
 
 
        Low 
 
 
 
Participation 
 
 
 
 
Trust 
 
 
 
 
Auto Electrical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       High 
 
 
 
 
Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auto Mechanical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auto Air (best practice) 
 
From the case study evidence, the factors that influence these patterns are numerous, 
but may include: 
· Degree of integration of workplace experiments  
· Management commitment to workforce participation  
· Workforce knowledge and skills 
· Union commitment to workforce participation. 
 
To close, two competing views were suggested at the beginning about the politics of 
workplace reform: which is more appropriate?  The first view was characterised as 
union/pluralist.  Representative forms of participation were considered necessary to 
redistribute power and thus win employee commitment to reform.  The second view 
was characterised as managerial/unitarist in which political status quo remained tilted 
 309 
towards management who would control limited direct employee involvement in 
production decision.  No case closely resembles these positions.  At one extreme Auto 
Air employs both forms of participation despite their theoretical incongruity.  In 
practice they can be mutually supportive.  The key condition for success, however, 
was managerial commitment to employee involvement in change rather than a 
redistribution of power between management and workers. 
 
At the other extreme lies Auto Electrical in which representative participation failed 
primarily due to managerial reluctance to allow dilution of their unitarist prerogatives 
and allow employees involvement in the change process.   
 
In summary despite the rhetoric of workforce participation as part of workplace 
reform there were differences between the case studies in the way that participation 
was operationalised.  This has less to do with whether workforce participation 
adopted a direct or representative form and more to do with the degree of managerial 
commitment to both workplace reform and workforce participation.  In Auto 
Electrical, management had little commitment to either structural or operational 
change.  This extended to lack of support for increased workforce participation.  At 
the other extreme, management at Auto Air embraced the need for change under each 
reform process and in so doing designed a change process that integrated each of the 
reform processes under analysis.  Workforce participation was designed to assist 
change by ensuring that workers were both individually included in the change 
process affecting their immediate work area, and collectively represented on 
discussions of change concerning the whole company.  Auto Mechanical existed 
somewhere in between these two extremes with management accepting the need for 
change to accommodate external pressures from its parent company.  The reform 
process designed to accommodate these changes recognised the need for increased 
workforce participation to encourage worker acceptance of change.   
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Appendix 1: Data Collection: 
 
Auto Electrical 
 
1. Interviews were held with Directors and Managers between August and December 
1992 with a union official on December 9 1992 and with workforce representatives on 
July 20 1993.  Interview dates are set out below.  Appendix 2 sets out the Interview 
Questions. 
 
Dates of Interviews: 
 
Managing Director August 1 1992 
Director Corporate Services - August 1 1992, September 15 1992, October 13 
1992, June 15 1993. 
Manager Personnel & Industrial Relations - September 15 1992, June 15 1993. 
Director Plant - December 8 1992, April 29 1993. 
Director Materials Purchasing & Supply - December 8 1992. 
Director Sales & Customer Liaison - December 8 1992. 
Manager Primary Production - December 8 1992. 
Manager Final Assembly - December 8 1992. 
Manager Production Planning - December 8 1992. 
Manager Production Engineering - December 8 1992. 
Director Finance - April 29 1993.  
Manager Health & Safety - July 20 1993. 
Manager Training & Development - July 20 1993. 
Manager Quality Assurance - July 20 1993. 
Manager Engineering Research & Development - July 30 1993. 
Ormsby C, MEWU Union official - December 9 1992. 
Board of Directors and Senior Managers - November 22 1991. 
Workforce Representatives - July 20 1993. 
 
2. Company records were researched.  Details are included in the bibliography. Company 
records consulted include: 
Memo’s - Internal Company  
Records - Corporate Service Division  
Minutes - Consultative Committee (1988-1993) 
Minutes - Quality Council (1989-1993) 
Minutes - Project and Kaizen team (1992-1993) 
Reports - external consultants (1982-1994).   
 
3. Joint workforce-management Focus Groups were held on August 19th and 28th and 
September 5th and 12th 1991 (Focus Groups A).  Appendix 3 sets out the Focus Groups 
questions.   
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Auto Mechanical 
 
1. Interviews were held with managers between October and December 1992 and 
between April 1993 and November 1993 with a final interview held with the newly 
appointed Managing Director in October 1994.  Interviews were also held with the shop 
steward and full time official of MEWU in May and November 1993.  Appendix 2 sets 
out the Interview Questions. 
 
Dates of Interviews: 
Managing Director - October 27, 1992, October 7, 1994. 
Director Human Resources - October 27 1992, May 4 1993. 
Director Quality - December 15 1992. 
Director Purchasing & Supply - December 15 1992. 
Manager Production - December 15 1992. 
Assistant Manager Sales & Engineering - October 26 1993.   
Financial Controller - March 15 1993. 
Consultative Committee - November 9 1993. 
Shop Steward - November 9 1993. 
MEWU Full time Official May 4 1993. 
 
2. Company records were researched.  Details are included in the bibliography. Company 
records consulted include  
Memo’s - Internal Company  
Records - Human Resource Department  
Minutes - Consultative Committee (1989-1993) 
Minutes - Quality Management Steering Committee Council (1990-1993) 
Minutes - Natural Work Team (1992-1993).   
 
3. Joint management-employee Focus Groups were held in February 1993 (Appendix 3).   
 
4.  An additional source of valuable information was the Report of an employee climate 
survey undertaken in 1993 (Climate Survey Analysis Report - Task Force Consultants 
1993).  The questionnaire used in the survey is included at Appendix 4).   
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Auto Air  
 
1. An interview was held with ‘forepersons’ (company terminology) on October 28 1990.  
Interviews were held with managers between September and December 1992 and during 
1993.  An interview was also held with the shop stewards on September 21 1992.  
Appendix 2 sets out the Interview Questions. 
 
Dates of Interviews: 
 
Manager Human Resource - August 21 1992, September 28 1992, July 1 1993. 
Manager Manufacturing - October 13 1992, July 8 1993. 
Manager Quality - October 13 1992. 
Manager  Supply - October 13 1992. 
Business Unit Co-ordinator Engineering - October 13 1992. 
Business Unit Co-ordinator Marketing - October 13 1992. 
Team Leader Receiving - October 13 1992. 
Health & Safety Consultant - October 28 1992. 
Personnel Officer - October 28 1992. 
Training Co-ordinator - November 17 1992. 
Team Leaders Production - December 1992. 
Business Unit Leader Technical Services - November 17 1992. 
Quality Assurance Officer - October 22 1993. 
Forepersons October 28 1990. 
Shop Steward - 21 September 1992. 
 
2. Company records were researched.  Details are included in the bibliography.  
Company records consulted include: 
Memos' - internal company  
Records - Human Resource Department  
Minutes of Consultative Committee 
 
3. Joint management-workforce Focus Groups were held (Appendix3).  These included: 
Focus Groups of production and stores employees and management in January 
1992 (Focus Groups B January 3 & 4) 
Focus Groups of specialist employees in October 1992 (Focus Groups C October 
14).   
 
4. An additional source of valuable information was provided by a company survey of 
forepersons undertaken in 1990 (May 1990 Appendix 5).   
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Interviews 
 
Interviews were held with company Directors, Managers, full time union officials, and 
workforce representatives.  The interviews were structured as closed questions prepared 
beforehand in accordance with a positivist approach to interviews1.   
 
Schedule 1: Company Background 
 
The first schedule of interviews aimed to collect information on the operation of each 
company prior to the implementation of reform.  This included information on company 
structure, product, market performance, corporate plan, work organisation, decision 
making, human resource management, and industrial relations.  Interviews were face-to-
face interviews with most Directors and Senior managers in all companies.  The Chief 
Executive Officer and/or the Human Resource Manager were asked all questions with 
other Directors and Managers asked only those related to their speciality.  Interviews 
went for between one to two hours.  Information collected from the interview was 
checked with each interviewee.  Most of the information was qualitative although 
quantitative data was collected as necessary.  Information from these interviews provides 
the material for the company background of each case study (Chapters 4, 6 and 8) 
 
Schedule 2: Reform Process. 
 
The second schedule of interviews aimed to collect information on the process by which 
workplace reform was implemented, particularly as it related to workforce participation.  
Interviews were again face-to-face with selected Directors and Managers (senior and 
middle management, including supervisors and team leaders).  Interviews were also held 
with several full-time union officials and workforce representatives.  Most of the 
information collected was qualitative.  Information collected from these interviews 
provides the material on the reform process implemented in each case study (Chapters 5, 
7 and 9). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Hussey J. and Hussey R. (1997) Business Research Macmillan Press 
Macmillan Business London. 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 1 
 
INDUSTRY: 
1. What influence has the industry had on this company?   
2. How does the product from this company contribute to the industry? 
 
COMPANY: 
 
A) OWNERSHIP  
1. What is the form of company ownership?  
2. What changes have occurred to the ownership of the company? 
3. What effect, if any, did these changes in ownership have on the company? 
 
B) PRODUCT 
1. What is the company’s product range? 
2. Have there been any changes to product range over the last 5 to 10 years? 
3. How is product divided between Original Equipment and Parts & Accessories? 
4. What product changes do you expect over the next 5 to 10 years? 
 
C) MARKET 
1. What is the product market facing the company? 
2. What changes have occurred to the market over the last 5 to 10 years? 
3. What changes, if any, do you expect to your market in the next 5 to 10 years? 
4. Who are your customers? 
5. Does the company have any formal agreements or joint ventures with its customers? 
6. What is the extent of competition for the company’s products?  
7. Does the company export?  If so what percentage of product is exported?  
8. What is the focus of the company’s marketing strategy? 
 
D) SUPPLIERS 
1. What sub-component products and raw materials are supplied to the company? 
2. Are company suppliers locally or overseas based? 
3. What is the nature of the relationship between the company and its suppliers? 
4. How predictable are suppliers? 
5. What level of inventory does the company maintain?   
6. What changes have occurred with suppliers over the last 5 to 10 years? 
 
E) COMPANY STRUCTURE 
1. Does the company play a role within the corporate body?  If so what is that role? 
2. What is the organisational structure within the company? 
3. What is the management structure within the company? 
4. What changes if any have occurred to these structures in the last 5 to 10 years? 
5. Are any structural changes planned? 
 
F) CORPORATE PLAN 
1. How is the company’s corporate plan determined? 
2. Is the corporate plan driven by a company mission? 
3. Is the corporate plan financially or strategically driven? 
4. What period of time is covered by the corporate plan? 
5. Who is involved in developing the corporate plan? 
6. What performance measures are identified in the corporate plan? 
7. What does human resources contribute to the corporate plan? 
8. What role does the workforce play in the corporate planning process? 
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G) PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
1. How is performance measured within the company?  
2. How is productivity measured?  Does productivity measurement include any of the following? 
measurement of capital productivity 
extent of downtime 
return on funds investment 
rate of return on investment 
3. How is profitability measured within the company 
4. How is efficiency measured within the company?  Do efficiency measures include any of the 
following? 
downtime 
internal delivery of inventory 
communication 
links with suppliers/buyers 
5. What is the current cost breakdown for the company between labour, capital equipment, overheads, 
materials, transport and storage, research and development, training, other? 
6. What is the company performance and profitability record over the last 5 to 10 years? 
7. How is production performance measured?  
 
H) WORK ORGANISATION 
i) Planning 
1. Which of the following planning approaches are utilised? 
aggregate 
MRP 
2. What changes have been introduced in the last 5 years? 
3. Does planning include the ability to adjust capacity for special requirements? 
4. Which of the following forecasting method are used for inventory management 
counting 
qualitative 
time series 
cause 
Which of the following inventory management methods are used 
fixed order 
replenishment 
optional replenishment 
5. What inventory planning methods are used? 
6. What changes, if any, have occurred to inventory planning methods in the last 5 years? 
7. To what extent have employees been involved in any changes that have occurred? 
8. Do you design for manufacturability? 
 
ii) Production 
1.  Would you describes the production process as  
capital or labour intensive? 
Batch, flow line, or group? 
2. What is the physical layout of the production process? 
3.  Which of the following best describes jobs within production? 
totally defined 
some variation dependent upon different machines and processes 
some discretion in job choice 
employee choice from a stack of different job 
4.  What changes if any have occurred to jobs in the last 5 to 10 years? 
5.  What technology is used in production? 
6. What new technology, if any, has been introduced in the last 5 to 10 years? 
7. What production control systems are used?   
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8. Have any new production control systems been introduced in the last 5 to 10 years? 
9. If changes have been introduced, who decided on these changes? 
10. What process was established for these changes? 
who was involved? 
what consultative was undertaken? 
what training was provided? 
 
I) TECHNOLOGY 
1. Which of the following best describes the age of technology used within the company? 
<5years 
5-10 years 
10-15years 
2. What technology is used in production? 
3. Do you have any of the following technological developments? 
Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) 
Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM) 
Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) 
NC/CNC 
FMC/FMG 
Laser technology 
Automated Guided Vehicle Systems (AGVS) 
Automated Sensor Inspection (ASI) 
Local Area Computer Network (LAN) 
Programmable Logic Control (PLC) 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
Robots 
Other 
4. What process was established for the introduction of technological change? 
who was involved? 
what consultation was undertaken? 
what training was provided? 
 
J) QUALITY: 
1. What quality system is employed within the company? 
2. Is there a company quality manual?  If so, how often it is updated? 
3. Does the quality manual include written specifications for the following? 
purchase materials 
finished products 
4. Which of the following is the most commonly used method of verifying correctness to specification of 
purchased material? 
inspection 
statistically based acceptance sampling 
random inspection 
Other (specify) 
5. Which of the following process control techniques do you use? 
sample inspection 
attribute control charts eg pcu 
variable control charts eg xr 
control charts for individuals 
cumulative sum control charts 
other (specify) 
6. Is the reliability of finished product formally monitored and analysed?  If so is it done: 
internally only 
externally only (customer feedback filed data) 
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both 
not at all 
7. Does the company measure the cost of quality?   
8. Which of the following methods are used in measuring the performance of the quality control 
program? 
cost-benefit analysis 
rate of return 
turnover 
profit on turnover 
profitability 
other (specify) 
9. To what extent did actual performance of the quality program meet the set target (for quality goals) 
over the last five years? 
10. Is a regular quality audit carried out in the company?   
yes, own staff 
yes, external consultatns 
jointly 
no 
11. Is the person responsible for quality involved in any of the following? 
product design & development 
quality instruction manual 
vendor quality 
inspection of incoming raw materials 
SPC 
product reliability 
product release 
customer complaint/feedback 
quality department training 
interdepartmental quality training 
assigning responsibilities to staff 
12. If the person responsible for quality is not involved in the above, how do those involved obtain 
knowledge about quality control & measurement? 
13. How is senior management involved in quality? 
14. How does senior management use quality data to make decisions regarding quality improvements in 
the following areas? 
training 
tooling 
process improvement 
higher quality raw materials 
other (specify) 
15. How is information concerning quality made available to the following? 
shop floor employees 
supervisors 
management 
16. Has the company received any outside assistance (financial or otherwise) concerning quality 
improvements from the following in the past 5 years?  If so what was the form and amount of that 
assistance? 
Federal government 
State government 
Australian Organisation for Quality 
Consultants 
parent or sister company 
major customer 
other (specify) 
17. Does the company undertake training in quality?   
18. If so, is there a specific budget for training in quality?  -Is it specified in terms of sales turnover? 
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19. How many days per annum are spent on quality training? 
20. Is there an established internal training program on quality for the following? 
management including supervisors 
employees including new employees 
21. What is included in the training: 
external skills training courses 
external classroom instruction 
internal classroom instruction 
in-house hands-on experience 
 
K. WORKFORCE DEMOGRAPHICS: 
1. What is the current employment level in the company?  How has this changed over the last 5 to 10 
years? 
2. What is the breakdown of the workforce between the following groups? 
management and employees 
direct/indirect 
award related/staff 
male/female 
English speaking background (ESB), non English speaking background (NESB) 
3. What is the distribution of the workforce between the following? 
departments 
functions 
clerical 
engineering 
technical 
trade 
process worker 
apprentices 
other 
4. What is the age breakdown of the workforce? 
15-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45+ 
5. What is the length of service of employees? 
<5years 
5-10 years 
10-15 years 
15-20 years 
20-25 years 
25-30 years 
>30 years 
6. What is the annual labour turnover?  Has this changed in recent years?  
7. What career opportunities exist for employees? 
8. Are technical, trade, professional, skills required? 
 
L) EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
i) Human Resource Management - Policy 
1. What is the formal reporting structure for the HR department? 
2. How many people are employed within the HR department? 
3. Is there a formal company HR Policy?  What contribution does this make to the company corporate 
plan or mission? 
4. What role does HR play in the following? 
performance reviews 
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recruitment 
promotion 
production changes  
the introduction of technology 
training 
industrial relations 
 
ii) Training 
1. Does the company have a formal training plan?  How was it developed?  Who developed it? 
2. What percentage of company payroll is spent on training? 
3. What formal training structure has been established? 
4. Is training provided on-the-job or off-the-job or both? 
5. Who makes decisions on training? 
6. What is the relationship between training and career progression? 
 
iii) Occupational Health and Safety 
1. Does the company have an occupational health and safety policy?  If so how was it developed?   
2. What is the company health and safety record in terms of the following? 
health and safety claims 
working days lost 
compensation costs 
i)  What training has occurred in occupational health and safety? 
ii)  Does the company have a health and safety committee? If so 
how was it established 
who is on the Committee? 
what issues does it discuss? 
how frequently does it meet? 
how does it communicate with the rest of the company? 
 
iv) Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 
i) Does the company have a policy on EEO?  How was it developed?  
ii) Does the company have a policy on Affirmative Action? 
 
M) INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
i) Wages and Working Conditions: 
1. Is more than one Award relevant within the workplace?  If so what is the principal Award? 
2.  How many employees are covered by each Award? 
3.  What are the major classifications of employees? 
4. Are over-award payments made? 
5. Is overtime required of employees?  If so what is the average level of overtime required? 
6. Are incentives paid? 
7. Are performance reviews undertaken? 
8. How are the salaries of non-Award employees set? 
9. What other benefits exist for employees? 
 
ii) Union involvement: 
1. What is the extent of union membership in the workforce? 
2. How many unions have coverage of the workforce? 
3. How many union delegates are present in the workplace? 
4. Which of the following formal activities are undertaken by the union in the workplace? 
meetings of delegates meetings with members 
formal communications with members 
meetings with management 
5. What is the role of the external full-time union officials 
6. What is the company experience of strike activity? 
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internally generated 
state-national strikes 
7. What formal dispute resolution policies and procedures exist within the company? 
8. To what extent do demarcation problems affect industrial relations within the company? 
9. What assistance is provided to the company by employer Associations? 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 2: Workplace Reform2 
 
GENERAL  
 
1. What should management do to assist the company to become a world competitive export company? 
2. How integrated are the consultative processes associated with workplace reform? 
 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT REFORM: 
1. Has the company received preferred supplier rating from any of its PMV assembly customers?  
If so what ratings and when? 
2. Did the company develop a TQM strategy to achieve this rating?  If so who was primarily 
responsible for initiating the process? 
3. What changes were required to be made to become a ‘preferred supplier’ under the new 
customer quality improvement requirements? 
4. Who is responsible for continuous monitoring of the reform process? 
5. What changes were introduced as a result of this strategy to the following? 
production 
quality monitoring 
training 
consultation 
communication 
6. Do you have a formalised Supplier rating system? 
7. What structures were introduced to enable workers to participate in continuous quality 
improvement? 
quality circles 
consultative committees 
unions  
other 
a) What has been the degree of improvement in the following as a direct result of your quality program? 
levels of scrap 
amount of rework 
stock turnover 
lead time 
product design 
levels of absenteeism 
machine downtime 
customer complaints 
warranty payments 
after-sales service 
8. How should change be introduced as part of quality management reform? 
 
INSTITUTIONAL WORKPLACE REFORM: 
1. What productivity improvements resulted from implementation of the following decisions by the 
AIRC? 
second tier 
award restructuring 
enterprise bargaining 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Questions on workforce participation were directed at both managers and union officials. 
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2. What structural changes occurred to the following as a result of these agreements? Management 
workforce 
production 
training 
consultation 
communication 
3. Was a Consultative Committee established for the company as part of this reform?   
4. If a consultative committee was established:  
when was it established? 
what were the terms of reference? 
what power did the committee have? 
who was on the committee? 
what training for committee members was undertaken? 
what was the relationship between the committee and management and employees? 
what issues were discussed by the consultative committee? 
what decisions were made by the Committee 
what do you see as the outcome of the consultative process? 
5. How should change be introduced as part of institutional workplace reform? 
 
BEST PRACTICE REFORM: 
1. What changes were introduced as a result of the implementation of best practice reform? 
2. Were these changes accompanied by any changes to any of the following? 
management 
workforce 
production 
training 
consultation 
communication 
3. Was best practice reform associated with workforce participation.  If so what form did participation 
take? 
teams 
training 
consultative committees 
workarea consultation 
4.      How should change be introduced as part of best practice reform? 
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Focus Groups  
 
Joint union-management Focus Groups were established in each case study company.  The number of 
Focus Groups varied according to the size of the company while the date of the Focus Group meetings 
varied according to the stage of reform implemented by the company.   
 
The aim of the focus groups was to gauge management and employee attitudes first to existing operational 
practices of the company second to proposals for reform.  In Auto Electrical two sets of focus groups were 
held because of the larger workforce.  In Auto Air two sets of focus groups were held because changes 
introduced affected Production employees and Specialists differently.   
 
Focus groups were as follows: 
Auto Electrical - August 19th and 28th and September 5th and 12th 1991 
Auto Mechanical - February 15th and 16th 1993 
 
Questions 
A) Operational Practice: 
 
1. Would you buy the products made by the company?   
2. What would the company have to do to sell more products? 
3. What training/career prospects exist in the company? 
4. Is promotion desirable? If so why is it desirable?  
5. What new technology has been introduced in the last five years and how was it introduced? 
6. What training would you like to do if you had the opportunity? 
7. What should be included in a plan to make the company a world competitive export company? 
8. What skills do you have that you do not use at work at present but feel you could use? 
 
B) Reform Requirements 
 
1. What changes have occurred to quality in the last five years? 
2. How could the quality of product be improved? 
3. What changes need to be made to your work area to enable you to produce better quality products 
without waste? 
4. How could heath and safety be improved?  
5. What changes have occurred in equal employment opportunity in the last five years?  What further 
changes are required? 
6. How could training be improved? 
7. What changes have occurred in consultation in the last 5 years? 
8. If consultation is to work what changes will need to be made to: 
the way managers act and the skills they have? 
the way workers act and the skills they have? 
the role of the Consultative Committee members and the skills they have? 
9. How would you describe the relationship between management and workers in the company? 
 
Auto Air  
Production Teams [Production and Stores employees and managers (A)] 
January 3rd and 4th 1992. 
Business Units [Specialist and managers (B)] October 14th 1992 
Questions: 
1. What are your main concerns about moving to a team-based/business unit organisation? 
2. What needs to be done to assist the successful implementation of teams/business units? 
3. What issues do you think team /business unit members will have to decide? 
4. What training will be needed for team/business unit members? 
5. What skills are available within the teams/business units. 
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AUTO MECHANICAL CLIMATE SURVEY 
 
During 1993 a Climate Survey of all employees was carried out for Auto Mechanical (Task Force 
Consultants 1993).  It is repeated below as an example of action taken by the company to improve 
consultation.  Some of the responses are referred to in the body of this thesis.  The survey consisted of 36 
mandatory and 4 optional questions.  30 questions took the form of a statement based on a Likert 5 point 
rating scale 4 questions catered for free text comments one required a ranking (1-9) and 5 were coded 
according to demographic responses.  Respondents were asked to tick a box in answer to a statement as set 
out below as  
Disagree Partly Disagree Undecided Partly Agree Agree. 
Approximately 150 Questionnaires were distributed.  A software package was utilised to analyse the data 
using frequency tables cross tabulations ranked order and work frequency as appropriate.  109 surveys were 
analysed (approx. 73% return rate).  Almost 60% of these returns were from Production and 20% were 
from Quality Engineering and Manufacturing.   
 
Q1. I like the kind of work I do.  My job is important to me. 
Q2. Management makes all the decisions.  There is little scope for making independent judgements 
Q3. I often feel anxious and stressed about some parts of my job.  I never seem to get on top of my work. 
Q4. My company is a friendly and happy place.  I get on well with my co-workers. 
Q5. In my work there is importance placed on meeting customer needs.  We concentrate on serving the 
customer. 
Q6. I enjoy learning new ways of doing things.  It is important to keep up with the latest methods and ideas. 
Q7. My company stresses the importance of the workers.  Staff morale is high. 
Q8. My company emphasises progress and growth through the development of new ideas.  Building new 
products and services is important. 
Q9. My company stresses stability and security.  Being capable and practical is important. 
Q10. My company emphasises getting results.  Achieving goals and targets is important. 
Q11 My department is well organised and runs efficiently.  The quality of work done by my .group is high. 
Q12. I am well informed about important issues that effect me.  I understand fully what is expected of me in 
my job. 
Q13. I do not usually get an opportunity to be involved in decisions that effect my work.  Management is 
not really interested in my views. 
Q14. My supervisor encourages me to obtain further education and training.  Support for training is 
widespread in the company. 
Q15. Management seems to be concerned about small and unimportant things.  They don’t know what’s 
going on in the real world. 
Q16. My company is a personal place.  It is like an extended family.  People seem to share a lot of 
themselves.  
Q17. My company is a very dynamic and inventive place.  People pay attention to rules and procedures to 
get things done. 
Q18. My company is a very formal and structured place.  People are concerned with getting the job done. 
Q19. My company is a very production oriented place.  People are concerned with getting the job done. 
Q20. There are no opportunities for me to get a better job in the company.  My career is at a stand-still. 
Q21. I’m satisfied with the job done by my manager.  My manager handles change well in my company. 
Q22. I find it difficult to talk freely with my supervisor.  Management is generally inaccessible and 
unapproachable. 
Q23. My work area is a healthy and safe environment.  The company pays attention to providing good 
facilities for staff. 
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Q24. The company is held together by loyalty and tradition.  Workers feel strongly supportive of the 
Company. 
Q25.  The company is held together by a commitment to innovation and development.  Being first with 
products and new ideas is important. 
Q26. The company is held together by formal rules and policies.  Following rules is important. 
Q27. The company is held together by task and goal achievements.  Everyone wants to meet their targets. 
Q28. I’m encouraged to come up with better ways of doing things.  I get involved in my job. 
Q29. The company is not making the right changes necessary to compete effectively.  Jobs are at risk. 
Q30. I am always treated fairly by Management.  I rarely if ever think about leaving for another job 
somewhere else. 
Q31. Please indicate what department/group in which you work. 
Q32. The best and most reliable means of obtaining information about what’s happening in the company is 
by: 
Memorandums   
Staff Meetings   
Face to face with Supervisor    
Company Newsletter 
Monthly Communication Meetings 
Union Meetings 
Friends in Company 
Q33.  The things that stop me from doing my job better are: 
Q34.  The best aspects of the work I do are: 
Q35.  The worst aspects of the work I do are: 
Q36.  Other relevant comments: 
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AUTO AIR FOREPERSONS SURVEY  
 
In May 1990 the company undertook a survey of forepersons to ascertain to extent to which this group of 
managers understood the opportunities provided by the Award restructuring process and concerns they may 
have about possible changes.  The Report of this survey had provides some useful information for this case 
study and so the questions are repeated below 
 
1. What do you understand ‘Award Restructuring’ to mean? 
2. What do you feel will be the benefits of award restructuring? 
3. What problems (if any) do you see arising from award restructuring? 
4. Do you consider yourself informed about award restructuring? 
5. What are the main tasks of you current job as foreperson? 
6. Describe the major skills required by you in your present job. 
7. How do you think you job will change with award restructuring? 
8. What new skills do you feel will be needed to carry out your job? 
9. What other factors besides training do you feel are necessary to assist you in moving to this new role? 
10. What barriers or obstacles do you see that may get in the way of your moving to this new role?  How 
can these be overcome? 
11. What do you believe you will gain from moving to this new role? 
12. Do you feel involved enough in the restructuring process?  If no How do you feel you can become 
more involved? 
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